McClellan Thomas and McClellan

[67th Tigers]

An account by Presidential aide William O. Stoddard of a meeting before Antietam

This is complimentary toward McClellan and shows Lincoln's courtesy toward him.

This is a copy-paste of Trice isn't it?

It is also the nonsensical ravings of a senile old man. A senile old man who kept meticulous records and doesn't mention this incident in them.

Of course, McClellan and Lincoln did have one (1) evening meeting in this period, but it is rather different to Stoddard's 1907 family history, written for his children. On 1st September McClellan was asked to come to Washington (from his HQ in Alexandria) to the Headquarters of the Army. There, in Halleck's office, he met General Halleck and Lincoln, and there was indeed a very long discussion. McClellan tried to get Halleck to assume command of the army in the field, and Lincoln was anxious that the army might mutiny, asking McClellan to write to the senior commanders and shore up their loyalty (which he did, and the communiques are in the record). Finally, they begged McClellan to take command again, and McClellan reluctantly agreed. After McClellan left, Lincoln told Halleck to write what would become GO122, placing McClellan in command of the Washington defences. They'd hand deliver it the next morning whilst McClellan was eating breakfast.

 

[Lubliner]

The problem was that McClellan thought himself "superior to all."

CEV's are a meaningless metric. A great CEV followed by retreats and inaction, is not going to win any war.

I was thinking the exact same thing. Advanced Class of Logic, Probabilities and Statistics.
Taking away (subtraction) all manner of human endeavor, it shows a resultant, but not the cause of it.
Richmond is attacked, the attack beaten back etc., does not deal with the human spirit and will involved.
They are numbers as cyphers in a system to understand the reasoning of advancement in a scientific approach.
Fatigue, hardship, stress, etc. The numbers do not qualify as a given specific.

Looking through the official correspondence, dealing with the human quality possessed by men of great acclaim, which is inclusive, McClellan was the rebel to the cause. Privately spoken words can do great damage, and more cabinet member leaked info, by far to other sources than Lincoln. We get to witness solemn moments of extreme grief and trial at the human cost of ultimate sacrifice, and numbers will never give an answer to what the experience is about. Sure is good as a litmus test of some sort to properly set it side by side, but an army of confederates scattered like chaff in the wind can qualify as an aggregate number for determining strength....Is there a number for NO?
Lubliner.

 

[Saphroneth]

OK. So what is the danger of being followed?
A following force can't move any faster on a narrow way.But a persued force can sure block that way easily enough.

It's because most of the force can't get into the narrow route in time. A fighting withdrawal is one of the hardest of military manoeuvres.

CEV's are a meaningless metric. A great CEV followed by retreats and inaction, is not going to win any war.

CEVs are a part of what makes a commander, not the whole. They're not meaningless, though they don't encapsulate the whole of a commander's performance.

Can you give an example of where McClellan made a retreat and/or was inactive after one of the battles where he had a good CEV, and this was in your view unjustified? Concurrently, can you provide an example of what he should have done instead?

Spoiler

For those who are watching, I already know he won't provide an example of what McClellan should have done instead... because if he did then we could analyze it.

 

[Saphroneth]

Fatigue, hardship, stress, etc. The numbers do not qualify as a given specific.

No, they don't, at least not explicitly. But the positive value of CEV is that, for example, it can let us put two battles side by side - or two careers. And, most importantly, it explicitly includes troop strength, which I think almost anyone would agree is a critical metric for determining how good a commander is given the result of a battle.
Clausewitz himself wrote about how winning when you have a 2:1 superiority (in broadly similar troops) is very easy indeed and winning when you have a 2:1 inferiority is a good performance and/or shows that your opponent was rather poor; naturally this is modified by defensive positions and so on.

CEVs are useful because they allow us to get a baseline for comparison - that's all.

Going beyond that is where one starts to bring in nuance. For example, in analyzing Antietam, it's possible to say that:
CEV-wise, it was the most successful attack launched on the Army of Northern Virginia.
This could be attributed to the way that the AoNV had not fully dug in, or it could be attributed to the hard marching fatiguing the Confederate troops, or it could be attributed to any one of a number of other things. But what the CEV illustrates is that one cannot sensibly say that Antietam was really a wasted opportunity - the Union did more damage to the AoNV relative to the amount it sustained than in any other battle in the war save perhaps for Gettysburg, and what's more the fighting at Antietam was the most compressed single day of violence in the war. So the Union army attacked Lee, and did him a lot of damage; if this isn't sufficient then nor is almost any battle in the Overland just for starters.


Similarly, one can look at Fredericksburg and say what we already knew - it was a very bloody battle and the Union took a lot of casualties. They were unable to effectively leverage their newly larger army.
As to why the CEV was so poor? The fact the Confederates were dug in is some of it, but beyond that you have to look at, say, the idea that it was because the assaults on Marye's Heights were made by brigade (and thus allowed all the Confederate defenders to engage each individual attacking wave)

The CEV is the beginning of analysis, not the end, but it does no good to dismiss it entirely.

Sure is good as a litmus test of some sort to properly set it side by side, but an army of confederates scattered like chaff in the wind can qualify as an aggregate number for determining strength....Is there a number for NO?

I'm not sure what you mean by "NO".
As for how the CEV calculation incorporates a routed army, it can be calculated including the troops who don't make it to safety as casualties for the victorious side. For example Appomattox can be calculated as a CEV of about 1.25 (eyeballed) if you do it that way, which is Grant's best in the East by far and is good but not "amazing" (since Grant outnumbered Lee about 2:1 and so forcing the surrender of the enemy army at a cost of 10% of your own force is "better than expected but not stupendous"; if Grant had compelled the enemy to surrender by outmanoeuvering them without fighting, the CEV would be sky-high.)

It's also possible, though a little trickier, to look at the CEVs for individual engagements. It would be theoretically possible to compare the strength (on the field) of each Union corps at Antietam with the similar strength of the units that engaged them, and thus calculate which of the corps assaults (1st, 12th, 2nd, 9th) was handled best; the main thing that would make this fiddly is if there were Confederate brigades involved in multiple assaults.

 

[Lubliner]

No, they don't, at least not explicitly. But the positive value of CEV is that, for example, it can let us put two battles side by side - or two careers. And, most importantly, it explicitly includes troop strength, which I think almost anyone would agree is a critical metric for determining how good a commander is given the result of a battle.
Clausewitz himself wrote about how winning when you have a 2:1 superiority (in broadly similar troops) is very easy indeed and winning when you have a 2:1 inferiority is a good performance and/or shows that your opponent was rather poor; naturally this is modified by defensive positions and so on.

CEVs are useful because they allow us to get a baseline for comparison - that's all.

Going beyond that is where one starts to bring in nuance. For example, in analyzing Antietam, it's possible to say that:
CEV-wise, it was the most successful attack launched on the Army of Northern Virginia.
This could be attributed to the way that the AoNV had not fully dug in, or it could be attributed to the hard marching fatiguing the Confederate troops, or it could be attributed to any one of a number of other things. But what the CEV illustrates is that one cannot sensibly say that Antietam was really a wasted opportunity - the Union did more damage to the AoNV relative to the amount it sustained than in any other battle in the war save perhaps for Gettysburg, and what's more the fighting at Antietam was the most compressed single day of violence in the war. So the Union army attacked Lee, and did him a lot of damage; if this isn't sufficient then nor is almost any battle in the Overland just for starters.


Similarly, one can look at Fredericksburg and say what we already knew - it was a very bloody battle and the Union took a lot of casualties. They were unable to effectively leverage their newly larger army.
As to why the CEV was so poor? The fact the Confederates were dug in is some of it, but beyond that you have to look at, say, the idea that it was because the assaults on Marye's Heights were made by brigade (and thus allowed all the Confederate defenders to engage each individual attacking wave)

The CEV is the beginning of analysis, not the end, but it does no good to dismiss it entirely.



I'm not sure what you mean by "NO".
As for how the CEV calculation incorporates a routed army, it can be calculated including the troops who don't make it to safety as casualties for the victorious side. For example Appomattox can be calculated as a CEV of about 1.25 (eyeballed) if you do it that way, which is Grant's best in the East by far and is good but not "amazing" (since Grant outnumbered Lee about 2:1 and so forcing the surrender of the enemy army at a cost of 10% of your own force is "better than expected but not stupendous"; if Grant had compelled the enemy to surrender by outmanoeuvering them without fighting, the CEV would be sky-high.)

It's also possible, though a little trickier, to look at the CEVs for individual engagements. It would be theoretically possible to compare the strength (on the field) of each Union corps at Antietam with the similar strength of the units that engaged them, and thus calculate which of the corps assaults (1st, 12th, 2nd, 9th) was handled best; the main thing that would make this fiddly is if there were Confederate brigades involved in multiple assaults.

I realize you explained somewhat what CEV is based upon, and I agree that on principles of 'across the board' comparison they are great for matching opposing forces, but I contend this is a surer thing for computerized war games etc., but in actuality, all considerations a General such as Lee vs. McClellan have to look into, are the levels of fatigue, stress, hardship, hunger, and not only for the purpose of movement into battle, but the ability to judge when and if and how the army should respond after. These CEV figures are static pronouncements of living troops in stationary position.
As the 'chaff in the wind' idea, you had said on Thomas as being a low CEV for that battle, when in all respects the confederates were not muster able for some length of time afterward. As is most scientific projects, results do not always agree with what is anticipated. As well, it would be very difficult to provide a perfect constant for basing the number upon. I hold statistics in a very skeptical light, because it is exactly what is used for making future projections. We really do need to return the topic back to its intended focus. Agree?
Lubliner.

 

[67th Tigers]

CEV's are a meaningless metric. A great CEV followed by retreats and inaction, is not going to win any war.

If I may quote Mark Grimsley:

"This is not analysis but the abdication of analysis, based on the premise that McClellan was incapable of achieving victory no matter how many resources he had at his disposal."

 

[Saphroneth]

As the 'chaff in the wind' idea, you had said on Thomas as being a low CEV for that battle, when in all respects the confederates were not muster able for some length of time afterward. As is most scientific projects, results do not always agree with what is anticipated. As well, it would be very difficult to provide a perfect constant for basing the number upon. I hold statistics in a very skeptical light, because it is exactly what is used for making future projections. We really do need to return the topic back to its intended focus. Agree?

Thomas' CEV for that battle is actually quite good, not low at all. It's just not "amazing".

The thing is that it's a little difficult to use by itself as a basis for comparison. The argument "Thomas is good because he hit a Confederate force hard enough to prevent them from taking the field for a long time afterwards" has some merit, but it needs to be considered in context (to whit, he had a 2:1 numerical superiority) - you can't say by itself that it makes him better unless you can look at an example of another commander in a similar situation. (Certainly it's possible to say Thomas was a lot better than Hooker...)

 

[Saphroneth]

Something else that I think it's useful to note is the question of what the commander at the time knew, and what they could know.

For example, McClellan not ordering an assault by his remaining coherent forces on the evening of the 17th (6th corps, plus the brigades of 5th that hadn't assaulted) would be iffy given what we know. But if we for a moment assume that McClellan had all possible information about what his troops had actually fought but not much beyond that, then it's possible to say that there would be a greater risk involved.

You see, McClellan's estimates of the total force Lee could have to hand have error bars on them, because he captured an order but that order didn't give the full Confederate strength or order of battle. It specifies several divisions but Jackson and Longstreet are specified by "command".
And of the brigades actually at Antietam, three (Armistead, Pender and Field) didn't fire a shot - but even a McClellan who positively identified every individual brigade that so much as shot at his troops wouldn't have been able to know that that was it, because of Smith's division at Richmond (the brigades of Wise, Daniel, Martin and French).


This is why McClellan's offensive actions at Antietam involve committing troops the way he does. In the morning he may intend for a single massive offensive move in the north, but he certainly commits three corps to attack on his right flank; in the centre and on the left he commits smaller forces because that's all that will fit, but he also keeps less back. When Franklin comes in he directs them to shore up the right because things aren't going well, and as of the end of the day there's 6th Corps forming a shield to guard the shattered 1st, 2nd and 12th corps to let them rally. (With how badly shattered the 1st, 2nd and 12th corps are they're not really able to offer effective resistance; an advance by the relatively fresh brigades of the Confederate line who hadn't faced a direct assault would be bad enough, but if Lee has several completely fresh reserve brigades behind the lines then McClellan would be vulnerable to a rout of his right wing unless there's a solid line to protect the shattered units on his right.)

You might note that he doesn't do the same on his left at first, and that's because Burnside's Bridge is a defile. Burnside however pleads weakness, and McClellan reinforces him to hold the debouche on the 18th.

By the 19th most of McClellan's units have recovered enough to at least conform to and support an attack, and the artillery ammunition has come in so he's got his guns supplied as well. McClellan now no longer has a reason to fear a total repulse even if GW Smith is around, and so he advances, but Lee's retreated behind the Potomac and the pursuit gets repulsed at Shepherdstown.

 

[Saphroneth]

So for a bit of a change I thought I'd look at the situation post Antietam.

Antietam was 17th September. Action after that could have taken place in late September, in October, or in early November.

18th September: armies still in position after Antietam, McClellan seeking artillery ammunition and waiting for his stragglers to come back in. Lee retreats south after dark, forms a defensive position around Boteler's Ford and begins crossing.
19th September: Lee finishes his retreat across the Potomac mid-morning. McClellan follows to the water's edge and a recce goes across after some fighting.
20th September: Battle of Shepherdstown, where the pursuit is stop-punched and it is clear that the Confederates are able to contest the water's edge at Boteler's Ford. This also sees 6th Corps fighting at Williamsport against Stuart's cavalry.

At this point the fords suitable for moving a large army are all covered by the enemy. McClellan shifts his weight to cross into the Shenandoah at Harpers' Ferry, builds a bridge (wrecked by a storm before it can be used) and then requisitions the materials for another bridge, which is denied on the grounds of cost. IIRC he's also told not to advance on Winchester at this point.

That's pretty much the end of the campaign; pursuit isn't feasible at this point.


Early-Mid October:
This is when Lincoln started asking McClellan to get moving again, but the problem is that the army wasn't properly being supplied. A back and forth happened where McClellan said he wasn't being supplied and the QMG said he was, and eventually this was investigated and it was discovered that all the supplies in question were being issued to the Washington garrison instead.

Late October-Early November

This is the Loudoun Valley campaign, and McClellan does indeed get moving again once he's supplied. The first supplies arrive on 14 October and the crossing of the Potomac begins on 26th October, which is twelve days (probably less counting movement to the fords) to set the army up for campaign; one may consider this slow, and it is longer than McClellan took to organize his force before setting out on his moves of the Maryland Campaign, but it's actually pretty short compared to the prep time before other Union offensives.

(ED: also note that when McClellan set off for Loudoun he did so as a flying column, and he carried enough supplies to sustain him until he reached Warrenton - which was almost two weeks away. So in those twelve days he drew in enough excess supplies over consumption to fit him out for another twelve days; this means getting him to launch on campaign six days earlier would have meant increasing the supply rate by half at least.)

 

[67th Tigers]

You might note that he doesn't do the same on his left at first, and that's because Burnside's Bridge is a defile. Burnside however pleads weakness, and McClellan reinforces him to hold the debouche on the 18th.

As an aside, I've been looking up why it took Burnside so long to get over the creek. I intend to write it up, but long story short - Burnside messed up.

At dawn on the 17th only one division (Rodman's) was near the creek. The rest were all in camp ca. a mile to the east. During the early morning Rodman was sent round to the south to "Farm Ford", leaving one regiment (11th Connecticut) to guard the battery he left overlooking the bridge (to prevent to rebels attacking Burnside). On receiving McClellan's ca. 0800 attack order, Burnside sent out three orders:

1. To Kingsbury of the 11th Connecticut - attack the bridge immediately,
2. To George Crook - move your brigade to the bridge and attack immediately,
3. To General Sturgis - break camp and bring your division to the bridge.

Kingsbury obeyed and charged the bridge at 0900. His regiment was repulsed with heavy casualties. George Crook got lost en route, and never found the bridge. Sturgis' division started marching to the bridge at 0900, and the lead brigade (Nagle's) ployed into line facing it before 1000. Two regiments of the brigade (2nd Maryland and 6th New Hampshire) each made a regimental charge at ca. 1000 and 1030 respectively. All three charges were mainly smashed by two rebel batteries (8 guns) that were 400 yds beyond the bridge, sweeping it. The 48th Pennsylvania was sent up onto the height, which they reached at 1100. A section of Simmond's battery under Lt Glassie accompanied the 48th Pa, and opened fire. Capt Durell followed with his battery and Capt Clark moved his regular battery over to engaged.

By 1130 the 12 Federal guns engaging the rebel batteries had won decisive fire superiority, and all the rebel batteries had withdrawn. Toombs had concluded the position was untenable, and by 1130 had withdrawn his infantry too, leaving only a few pickets. The bridge was now completely undefended, but getting anyone to charge it was problematic. Ferrero's brigade was the next designated attacker, and Ferrero disputed the order. After Sturgis stated it was peremptory, Col Hartranft (51st Pa) and Col Potter (51st NY) entered a state of open mutiny, refusing Ferrero's order to charge. Ferrero's own 35th Massachusetts had to be kept away, as they'd put a volley into the backs of the 51st Pa earlier, and that regiment was looking at repaying the favour. Finally, Col Clark (21st Mass) refused to acknowledge Ferrero's seniority over him, and hence did not accept Ferrero was allowed to give him an order. Ferrero eventually had to bypass the CO's and personally take command of the two 51sts, appealing directly to the men to follow him.

When the two 51sts charged the pickets fired one volley (which halted both regiments) and bugged out. It took some time for the colonels to actually get some men to charge over the bridge, and they found only a couple of sharpshooters.

The general lesson is that Burnside should have moved artillery to fire on the defenders of the bridge before attacking. However, at 0800-ish he received a peremptory order to attack, before three of his divisions had left camp. He threw in some uncoordinated charges with no fire support. What was decisive was the movement of artillery to engage the defenders, which was mostly Sturgis' doing. Sadly, Burnside did have a division close at hand to assault at dawn. He could have advanced Rodman's artillery about 500 yds WNW to the heights over the bridge, driven off the defenders, and then passed Rodman over the bridge in the course of about 1-2 hrs. However, he sent Rodman on an errand to find a ford instead...

 

[Saphroneth]

He could have advanced Rodman's artillery about 500 yds WNW to the heights over the bridge, driven off the defenders, and then passed Rodman over the bridge in the course of about 1-2 hrs. However, he sent Rodman on an errand to find a ford instead...

And if the bridge is taken and troops over it by 10AM, then it's hours until AP Hill can get there and it's at least possible that Lee's line cracks under the strain.

That said, I've wondered before what would have happened if Couch hadn't been ordered up and if he'd instead been told to cross at Harpers Ferry if AP Hill vacated the area. This seems (albeit with hindsight) to be a good way to trap the AoNV on the northern side of the Potomac?

 

[DanSBHawk]

Can you give an example of where McClellan made a retreat and/or was inactive after one of the battles where he had a good CEV, and this was in your view unjustified? Concurrently, can you provide an example of what he should have done instead?

Spoiler

For those who are watching, I already know he won't provide an example of what McClellan should have done instead... because if he did then we could analyze it.

Saphroneth, I offer my opinions on history but I have no obligation to engage in your fantasy what-if situations. You and 67 begin all your analysis assuming that McClellan is blameless and others are to blame for his failures. You play with the numbers and apply inconsistent standards (Overland 62 vs. Urbanna) in order to elevate McClellan. No one here is obligated to let the discussion be defined by you and 67.

 

[Saphroneth]

Saphroneth, I offer my opinions on history but I have no obligation to engage in your fantasy what-if situations. You and 67 begin all your analysis assuming that McClellan is blameless and others are to blame for his failures. You play with the numbers and apply inconsistent standards (Overland 62 vs. Urbanna) in order to elevate McClellan. No one here is obligated to let the discussion be defined by you and 67.

I take no pleasure in having predicted your lack of a response.



What you said was:

CEV's are a meaningless metric. A great CEV followed by retreats and inaction, is not going to win any war.

But if you can't present an example of this appertaining to McClellan I can only assume that you aren't talking about McClellan.


I'd love there to be a discussion on the merits of the case which looks at the specific details on what actually happened in one of the cases where you feel McClellan missed an opportunity, and indeed I've mentioned an example of a place where with hindsight different orders from McClellan could have resulted in a better outcome at Antietam.
I've also made the point that the breakdown in a relationship is something that can be blamed on both sides; this applies to McClellan as well as Lincoln, and the best way I can sum up McClellan's personal conduct with the President is that he appears not to have been openly insulting (though I'm aware that the dislike probably came across anyway, despite McClellan tending to stick to the minimum required of a professional officer).
But if you prefer to abdicate that for general statements that you're unwilling to defend in any specific case then I can't really see how it's justified to assert that I'm the only one starting from an assumption.



So as to return this thread to topic, I think an obvious difference between the two men is how they reacted when offered high command. McClellan obviously was very much interested in it, while Thomas appears not to have been.
It's possible to interpret McClellan as arrogant and Thomas as humble, but it's also possible to interpret McClellan as confident and Thomas as lacking confidence. The truth is probably somewhere in the middle.

 

[67th Tigers]

Saphroneth, I offer my opinions on history but I have no obligation to engage in your fantasy what-if situations. You and 67 begin all your analysis assuming that McClellan is blameless and others are to blame for his failures. You play with the numbers and apply inconsistent standards (Overland 62 vs. Urbanna) in order to elevate McClellan. No one here is obligated to let the discussion be defined by you and 67.

"This is not analysis but the abdication of analysis, based on the premise that McClellan was incapable of achieving victory no matter how many resources he had at his disposal."

 

[Rebforever]

"This is not analysis but the abdication of analysis, based on the premise that McClellan was incapable of achieving victory no matter how many resources he had at his disposal."

He never won a battle but he did win his men for that reason.

 

[Saint Jude]

a man's reputation does not necessarily reflect his worth.

Amen to that! Cases in point: "Fighting Joe" Hooker at Chancellorsville or "Hancock the Superb" on the Overland Campaign.

 

[Rebforever]

Amen to that! Cases in point: "Fighting Joe" Hooker at Chancellorsville or "Hancock the Superb" on the Overland Campaign.

Not talking about 'fighting Joe" or 'Hancock the Superb'. Talking about McClellan.

 

[DanSBHawk]

"This is not analysis but the abdication of analysis, based on the premise that McClellan was incapable of achieving victory no matter how many resources he had at his disposal."

Interesting article. But it doesn't exonerate McClellans failures.

 

[Rebforever]

Interesting article. But it doesn't exonerate McClellans failures.

I get tired of reading the same old garp every time McClellan's name is mentioned.

 

[CanadianCanuck]

Interesting article. But it doesn't exonerate McClellans failures.

It's interesting insofar as we get the tired old nugget "if McClellan had everything he wanted he would have won" which is just silly. For instance the quoted section says this:

"This alternative outcome is about as obvious as anything can be. Yet to a large extent, historians have praised Lincoln for his diversion of McDowell from the decisive theater of operations and overlooked or minimized the impact of his absence from the Army of the Potomac in June.[31] Their assessment is based on sheer disdain for McClellan. It is well expressed in a recent treatment of the Peninsula Campaign: "The notion that McDowell's Corps was essential to victory on the peninsula is nonsense. McClellan always greatly overestimated his opponents, and McDowell would not have made a difference. . . . There is absolutely no reason to think that if [McClellan] had been . . . given everything he wanted in the Peninsula Campaign it would have made any difference."[32] This is not analysis but the abdication of analysis, based on the premise that McClellan was incapable of achieving victory no matter how many resources he had at his disposal. "

For one thing is assumes a) Lincoln should just have ignored the problem/opportunity Jackson in the Valley presented and b) that with everything given only then would McClellan win a victory over the secesh.

Any reason for why we should believe this is rarely offered. The idea that Lee might have found another way to attack McClellan is dismissed, the possibility of a long protracted siege sapping the efficiency of the Army of the Potomac is not considered (the siege of Richmond/Petersburg in 1864 took 9 months with a smaller Confederate army and Lee was hardly inactive) and no indication is given just how McClellan will totally baffle Lee and prevent any type of counterattack.

I mean, the rest of the article attempts to downplay the whole historical narrative as falling into various "archetypes" when the reality is that McClellan was rarely in command during the Seven Days and so the whole series of Lee's failure to bring off a decisive attack and the armies survival falls less on the shoulders of the general commanders, but rather on their subordinates.

In a real twist, the article concludes:

"In McClellan we see a man of much promise and many gifts but also the fatal belief that he already possessed every faculty to achieve success. If the lesson of Lincoln is that we must grow or die, the lesson of McClellan is the bitter fate that awaits us if we do not continue to mature."

The author recognizes McClellan's flaws, while his partisans really don't.