Rebforever
Lt. Colonel
- Joined
- Oct 26, 2012
Thomas is a way better General than McClellan could ever be.
Thomas is a way better General than McClellan could ever be.
Heck, McClellan had Lee cornered up 2 times and even had Lee's instruction which in hand. You are preaching to the wrong person here.However, "General" is a nebulous term. It encompasses brigadiers, who might be commanding not much more than 1,000 men, and basically super-colonels, to the division (10,000), corps (30,000), army (100,000) commanders, and the supreme command.
Thomas never commanded a full sized army of ca. 100,000 men, and was only once in an independent command (at Nashville). My assessment when this came up a year ago that Thomas was a solid executive general who wasn't cut out for independent command seems reasonable. What's more, Thomas knew his own limitations, which is why he kept insisting that he not be given an army.
However, "General" is a nebulous term. It encompasses brigadiers, who might be commanding not much more than 1,000 men, and basically super-colonels, to the division (10,000), corps (30,000), army (100,000) commanders, and the supreme command.
Thomas never commanded a full sized army of ca. 100,000 men, and was only once in an independent command (at Nashville). My assessment when this came up a year ago that Thomas was a solid executive general who wasn't cut out for independent command seems reasonable. What's more, Thomas knew his own limitations, which is why he kept insisting that he not be given an army.
I was not aware Thomas "kept insisting" he not be given an army. I only knew we declined to replace his commanding officer, General Buell. Please elaborate. I know he only won the battles he fought and never sent his troops in impulsively throwing away their lives. Please also remind me of those battles he lost. Thanks
The wizardry of strategic operations had benefitted by General Scott's initial Anaconda Plan, in spite of what the young General hoped to crown himself with; laurels of being the main centerpiece of the defeated rebellion.
Meanwhile, McClellan was blaming General Wool for not submitting to orders as he had promised, and blaming tardiness on other reasons besides himself.
His complacency to reinforce the field at Second Manassas was a direct disobedience where other generals took the blame; a usual predicament with McClellan.
I don't believe anyone fell into disgrace by General Thomas's acts, because he shouldered the responsibilities resulting from his own actions. McClellan never would.
I'm not sure I follow what you mean here. Can you specify? (I don't want to argue about the wrong period.)His complacency to reinforce the field at Second Manassas was a direct disobedience where other generals took the blame; a usual predicament with McClellan.
Meanwhile, McClellan was blaming General Wool for not submitting to orders as he had promised, and blaming tardiness on other reasons besides himself.
I don't believe anyone fell into disgrace by General Thomas's acts, because he shouldered the responsibilities resulting from his own actions. McClellan never would.
I will go along with your word lucky. Just so happems though, Thomas was more luckier.Why should one be rated any higher than the other? I find both McClellan and Thomas to have sterling qualities for leadership at the Major General Level. Both men faced unique circumstances that precludes any proper comparison. McClellan was an unlucky General, much more than Thomas who really was lucky. That to me is the real kicker when I see both side by side.
I still believe Lincoln was being duped into putting all his eggs in one basket, and all his resources plus authority unto one very ambitious young man. Whether or not the Secretary of War passed on the warnings from General Scott, I believe it was so, but I do see in 1862 a cadre of generals forming up to usurp the powers of Government, such as Freemont, Banks, McClellan, and possibly Butler. Butler possibly had Gideon Welles support in the cabinet. Still, a whole top echelon of generals were ousted before further embarrassment of egotistical folly and persuasion could solidify and dictate a Presidential Decree.
Lubliner.
Perhaps it's worth reviewing his record? One should remember, that Thomas served the whole war, and that when McClellan was relieved, Thomas had only been in one action (Mill Springs/ Fishing Creek) and managed to miss another (Perryville) by stubbornness.
Mill Springs/ Fishing Creek - Thomas (a division commander) was attacked by Zollicoffer and repulsed the attack, but refused McClellan's orders to move forward on Knoxville.
Perryville - Thomas was nominally 2i/c, but was assigned to command 2nd Corps (Crittenden). Buell had assigned Thomas a movement directly up the Lebanon Road to Perryville. This would have been a masterstroke if carried out, encircling Bragg's Army and likely leading to its destruction. Thomas however decided the troops were too tired, and instead had moved them away from the battle to find water. Whilst they could hear the action, Thomas kept his corps in camp, and ignored Buell's orders to report in person.
Stones River - Thomas commanded a corps of 13,500 men (i.e. the size of a full strength division), under Rosecrans' close attention. He did an okay job of managing it.
Chickamauga - Thomas of course did a good job holding a rally point, before extracting.
Missionary Ridge - Thomas' quiet mutiny against Grant was successful, surprisingly so for a frontal assault on what should have been a strong position. Of course, Hooker had turned the rebels out of position the night before, and they'd quickly occupied their position. They placed their guns incorrectly.
Kennesaw - Thomas basically refused to make a real attack. He put on a show of a weak attack, and then refused to attack again when Sherman asked.
Peach Creek - A battle mainly fought by Hooker. Thomas, when he received word Hooker's Corps was under attack, became telescoped in on moving one battery over the creek. He'd already been lying to Sherman, saying his forces were across the creek as ordered, and ready to move forward, whilst at the same time complaining to his subordinates about them not being across the creek.
Nashville -Thomas originally had the idea of pinning the rebel line with a demonstration and sweeping round the rebel left. It worked after a fashion. The fixing attacks were pushed in far too vigorously, and the rebels slaughtered the attackers. They were however turned, and withdrew to a new prepared position on Shy's and Overton Hills. On Shy's Hill the engineers made the same mistake as on Missionary Ridge, siting the artillery too high up.
The next day Thomas launched "straight up the middle" assaults on this fortified line, with great slaughter (ca. 3:1 loss ratio in favour of the rebs). Thomas dismounted his cavalry and had them make one last desperate push on Shy's Hill, and during that dusk assault an infantry brigade of AJ Smith's got lucky. The position on Shy's Hill disintegrated at nightfall. Hood withdrew his army in good order, and force marched for the Duck River, crossing it on the 19th and burning the bridges. In dismounting his cavalry, Thomas had lost the ability to exploit any success, and Thomas was binned thereafter. Hood's army fell apart by desertion over the coming months, and was certainly not "annihilated" as some partisans claim.
That's the thing, though, because the movement up to Aquia was limited first by the need to send off all the wounded (who couldn't be transported except by loading them onto ships at Harrisons Landing) and second by the availability of transports to ship everyone up once the AotP had marched to somewhere more transport ships could arrive.The maneuver up to Aquia Creek and the landing of reinforcements there had somehow been mismanaged. Please allow me to backtrack and show my own blunder in calling out McClellan for this recalcitrance. I have not studied the Second Battle of Manassas and I have only general knowledge of it. I knew by governmental research, being that study was more demanding at the time, that McClellan was not in a good mood at all, and it was bounced around that he had dawdled with no enthusiasm toward success.
The reference I've found in the ORs is that Wool was insisting that troops land at Hampton instead of Monroe (which is what Smith reported to McClellan, complaining that it would be a slow process to land troops at the one wharf at Hampton). If that was a false report the blame lies with Smith.McClellan complained to Stanton that General Wool was diverting transport traffic up York River and Back River, and not allowing troops to land in the immediate vicinity of Hampton. Secretary Stanton then orders General Wool to stand down and allow McClellan his way. Wool responds back that the report was false, he had not hindered, he had a landing site, etc. Strike one.
He had tried at this point to claim 10,000 extra men of General Wool's Ft. Monroe detail, which had not been promised; just the help in controlling the landing of troops, and wanted to send them off under his own command leaving Ft. Monroe with Navy Guard only.
It wasn't, because the Anaconda plan specifically foreswore invading the Confederacy except going down the Mississippi (and down only, not up). That lack of major battles was why Scott said that it would bring the Confederacy to heel "with less bloodshed than any other plan".And again @67th Tigers, The Ananconda Plan was the actual military blueprint used for the invasion of quelling the confederacy.
Eh? It's a plan to do nothing but blockade, and that was a plan which basically relied on the idea that the CSA would just come back into the fold if left alone. This is nothing remotely like the plan that was actually followed.Not at all, but a good conception of some plan to bring the confederacy back into the Union had been formed. I do not believe McClellan could accept the sharing of ultimate success for the Union.
McClellan asked to form most of the troops at Fort Monroe into a field division under Mansfield, and that was approved by the war department. I'm not sure how McClellan could have abused that privelige.Meanwhile if you dig a bit further than the initial order by Stanton with troops for McClellan, you may find, if my memory serves me some, the incident involving the abuse of that privilege.
He had tried at this point to claim 10,000 extra men of General Wool's Ft. Monroe detail, which had not been promised