McClellan Thomas and McClellan

[Robin Lesjovitch]

It can be understood by looking at his trains. Lee's army was moving as a flying column, and intending to forage en route much as it did during the Pennsylvania campaign, but that meant that he had all his wagons pretty much with him.

The stand at Sharpsburg was essentially to save his army from being destroyed. He could have fled over the river on the 16th, but at that time he hadn't got his trains over the river which would have left him without ammunition or the ability to operate as a moving army; he spent the 16th, 17th and 18th moving his wagon trains south of the Potomac, and moved the fighting echelon of the army on the night of the 18th-19th.

As it was, Lee took one hell of a beating - worse than the usual headline numbers suggest, because there are some known casualties that went unreported - and his available strength drops pretty heavily before rising back up again. (It's actually pretty amazing how shattered both armies were after Antietam - one entire Union division was reporting only 300 men with the colours on the afternoon of the 17th, because of heavy casualties and because the formations couldn't sustain combat. The rest of the men came back in but that took time.)

Yes, Lee took quite a whoopin'.
But, Lee wanted the fight on the Maryland side. He could not make the stand without Jackson.
Lee no doubt would have crossed the Potomac on the 15th-16th save that Jackson had reduced Harpers Ferry. It was on the 15th that Lee elected to stay, and, I think for political reasons more than any other.
As the thread is about McClellan, I give him credit for proceeding as any judicious general should. He could not know why Lee was standing with his back to the Potomac. But he knew Lee knew what "Cannae" meant.

 

[Saphroneth]

Lee no doubt would have crossed the Potomac on the 15th-16th save that Jackson had reduced Harpers Ferry. It was on the 15th that Lee elected to stay, and, I think for political reasons more than any other.

Well, if it hadn't been that Jackson had taken Harpers Ferry (and earlier than expected, at that, because the commander of the HF garrison abandoned the heights) then Lee would have lost a quarter of his army to surrender in the Pleasant Valley. McLaws and Anderson's dvisions were pinned between Franklin and Harpers Ferry, and until HF fell Lee was asking if that "corps" could get some men out over the Maryland Heights.

As the thread is about McClellan, I give him credit for proceeding as any judicious general should. He could not know why Lee was standing with his back to the Potomac. But he knew Lee knew what "Cannae" meant.

McClellan actually committed a huge fraction of his force to the attack, and because they all took place on the same day (and much of the attacks in the morning at that) it's a little hard for the mind to properly compare them.

McClellan had about 43.5 infantry brigades. Of these, 33 made assaults, which is about 75%; of the remainder, 7 were engaged on the firing line but did not make an assault (mostly in the north where they covered 1st, 12th and 2nd Corps reforming) and the remainder were in reserve and didn't fire a shot. (That's basically a chunk of Sykes and most of Morell.)

Compare that to Gettysburg, where Picketts Charge involved about nine Confederate brigades out of 37; that means that just before Picketts Charge stepped off Lee had involved (no more than) 75% of his infantry battalions in some kind of assault or other over the course of two full days; McClellan did that in a single day.

If the supplies had come through it's possible that McClellan would have attacked on the 18th; we certainly know that he would have attacked on the 19th (once the supplies were through) because he did, but Lee had crossed the Potomac by then.



What this means is that Antietam didn't destroy the Confederate army.
We also know based on the fact that Lee didn't need to use "interior lines" and that he had a few brigades that hadn't been engaged by the end of it that this isn't really a coordination issue as such; McClellan just sent a strong attack at Lee which failed to destroy Lee's army. It did do a lot of damage, indeed it appears to have inflicted more casualties than it took (though some of that is prisoners captured during the forced-marches to the Sharpsburg area) which is pretty good for an assault and very rare indeed for one against Lee.

 

[67th Tigers]

Yes, Lee took quite a whoopin'.
But, Lee wanted the fight on the Maryland side. He could not make the stand without Jackson.
Lee no doubt would have crossed the Potomac on the 15th-16th save that Jackson had reduced Harpers Ferry. It was on the 15th that Lee elected to stay, and, I think for political reasons more than any other.
As the thread is about McClellan, I give him credit for proceeding as any judicious general should. He could not know why Lee was standing with his back to the Potomac. But he knew Lee knew what "Cannae" meant.

Lee's stand was one of desperation. He wanted to move north, not fight a battle at Antietam. However, McClellan cornered him, and cut him of from his intended movement. Lee was desperately trying to bring his army back together. Until Harper's Ferry fell, McLaws with fully a quarter of Lee's army was cut off and isolated in the Pleasant Valley.

Lee was relatively mobile. All his trains were across the Potomac, either having crossed with Jackson etc., or on the day of South Mountain. This meant he could cross the Potomac in 8 hours as opposed to 3 days. Indeed, on the 18th he did cross the Potomac in 8 hours, because most of the vehicles were already across. Hence Lee's back was not really against the river - he could cross in a night. The converse is not true - it would taken McClellan maybe 4 days to get his army with trains across that same river, remembering it took Lee 3 days to get his across a few weeks earlier. The Potomac ford acted as a "golden bridge". To "cannae" Lee's army, McClellan needed to get behind Lee and cut him off from the river.

 

[Robin Lesjovitch]

Well, if it hadn't been that Jackson had taken Harpers Ferry (and earlier than expected, at that, because the commander of the HF garrison abandoned the heights) then Lee would have lost a quarter of his army to surrender in the Pleasant Valley. McLaws and Anderson's dvisions were pinned between Franklin and Harpers Ferry, and until HF fell Lee was asking if that "corps" could get some men out over the Maryland Heights.


McClellan actually committed a huge fraction of his force to the attack, and because they all took place on the same day (and much of the attacks in the morning at that) it's a little hard for the mind to properly compare them.

McClellan had about 43.5 infantry brigades. Of these, 33 made assaults, which is about 75%; of the remainder, 7 were engaged on the firing line but did not make an assault (mostly in the north where they covered 1st, 12th and 2nd Corps reforming) and the remainder were in reserve and didn't fire a shot. (That's basically a chunk of Sykes and most of Morell.)

Compare that to Gettysburg, where Picketts Charge involved about nine Confederate brigades out of 37; that means that just before Picketts Charge stepped off Lee had involved (no more than) 75% of his infantry battalions in some kind of assault or other over the course of two full days; McClellan did that in a single day.

If the supplies had come through it's possible that McClellan would have attacked on the 18th; we certainly know that he would have attacked on the 19th (once the supplies were through) because he did, but Lee had crossed the Potomac by then.



What this means is that Antietam didn't destroy the Confederate army.
We also know based on the fact that Lee didn't need to use "interior lines" and that he had a few brigades that hadn't been engaged by the end of it that this isn't really a coordination issue as such; McClellan just sent a strong attack at Lee which failed to destroy Lee's army. It did do a lot of damage, indeed it appears to have inflicted more casualties than it took (though some of that is prisoners captured during the forced-marches to the Sharpsburg area) which is pretty good for an assault and very rare indeed for one against Lee.

Please... I used the term "judicious" as a positive. McClellan prepared his force and made plans before acting.
I really do not understand how Lee will come to grief if he and his army are crossing the Potomac before Franklin. Unless Jackson and Lee are both stupid, and believe they were not, it might have been Franklin in serious trouble.

 

[Robin Lesjovitch]

Lee's stand was one of desperation. He wanted to move north, not fight a battle at Antietam. However, McClellan cornered him, and cut him of from his intended movement. Lee was desperately trying to bring his army back together. Until Harper's Ferry fell, McLaws with fully a quarter of Lee's army was cut off and isolated in the Pleasant Valley.

Lee was relatively mobile. All his trains were across the Potomac, either having crossed with Jackson etc., or on the day of South Mountain. This meant he could cross the Potomac in 8 hours as opposed to 3 days. Indeed, on the 18th he did cross the Potomac in 8 hours, because most of the vehicles were already across. Hence Lee's back was not really against the river - he could cross in a night. The converse is not true - it would taken McClellan maybe 4 days to get his army with trains across that same river, remembering it took Lee 3 days to get his across a few weeks earlier. The Potomac ford acted as a "golden bridge". To "cannae" Lee's army, McClellan needed to get behind Lee and cut him off from the river.

I used Cannae as a possibility Lee might have had for McClellan. I think Mac understood that possibility. If Lee were in real strength, and ordered his center to retire slowly. McClellan might find his army with Lee on three sides and the Potomac on the other.

 

[Saphroneth]

Please... I used the term "judicious" as a positive. McClellan prepared his force and made plans before acting.

That's fine, but I thought it was also worth saying - McClellan has been accused of wasting the opportunity, and I don't think that's supported by what happened.

I really do not understand how Lee will come to grief if he and his army are crossing the Potomac before Franklin. Unless Jackson and Lee are both stupid, and believe they were not, it might have been Franklin in serious trouble.

It's because of where McLaws and Anderson were just before Harpers Ferry fell. I'll provide a map in a few minutes.

 

[Saphroneth]

It's because of where McLaws and Anderson were just before Harpers Ferry fell. I'll provide a map in a few minutes.

This map isn't ideal, but it should do for purpose.

During the Battle of South Mountain, much of the force of McLaws and Anderson was drawn away to contest Cramptons Gap. They failed to hold the gap, and the result of this was that there was the large Confederate force mostly in the valley to the east of Elk Ridge and Miles (at the time) holding out in Harpers Ferry, which meant that the force (about a quarter of Lee's army) was trapped with enemy troops controlling all the exits save for climbing over Elk Ridge itself (possible but very difficult to do and would take quite a long time).

The surrender of Harpers Ferry meant that the "cork" was taken out of the "bottle" and McLaws and Anderson could retreat across the Potomac.

 

[Saphroneth]

Something that I haven't brought up until this point, but which I think is worth considering, is the matter of comparing commanders by CEV.

This is not the only way of comparing commanders, but it's a good one IMO because what it does is that it specifically factors out the issue of numbers. Everything else is fair game, and a commander on the defensive will naturally have a higher CEV on average (for example); in another war it would be useful to try and work out if one side had better troops, but in this case since most large ACW armies were broadly similar it's worth looking at.

The way that the CEV works is that you take the force ratio of the two armies, and square it; this is the expected casualty ratio going the other way. So if army A is twice the size of army B, you square the ratio A:B (2:1) and it becomes 4:1.
This is the expected casualty ratio in favour of the larger army.

Then you look at the actual casualty ratio (let's say that A inflicts twice as many casualties on B as B inflicts on A) and compare them. The amount that an army does better or worse than the expected value is the CEV of that army.

So a 2:1 advantage in favour of A looks good, but it's actually indicative of a CEV of 0.5; B has done well to hold itself to that few casualties.


Achieving a high CEV is not by itself a way to win a war. If Army A and Army B in the above example kept clashing then Army B would be worn down to a stub quite quickly. But it is a useful way of comparing commanders by looking at how well they did relative to the forces they had available.


First, as a quick benchmark, the Union CEVs in most of the big battles in the East are listed below.

1st Bull Run 0.74
2nd Bull Run and Chantilly 0.24
Fredericksburg 0.2
Chancellorsville 0.26
Gettysburg 0.88
Mine Run 0.22
Wilderness 0.22
10th May at Spotsylvania 0.39
12th May ditto 0.35
Cold Harbor 0.09
Petersburg 0.15
Crater 0.12


In some cases not a lot of fighting took place but that which did can still be analyzed.

Note that these don't actually consider whether or not the battle was a victory, though most of these are actually (at least tactical) defeats - this is just about the fighting itself. The manoeuvering is separate, though good manoeuvres can lead to a good CEV or can win a battle in spite of a bad CEV.


Now, here's how George Thomas did as an independent commander.
1) Mill Springs.
CEV here is 4.06, which is really good. It's on the defensive and a small unit action, which can be quite "swingy", but it's definitely a good sign.
2) Peachtree Creek.
CEV here is 1.2. This is actually better than Gettysburg, and it's a much larger battle than Mill Springs - Thomas was defending against a slightly smaller army here, but he acquitted himself well.
3) Nashville.
Sadly this isn't so good. Thomas had slightly more than double Hood's force size, which means that in spite of doing a lot of damage he comes out at about 0.5 for this one. It's a pretty good offensive battle, though, and it's actually better than any offensive battle in the above sample.



Here, however, are McClellan's battles.

Seven Pines 1.6
Mechanicsville 4.5
Gaines Mill 3.55
Peach Orchard, Glendale and Malvern Hill 1.28
South Mountain 0.64
Antietam 0.7

The interesting thing about these is that we have five McClellan-Lee engagements. Lee's CEV for the latter five is just the inverse of McClellan (which is how the CEV works) and we can thus determine the characteristic CEVs for these commanders attacking and defending against one another, and the way it comes out is that - purely in terms of the ability to use the "whole force" available - McClellan slightly outfights Lee.
This is the case for no other Union commander, indeed nobody comes close to McClellan's offensive CEV against Lee and whenever someone (mostly Meade) got a chance to try it on for a defensive CEV against Lee they came out with a CEV of less than one.

 

[wbull1]

Something that I haven't brought up until this point, but which I think is worth considering, is the matter of comparing commanders by CEV.

This is not the only way of comparing commanders, but it's a good one IMO because what it does is that it specifically factors out the issue of numbers. Everything else is fair game, and a commander on the defensive will naturally have a higher CEV on average (for example); in another war it would be useful to try and work out if one side had better troops, but in this case since most large ACW armies were broadly similar it's worth looking at.

The way that the CEV works is that you take the force ratio of the two armies, and square it; this is the expected casualty ratio going the other way. So if army A is twice the size of army B, you square the ratio A:B (2:1) and it becomes 4:1.
This is the expected casualty ratio in favour of the larger army.

Then you look at the actual casualty ratio (let's say that A inflicts twice as many casualties on B as B inflicts on A) and compare them. The amount that an army does better or worse than the expected value is the CEV of that army.

So a 2:1 advantage in favour of A looks good, but it's actually indicative of a CEV of 0.5; B has done well to hold itself to that few casualties.


Achieving a high CEV is not by itself a way to win a war. If Army A and Army B in the above example kept clashing then Army B would be worn down to a stub quite quickly. But it is a useful way of comparing commanders by looking at how well they did relative to the forces they had available.


First, as a quick benchmark, the Union CEVs in most of the big battles in the East are listed below.

1st Bull Run 0.74
2nd Bull Run and Chantilly 0.24
Fredericksburg 0.2
Chancellorsville 0.26
Gettysburg 0.88
Mine Run 0.22
Wilderness 0.22
10th May at Spotsylvania 0.39
12th May ditto 0.35
Cold Harbor 0.09
Petersburg 0.15
Crater 0.12


In some cases not a lot of fighting took place but that which did can still be analyzed.

Note that these don't actually consider whether or not the battle was a victory, though most of these are actually (at least tactical) defeats - this is just about the fighting itself. The manoeuvering is separate, though good manoeuvres can lead to a good CEV or can win a battle in spite of a bad CEV.


Now, here's how George Thomas did as an independent commander.
1) Mill Springs.
CEV here is 4.06, which is really good. It's on the defensive and a small unit action, which can be quite "swingy", but it's definitely a good sign.
2) Peachtree Creek.
CEV here is 1.2. This is actually better than Gettysburg, and it's a much larger battle than Mill Springs - Thomas was defending against a slightly smaller army here, but he acquitted himself well.
3) Nashville.
Sadly this isn't so good. Thomas had slightly more than double Hood's force size, which means that in spite of doing a lot of damage he comes out at about 0.5 for this one. It's a pretty good offensive battle, though, and it's actually better than any offensive battle in the above sample.



Here, however, are McClellan's battles.

Seven Pines 1.6
Mechanicsville 4.5
Gaines Mill 3.55
Peach Orchard, Glendale and Malvern Hill 1.28
South Mountain 0.64
Antietam 0.7

The interesting thing about these is that we have five McClellan-Lee engagements. Lee's CEV for the latter five is just the inverse of McClellan (which is how the CEV works) and we can thus determine the characteristic CEVs for these commanders attacking and defending against one another, and the way it comes out is that - purely in terms of the ability to use the "whole force" available - McClellan slightly outfights Lee.
This is the case for no other Union commander, indeed nobody comes close to McClellan's offensive CEV against Lee and whenever someone (mostly Meade) got a chance to try it on for a defensive CEV against Lee they came out with a CEV of less than one.

Of course not every battle is equivalent in what the general faces. From Bruce Catton, an admirer and biographer of Grant: "Yet Gen. George Thomas It may also be worth making note that just twice in all the war was a major Confederate army driven away from a prepared position in complete rout—at Chattanooga and at Nashville. Each time the blow that finally routed it was launched by Thomas." Nashville was the only engagement in which one army virtually annihilated another. Thomas B. Buell, a student of Civil War generalship, wrote that in Tennessee, Thomas performed the war's "unsurpassed masterpiece of theater command and control....So modern in concept, so sweeping in scope, it would become a model for strategic maneuver in 20th century warfare."

So maybe his performance at Nashville was better than "pretty good."

 

[Saphroneth]

So maybe his performance at Nashville was better than "pretty good."

Though it's probably worth noting how rare it was that a commander in the Civil War had a 2:1 superiority of numbers, too. There's a saying that a Cannae needs a Varro, and the fact that Hood mauled his army by attacking heavily into entrenchments at Franklin before continuing to advance and pressure an enemy who outnumbers him more than 2:1 probably helped in Thomas' victory.

As for the idea that Hood was virtually destroyed, he got across the Duck River and reported 15,000 effective infantry left on 20th January. This isn't much, but he was down to about 18,300 effective infantry on 10 December before Nashville itself. (note that not all of an army is effectives.) The casualties proportionately as a fraction of fighting strength are not very large.

 

[Robin Lesjovitch]

That's fine, but I thought it was also worth saying - McClellan has been accused of wasting the opportunity, and I don't think that's supported by what happened.


It's because of where McLaws and Anderson were just before Harpers Ferry fell. I'll provide a map in a few minutes.

I understand that McClaws and Anderson could get in trouble if stupidity reigns. Despite orders to relieve Miles, Franklin really doesn't move.
Suppose Franklin does start south with some conviction. And Miles elects to hold out. The Confederates can oppose Franklin in the Valley, and the RR bridge and pontoons can be destroyed, as Lee would be collecting the army on the VA side....the Harpers Ferry garrison could not get to McClaws and Anderson. In fact, it would be better to destroy the bridges and move east on the B&O right-of way then cross the Potomac and join with Walker, without engaging Franklin.
Other permutations would be worse for McClellan.

 

[Robin Lesjovitch]

To get to the meat of this thread, I'll venture McClellan would have prostrated Lee at least a year before it actually happened.
And Thomas would have ended Bragg's career as a field commander months before that really happened. I will not guess what Thomas might have accomplished after Bragg, though.

 

[wbull1]

Though it's probably worth noting how rare it was that a commander in the Civil War had a 2:1 superiority of numbers, too. There's a saying that a Cannae needs a Varro, and the fact that Hood mauled his army by attacking heavily into entrenchments at Franklin before continuing to advance and pressure an enemy who outnumbers him more than 2:1 probably helped in Thomas' victory.

As for the idea that Hood was virtually destroyed, he got across the Duck River and reported 15,000 effective infantry left on 20th January. This isn't much, but he was down to about 18,300 effective infantry on 10 December before Nashville itself. (note that not all of an army is effectives.) The casualties proportionately as a fraction of fighting strength are not very large.

So was the victory no better than "pretty good?"

 

[wbull1]

Was McClellan disrespectful toward Lincon? A witness' opinion:
From: Ethan S. Rafuse, "Typhoid and Tumult: Lincoln's Response to General McClellan's Bout with Typhoid Fever during the Winter of 1861-62", Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association, Winter 2003, p. 9.



General Meigs recalled: "The next day, January 13, the same persons and General McClellan appeared at the rendezvous. The President opened the proceedings by making a statement of the cause of his calling the council. Mr. Chase and Mr. Blair, if memory is accurate, both spoke. All looked to McClellan, who sat still with his head hanging down, and mute. The situation grew awkward. The President spoke again a few words. One of the generals said something; McClellan said something which evidently did not please the speaker and again was mute."
"I moved my chair to the side of McClellan's and urged him, saying, 'The President evidently expects you to speak; can you not promise some movement towards Manassas? You are strong.' He replied, 'I cannot move on them with as great a force as they have.' 'Why, you have near 200,000 men, how many have they?' 'Not less than 175,000 according to my advices.' I said, 'Do you think so?' and 'the President expects something from you.' He replied, 'If I tell him my plans they will be in the New York Herald tomorrow morning. He can't keep a secret, he will tell them to Tad.' I said: 'That is a pity, but he is the President, – the Commander-in-Chief; he has a right to know; it is not respectful to sit mute when he so clearly requires you to speak. He is superior to all.'"

Apparently, General Meigs thought McClellan needed reminding about who was the boss.

 

[Saphroneth]

So was the victory no better than "pretty good?"

In CEV terms, which is what I was looking at, it comes out as "pretty good" because it's against a dug in army but there's a 2:1 superiority involved on the attacking side (and so the CEV is 0.5). This means it exceeds any other attacking commander in the analysis except Lee at Gettysburg, Lee during the Glendale sequence and McClellan in Maryland (and those latter two are slightly less comparable because there wasn't so much entrenchment).

Operationally, meanwhile, it drove Hood back in disorder but he salvaged the majority of his army; more than half the casualties suffered in the Franklin-Nashville operations sequence appear to be at Franklin, not Nashville.

 

[wbull1]

Another witness account of Lincoln and McClellan



Frpm: Stephen W. Sears, George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon, pp. 283-284.



An account by Presidential aide William O. Stoddard of a meeting before Antietam


"The house was reached and we were shown into a well-furnished front parlor with the usual fireplace and mantel and a center table. I went over to the right and sat down in a chair, but the President took a seat in the middle of the room. He was calm, steady, even smiling, but in half a minute there was no room there at all. Only Abraham Lincoln filling the place brimful. Our names had been carried upstairs, I knew, but long minutes went by and I felt the hot blood surging into my cheeks hotter and hotter with every moment of what seemed to me a disrespectful waiting-time. Not so the great man over there beyond the table, for he was as cool and solid as ice. Then – for the hall door was open – a kind of jingle, and slow, descending footsteps were heard from the stairs. It was the great general himself, in full uniform, followed by his chief of staff, General [Randolph] Marcy, and an army colonel. In dress uniform with their swords they were a brilliant trio. General McClellan may have thought that he had come downstairs to receive the President formally and impressively, but he was altogether mistaken. He entered that parlor to be received there, very kindly, by President Abraham Lincoln, who somehow had taken possession and was the only man in the room."
"The conference began almost immediately, for a kind of report of the situation and of plans was plainly called for. It was given, in a masterly way, by McClellan. He was a man of nerve strength, and I admired him as he went on into what was made more and more evidently a grand wrestling-match, with the control of the armies for the prize; also the future control of the political situation or field and the next Presidency of the United States. That important point was really settled before the match was over – for it was a long one. Lincoln listened well and he said little, at first. Then a word at a time, he began to open, expanding visibly as he went on, and the match became intensely interesting. Grapple after grapple, tug, strain – down you go! Perfect accord, perfect good-will, perfect good manners, not a trace of excitement on either side. There was, in fact, a mutual yielding of many points under discussion, but at the end of it they had all been surrendered by General McClellan, with the courteous assistance of his handsome and capable chief of staff, General March. Silence was my stronghold, and I held it tenaciously. A close came, and Mr. Lincoln and I were ceremoniously shown to the door. The parlor we left behind us was still, to my mind, full of Mr. Lincoln, although he had walked out. Never before had I so fully appreciated the human will in its greatest power."

This is complimentary toward McClellan and shows Lincoln's courtesy toward him.

 

[Saphroneth]

Apparently, General Meigs thought McClellan needed reminding about who was the boss.

And I imagine that if the President ordered McClellan personally to disclose his plans he may well have done so; however, Megis is not the President. And since what McClellan describes had actually already happened once (that is, McClellan told Lincoln, Lincoln told Tad and Tad leaked it) then it's a valid question of operational security.

I understand that McClaws and Anderson could get in trouble if stupidity reigns. Despite orders to relieve Miles, Franklin really doesn't move.

I think it's a timing issue - my understanding is that Franklin stopped pushing when the cannonade at HF fell silent (as Miles surrendered) though I could be wrong on that.

Suppose Franklin does start south with some conviction. And Miles elects to hold out. The Confederates can oppose Franklin in the Valley, and the RR bridge and pontoons can be destroyed, as Lee would be collecting the army on the VA side....the Harpers Ferry garrison could not get to McClaws and Anderson. In fact, it would be better to destroy the bridges and move east on the B&O right-of way then cross the Potomac and join with Walker, without engaging Franklin.

That's not really possible, you can't move that large an army quickly through that small a space. McLaws and Anderson would form a moving column that would take hours to go past down a single road.

 

[wbull1]

In CEV terms, which is what I was looking at, it comes out as "pretty good" because it's against a dug in army but there's a 2:1 superiority involved on the attacking side (and so the CEV is 0.5). This means it exceeds any other attacking commander in the analysis except Lee at Gettysburg, Lee during the Glendale sequence and McClellan in Maryland (and those latter two are slightly less comparable because there wasn't so much entrenchment).

Operationally, meanwhile, it drove Hood back in disorder but he salvaged the majority of his army; more than half the casualties suffered in the Franklin-Nashville operations sequence appear to be at Franklin, not Nashville.

So since the Confederates had better defensive positions at Franklin which the CEV does not take into account, in your opinion is Thomas's performance still just pretty good?

 

[Robin Lesjovitch]

That's not really possible, you can't move that large an army quickly through that small a space. McLaws and Anderson would form a moving column that would take hours to go past down a single road.

OK. So what is the danger of being followed?
A following force can't move any faster on a narrow way.But a persued force can sure block that way easily enough.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I said: 'That is a pity, but he is the President, – the Commander-in-Chief; he has a right to know; it is not respectful to sit mute when he so clearly requires you to speak. He is superior to all.'"

Apparently, General Meigs thought McClellan needed reminding about who was the boss.

The problem was that McClellan thought himself "superior to all."

CEV's are a meaningless metric. A great CEV followed by retreats and inaction, is not going to win any war.