If not McClellan, then who?

[SgtTB]

Ask Lee one more time

 

[Cavalier]

This will raise some eyebrows I imagine. My heart wanted to suggest "Bull Head" Sumner. However my brain, what there is of it, said he was just not up to the big job. I still admire the h--- out of the old cuss though.

John

 

[JerryD]

I think the selection of Rosecrans makes the most sense. Yes it would have required that Washington dig a bit deeper and get by the McClellan presentation of himself.

Rosecrans was at least as good as McClellan with logistics and organization and maybe better as a planner. He was also not loathe to initiate a battle although he did have some difficulties in fighting one.

Overall he was at least as good a choice as McClellan and probably a bit better.

I agree, in retrospect. But given what was known in July 1861, I don't think he was on the radar.

 

[JerryD]

I think the biggest mistake with McClellan in 1861 was he needed to be General in Chief OR army commander; never both.

I don't think Fremont was ever an option. I think his political connections got him command in Missouri more than his military experience. His antebellum behavior exposed him as a loose cannon.

I think McDowell was superseded primarily for PR and morale reasons, but his recent biography exposes him as probably ill-suited for army command.

I suggest McClellan as General-in-Chief, Joseph Mansfield as army commander, and McDowell as Mansfield's chief-of-staff.

I wholeheartedly agree that giving Mac both jobs was a mistake. Personally, I would have kept Scott in place for the short term and to the extent Mac could not work within the chain of command he needed a good smackdown and told to get in line or get out. Mac's treatment of Scott was a disgrace and sadly Lincoln and others were treating Mac at this time like the savior of the Union and were permitting him to do an end run around Scott. No wonder Mac's ego took flight.

That being said, Scott was going to need to go at some point. His plan to win the war was simply not going to work. The Anaconda Plan had as its central tenet that the south was not to be conquered but that simply cutting it off and taking the Mississippi would convince them to come back. In effect, the Anaconda Plan envisioned a relatively bloodless war. That was not going to happen. But in July and into the early part of 1862 this was still not widely understood. I would have kept Scott in place until someone has risen and earned the spot. To my way of thinking, McClellan had not done enough to earn the spot by time time he had hounded Scott of office and was handed the job.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

I would have kept Scott in place until someone has risen and earned the spot.

Scott was 75 and not in poor physical condition. His retirement was overdue.

A compromise would be Scott retires and John Wool, next on the seniority list, gets the position, for now. He was actually a couple years older than Scott but in much better health. It's easy to push him into retirement once a better option comes along.

 

[neyankee61]

Kearny would have been a poor choice. Super aggressive with very little high command experience. Good division commander on the Peninsula but going higher? Not so sure. If he isn't killed at Chantilly he poses a different question. Does he block Hooker from command of the AoP? He outranked him.

 

[Belfoured]

I think the biggest mistake with McClellan in 1861 was he needed to be General in Chief OR army commander; never both.

I don't think Fremont was ever an option. I think his political connections got him command in Missouri more than his military experience. His antebellum behavior exposed him as a loose cannon.

I think McDowell was superseded primarily for PR and morale reasons, but his recent biography exposes him as probably ill-suited for army command.

I suggest McClellan as General-in-Chief, Joseph Mansfield as army commander, and McDowell as Mansfield's chief-of-staff.

You mean the "political connections" of Fremont's 1856 campaign manager and her family?

IIRC Mansfield - despite his age - was in the running for the position in 1861. McDowell is hard to assess. I'm not sure anybody could have led that motley collection to victory in July 1861, and in his only other test he was operating in the cluster that became Second Bull Run. Pretty much anybody was a "roll of the dice" in 1861 - certainly once Lee removed himself from the running.

 

[Belfoured]

I think the selection of Rosecrans makes the most sense. Yes it would have required that Washington dig a bit deeper and get by the McClellan presentation of himself.

Rosecrans was at least as good as McClellan with logistics and organization and maybe better as a planner. He was also not loathe to initiate a battle although he did have some difficulties in fighting one.

Overall he was at least as good a choice as McClellan and probably a bit better.

It's easy to forget that McClellan had achieved prominence from being the "young guy" on the Delafield Commission. He also had good connections with two important governors in 1861 (Dennison of Ohio and Curtin of Pennsylvania) and was weighing in on Union policy that Spring/early Summer. The success in WV (notwithstanding Rosecrans' role) may have tipped the balance. As things stood in 1861 it was - as I stated - a "weak draft year" in sports terms.

 

[OpnCoronet]

In another thread I expressed my opinion that Mac got promoted too quickly and he was way too immature for the position he was given in July 1861. But that raises the question, if not McClellan, then who should have been given command of the US forces in the east? Would love to hear who else might have been an option, and how we think they might have done. And please, keep it realistic. There was no chance Lincoln was going to pluck Grant or even Sherman out of no where at this point. Its an interesting exercise.

My idea of the possible contenders, but please add to this list if you wish:

1. Keep McDowell. To be honest, I always thought McDowell got the hook a little too quick. He had a good plan at FBR and just succumbed to fresh reinforcements and the greenness of his troops. Given the disaster that occurred its not hard to see why Lincoln looked elsewhere, but McDowell might have been the best choice.

2. Samuel Heintzelman. Led a division in FBR and performed capably until relieved for being too old.

3. Erasmus Keyes. Another experienced Mexican War veteran who fought at FBR.

4. David Hunter. Another division commander at FBR. Lincoln knew him and would later appoint him to replace Fremont.

4. John C. Fremont. Missed FBR but was given overall commend of the Western Department after FBR, so Lincoln clearly thought highly of him. Connected politically.

5. Philip Kearney. Probably a reach, but given his resume he would not have been a bad choice.

6. William Rosecrans. If Lincoln really wanted who won the battles in West Virginia, he should have reached down and selected Rosecrans. In retrospect, he likely would have been the best choice at this time, but again, probably a reach.

7. Daniel Tyler and Robert Patterson. I list them just to eliminate them. Too old and quickly sidelined or dismissed.

Anyone think of anyone else? Doing this exercise, you can kind of see how McClellan was given the opportunity. Although I still say giving him overall command of all US forces was probably a great disservice to him. Let him actually do something first before taking that step.

Phil Kearney or Rosecrans seem to me to be the most likely.

Kearney seems to have been a true professional and Rosecrans had proven to have had some ability Plus their ages more suitable for the wart, IMO.

I believe Burnside had read ability as a commander of small armies, but seems to have been suited for independent commands. He seems to have not responded well to close supervision.

I can agree with you about McClellan, up to a point. Although I believe he had many, if not most, of the needed qualities to have been a very successful army commander. But, although IMO, it was not his military talent or abilities I doubt as much as the very real psychological baggage that tended to nullify any real talent and abilities he may have possessed.

 

[Saphroneth]

I think the obvious alternatives to McClellan are Fremont (the other MG(R) promoted in May by Lincoln) and Halleck (which is the man Scott wanted).

Fremont has corruption problems and would also go too far too soon on emancipation for Lincoln. He might have done okay as a commander but I don't really have a sense of his preferred strategic approach, so I can't comment on his strategic preference.

Halleck's strategic preference, OTOH, is pretty clear. His preference under most circumstances is to concentrate the largest possible army at the friendly centre of gravity and move it directly towards the enemy centre of gravity. Whether this means a direct attack on the strong fortifications at Centreville in the autumn of 1861, I don't know, but I think that the Halleck approach basically stalls out at the Rappahannock (if it gets there) unless he's provided with so many men that he can eat the casualties of a Fredericksburg without blinking.

 

[67th Tigers]

The law as it stood in 1861 was that the senior substantive general of the regular army was the General-in-Chief. This gave Lincoln two choices:

1. Major-General McClellan to be General-in-Chief, or
2. Brigadier-General (Brevet Major-General) Wool to be promoted to substantive MG, becoming senior and thus General-in-Chief.

In April 1862 the law was changed to give the President free choice within a grade of whom was in command regardless of seniority. This law enabled Halleck to be appointed GinC, and when Grant was made Lieutenant-General, Halleck had to write a letter pointing out that the law as it stood meant Grant must be General-in-Chief. Hence there was a brief period where LG Grant was technically under Commanding General Halleck, but the law meant Halleck could not issue Grant an order, making his position untenable.

After April 1862, Lincoln has the choice of:

1. MG McClellan
2. MG Fremont
3. MG Halleck
4. Bvt MG Wool
5. Lincoln can nominate another MG, but it must pass Congress.

 

[67th Tigers]

The OP proffers, in their July 1861 ranks:

1. Acting BG McDowell (confirmed 3rd August)
2. Acting Col. Heintzelman ("")
3. Acting Col Keyes (confirmed 5th August)
4. Acting Col. Hunter ("")
5. Acting MG Fremont (confirmed 3rd August)
6. Mr. Philip Kearny, a private citizen
7. Acting BG Rosecrans (confirmed 3rd August)
8. Daniel Tyler, BG of Connecticut Militia
9. Robert Patterson, MG of the Pennsylvania Militia

These aren't really the candidates. There were five major-generals in U.S. service (not Federalised militia):

1. MG McClellan
2. MG Fremont
3. MG(V) Dix
4. MG(V) Banks
5. MG(V) Butler

These are really the contenders.

 

[Saphroneth]

Kearney seems to have been a true professional

I'm kind of surprised by this description, because even by the account of a pro-Kearny book he was easily bored and had trouble focusing on administration. He didn't go to West Point, and when he did get picked as one of three cavalry officers to go through the French cavalry school he by all accounts got bored within days and left, squandering the opportunity. Consequently he never had any real degree of professional officer training.

Obviously I don't know what you mean by "a true professional", but...

 

[Cavalier]

@Saphroneth I am under the impression that Kearny quit the French cavalry school because he wanted to get an up close and personal view of the French war in Algeria. It seems to me to be a reasonable thing to do for an American officer anxious to learn the trade of soldiering. I'm not sure anyone could have predicted with any certainty that a civil war was coming, or how intense the fighting was liable to be and other then that there doesn't seem to have been much likelihood of any other chance for an American officer to get actual battlefield experience, at least that I am aware of.

Although he wouldn't have been my first choice for Army commander I admit to a bias as I'm a Kearny fan, but I would not just write him off for bigger things had he survived longer.

John

 

[Saphroneth]

@Saphroneth I am under the impression that Kearny quit the French cavalry school because he wanted to get an up close and personal view of the French war in Algeria. It seems to me to be a reasonable thing to do for an American officer anxious to learn the trade of soldiering.

He'd been sent to get a professional education in cavalry soldiering for the benefit of the whole US Army (that is, three men were sent to find out how the French army did cavalry training and report back on it). Since Kearny hadn't had any other officer training, this was his big chance to get professional training.

He quits within days because he wants to go off and enjoy himself.

Yes, I understand that the peacetime army can be dull, but this is a man who is assigned a task to benefit the whole US and simply doesn't do it. I do not understand how he comes across here as professional.


More generally, I think Kearny's performance indicates that he's a personally very brave man, but he seems to have real trouble focusing on complex tasks. By that I mean that there is a trend in his actions and statements, and what he tends to do in combat situations; it would also be remiss not to note in the context of professionalism that Kearny seems in many cases to have considered promotions his just due. During March 1862, five corps commanders are created (McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, Keyes and Banks) and with those divisions vacated brigade commanders are offered their slots. Kearny, as a quite senior brigade commander, is offered a division (Sumner's).
He refuses because he wants to keep his old brigade (which is part of Franklin's division), which is a fair enough reason to refuse, and so the division goes to Richardson instead. This Kearny considers a "dirty trick" and "low petty machinations" - he is offered a division, refuses it, and complains about the result!

Obviously people in the US army could be precious about promotions. That happens. But it doesn't really highlight Kearny as unusually professional.

 

[Cavalier]

@Saphroneth I think it was a good thing that somebody wanted to get some actual battle experience, even if he thought he was going to enjoy it. I believe be contributed to cavalry Manuel and served some time at the cavalry school at Carlisle Pa. before being assigned to Scott's staff. Seems to me he attempted to improve his soldiering skills and desired a more professional American Army.

Unlike the European armies chances at first hand battle experience are probably pretty slim for aspiring U.S. Army officers in the 1830s.

That he had personality flaws I wouldn't doubt. But in that he wasn't alone. I'm sure he had less then I do so I can't throw stones being that I'm living in a glass house.

John

 

[67th Tigers]

Remember, Kearny was not a trained officer. He bought a direct Commission in his uncles regiment in 1837 and served as a ADC for a couple of years. He's then sent to Paris to learn to be a cavalry officer. He flunks out of the first year of the cavalry course at Saumur within six-weeks. He basically didn't care for it. He then spends the next eight months carousing around Paris. He's independently extremely wealthy and became a staple of the Paris social scene.

He decided he wanted to see Valee's expedition, and purchased passage to Algiers, arriving ca. 3rd May (the date on the letter reporting his arrival). He'd missed the expedition, which returned to Algiers in late May having been defeated at Ammal. He asked for a honorary ADC position and was attached to the 1er Chasseurs d'Afrique for about a month whilst they were in camp around Algiers, before returning to Paris at the beginning of July. He saw no action.

A major problem is that his nephew, Thomas Kearny, self-published a hagiography with only a passing resemblance to reality, and that gets quoted. He even tried to sue reviewers...

 

[Saphroneth]

@Saphroneth I think it was a good thing that somebody wanted to get some actual battle experience, even if he thought he was going to enjoy it. I believe be contributed to cavalry Manuel and served some time at the cavalry school at Carlisle Pa. before being assigned to Scott's staff. Seems to me he attempted to improve his soldiering skills and desired a more professional American Army.

The cavalry manual having his name on it doesn't necessarily mean he did any of the work to produce it, since the three soldiers sent would have all their names on it. It's a group project and we need to assess how much work Kearny did individually; we would naturally expect the two men who actually attended the school to have had most of the input.

Being assigned to Scott's staff is not really an indicator of wanting a more professional American army, and certainly not of doing so successfully - it's not nothing but it's more indicative of Having Connections than anything. Remember, his commission comes about because his uncle happens to be running the regiment, and he goes straight in at 1st Lt (skipping 10-15 slots on the seniority ladder compared to a USMA graduate, which must have been nice).

Similarly his peacetime service in California sees him show up August 1851 and quit in October the same year. What I'm getting at here is that Kearny is not "anomalously professional" and in fact you could make a case that he is otherwise.

 

[67th Tigers]

The 1841 Cavalry Manual was promulgated by Poinsett, the Secretary-of-War. He'd been a cavalry officer. As part of the preparation for this, he'd sent a variety of officers to Europe, including six subalterns to Saumur (three in 1839 and three in 1840). The manual was a direct translation of the French manual. One of the problems was Kearny did not speak French, and so it was left to the others to do the translation. Indeed, the reason Kearny was dropped from training is he simply didn't understand his instructors, who of course instructed him in French. Very "Emily in Paris."

Kearny's entire contribution to the project was a report on the organisation of the French cavalry in camp, from his month with them at Algiers in June 1840. It was not included in the manual.

The idea that Kearny "wrote the manual" is an invention of his nephew, Thomas Kearny. Thomas contended Kearny wrote "Applied Cavalry Tactics Illustrated in the French Campaign" and it was adopted as the standard cavalry manual. It wasn't, and no such manual is in existence. Thomas invented it, and all references to the existence of such a manual ultimately traced to Thomas' confabulation.

 

[Cavalier]

@Saphroneth @67th Tigers As to using influence to advance himself I think that was pretty common. However I was under the impression he quit the cavalry school in order to participate in the Algerian campaign and that he saw action there with the Chasseurs d' Afrique. If not that's another bubble busted !!!

Also I has assumed that he did speak French. Although that was not something I read anywhere.

All these things considered my balloon seems to be leaking hot air pretty quickly.

I do appreciate all the information however, even if its painful !!!!

John