Member Review McClellan's War, by Ethan S. Rafuse

[JerryD]

Just finished reading this eminently enjoyable book by Ethan Rafuse on McClellan. In summary, I'd say that Rafuse treats McClellan very fairly, though I do detect a pro-McClellan tilt on occasion. Despite, this, though, he feels free to criticize Mac for many of his actions (discussed below). Rafuse has a very readable style, and my only complaint, such as it is, is that he engages in a little too much of what I would call psycho babble in terms of explaining away some of McClellan's actions. The first nearly 100 pages of the book gives an extensive background on Mac's Whig background and the political theory of Whigs, which Rafuse goes back to repeatedly throughout the book. While an interesting perspective to think about, I did not find it all that persuasive and also felt that Rafuse could have made his point without going into such detail of Whig political theory.

The main theme of the book is that Mac, as a Whig, believed in reason and judgement and abhorred extremists and resorts to passion, and thus pursued a course of action in the early stages of the war that assumed the seceding states could be coaxed back into the Union so long as the US was restrained in its response to the war. The subtitle of the book is "The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union". In this, at least at first, he was mostly aligned with Scott's and Lincoln's thinking and wishes for a limited war. One thing Rafuse does not do, though, is assess whether this was ever true. He does state that after the summer of 1862 that the Confederate States could only be induced to rejoin the Union through hard war, but he seems to imply that prior to this moment Mac was correct that with the right amount of kid gloves that the seceding states would see the error of their ways and admit secession was all a big mistake and come trotting back into the fold. Color me skeptical on this point. But Rafuse seems to just accept Mac's judgement on this without critically assessing it.

In line with the above theory of how the war should be fought, Mac was operating on the thought that one big, decisive blow that captured Richmond would end the war. I realize that Mac was not alone on this thought, but again, Rafuse never critically addresses whether this was ever true. Personally, I think the fall of Richmond would have been a hard blow against the CSA, such as the fall of New Orleans was, but that even if Mac captured Richmond in 1862 the war would have carried on. Especially since Davis, even after Richmond fell in 1865, was still intent on carrying on the war. Rafuse repeatedly claims the proper approach to Richmond was through the Peninsula, thus implicitly accepting Mac's approach, and never recognizes that the true key to winning the war was the destruction of CSA armies and not merely capturing key cities. Given his sympathy with Mac's moderate approach to war, I can see why he ignored this approach, but it strikes me as Rafuse ignoring an inconvenient truth that conflicts with his preferred theory.

Rafuse does make some pretty critical assessments of Mac, but again, to my thinking at least, he kind of glosses over most of them. He admits that Mac, the Philadelphian Brahmin, had a very condescending view of Lincoln, the backwards lawyer, which hindered his ability to just accept subordination to Lincoln's judgement on how the war should be conducted. But he never really takes Mac to task for this view, but merely states it as a fact of life.

His harshest criticism of Mac is in terms of his handling of the army during the Seven Days and how he effectively abandoned the army during Glendale and spending the afternoon on the Galena while the battle was fought by subordinates, and then nearly did the same thing by spending a good deal of time on the Galena on the morning of Malvern Hill. It was only due to CSA delays that permitted Mac to return to the battlefield in time for the battle.

He also concludes that Mac held back troops during Second Manassas in order to destroy his rival, Pope. I would think this was an even greater crime than Mac's conduct during Glendale, but Rafuse, while admitting Mac arguably committed a crime of the highest order, does not chastise Mac for his decision.

Rafuse also admits that during Antietam Mac had a great chance to destroy Lee's army if he had only committed his reserves, but explains away his failure to do so by saying that, given Mac's view that he was facing overwhelming numbers, it was prudent, from a Whig perspective, to keep the reserve in case that unaccounted for 100,000 troops should suddenly show up. He does not really assess whether it was reasonable for Mac to think he was facing such overwhelming numbers.

Despite these criticisms, Rafuse is generally positive about McClellan's generalship, especially when you consider his theory on how the war should be conducted. He even suggests that, given his theory of soft war, that destroying Lee's army was not really his objective. But if you accept that moderation in conducting a war was the correct approach, as Rafuse seems to do, then I guess you can see why his methodical approach makes sense. Rafuse also does a good job of showing that McClellan was very sound from a tactical and strategic perspective, at least when you understand his moderate, soft war approach. What Rafuse never does, though, is assess the value of time or maintaining the initiative should have on McClellan's decision making. It seems all political considerations could be ignored, and allowing the enemy to control the initiative was no big deal.

In the end, Rafuse recognizes that Mac's theory of soft war by summer of 1862 was no longer realistic (if it ever was) and that he and Lincoln were no longer aligned, so he had to be relieved.

 

[DanSBHawk]

A very insightful review.

 

[121st PA Vols]

Nice work JerryD.
About Mac's generalship, meaning as you mentioned, "But if you accept that moderation in conducting a war was the correct approach, as Rafuse seems to do, then I guess you can see why his methodical approach makes sense"
My question for the author would be....to what end? What is the bottom line of this method? What was ever accomplished?
With Grant, his hammer blows in fact destroyed an army. At Fort Henry and Donelson, he demonstrated that destroying armies was not always the objective.
With Sherman's March, he showed very clearly the might of his army could enforce the will of the Federal government with all its economic, pyschological, political, etc, etc ramifications.

The point of those egs was to show those generals accomplished something through a very clear method. You don't see that with McClellan's so-called methods to "let em down easy" before the war is ever over!? This is a very strange method.

 

[JerryD]

Nice work JerryD.
About Mac's generalship, meaning as you mentioned, "But if you accept that moderation in conducting a war was the correct approach, as Rafuse seems to do, then I guess you can see why his methodical approach makes sense"
My question for the author would be....to what end? What is the bottom line of this method? What was ever accomplished?
With Grant, his hammer blows in fact destroyed an army. At Fort Henry and Donelson, he demonstrated that destroying armies was not always the objective.
With Sherman's March, he showed very clearly the might of his army could enforce the will of the Federal government with all its economic, pyschological, political, etc, etc ramifications.

The point of those egs was to show those generals accomplished something through a very clear method. You don't see that with McClellan's so-called methods to "let em down easy" before the war is ever over!? This is a very strange method.

I think it reflects a fundamental misreading of the mood of the south. I started another thread on this very topic about whether a soft war approach could work to re-unite the country. Perhaps a soft war approach would work well with the general population, but I think the leaders who actually controlled events were too far committed to their cause.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Just finished reading this eminently enjoyable book by Ethan Rafuse on McClellan. In summary, I'd say that Rafuse treats McClellan very fairly, though I do detect a pro-McClellan tilt on occasion. Despite, this, though, he feels free to criticize Mac for many of his actions (discussed below). Rafuse has a very readable style, and my only complaint, such as it is, is that he engages in a little too much of what I would call psycho babble in terms of explaining away some of McClellan's actions. The first nearly 100 pages of the book gives an extensive background on Mac's Whig background and the political theory of Whigs, which Rafuse goes back to repeatedly throughout the book. While an interesting perspective to think about, I did not find it all that persuasive and also felt that Rafuse could have made his point without going into such detail of Whig political theory.

The main theme of the book is that Mac, as a Whig, believed in reason and judgement and abhorred extremists and resorts to passion, and thus pursued a course of action in the early stages of the war that assumed the seceding states could be coaxed back into the Union so long as the US was restrained in its response to the war. The subtitle of the book is "The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union". In this, at least at first, he was mostly aligned with Scott's and Lincoln's thinking and wishes for a limited war. One thing Rafuse does not do, though, is assess whether this was ever true. He does state that after the summer of 1862 that the Confederate States could only be induced to rejoin the Union through hard war, but he seems to imply that prior to this moment Mac was correct that with the right amount of kid gloves that the seceding states would see the error of their ways and admit secession was all a big mistake and come trotting back into the fold. Color me skeptical on this point. But Rafuse seems to just accept Mac's judgement on this without critically assessing it.

In line with the above theory of how the war should be fought, Mac was operating on the thought that one big, decisive blow that captured Richmond would end the war. I realize that Mac was not alone on this thought, but again, Rafuse never critically addresses whether this was ever true. Personally, I think the fall of Richmond would have been a hard blow against the CSA, such as the fall of New Orleans was, but that even if Mac captured Richmond in 1862 the war would have carried on. Especially since Davis, even after Richmond fell in 1865, was still intent on carrying on the war. Rafuse repeatedly claims the proper approach to Richmond was through the Peninsula, thus implicitly accepting Mac's approach, and never recognizes that the true key to winning the war was the destruction of CSA armies and not merely capturing key cities. Given his sympathy with Mac's moderate approach to war, I can see why he ignored this approach, but it strikes me as Rafuse ignoring an inconvenient truth that conflicts with his preferred theory.

Rafuse does make some pretty critical assessments of Mac, but again, to my thinking at least, he kind of glosses over most of them. He admits that Mac, the Philadelphian Brahmin, had a very condescending view of Lincoln, the backwards lawyer, which hindered his ability to just accept subordination to Lincoln's judgement on how the war should be conducted. But he never really takes Mac to task for this view, but merely states it as a fact of life.

His harshest criticism of Mac is in terms of his handling of the army during the Seven Days and how he effectively abandoned the army during Glendale and spending the afternoon on the Galena while the battle was fought by subordinates, and then nearly did the same thing by spending a good deal of time on the Galena on the morning of Malvern Hill. It was only due to CSA delays that permitted Mac to return to the battlefield in time for the battle.

He also concludes that Mac held back troops during Second Manassas in order to destroy his rival, Pope. I would think this was an even greater crime than Mac's conduct during Glendale, but Rafuse, while admitting Mac arguably committed a crime of the highest order, does not chastise Mac for his decision.

Rafuse also admits that during Antietam Mac had a great chance to destroy Lee's army if he had only committed his reserves, but explains away his failure to do so by saying that, given Mac's view that he was facing overwhelming numbers, it was prudent, from a Whig perspective, to keep the reserve in case that unaccounted for 100,000 troops should suddenly show up. He does not really assess whether it was reasonable for Mac to think he was facing such overwhelming numbers.

Despite these criticisms, Rafuse is generally positive about McClellan's generalship, especially when you consider his theory on how the war should be conducted. He even suggests that, given his theory of soft war, that destroying Lee's army was not really his objective. But if you accept that moderation in conducting a war was the correct approach, as Rafuse seems to do, then I guess you can see why his methodical approach makes sense. Rafuse also does a good job of showing that McClellan was very sound from a tactical and strategic perspective, at least when you understand his moderate, soft war approach. What Rafuse never does, though, is assess the value of time or maintaining the initiative should have on McClellan's decision making. It seems all political considerations could be ignored, and allowing the enemy to control the initiative was no big deal.

In the end, Rafuse recognizes that Mac's theory of soft war by summer of 1862 was no longer realistic (if it ever was) and that he and Lincoln were no longer aligned, so he had to be relieved.

Good post. Excellent assessment, JerryD.

 

[jackt62]

He does state that after the summer of 1862 that the Confederate States could only be induced to rejoin the Union through hard war, but he seems to imply that prior to this moment Mac was correct that with the right amount of kid gloves that the seceding states would see the error of their ways and admit secession was all a big mistake and come trotting back into the fold.

Mac's views about "soft war" and hopes about inducing the seceded states to rejoin the Union was probably the prevailing view of the Lincoln administration in that first year of war. But that view was based on a shaky belief that many southerners were not wholly supportive of the Confederacy, and on the unrealistic expectation that one major blow (such as capturing Richmond) would cause the rebellion to totter. But given that these views were considered federal orthodoxy, McClellan was probably the right man for the job. His management and leadership abilities were exactly what the Union needed to whip a large, unorganized mass of civilians into a disciplined fighting force. Moreover, his tactical doctrine of applying engineering and fortification principles that he learned at West Point, Veracruz in Mexico, and as an observer in Crimea, dovetailed nicely with his slow and steady belief in the superiority of siege warfare. McClellan's problem was his inability to discern that the nature of the war had shifted by mid-1862 and his brand of fighting was anathema to the Republican party. Not to mention his lack of a "learning curve" in which to burnish his martial skills; lacking the experience of brigade or regimental command would be a drawback to any officer aspiring to senior command.

 

[TallTallMan]

Just finished reading this eminently enjoyable book by Ethan Rafuse on McClellan. In summary, I'd say that Rafuse treats McClellan very fairly, though I do detect a pro-McClellan tilt on occasion. Despite, this, though, he feels free to criticize Mac for many of his actions (discussed below). Rafuse has a very readable style, and my only complaint, such as it is, is that he engages in a little too much of what I would call psycho babble in terms of explaining away some of McClellan's actions. The first nearly 100 pages of the book gives an extensive background on Mac's Whig background and the political theory of Whigs, which Rafuse goes back to repeatedly throughout the book. While an interesting perspective to think about, I did not find it all that persuasive and also felt that Rafuse could have made his point without going into such detail of Whig political theory.

The main theme of the book is that Mac, as a Whig, believed in reason and judgement and abhorred extremists and resorts to passion, and thus pursued a course of action in the early stages of the war that assumed the seceding states could be coaxed back into the Union so long as the US was restrained in its response to the war. The subtitle of the book is "The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union". In this, at least at first, he was mostly aligned with Scott's and Lincoln's thinking and wishes for a limited war. One thing Rafuse does not do, though, is assess whether this was ever true. He does state that after the summer of 1862 that the Confederate States could only be induced to rejoin the Union through hard war, but he seems to imply that prior to this moment Mac was correct that with the right amount of kid gloves that the seceding states would see the error of their ways and admit secession was all a big mistake and come trotting back into the fold. Color me skeptical on this point. But Rafuse seems to just accept Mac's judgement on this without critically assessing it.

In line with the above theory of how the war should be fought, Mac was operating on the thought that one big, decisive blow that captured Richmond would end the war. I realize that Mac was not alone on this thought, but again, Rafuse never critically addresses whether this was ever true. Personally, I think the fall of Richmond would have been a hard blow against the CSA, such as the fall of New Orleans was, but that even if Mac captured Richmond in 1862 the war would have carried on. Especially since Davis, even after Richmond fell in 1865, was still intent on carrying on the war. Rafuse repeatedly claims the proper approach to Richmond was through the Peninsula, thus implicitly accepting Mac's approach, and never recognizes that the true key to winning the war was the destruction of CSA armies and not merely capturing key cities. Given his sympathy with Mac's moderate approach to war, I can see why he ignored this approach, but it strikes me as Rafuse ignoring an inconvenient truth that conflicts with his preferred theory.

Rafuse does make some pretty critical assessments of Mac, but again, to my thinking at least, he kind of glosses over most of them. He admits that Mac, the Philadelphian Brahmin, had a very condescending view of Lincoln, the backwards lawyer, which hindered his ability to just accept subordination to Lincoln's judgement on how the war should be conducted. But he never really takes Mac to task for this view, but merely states it as a fact of life.

His harshest criticism of Mac is in terms of his handling of the army during the Seven Days and how he effectively abandoned the army during Glendale and spending the afternoon on the Galena while the battle was fought by subordinates, and then nearly did the same thing by spending a good deal of time on the Galena on the morning of Malvern Hill. It was only due to CSA delays that permitted Mac to return to the battlefield in time for the battle.

He also concludes that Mac held back troops during Second Manassas in order to destroy his rival, Pope. I would think this was an even greater crime than Mac's conduct during Glendale, but Rafuse, while admitting Mac arguably committed a crime of the highest order, does not chastise Mac for his decision.

Rafuse also admits that during Antietam Mac had a great chance to destroy Lee's army if he had only committed his reserves, but explains away his failure to do so by saying that, given Mac's view that he was facing overwhelming numbers, it was prudent, from a Whig perspective, to keep the reserve in case that unaccounted for 100,000 troops should suddenly show up. He does not really assess whether it was reasonable for Mac to think he was facing such overwhelming numbers.

Despite these criticisms, Rafuse is generally positive about McClellan's generalship, especially when you consider his theory on how the war should be conducted. He even suggests that, given his theory of soft war, that destroying Lee's army was not really his objective. But if you accept that moderation in conducting a war was the correct approach, as Rafuse seems to do, then I guess you can see why his methodical approach makes sense. Rafuse also does a good job of showing that McClellan was very sound from a tactical and strategic perspective, at least when you understand his moderate, soft war approach. What Rafuse never does, though, is assess the value of time or maintaining the initiative should have on McClellan's decision making. It seems all political considerations could be ignored, and allowing the enemy to control the initiative was no big deal.

In the end, Rafuse recognizes that Mac's theory of soft war by summer of 1862 was no longer realistic (if it ever was) and that he and Lincoln were no longer aligned, so he had to be relieved.

Coincidently I was reading about this book today! Sounds like a rarity for McClellania: balance.

 

[JerryD]

Mac's views about "soft war" and hopes about inducing the seceded states to rejoin the Union was probably the prevailing view of the Lincoln administration in that first year of war. But that view was based on a shaky belief that many southerners were not wholly supportive of the Confederacy, and on the unrealistic expectation that one major blow (such as capturing Richmond) would cause the rebellion to totter. But given that these views were considered federal orthodoxy, McClellan was probably the right man for the job. His management and leadership abilities were exactly what the Union needed to whip a large, unorganized mass of civilians into a disciplined fighting force. Moreover, his tactical doctrine of applying engineering and fortification principles that he learned at West Point, Veracruz in Mexico, and as an observer in Crimea, dovetailed nicely with his slow and steady belief in the superiority of siege warfare. McClellan's problem was his inability to discern that the nature of the war had shifted by mid-1862 and his brand of fighting was anathema to the Republican party. Not to mention his lack of a "learning curve" in which to burnish his martial skills; lacking the experience of brigade or regimental command would be a drawback to any officer aspiring to senior command.

That's a pretty great summary of the situation, as Rafuse presented it. Just to add a slight twist, the concept of siege type warfare also had the added benefit of reducing casualties, since Mac felt that excessive casualties would only inflame public opinion on both sides and people would seek to resort to vengeance, all being anathema to Mac's Whig sensibilities.

 

[JerryD]

Coincidently I was reading about this book today! Sounds like a rarity for McClellania: balance.

That is actually the reason I picked it up. And for that reason, I think its well worth your time. Rafuse does a good job of showing just how truly competent Mac was in many areas vital for being a good general.

Where I think he failed a little bit, though, is that he never really criticizes McClellan for his laissez faire attitude towards time and the political and economic pressures the Lincoln Administration was under in conducting the war. Mac never had much of a sense of urgency, other than in the days leading up to Antietam. As a result, once Lee was established at the head of the ANV, Mac was almost always responding to Lee, instead of dictating the action. He totally surrendered the initiative due to his failure to appreciate the value of acting with a sense of urgency.

And as I noted above, Rafuse also pretty much gives McClellan a pass for what I would argue was a totally unforgivable crime of delaying troops sent to the aid of Pope. This was simply playing with men's lives, all to advance Mac's machinations against his military rival. Rafuse concludes Mac did try to slow down and even avoid sending these men to Pope, but did not really address the consequences of Mac doing so.

 

[TallTallMan]

That is actually the reason I picked it up. And for that reason, I think its well worth your time. Rafuse does a good job of showing just how truly competent Mac was in many areas vital for being a good general.

Where I think he failed a little bit, though, is that he never really criticizes McClellan for his laissez faire attitude towards time and the political and economic pressures the Lincoln Administration was under in conducting the war. Mac never had much of a sense of urgency, other than in the days leading up to Antietam. As a result, once Lee was established at the head of the ANV, Mac was almost always responding to Lee, instead of dictating the action. He totally surrendered the initiative due to his failure to appreciate the value of acting with a sense of urgency.

And as I noted above, Rafuse also pretty much gives McClellan a pass for what I would argue was a totally unforgivable crime of delaying troops sent to the aid of Pope. This was simply playing with men's lives, all to advance Mac's machinations against his military rival. Rafuse concludes Mac did try to slow down and even avoid sending these men to Pope, but did not really address the consequences of Mac doing so.

Totally agree.

 

[jackt62]

That's a pretty great summary of the situation, as Rafuse presented it. Just to add a slight twist, the concept of siege type warfare also had the added benefit of reducing casualties, since Mac felt that excessive casualties would only inflame public opinion on both sides and people would seek to resort to vengeance, all being anathema to Mac's Whig sensibilities.

I enjoyed Rafuse's book much so. You are correct about McClellan's perspective on excessive casualties; aside from the negative impact on public opinion and reactions, it is my impression that Mac didn't have the same stomach for ordering men into bloodletting battle that did not seem a problem for other commanders.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I have been sick recently and hence I haven't been able to comment over the past few days, but I would recommend picking up a copy of Peter Michie's book from 1901, if you enjoyed Rafuse and want to learn more about McClellan.

Amazon.com

 

[Belfoured]

I have been sick recently and hence I haven't been able to comment over the past few days, but I would recommend picking up a copy of Peter Michie's book from 1901, if you enjoyed Rafuse and want to learn more about McClellan.

Amazon.com

Michie makes some solid observations.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Michie makes some solid observations.

If someone is really interested in reading more on McClellan that way, they should pick up Sears and Hassler, as well, to be frank.

I would get Michie next though if I were @JerryD.

 

[Belfoured]

If someone is really interested in reading more on McClellan that way, they should pick up Sears and Hassler, as well, to be frank.

I would get Michie next though if I were @JerryD.

I referred to the Michie book only because it tends to get missed in favor of the later biographies.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

He also concludes that Mac held back troops during Second Manassas in order to destroy his rival, Pope. I would think this was an even greater crime than Mac's conduct during Glendale, but Rafuse, while admitting Mac arguably committed a crime of the highest order, does not chastise Mac for his decision.

Based on Rafuse's psychoanalysis of McClellan, an argument that Mac thought Pope was doomed and wanted to conserve the remaining troops seems plausible. Not a decision I agree with, but an understandable decision.

But if McClellan deliberately left Pope high and dry out of personal animosity that's a serious offense that should have gotten Mac court martialed and possibly put in front of a firing squad.

I will probably end up reading this book, though I'm not sure I'm quite the target audience. Rafuse seems to primarily be trying to correct the people who consider McClellan a traitor or an incompetent. I consider Mac a talented, but seriously flawed general. His decisions are mostly understandable, but simply wrong. And I find that his ego makes him unlikable as a person.

 

[JerryD]

Based on Rafuse's psychoanalysis of McClellan, an argument that Mac thought Pope was doomed and wanted to conserve the remaining troops seems plausible. Not a decision I agree with, but an understandable decision.

But if McClellan deliberately left Pope high and dry out of personal animosity that's a serious offense that should have gotten Mac court martialed and possibly put in front of a firing squad.

I will probably end up reading this book, though I'm not sure I'm quite the target audience. Rafuse seems to primarily be trying to correct the people who consider McClellan a traitor or an incompetent. I consider Mac a talented, but seriously flawed general. His decisions are mostly understandable, but simply wrong. And I find that his ego makes him unlikable as a person.

We agree a lot on perceptions of McClellan. He is a great enigma, in that he had all the training and intellect, but was seriously lacking in some of the essential elements required of an army leader. Rafuse would argue, I think, that instead of being timid, that he was really just trying to keep down casualties in order avoid inflaming passions.

Rafuse goes beyond your statement, though. Yes, he does find that Mac thought Pope would inevitably be defeated. But he also said that Mac saw Pope as his rival and wanted to bring about his downfall. So when the troops arrived in Alexandria Mac deliberately delayed sending them forward until all their wagons and other transportation was available, knowing that this would result in a serious delay on the eve of battle.

According to Rafuse (and I have read of this from other sources), Stanton and most of the cabinet wanted him arrested. Lincoln was also not happy with his performance, but after discussing the matter with some of the generals of the AoP realized that in the emergency, no one but Mac could pull the army back together. In this Lincoln was probably correct.

 

[Belfoured]

We agree a lot on perceptions of McClellan. He is a great enigma, in that he had all the training and intellect, but was seriously lacking in some of the essential elements required of an army leader. Rafuse would argue, I think, that instead of being timid, that he was really just trying to keep down casualties in order avoid inflaming passions.

Rafuse goes beyond your statement, though. Yes, he does find that Mac thought Pope would inevitably be defeated. But he also said that Mac saw Pope as his rival and wanted to bring about his downfall. So when the troops arrived in Alexandria Mac deliberately delayed sending them forward until all their wagons and other transportation was available, knowing that this would result in a serious delay on the eve of battle.

According to Rafuse (and I have read of this from other sources), Stanton and most of the cabinet wanted him arrested. Lincoln was also not happy with his performance, but after discussing the matter with some of the generals of the AoP realized that in the emergency, no one but Mac could pull the army back together. In this Lincoln was probably correct.

Some of this also can get into the definitions of words. I'm not sure "timid" is precisely accurate. Purely a matter of opinion but I think "excessively cautious" might be a slightly better fit. McClellan was a guy who liked to have things set up to a degree that isn't generally realistic in warfare - whether it's his strength numbers, the roads, reserves, etc etc etc. A great commander has to be willing to roll the dice at some point and recognize when the enemy is vulnerable despite his own concerns. What motivated that is a wide open topic.

 

[RedRover]

We agree a lot on perceptions of McClellan. He is a great enigma, in that he had all the training and intellect, but was seriously lacking in some of the essential elements required of an army leader. Rafuse would argue, I think, that instead of being timid, that he was really just trying to keep down casualties in order avoid inflaming passions.

Rafuse goes beyond your statement, though. Yes, he does find that Mac thought Pope would inevitably be defeated. But he also said that Mac saw Pope as his rival and wanted to bring about his downfall. So when the troops arrived in Alexandria Mac deliberately delayed sending them forward until all their wagons and other transportation was available, knowing that this would result in a serious delay on the eve of battle.

According to Rafuse (and I have read of this from other sources), Stanton and most of the cabinet wanted him arrested. Lincoln was also not happy with his performance, but after discussing the matter with some of the generals of the AoP realized that in the emergency, no one but Mac could pull the army back together. In this Lincoln was probably correct.

Secretary of the Navy Welles in his diary, presumed Mac had done Pope ill by not more rapidly forwarding supplies, reinforcement, etc. However, he also opined that it was apparent from the cabinet discussions That Sec. of War Stanton and Sec. of the Treasury Chase particularly, had intended for Pope to take over all...

...but his defeat at Manassas ruined him.

President Lincoln, on consultation with General Halleck, decided to clearly make McClellan commander of all the forces concentrated about the capitol instead, which Welles recorded outraged most of the cabinet... Lincoln explained...

There was no salvaging Pope. Welles says when Pope's preliminary report came forth, instead of making a rational case, it was a "manifesto" of wounded pride, and confirmed he was not suited to senior command.

 

[Belfoured]

Based on Rafuse's psychoanalysis of McClellan, an argument that Mac thought Pope was doomed and wanted to conserve the remaining troops seems plausible. Not a decision I agree with, but an understandable decision.

But if McClellan deliberately left Pope high and dry out of personal animosity that's a serious offense that should have gotten Mac court martialed and possibly put in front of a firing squad.

I will probably end up reading this book, though I'm not sure I'm quite the target audience. Rafuse seems to primarily be trying to correct the people who consider McClellan a traitor or an incompetent. I consider Mac a talented, but seriously flawed general. His decisions are mostly understandable, but simply wrong. And I find that his ego makes him unlikable as a person.

Not really relevant to assessing his military skills but I've never figured out who could read all of McClellan's writings and decide that he was a likable or admirable guy as opposed to a bit of a narcissist with a victim mentality. The simple test is to compare Grant's introduction to his Memoirs and McClellan's brief Intro to MOS.