McClellan Thomas and McClellan

[Saphroneth]

In an orchestration he desired solo prominence that allowed no other member a share without him dividing the laurels of war. He also proved an immoveable obstacle when others were choreographed within the theater of operations.

Is this actually based on anything? It's poetic language, but certainly McClellan was quite willing to praise the commanders under him ("Hancock the Superb"); he appears to have considered himself to be the best choice for an offensive against Richmond, but that's just what you'd expect of a commander who trusted his own judgement.

 

[Rebforever]

McClellan reminds me of Longstreet. Always questioning those in command and writing letters to politicians trying to get something for nothing.

 

[Saphroneth]

McClellan reminds me of Longstreet. Always questioning those in command and writing letters to politicians trying to get something for nothing.

Eh?

Longstreet was pretty much always under someone; McClellan was the senior general for most of his time in the East. Certainly McClellan questioned those over him and wrote letters to politicians, but since those over him were politicians that's basically just the same thing.

McClellan's plan on the Peninsula for example was predicated on the idea of taking thirteen divisions with him (Franklin, McCall, King in 1st Corps; Richardson, Blenker, Sedgwick in 2nd Corps; Porter, Hooker, Hamilton in 3rd Corps; Couch, WF Smith, Casey in 4th Corps; Wool's troops constituted as Mansfield as an additional division) then twelve (- Blenker), at which point he was promised no further reductions.
After he'd reached Fort Monroe it was cut down to eight (- Franklin, McCall, King, Mansfield).

At this point McClellan has three options.

Option number one is to continue the project without complaint and with a force which is much smaller than the force which he considered to be necessary to conduct the campaign.
Option number two is to report that the project cannot be done any more; that is, to give up straight off.
Option number three is to continue the project and ask for his troops back to make the force size he'd originally specified would be necessary to conduct the campaign.

Of these three options, number three is manifestly the better option.

The fact McClellan spent April, May, June and July asking for reinforcements is essentially a product of how those reinforcements were very slowly drip-fed to him and he never really got enough to make up for the losses.

 

[DanSBHawk]

It looks like I served a Supreme Pizza to the table, and it was cut into 1/16th's. Everyone gets a piece! First, thank you both, @67th Tigers and @Saphroneth for putting so much thought into comments, seriously. I only hope my response will be found satisfying.
The maneuver up to Aquia Creek and the landing of reinforcements there had somehow been mismanaged. Please allow me to backtrack and show my own blunder in calling out McClellan for this recalcitrance. I have not studied the Second Battle of Manassas and I have only general knowledge of it. I knew by governmental research, being that study was more demanding at the time, that McClellan was not in a good mood at all, and it was bounced around that he had dawdled with no enthusiasm toward success. Government circle. The military side points to a courts-martial and with a thrust so soon into Maryland, no replacement for and one last chance for McClellan. What is going here is not an argument on strength of numbers to me. A serious problem has developed with placement of command. Areas of rule have overlapped, so a conflict of orders is inevitable. Another serious problem is temperament. On the movement south from Alexandria, when the troops were being transported, and before McClellan had left for General Wool's area of command, Secretary Stanton had been in contact with General Wool, and formed an agreement that any help in offloading of troops would be done with all due obeisance. Another problem was the conflict of interest with the Navy in areas of command, in specifications of duty, and requirements for operations. McClellan complained to Stanton that General Wool was diverting transport traffic up York River and Back River, and not allowing troops to land in the immediate vicinity of Hampton. Secretary Stanton then orders General Wool to stand down and allow McClellan his way. Wool responds back that the report was false, he had not hindered, he had a landing site, etc. Strike one.
McClellan was not cool in his delivery of correspondence with others while under pressure. He had tried at this point to claim 10,000 extra men of General Wool's Ft. Monroe detail, which had not been promised; just the help in controlling the landing of troops, and wanted to send them off under his own command leaving Ft. Monroe with Navy Guard only. These conflicts between leadership roles, in their spheres of influence had to be ameliorated before success could be attempted. McClellan was a sore point of continual strife, and he had no tact whatever in dealing with subordinates nor his superiors, and equals, unless they kowtowed to his own priorities of importance.
So in dealing with McClellan, numbers to me mean nothing. It is the attitude of the General, and his ability to prove harmonious concert with others in all ranks. He fed, clothed and encamped men, and taught them how to be soldiers. He was a very good man. But he was a common man, and did not have the quality of being hoisted up among the stars. His time came too soon.
Lubliner.

Ethan Rafuse wrote a book very sympathetic to McClellan titled "McClellan's War." Rafuse does a good job explaining McClellans failures before 2nd Manassas in chapter 12, "He Has Acted Badly."

 

[67th Tigers]

Ethan Rafuse wrote a book very sympathetic to McClellan titled "McClellan's War." Rafuse does a good job explaining McClellans failures before 2nd Manassas in chapter 12, "He Has Acted Badly."

Yet Rafuse completely missed the confrontation between Halleck and McClellan at Halleck's house, and indeed he didn't know that McClellan went to Washington aboard the Ariel. Without this it is impossible to parse the events correctly.

The reason Rafuse missed this is that he relied almost exclusively on Hennessey's Return to Bull Run for his narrative. Hennessey was writing from Pope's general POV, and hence this was not a major issue there.

A much better insight is in Chapter 26 of Carman's Maryland Campaign.

Militarily, the situation was roughly (a repost):

If you read McClellan's personal letters he has a sense of foreboding that Pope was going to be destroyed. He personally thinks his forces can save Pope, and wants to get them to him. However, Halleck literally has no idea where Pope is, and so McClellan doesn't know where to send them.

Here I should note that the only communications between Pope and the outside world are because of, and via, FJ Porter. Porter landed at Aquia Landing and found Burnside there. Burnside had been ordered to send forward the bulk of his force but had been forbidden from going himself to Pope, like McClellan was a few days later. Porter arranged to send couriers back to Burnside who would forward the news up to Washington. Even this route became compromised.

When McClellan landed it was at Aquia, where 2nd Corps landed. 6th Corps had landed at Alexandria. Everything is confused. Halleck is trying to communicate directly with 6th Corps and failing, directing a botched movement by a brigade and a half against Bull Run Bridge (this force, under Taylor, runs straight into AP Hill's Division and is smashed). Franklin, Smith* and Slocum had all left the corps and headed to Washington, leaving Hancock in acting command. On the morning of the 26th, McClellan secures permission to go to Alexandria himself and find out what is happening and goes. Arriving at Alexandria he finds chaos - the corps and division commanders are missing and Halleck is spewing out nonsensical orders to brigadiers. After reordering the situation McClellan grabs a gunboat (USS Ariel) and heads to Washington to confront Halleck directly.

What we know about said meeting comes mainly from Halleck's report. McClellan arrived at Halleck's house (ISTR ca. 0100 hrs) and got him out of bed, demanding Halleck actually take control of the situation. McClellan then rounds up the errant Franklin and his division commanders and returns to Alexandria the next day. His orders from Halleck as of the 27th were to hold fast at Alexandria and to pull in the 2nd Corps (from Aquia), 4th Corps (from the Peninsula) and Cox's division (also at Aquia).

On the afternoon of the 28th, probably after a bollocking from Lincoln and Stanton, Halleck changes his orders again - 6th Corps will march to Pope. This leads to the obvious question of "where is Pope then?". Halleck has no answer but rather pathetically orders McClellan to "find out". Hence McClellan orders 6th Corps to advance the morning of the 29th. Reaching Annandale the lead division commander (Smith) goes firm and asks should he advance further. McClellan simply refers this up via the wire to Halleck, who leaves it upto Smith. Smith does exercise the option that Halleck allowed to him.

The next day (30th) McClellan sends 2nd Corps forward as well, and 6th and 2nd Corps edge their way blindly towards the sound of firing, and Franklin is forming his corps from column into a fighting line along the Cub Run just as Longstreet is hitting Pope's hanging flank. 6th Corps acts as a rearguard, withdrawing to Centreville after Pope's army is past.

The major issues regards said movement were that Halleck literally had no idea what was happening. If he'd simply known where Pope was he could have directed McClellan where to send the forces, but he didn't. The 6th and 2nd Corps had to edge forward in an "advance to contact" rather than marching through a safe rear area. I think this map (which Ned Baldwin has modified) shows the issue succinctly:

Jackson's corps is between Pope and Franklin. It is actually impossible for Franklin to reinforce Pope, as Lee has already enveloped Pope completely. The question becomes one of an unsupported attack against Jackson independent of Pope.

* Since writing this years ago I've learnt that Smith, and apparently Franklin and Slocum, had departed the army to try and wangle postings to the western army. Smith was told in no uncertain terms by Stanton that he could be reassigned to the west if he wanted, but that the promotion to Major-General that McClellan had recommended would not be confirmed in that case.

 

[Saphroneth]

as Lee has already enveloped Pope completely.

Well, you can't say Pope didn't call it.

I hear constantly of 'taking strong positions and holding them,' of 'lines of retreat,' and of 'bases of supplies.' Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before us, and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance, disaster and shame lurk in the rear.

 

[DanSBHawk]

A much better insight is in Chapter 26 of Carman's Maryland Campaign.

Militarily, the situation was roughly (a repost):

If you read McClellan's personal letters he has a sense of foreboding that Pope was going to be destroyed. He personally thinks his forces can save Pope, and wants to get them to him. However, Halleck literally has no idea where Pope is, and so McClellan doesn't know where to send them.

Here I should note that the only communications between Pope and the outside world are because of, and via, FJ Porter. Porter landed at Aquia Landing and found Burnside there. Burnside had been ordered to send forward the bulk of his force but had been forbidden from going himself to Pope, like McClellan was a few days later. Porter arranged to send couriers back to Burnside who would forward the news up to Washington. Even this route became compromised.

When McClellan landed it was at Aquia, where 2nd Corps landed. 6th Corps had landed at Alexandria. Everything is confused. Halleck is trying to communicate directly with 6th Corps and failing, directing a botched movement by a brigade and a half against Bull Run Bridge (this force, under Taylor, runs straight into AP Hill's Division and is smashed). Franklin, Smith* and Slocum had all left the corps and headed to Washington, leaving Hancock in acting command. On the morning of the 26th, McClellan secures permission to go to Alexandria himself and find out what is happening and goes. Arriving at Alexandria he finds chaos - the corps and division commanders are missing and Halleck is spewing out nonsensical orders to brigadiers. After reordering the situation McClellan grabs a gunboat (USS Ariel) and heads to Washington to confront Halleck directly.

What we know about said meeting comes mainly from Halleck's report. McClellan arrived at Halleck's house (ISTR ca. 0100 hrs) and got him out of bed, demanding Halleck actually take control of the situation. McClellan then rounds up the errant Franklin and his division commanders and returns to Alexandria the next day. His orders from Halleck as of the 27th were to hold fast at Alexandria and to pull in the 2nd Corps (from Aquia), 4th Corps (from the Peninsula) and Cox's division (also at Aquia).

On the afternoon of the 28th, probably after a bollocking from Lincoln and Stanton, Halleck changes his orders again - 6th Corps will march to Pope. This leads to the obvious question of "where is Pope then?". Halleck has no answer but rather pathetically orders McClellan to "find out". Hence McClellan orders 6th Corps to advance the morning of the 29th. Reaching Annandale the lead division commander (Smith) goes firm and asks should he advance further. McClellan simply refers this up via the wire to Halleck, who leaves it upto Smith. Smith does exercise the option that Halleck allowed to him.

The next day (30th) McClellan sends 2nd Corps forward as well, and 6th and 2nd Corps edge their way blindly towards the sound of firing, and Franklin is forming his corps from column into a fighting line along the Cub Run just as Longstreet is hitting Pope's hanging flank. 6th Corps acts as a rearguard, withdrawing to Centreville after Pope's army is past.

The major issues regards said movement were that Halleck literally had no idea what was happening. If he'd simply known where Pope was he could have directed McClellan where to send the forces, but he didn't. The 6th and 2nd Corps had to edge forward in an "advance to contact" rather than marching through a safe rear area. I think this map (which Ned Baldwin has modified) shows the issue succinctly:


View attachment 303743


Jackson's corps is between Pope and Franklin. It is actually impossible for Franklin to reinforce Pope, as Lee has already enveloped Pope completely. The question becomes one of an unsupported attack against Jackson independent of Pope.

* Since writing this years ago I've learnt that Smith, and apparently Franklin and Slocum, had departed the army to try and wangle postings to the western army. Smith was told in no uncertain terms by Stanton that he could be reassigned to the west if he wanted, but that the promotion to Major-General that McClellan had recommended would not be confirmed in that case.

The editors notes in the referenced chapter make it clear that Carman really disliked Halleck, and as a result he tried to depict McClellan in the best light in order to make Halleck look bad.

 

[67th Tigers]

Was the amount of troops McClellan asked for excessive?
Again, I think there is a strong case that it was not. The number of troops that passed through the Union army that conducted the Overland Campaign was 170,000 (possibly using a more restrictive measure of PFD than the one during McClellan's campaign, but we'll ignore that for now) while even with the largest rush of reinforcements McClellan ever asked for personally the total number of men PFD passing through his force would not have gone over 160,000 (and that was a case of 'this will make it easier' rather than 'I need these'); he was also opposed to a Confederate army that was larger in size than that which faced the Overland campaign.

In fact it was larger than that. Grant had ca. 250,000 men pass through his army in May and June 1864.

The aggregate present of the AoP, 9th Corps and the active part of the AoJ was 192,120 in the April return. To this Grant received 55,178* reinforcements in units from Washington, and by 12th June 2,453 recruits, to total 249,751. He lost a very small number by discharge during this period, probably similar in number to the recruits gained 13th June to the end of the month.

*By 20th May, 2nd Corps alone had 14,376 new troops since the start of the campaign. Thus the figure Halleck gives seems totally reasonable.

In the June state, these forces report 146,973 aggregate present, a loss of 102,778. The acknowledged battle casualties of this force in these two months is 77,133. This leaves 25,625 unaccounted for, and these will be additional combat losses (the daily losses from skirmishing aren't known, and several cavalry fights aren't known), desertion, general sickness etc. The Surgeon-General shows 44,169 non-combat hospital admissions in those two months for the two departments (including the non-field part of the Dept of Va and NC), and so this is quite consistent.

In broad figures, Grant used a quarter of a million men to reach Petersburg, and lost over 100,000 in the process, of which ca. 80,000 are battle casualties, and the remainder sickness and desertion. This is about than twice the entire force in McClellan's army April-June '62, and Grant lost roughly four times the battle casualties.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Rather than partisan blogs, Gordon Rhea is a much more credible reference for anyone wanting an accurate picture of the Overland Campaign. But again, this thread is not about Grant.

 

[Saphroneth]

In fact it was larger than that. Grant had ca. 250,000 men pass through his army in May and June 1864.

I was using PFD for both. I could use AP for both, though; that would be a little harder and I'd have to do it again.

 

[Saphroneth]

I was using PFD for both. I could use AP for both, though; that would be a little harder and I'd have to do it again.

Count of troops which McClellan had access to, Present.

Total strength of the Army of the Potomac on the 30th of April 1862:
112,392 PFD
5,850 special duty/sick/under arrest

This is 19054+887 in Sumner, 34663+2009 in Heinzelmann and 33586+1886 in Keyes, plus Franklin and the army "overhead" (regular infantry, artillery reserve, regular cavalry, provost guard, engineers etc.)

Heinzelmann and Keyes have actually gone up since the March 31 state of their Present; this suggests that this approach does not undercount too badly.


McCall's division (per a report of June 15)
9,514 PFD
262 special duty etc.


In addition to this McClellan drew in some extra regiments from the Dept. of Virginia.

As of June 20, McClellan's total strength Present (not counting Dix's forces at Fort Monroe) was 117,226.
His strength on 31st May was 103,382 and on 20th May was 107,088.

The best way to evaluate maximum strength seems to me to be to estimate the regiments recieved as reinforcements to his field army as 117,226 - 103,382 (the increase) - 9,776 (McCall's troops)
+ 400 (Hanover Court House casualties) + 5,000 (Seven Pines casualties) to give an upper bound for the "regiments from Dept. of Virginia".

This upper bound is 9,486 spread over twelve regiments, which seems plausible enough to be going on with.


Thus it is possible to sum:
118,242 in the original movement to the Peninsula (inc. Franklin)
9,776 in McCall's troops
9,486 in incidental strength

Total Present: 137,504

There were two more brigades post-Seven Days but 145,000 seems like a reasonable upper bound of total troops McClellan got Present.


On March 31, the total AP strength of the twelve original AotP divisions Mccelllan wanted to take, plus the regular infantry, cavalry, provost marshal, artillery reserve and engineers etc. came to:

73 + 35943 + 27907 + 35842 + 34798 (the corps and general staff)
+ 633 + 4142 + 2771 + 2906 + 237 + 113 (the sundry extras)

Total 145,365 Present


This matches the rough assessment from looking at raw division counts, which is that McClellan got pretty much the same number of troops as he originally intended to take - but spread over many months during which time the Confederacy got considerably stronger by concentrating all their troops around Richmond, a process which was still going on in late July after McClellan's reinforcements had dried up completely.

It's also a lot less than Grant got, though it looks more like 60% of what Grant used (by 67th's numbers) than 50%.

Comparing what Grant faced to what McClellan faced is a separate issue - but there's little reason to suppose Grant faced a larger force

 

[67th Tigers]

I was using PFD for both. I could use AP for both, though; that would be a little harder and I'd have to do it again.

Aggregate Present has the same definition for both. As is made clear by Humphreys, the returns of 1864 excluded the extra duty men etc. In McClellan's time, PFD was filled out as per regulations. However, the report of the Sec'y of War used the regulation definition of PFD (as Humphreys discusses, the sick, under arrest and the small number "on special duty" are the difference between AP and PFD, but extra duty are carried under PFD). Thus in "regulation PFD" terms (as in McClellan's returns), Grant started with 120,384 + 20,780 = 141,164 PFD (inc. extra duty etc.) at the start of the Overland Campaign.

The active part of the Army of the James (i.e. the entries for Yorktown, Gloucester and Portsmouth, the latter being the cavalry and siege arty) was 37,484 PFD. Thus the total force that assailed Richmond/Lee in early May was 178,648 PFD (vs 192,120 present).

The total force McClellan slated to be moved from Washington, excluding one Irish regiment which was supposed to be added to the Irish Brigade was 136,474, including engineers etc.. The disposable force in Wool's department available to make Mansfield's division was 7,980 PFD. Thus the entire force intended to be used was 144,454 PFD.

In other words, McClellan's "overwhelming force" was smaller than what Grant set in motion in May '64. Of course, McClellan didn't get to use that whole force. What McClellan had available in mid-April '62 (after Richardson's, Hooker's and Casey's divisions, plus the engineers arrived) was 101,060 PFD. Franklin's division added 11,332 PFD. McCall's division added 9,514 PFD. Twelve additional regiments from Ft Monroe (9) plus Washington and Baltimore added 7,561. In PFD terms the maximum McClellan got prior to reaching Harrison's was 129,467. In contrast, the minimum Grant used (accepting Humphreys' lower estimate of reinforcements) was 208,919 PFD, and the upper is 236,279 PFD.

Depending on what numbers you accept, Grant used between 1.6 and 1.8 times the number of men McClellan had for the campaign.

The defending rebel army was larger - just adding the battle casualties from Yorktown, Eltham's Landing, Williamsburg, Seven Pines and Hanover Court House to the number of defenders of Richmond at the time of the Seven Days gives 122,376 PFD. Young lists 91,645 PFD for the rebels for the whole Overland Campaign, but doesn't include all of Beauregard's command (only half, Hokes' division and a few misc. units, that fought on the left bank of the James). To this we should add Johnson's division, which is reported at 6,780 PFD in the June state, and is likely lost ca. 1,000 cas (say) for 99,515-ish. So the rebel force was ca. 1.2 times the size as Grant faced.

The force ratios thus become:

Grant vs Lee: 2.1 to 2.4:1 (both PFD, noting rebel PFD is "effectives")
McClellan vs Johnston/Lee: 1.1:1 (ditto)

 

[Saphroneth]

And to allow for comparison with Thomas' victory at Nashville...

10 December returns.

Hood gives:
Effectives 23,000
PFD 26,850
AP 36,400
AP&A 87,000


Thomas' return on the same day gives:

(Units present at Battle of Nashville are
GHQ, 4th AC, 23rd AC, Det. AoT (Smith), District of the Etowah, and all but 2nd division of the cavalry corps

GHQ 41
4th AC 17,639
23rd AC 11,721
Detachment AoT (Smith) 14,125
District of the Etowah 9,409
Cavalry corps 27,206
- 2nd Division of the cavalry (not present) -6,582

Total 73,559

So almost exactly double what Hood had. (There's some "unassigned" units I didn't tally.)


Naturally it's easier to win a given battle the more troops you have, all else being equal...

 

[Lubliner]

Is this actually based on anything? It's poetic language, but certainly McClellan was quite willing to praise the commanders under him ("Hancock the Superb"); he appears to have considered himself to be the best choice for an offensive against Richmond, but that's just what you'd expect of a commander who trusted his own judgement.

I have decided to honorably fold my side of the debate on these specifics, while I can. I would be very interested to hear, maybe on a new thread, your belief about the forces that created McClellan's downfall, why they came to exist, and why they succeeded. In all respects your argument has been well thought out, thorough, and ably put. But on the other hand, in accepting the argument you have presented and won, there would be no purpose in the meddling of affairs by the President. Was he alone responsible for the sack, or had he brought into his design Halleck and Stanton, or others as well. (New Thread?) Let me continue as a listener so no muddling of lines can occur. I enjoyed it. Thank you.
Lubliner.