It's interesting insofar as we get the tired old nugget "if McClellan had everything he wanted he would have won" which is just silly. For instance the quoted section says this:
I think we read different articles.
If we make the assumption that victory in the east was possible in 1862, then we have to consider why it was not achieved. If we reject the supposition that victory was possible, then we're having a very different conversation.
You reject analysis, and try and blame the failure on McClellan (although how to blame the failure in the Shenandoah, or West Va on McClellan?). You make the assumption that McClellan would not achieve victory, no matter what.
What part of saying that had McClellan had the forces that had been agreed with Lincoln, then he'd have taken Richmond is "just silly"? As is clear, it was agreed that the movement to the Peninsula be made with 13 full strength infantry divisions, rather than the 8 that historically it was (plus ca. 2 divisions worth in June, which replaced the casualties of the campaign). It is not "everything he wanted", it was what the professionals, not just McClellan, agreed was needed.
Another way of looking at this is that Lincoln expected McClellan to succeed with a force which all the professionals who analysed the matter (Meigs excepted) agreed was insufficient. Compounding matters, Lincoln didn't even bother to tell McClellan what was being done.
For one thing is assumes a) Lincoln should just have ignored the problem/opportunity Jackson in the Valley presented and b) that with everything given only then would McClellan win a victory over the secesh.
Well, there was no opportunity, as McDowell explained to Lincoln at length. Lincoln's argument was that on a map the distance the intercepting forces was shorter. McDowell pointed out Lincoln was asking the intercepting forces to travel over dirt roads and over mountain ranges, whilst Jackson was on a flat macadamised road, and hence could travel much faster. Lincoln could not understand this.
Jackson's intent was to stop McDowell reaching Richmond and sealing the Confederacy's fate. He played on Lincoln's paranoia, paralysed a large force (as McDowell predicted and told Lincoln would happen), and then united with Lee to achieve numerical superiority over McClellan.
Any reason for why we should believe this is rarely offered. The idea that Lee might have found another way to attack McClellan is dismissed, the possibility of a long protracted siege sapping the efficiency of the Army of the Potomac is not considered (the siege of Richmond/Petersburg in 1864 took 9 months with a smaller Confederate army and Lee was hardly inactive) and no indication is given just how McClellan will totally baffle Lee and prevent any type of counterattack.
Lee had only one chance, a left-flanking movement over the Totopotomoy, with a force coming in from the north (Jackson). This depended upon Jackson baffling the Federals in the Shenandoah and then arriving behind McClellan's lines. This is of course exactly what happened.
Let us pose the counterfactual of what would have happened without Jackson. The Federals had a solid defensive position behind Beaver Dam Creek, that a month earlier Johnston had intended to attack, but found it far too heavily entrenched. Johnston switched to an attack at Seven Pines instead. On 26th June, Jackson was running late and Lee ordered a frontal assault on the Beaver Dam Creek works to fix McCall.
It was an utter slaughter. Had Jackson crossed the Totopotomoy behind the Federal line, the Beaver Dam Creek line likely would have been held forever, and Lee's army destroyed trying to attack it.
Are there other options? No. A right flanking movement is impossible, due to the White Oak shielding McClellan's left. A frontal assault on McClellan from Richmond? Nonsense.
If you think Lee has so many options, then please find them.
I mean, the rest of the article attempts to downplay the whole historical narrative as falling into various "archetypes" when the reality is that McClellan was rarely in command during the Seven Days and so the whole series of Lee's failure to bring off a decisive attack and the armies survival falls less on the shoulders of the general commanders, but rather on their subordinates.
Sears et al. try to claim that McClellan was not in command. However, a close survey of the actions shows this is nonsense. Except for a period of ca. 4 hours on 1st July when he handed command over to Sumner whilst he check Harrison's Landing, McClellan remained in command of his army.
Your general problem is that you refuse to recognise that Lincoln was an utter failure during this period. Of course, it is not acceptable to actually judge him, and so a scapegoat is needed. McClellan is Lincoln's scapegoat.
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