McClellan Thomas and McClellan

[MikeyB]

Was Thomas a lot like McClellan? Good soldier, looked on with suspicion by many on his own side, good organizer, good planner, good logistician, not one to launch wasteful and deadly frontal assaults, and moved slowly but deliberately, and with a clear understanding of objectives and aims. Or is this doing a disservice to Thomas (or Mac)?

And my question is - when Grant yells at Thomas for being too slow, is this strikingly similiar to the objections of McClellan being too slow? And if we think Grant was unfair to Thomas, should we not feel the same way about McClellan? Or is it completely two different situations?

Also, a lot of people claim Thomas should have been higher in the Union high command, but I wonder, if he had been head of the AoP, would his style have been similiar to Mac's and he would have been sacked like Mac was for being too slow and deliberate? So as not to get into a what-if, was Thomas' actual historical command style at all similiar to McClellans?

 

[ErnieMac]

One thing to remember is the Thomas was offered command of Buell's Army of the Ohio during the 1862 Heartland Offensive. He declined since he did not think it proper to change army commanders immediately prior to a battle he knew was coming. After the Battle of Perryville Buell was removed, but the new command went to Rosecrans and Thomas had to wait a year to command an army. Had he been less scrupulous he might have obtained that command earlier, but then he would not have been George Thomas.

 

[wbull1]

1. Grant and Thomas: A Classic Case of Micro-Management - Bad for Business; Worse for Armies.
Grant and Thomas: December, 1864 by Stephen Z. Starr. Courtesy of the Cincinnati Civil War Round Table.
The Starr paper does a masterful job of explaining why Grant mistreated and tried to micro-manage Thomas during the Nashville campaign. However Grant's persecution of Thomas goes farther back than Nashville. Some historians say it started in May of 1862 due to his resentment of having his Army of the Tennessee given to Thomas when Halleck kicked Grant 'upstairs' as his second in command and left him without an active job.
Sometime after he took command of the Western Theatre, I think (opinion alert) Grant made an assessment of his top subordinates to see which ones could challenge him for his job based on ability. First he replaced General William S. Rosecrans with George Thomas to eliminate Rosecrans1. He was worried about Thomas also but had no choice in giving Thomas command of the Army of the Cumberland after his heroic performance at Chickamauga as Stanton and Lincoln would accept no one else. He then proceeded to limit Thomas' opportunities as much as he could. Grant carefully planned the Battle of Chattanooga to spotlight General Sherman so he could be promoted over General Thomas.
In reality, Thomas, a Virginian, had little chance of the top job due to the influence of the Ohio (plus, in the case of Grant, the Illinois) congressional delegations who were quite impressive in forwarding the careers of Grant, Sherman and Sheridan, et al but apparently Grant, who seemed somewhat in awe of Thomas, did not want to chance it.

Grant's promotion of his friend General Sherman, after Sherman had totally failed at Chattanooga, over Thomas was an example of eliminating a rival using army politics of the worst type. Grant rationalized his decision by stating in his memoirs that Sherman was more aggressive. Yet up to that point in the war, Sherman had done very little (if anything) to indicate he had much capacity for independent command while Thomas was a proven winner since January 1862 at Mill Springs. At this point, in any discussion of the abilities of the various Generals, someone will invariably say, 'yes, but Thomas was slow'. This 'logic' is just mindlessly repeating a carefully concocted impression by both Grant and Sherman during the war and especially in their memoirs afterwards to justify, in the case of Grant, not promoting Thomas for merit, and in the case of Sherman, that Grant had made a good choice in picking him over Thomas.2
In reality, punctuality was one of Thomas' quirks. He hated to be late. For example, if he had a part in a coordinated battle plan, he was never late. He did always try to get his ducks in a row before committing his men to the shock of battle, but he always did so as fast as possible. His comprehensive battle planning was really the beginning of the modern Army.3
At Nashville, it was ironic that Grant chastised Thomas for taking so long to bring on battle (two weeks delay due to remount of cavalry and ice storm) while at the same time, Grant had been going nowhere fast against General Lee at Petersburg for six months.
After Thomas' resounding victory at Nashville, Grant rewarded him by taking away his infantry (because he was 'too slow') to make sure he had no more opportunity to outshine Sherman or himself.4
When Grant gave Sherman command of the Western theatre in early 1864, despite the fact that Thomas was senior to Sherman and despite the fact that it was Thomas' men not Sherman's that won the Battle of Chattanooga, General Thomas had good reason to resent the breech of army protocol but, to his everlasting credit, he quietly accepted a command under Sherman during the Atlanta campaign and exerted all his abilities to make the campaign and General Sherman successful. He never let personal issues detract him from his main goal of successfully ending the war.
Notes:
1. Varney, Frank: General Grant and the Rewriting of History, Savas Beatie, El Dorado, CA, 2013
2. J. H. Sherratt: Some Corrections of Grant's Memoirs as Regards General George H. Thomas; in Commandery of the State of Illinois, MOLLUS, Military Essays and Recollections, vol. II, pg. 499-514, Chicago, IL, 1894.
3. Pratt, Fletcher: Old Pap, Infantry Journal 45 (Jan/Feb 1938): pp. 17-24 & (Mar/Apr 1938): pp. 146-156. Per.
4. Rose, Joseph A. Grant Under Fire, New York: Alderhanna Publishing, 2015, p.517.

 

[Northern Light]

Don't forget that at Nashville, Schofield was sending Grant telegrams denigrating Thomas, hoping he would get Thomas's position, the slimy little weasel!

 

[wbull1]

Thomas' reputation may have started at West Point where he was called "Old Slow Foot" for refusing to allow cadets to gallop their horses into exhaustion. When actually outnumbered and outgunned at Chickamauga, (unlike McClellan's imaginings) he stood his ground and allowed the Union Army to escape. He never ordered his men into a failed assault that should have never been attempted and ended only in slaughter, like Grant at Cold Harbor or Sherman at Kennesaw Mountain. He is the only Civil War commander on either side who won major battles and suffered far few casualties than he inflicted while doing so: Mill Springs 246 – 529, Nashville 3,061 – 6000.

Private MikeyB, should you ever have the honor of serving under an officer of Thomas' caliber, I hope you will remember that a man's reputation does not necessarily reflect his worth.

 

[DanSBHawk]

1. Grant and Thomas: A Classic Case of Micro-Management - Bad for Business; Worse for Armies.
Grant and Thomas: December, 1864 by Stephen Z. Starr. Courtesy of the Cincinnati Civil War Round Table.
The Starr paper does a masterful job of explaining why Grant mistreated and tried to micro-manage Thomas during the Nashville campaign. However Grant's persecution of Thomas goes farther back than Nashville. Some historians say it started in May of 1862 due to his resentment of having his Army of the Tennessee given to Thomas when Halleck kicked Grant 'upstairs' as his second in command and left him without an active job.
Sometime after he took command of the Western Theatre, I think (opinion alert) Grant made an assessment of his top subordinates to see which ones could challenge him for his job based on ability. First he replaced General William S. Rosecrans with George Thomas to eliminate Rosecrans1. He was worried about Thomas also but had no choice in giving Thomas command of the Army of the Cumberland after his heroic performance at Chickamauga as Stanton and Lincoln would accept no one else. He then proceeded to limit Thomas' opportunities as much as he could. Grant carefully planned the Battle of Chattanooga to spotlight General Sherman so he could be promoted over General Thomas.
In reality, Thomas, a Virginian, had little chance of the top job due to the influence of the Ohio (plus, in the case of Grant, the Illinois) congressional delegations who were quite impressive in forwarding the careers of Grant, Sherman and Sheridan, et al but apparently Grant, who seemed somewhat in awe of Thomas, did not want to chance it.

View attachment 302347​

Grant's promotion of his friend General Sherman, after Sherman had totally failed at Chattanooga, over Thomas was an example of eliminating a rival using army politics of the worst type. Grant rationalized his decision by stating in his memoirs that Sherman was more aggressive. Yet up to that point in the war, Sherman had done very little (if anything) to indicate he had much capacity for independent command while Thomas was a proven winner since January 1862 at Mill Springs. At this point, in any discussion of the abilities of the various Generals, someone will invariably say, 'yes, but Thomas was slow'. This 'logic' is just mindlessly repeating a carefully concocted impression by both Grant and Sherman during the war and especially in their memoirs afterwards to justify, in the case of Grant, not promoting Thomas for merit, and in the case of Sherman, that Grant had made a good choice in picking him over Thomas.2
In reality, punctuality was one of Thomas' quirks. He hated to be late. For example, if he had a part in a coordinated battle plan, he was never late. He did always try to get his ducks in a row before committing his men to the shock of battle, but he always did so as fast as possible. His comprehensive battle planning was really the beginning of the modern Army.3
At Nashville, it was ironic that Grant chastised Thomas for taking so long to bring on battle (two weeks delay due to remount of cavalry and ice storm) while at the same time, Grant had been going nowhere fast against General Lee at Petersburg for six months.
After Thomas' resounding victory at Nashville, Grant rewarded him by taking away his infantry (because he was 'too slow') to make sure he had no more opportunity to outshine Sherman or himself.4
When Grant gave Sherman command of the Western theatre in early 1864, despite the fact that Thomas was senior to Sherman and despite the fact that it was Thomas' men not Sherman's that won the Battle of Chattanooga, General Thomas had good reason to resent the breech of army protocol but, to his everlasting credit, he quietly accepted a command under Sherman during the Atlanta campaign and exerted all his abilities to make the campaign and General Sherman successful. He never let personal issues detract him from his main goal of successfully ending the war.
Notes:
1. Varney, Frank: General Grant and the Rewriting of History, Savas Beatie, El Dorado, CA, 2013
2. J. H. Sherratt: Some Corrections of Grant's Memoirs as Regards General George H. Thomas; in Commandery of the State of Illinois, MOLLUS, Military Essays and Recollections, vol. II, pg. 499-514, Chicago, IL, 1894.
3. Pratt, Fletcher: Old Pap, Infantry Journal 45 (Jan/Feb 1938): pp. 17-24 & (Mar/Apr 1938): pp. 146-156. Per.
4. Rose, Joseph A. Grant Under Fire, New York: Alderhanna Publishing, 2015, p.517.

I have zero respect for Starr or Varney or Rose. They are no different from any Lost Cause adherent in how they try to skew history.

Thomas was nothing like McClellan. McClellan was a narcissist who was convinced he was the great man of the era. Thomas was a solid soldier who was a great subordinate and a competent general. Even his army friends admitted he was slow, but he was unbeatable in a defensive situation.

 

[JeffBrooks]

Thomas had the same good points that McClellan had, in that he was an excellent organizer and brilliant a logistics. Indeed, Thomas has never been given full credit for his achievement in this realm of military activity.

Thomas wasn't rash, but that's not the same thing as being overly cautious. He was careful and it paid off. After winning a tactical victory at Mill Springs, for example, Thomas turned it into a strategic triumph by launching his army into a vigorous pursuit that ended with the total defeat of the enemy force and the capture of its base camp. He did this despite the fact that his men were tired from fighting and marching already. McClellan would have sat on his hands and done nothing, content to let the enemy get away.

At Nashville, Thomas was absolutely correct to wait until his cavalry force was prepared, for he understood that this element would be vital in both winning the tactical victory and then exploiting it in the aftermath. He also decided not to launch an attack when the ground was covered with a foot-thick layer of ice, but if you ask me this is common sense and not "slowness". When he did come out, he won perhaps the most overwhelming tactical victory of the war and also had the ability to pursue Hood almost to destruction right out of Tennessee. McClellan, by contrast, would have sat within the Nashville defenses until the spring thaw had come.

 

[Lubliner]

I agree 'Little Mac' had an overblown ego, who was insubordinate to General Winfield Scott in every respect; something that is totally contrary to anything such as Thomas's demeanor and bearing. The Generals, Rosecrans and Buell, were both dilatory to an incredibly disastrous degree, allowing defeat. Thomas never gave me the impression of 'slowness' without proper cause. His complaints concerning the winter and early spring of 1865 are very valid, and his opportunity at Nashville was never twittered away by misgivings, bad judgements, nor incompetence. The others I mentioned, as well as 'Little Mac' exhibited an abundance of such flaws; I.e. the mindset, 'If I can find an excuse not to, I will not; and if I must, I will not, to prove I am right'...is a defeatist example of thinking.
Thomas lost most of his cavalry that winter (1865) as well, some going to Smith(?) at Vicksburg, Stoneman in Tennessee, and Canby for the Mobile Campaign. Thomas should be exonerated. Which was it, Sedgewick or Reynolds that declined the role of Generalship when Meade was promoted? Just saying the choice Thomas made in the west, which was mimicked in the east the next year never sullied reputations.
Lubliner.

 

[OpnCoronet]

The main difference was little mac was cautious, Thomas was methodical. Little Mac was timid on the offense, Thomas was bold. To me, all the differences in the World.

 

[Lubliner]

The main difference was little mac was cautious, Thomas was methodical. Little Mac was timid on the offense, Thomas was bold. To me, all the differences in the World.

Your adjectives are much nicer than mine.
Lubliner.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Thomas was a solid competent general, but I think he fell a little short of being considered great or brilliant. I don't think he was operating at the same level as a Grant or Sherman, but he was very strong as a subordinate. I think he excelled at the tactical level, and maybe the operational level (although there's some questions there), but at the strategic level I think he was a little weak.

All in all, I think his strengths far outweighed his weaknesses, as opposed to the reverse for McClellan.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Your adjectives are much nicer than mine.
Lubliner.

I have used up most of my pejoratives on McClellan through the years.

 

[Lubliner]

I have used up most of my pejoratives on McClellan through the years.

So you know, 'he is a Peeve.'?
Lubliner.

 

[Saphroneth]

When actually outnumbered and outgunned at Chickamauga, (unlike McClellan's imaginings) he stood his ground and allowed the Union Army to escape.

I mostly wanted to highlight this one because there was actually a battle where McClellan was outnumbered - outgunned is harder to say because that refers to artillery, but we know that McClellan in the Seven Days was outnumbered.*

With that in mind it's also worth considering that McClellan's retreat in the Seven Days (which is the only time he did actually retreat) was conducted in a situation where there was basically no militarily feasible alternative, or to be precise the situation was such that not retreating would mean that the Union army was surrounded and captured. It's also not a case of McClellan running for the whole Seven Days, it's actually three separate movements:

1) When turned by Jackson, the right wing retreated from the Mechanicsville position to the Gaines Mill position. Not doing this would mean losing the right wing on top of being cut off from supply.
2) When defeated at Gaines Mill, the army moved south from the Savage's Station position to the Glendale position. Not doing this would mean being trapped between the Chickahominy and the White Oak and out of supply.
3) When Franklin quit position without orders, the army retreated south to Harrisons Landing (with a pause at Malvern Hill because it was too far to go on one night). Not doing this would mean being enveloped through the open Union right flank and cut off from resupply.

The issue of the retreat and the issue of the troop counts in the Seven Days are actually separate, though interrelated.

If there'd been more troops in McClellan's army (coincidentally enough that he had slightly more than the Confederates used against him) he'd be able to cover the frontage to prevent Jackson from turning him on his right.
If there'd been fewer troops in Lee's army (coincidentally such that he had fewer than McClellan?) he wouldn't have been able to break through at Gaines Mill and the line north of the Chickahominy would have held - it was a close-run thing as it was.
But aside from that, the retreats during the Seven Days are driven primarily not by Confederate numbers (except in so far as they made it so McClellan couldn't gamble on a straight-up fight) but by Confederate position - specifically, turning movements or the threat of them.

I've sometimes asked people to give me an alternative to McClellan's actions in this period which is at least somewhat feasible and doesn't starve the army. The closest that I recall having is the suggestion to keep more troops north of the Chickahominy (covering the line of the Tolopatamoy or just providing a flank guard for what was the historical right wing) but this just means that while the Seven Days don't happen there's no actual forward movement against Richmond either - there's a kind of steady-state going on.



Why do I bring all this up? It's because McClellan's movements south are for the same purpose as Thomas standing his ground at Chickamauga - they're to save the Union army in question, and I mean that in all honesty. I can see at least three places where McClellan not moving his army (or a part of it) south would lead to the loss of several divisions or the whole Union army over the space of just that one week.



* Harsh has compared the armies by PFD, but it's also possible to compare the armies by officer counts. Lee's army post-Seven-Days was larger in number of officers and Lee was also calling for more officers as he said his units didn't have enough of them.

 

[Lubliner]

@Saphroneth, I mean no harm in name calling, which is so easy to do, and my own shame for doing so forces me to apologize. I know of no other battlefield as difficult as what took place between Yorktown, Richmond, and the James River. The terrain there even today is, let us just say 'claimed land' by military, Park, State, and County. It is a miasma of impassable growth that will pull someone down and swallow up whole. McClellan also had an enormous weight of responsibility upon his shoulders, and I do see his responses as being defensive for just cause. He had more than anyone else to lose from that fight, and came away miraculously by the sheer determination and management of his troops.
Despite all this, and even when you listen to the scuttlebutt up north, he comes across as a peeve. It is peer judgement done behind the back, and it did nothing but make his way slippery. So, was he the victim of his own character? Or policy? Or our judgements upon him?
Same as with Thomas.
Lubliner.

 

[Saphroneth]

Despite all this, and even when you listen to the scuttlebutt up north, he comes across as a peeve. It is peer judgement done behind the back, and it did nothing but make his way slippery. So, was he the victim of his own character? Or policy? Or our judgements upon him?

I think to some extent there's all of these, but it's worth realizing a few things.

Firstly, there's that the East was under the eye of Lincoln to an extent that no other theater was, and we know (from what he said both publicly and privately) that Lincoln was not actually very good at understanding the modern military of the time. He went so far as to express a contempt for "strategy" and thought that armies preferred to fight through entrenchments instead of going around them.

Secondly, and relatedly, there's the matter of what that meant for military policy. It was very common during McClellan's campaigns for him to not have what he'd been promised - either he'd been promised a certain troop strength and then didn't get it (most of the Peninsular Campaign) or he'd been promised supplies and then didn't get them (post-Antietam) or similar. You can argue about whether the administration in general was justified in deciding that those resources could be better used elsewhere - though the post-Antietam one is basically impossible to justify, that was just a SNAFU - but you can't deny that it is very hard for a military officer to make plans when he doesn't know if he's going to get 30,000 reinforcements next week or not.

Thirdly, McClellan suffered the natural disadvantage of coming first. Not first in terms of being the first Union commander at all, but first to have such a large army in the field in the East. What this meant was that he was judged by the standards that people imagined, rather than by the standards of previous generals, and further that he happened to be in command during the period that the Confederacy was strongest compared to the Union.

And, fourthly, McClellan was the Democratic party nominee in 1864. This meant political campaigning against him, and some of those campaign ads were manifestly false but they still come down to us today (like the one about him being on a gunboat at Malvern Hill while his army fought).


What this all means is that McClellan was a target for the "lost cause" school (who portrayed him as an ineffectual blunderer who Lee fought rings around, and who excused Lee's poor showing at Antietam by giving McClellan a 2:1 numerical advantage) and also for those who considered Lincoln to be tops (who portrayed him in - well - much the same light, to be honest).



The way that I see McClellan is:
1) Not good at politics, which meant that it was easy for other people to shape the narrative.
2) A good general. Maybe not a great general, but a general who could have won the war for the Union (or taken Richmond, at least) at a significantly smaller outlay of resources and indeed time than it historically took to actually take Richmond.
3) A good organizer. Not just for building the Army of the Potomac, but for rebuilding the Army of the Potomac after Second Bull Run (within three weeks of that rather disastrous near-rout, McClellan had fought the bloodiest single-day battle in US history.)
4) Possessing skills as an army commander that nobody else was able to successfully employ on the same scale. Here I'm thinking specifically of his ability to fight regular approaches, using heavy artillery to blast through fortifications.



He certainly doesn't deserve nearly as much ridicule as he gets.

 

[Lubliner]

I think to some extent there's all of these, but it's worth realizing a few things.

Firstly, there's that the East was under the eye of Lincoln to an extent that no other theater was, and we know (from what he said both publicly and privately) that Lincoln was not actually very good at understanding the modern military of the time. He went so far as to express a contempt for "strategy" and thought that armies preferred to fight through entrenchments instead of going around them.

Secondly, and relatedly, there's the matter of what that meant for military policy. It was very common during McClellan's campaigns for him to not have what he'd been promised - either he'd been promised a certain troop strength and then didn't get it (most of the Peninsular Campaign) or he'd been promised supplies and then didn't get them (post-Antietam) or similar. You can argue about whether the administration in general was justified in deciding that those resources could be better used elsewhere - though the post-Antietam one is basically impossible to justify, that was just a SNAFU - but you can't deny that it is very hard for a military officer to make plans when he doesn't know if he's going to get 30,000 reinforcements next week or not.

Thirdly, McClellan suffered the natural disadvantage of coming first. Not first in terms of being the first Union commander at all, but first to have such a large army in the field in the East. What this meant was that he was judged by the standards that people imagined, rather than by the standards of previous generals, and further that he happened to be in command during the period that the Confederacy was strongest compared to the Union.

And, fourthly, McClellan was the Democratic party nominee in 1864. This meant political campaigning against him, and some of those campaign ads were manifestly false but they still come down to us today (like the one about him being on a gunboat at Malvern Hill while his army fought).


What this all means is that McClellan was a target for the "lost cause" school (who portrayed him as an ineffectual blunderer who Lee fought rings around, and who excused Lee's poor showing at Antietam by giving McClellan a 2:1 numerical advantage) and also for those who considered Lincoln to be tops (who portrayed him in - well - much the same light, to be honest).



The way that I see McClellan is:
1) Not good at politics, which meant that it was easy for other people to shape the narrative.
2) A good general. Maybe not a great general, but a general who could have won the war for the Union (or taken Richmond, at least) at a significantly smaller outlay of resources and indeed time than it historically took to actually take Richmond.
3) A good organizer. Not just for building the Army of the Potomac, but for rebuilding the Army of the Potomac after Second Bull Run (within three weeks of that rather disastrous near-rout, McClellan had fought the bloodiest single-day battle in US history.)
4) Possessing skills as an army commander that nobody else was able to successfully employ on the same scale. Here I'm thinking specifically of his ability to fight regular approaches, using heavy artillery to blast through fortifications.



He certainly doesn't deserve nearly as much ridicule as he gets.

I am not one to disagree when I hear a proper argument, and I try to listen. All good points above, except I think Lincoln had read plenty on war, but had no experience in the handling. The more I read on my own, the more I discovered your point on 'Lincoln Praise' being entirely true, and found a terrible usurping of position, Lincoln against McClellan. This is varnished over in many histories I have read, and only by direct research in reports and correspondence was it discovered by me. (Not a Gore Joke).
There was a distinct breath of humanity in McClellan's breast for the southern people and there status quo, and his military ideas were sound in what he set out to accomplish. Maybe he could be called a 'whiner' because he did not get what he wanted, but in all due fair retrospect his adversaries were from both directions.
Politically Lincoln had to share, and so he did share, McClellan's troops. He also had to listen to the Northern Anti-Slavery Leagues and weigh it to the common denominator. He knew McClellan's views I am certain. No secrets appear to have been kept or held back for long. So dealing with a leading General with a contrary purpose to his own, inevitably the General was cashiered. I am doubtful McClellan wanted to bring charges of unfairness against an idolized President after the assassination so my belief is he plain shut up all argument. Besides, Railroading was a viable recompense for his behalf. Only wish for all our sakes history would not be so _________.
(Fill in the blank), Lubliner.

 

[Saphroneth]

He also had to listen to the Northern Anti-Slavery Leagues and weigh it to the common denominator. He knew McClellan's views I am certain. No secrets appear to have been kept or held back for long. So dealing with a leading General with a contrary purpose to his own, inevitably the General was cashiered.

I actually don't think this is the case. As of 1862, McClellan's view is that what matters is the restoration of the Union - slavery does not matter in comparison.

This is also Lincoln's view at the same time.

 

[Lubliner]

I actually don't think this is the case. As of 1862, McClellan's view is that what matters is the restoration of the Union - slavery does not matter in comparison.

This is also Lincoln's view at the same time.

I cannot give you a source, but in his talks with other politicians he spoke rather freely at times with his problems, and one of his bigger headaches were the New England States that called for abolishment. Of course all opinions on slavery spread like a wildfire over the land. At least in today's world we can stand on solid ground of what is right and wrong concerning that issue. Lincoln had an extraordinary fore-sense of knowing bona fide truths, and when he spoke of a house divided, he spoke words of prophesy; alluding to freedoms.
Lubliner.

 

[wbull1]

I apologize for implying McClellan always had a better situation than his opponents. He did not. I agree he was a good general and bad at politics. He also tried to minimize bloodletting, which is admirable in itself. Unfortunately, he apparently thought he was a great general and far above Lincoln both socially and intellectually. Wrong on two out of three. His disrespect then filtered down to other officers. In my opinion, Lincoln was extremely patient, putting up with McClellan's name-calling and ignoring the Commander-in-Chief. I believe McClellan's inflated ego was more the reason he got fired than any military shortcomings.