Yeah, I almost gave up reading the book in the first two chapters because the whole Whig political theory stuff just seemed overblown. And I agree, it does reek of apologia. I'd encourage you power through. I did appreciate getting a different perspective on Mac, but in the end I am with you. I just really don't like the guy and have to work hard to get over to critically assess his generalship. You are right about the politics of the time he had to deal with (and to be honest, that he somewhat made a decision to dabble in). He also had the disadvantage of getting Lincoln as CiC when Lincoln was still learning how to fight that war. In the end he was probably a better than average general but was never going to have the killer instinct to carry the war through to victory.
I have enjoyed the background history the author gave of Mac's time at West Point. It added to my understanding of the West Point conservatism and mentality. Still the academy and the politics explain Mac's preferences, but not his personality and the personality of a senior level commander is one of the most important attributes he needs to succeed. That's ultimately why I am not convinced by any of this background, although it's interesting and helpful for context about a group of men that were significant in steering things at the time.
You know who actually has given me a different perspective on Mac, Halleck, Buell, and specially Grant, etc? Clausewitz ironically, or maybe not so ironically. I recommend the very short introduction published by the Oxford University Press and written by Michael Howard. It made understanding "On War" easier.
"Jomini believed that there was a common formula underlying the successes of both Napoleon and Frederick the Great that could be summarized as 'directing the mass of one's forces successively on the decisive points in the theatre of war, and as far as possible against the communications of the enemy without disrupting one's own': an object that could best be achieved by the mastery of what he termed (as everyone else has ever since) 'interior lines'. Clausewitz denied the validity of such formulations, not so much because they were oversimplifications, but because they ignored what he saw as the essence of war. They aim at fixed values; but in war everything is uncertain, and calculations have to be made with variable quantities.
They direct the inquiry exclusively towards physical quantities, whereas all military action is intertwined with psychological forces and effects. They consider only unilateral action, whereas war consists of a continuous interaction of opposites. (p. 136) No theory could be of any value, he maintained, that did not take account of these interconnected elements - the uncertainty of all information, the importance of moral factors, and, lending emphasis to both of these, the unpredictable reactions of the adversary.
The element of uncertainty arose very largely from the impossibility of gauging enemy intentions and reactions, something that was particularly difficult when there were no overmastering political incentives to determine his military decisions. At best one could only work on probabilities, and in doing this, however good one's judgement, there would always be a substantial element of sheer luck. Even the best generals were successful gamblers who had the nerve to back their judgement.
No amount of theory could, in a moment of crisis, tell them what to do."
Karl von Clausewitz (1780 - 1831) is considered by many to have been one of the greatest writers on war. His study On War was described by the American strategic thinker Bernard Brodie as “not simply the greatest, but the only great book about war.” It is hard to disagree. Even though he wrote...
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Clausewitz is fascinating, maybe you'll read it and see different generals reflected in a passage, almost like Clausewitz was talking about one or another of them. I could cite a few more but won't do so here because my post is already too long and I may just do a separate post about this at some future point because I'm so immersed in this.
A different topic that your original post had me thinking about was — although Rafuse never gets into this as you point out, because it's a topic more proper for military theory than history —
Would the right amount of kid gloves have worked out? There's a fallacy inherent on that, because what the Union was doing in 1862 was already not kid gloves. The escalation had already started when the Union, after a defeat at Bull Run decided to enlist, equip, and train a huge army and navy to forcefully subdue the rebellion.
Was it possible to win without ending slavery? This is possibly the point where we'd be engaged in exchanges of opinion that ultimately are just interesting from a military theory POV. My guide in these kind of issues is understandably General Grant because not only was he the victorious general but he lived in those times. Even though his opinions can only be speculation about the different results of different actions. If he or Halleck had acted differently we don't know how things would have changed afterwards, but in his view:
"My opinion was and still is that immediately after the fall of
Fort Donelson the way was opened to the National forces all over
the South-west without much resistance. If one general who would
have taken the responsibility had been in command of all the troops
west of the Alleghanies, he could have marched to Chattanooga,
Corinth, Memphis and Vicksburg with the troops we then had, and as
volunteering was going on rapidly over the North there would soon
have been force enough at all these centres to operate offensively
against any body of the enemy that might be found near them.
Rapid
movements and the acquisition of rebellious territory would have
promoted volunteering, so that reinforcements could have been had
as fast as transportation could have been obtained to carry them to
their destination. On the other hand there were tens of thousands
of strong able-bodied young men still at their homes in the
South-western States, who had not gone into the Confederate army in February, 1862, and who had no particular desire to go. If our
lines had been extended to protect their homes, many of them never
would have gone. Providence ruled differently. Time was given the
enemy to collect armies and fortify his new positions; and twice
afterwards he came near forcing his north-western front up to the
Ohio River."
Excerpt From
Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Ulysses S. Grant.
I think equally McClellan could say that had he been allowed to do as he thought and continue to proceed against Richmond he could have eventually captured it and destroyed the confederacy will to fight. Those things will forever remain on the what if, speculative world. I noticed how Grant used the words "Providence ruled differently." It wasn't to be.
Someone else pointed out maybe it was in a different thread that the more the armies advanced south they were already encountering slave fugitives. The issue was unavoidable, Ultimately for me that war would kill slavery was a fact the longer it went on.
Bringing the