McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[Elennsar]

He doesn't usually take a beating because of his anti-Republican politics (although his belief that he should be directing policy is disturbing); he takes a beating because he wasn't terribly competent in the field and probably wasted opportunities to end the war early on.

R

To elaborate on this: Many other (Hancock, if one wants an example) generals were Democrats, and yet their records on the field define how they're seen.

If anything, Lincoln's favorite generals seem to be men whose political positions were of no consequence (whatever their leanings) - such as Grant - not men of "his own party", most of which were if anything more problematic from the standpoint of how generals need to be able to get along with the boss than the majority of Democratic generals.

But unlike for example Fremont, McClellan was not removed for failing to accept the political desires of the president, he was removed for failing to accept the military desires (so far as these can be kept separate) - for being a failure as a general rather than setting policies Lincoln disapproved of.

 

[BillO]

He doesn't usually take a beating because of his anti-Republican politics (although his belief that he should be directing policy is disturbing); he takes a beating because he wasn't terribly competent in the field and probably wasted opportunities to end the war early on.

R

I well realize that this is the general consensus among historians and fellow ACW enthusiasts but I can't help but wonder if this is correct. Militarily speaking he wasn't inept but he was overly cautious. After all he managed to get within 6 miles of Richmond with far fewer causalities than anyone else managed to do and he didn't lose the war. The AoP was in better shape when he left it than when he got it. In fact one could make a very good argument that he created the Federal eastern army. The war itself was new and IMO the north nor it's politicians were ready to accept what was later called "the grim arithmetic of war."

 

[rpkennedy]

I well realize that this is the general consensus among historians and fellow ACW enthusiasts but I can't help but wonder if this is correct. Militarily speaking he wasn't inept but he was overly cautious. After all he managed to get within 6 miles of Richmond with far fewer causalities than anyone else managed to do and he didn't lose the war. The AoP was in better shape when he left it than when he got it. In fact one could make a very good argument that he created the Federal eastern army. The war itself was new and IMO the north nor it's politicians were ready to accept what was later called "the grim arithmetic of war."

I give him credit for creating the army that could stand toe-to-toe with Lee's Army of Northern Virginia but his cautious nature would never push Lee to defeat (although the Army of the Potomac that ultimately beat Lee was very different from the army created by McClellan). McClellan always seemed to want to avoid losing rather than pushing to win and that was his failure. His was a non-winning strategy, especially against Lee.

Plus, his political desire to basically bring back the Confederate states with the antebellum status quo was absurd.

R

 

[BillO]

I give him credit for creating the army that could stand toe-to-toe with Lee's Army of Northern Virginia but his cautious nature would never push Lee to defeat (although the Army of the Potomac that ultimately beat Lee was very different from the army created by McClellan). McClellan always seemed to want to avoid losing rather than pushing to win and that was his failure. His was a non-winning strategy, especially against Lee.

Plus, his political desire to basically bring back the Confederate states with the antebellum status quo was absurd.

R

Very good, let's see if we can't revive this thread because I don't think it's done yet. Last sentence first. You may think it absurd but wasn't that really the stated policy of the Federal govt. when he assumed command?
Avoiding losing is not a bad thing in a general. He was too cautious I agree but even though he might not have beaten Lee his caution meant that Lee wouldn't beat him as well. Your statement that the army that beat Lee was different from the army that McClellan created is also very true. The AoP[ that marched into Richmond was a very different army that had marched into the Wilderness.

 

[brass napoleon]

...Avoiding losing is not a bad thing in a general. He was too cautious I agree but even though he might not have beaten Lee his caution meant that Lee wouldn't beat him as well..

That all depends on what the overall mission is. If your overall mission is to put down a rebellion, avoiding being beaten isn't going to cut it. For Lee, being the rebel, avoiding being beaten would be a more viable strategy. McClellan would have worked out better in the Confederate Army (but then the Confederates already had him - in the person of Joe Johnston ).

 

[BillO]

That all depends on what the overall mission is. If your overall mission is to put down a rebellion, avoiding being beaten isn't going to cut it. For Lee, being the rebel, avoiding being beaten would be a more viable strategy. McClellan would have worked out better in the Confederate Army (but then the Confederates already had him - in the person of Joe Johnston ).

Avoiding a beating is the first set in whipping the other guy. Remember that the feds had just taken a good whipping and had actually been chased off the field when he was called up. He rebuilt the army and captured most of Northern Virginia by manuvering. If he had simply continued down the road he would have been facing the southern army sitting behind the river just like Burnside and Hooker later.

 

[brass napoleon]

Avoiding a beating is the first set in whipping the other guy.

I disagree that avoiding a beating is the first step towards victory. George Washington took multiple beatings in the Revolutionary War. Even Napoleon in his prime took a beating at Aspern-Essling. A successful general certainly won't be reckless, but he will also understand that it's necessary to take risks. And taking risks means occasionally being handed your tail. McClellan was unwilling to risk that.

Remember that the feds had just taken a good whipping and had actually been chased off the field when he was called up. He rebuilt the army and captured most of Northern Virginia by manuvering. If he had simply continued down the road he would have been facing the southern army sitting behind the river just like Burnside and Hooker later.

What good did capturing Northern Virginia do him? He could dance his way across the entire continent, chasing Confederate armies all the way, and it would accomplish absolutely nothing. Sooner or later you're going to have to destroy that army, even if it means you'll take heavy losses yourself, and even face the risk of defeat. McClellan was just there for the dance.

 

[rpkennedy]

Avoiding a beating is the first set in whipping the other guy. Remember that the feds had just taken a good whipping and had actually been chased off the field when he was called up. He rebuilt the army and captured most of Northern Virginia by manuvering. If he had simply continued down the road he would have been facing the southern army sitting behind the river just like Burnside and Hooker later.

One has to risk a beating in order to deliver a beating. McClellan never seemed to be willing to risk much in order to deliver a beating.

R

 

[David Knight]

Many a succesful leader in any field of activity needs to have confidence in the ability of there team/army and also be confident in themselves.

McClellan seems to be fully confident in himself, or did he. Even when he held most of the aces and picture cards in the deck he still somehow managed to let the ANV fight out a stalemate at Antietam when a full confident army and leader would have acted swiftly decisively and probably victoriously.

McClellan is a flawed general and his lack of self belief is at the centre of it. Being a big head and opinionated is not the same as having self belief.

 

[Elennsar]

One has to risk a beating in order to deliver a beating. McClellan never seemed to be willing to risk much in order to deliver a beating.

R

This. That's why McClellan being so close to Richmond doesn't impress me - yes, he got there, and then what did he do?

Let's assume for discussion's sake that changing his base in the Seven Days was justified and even potentially useful. Fine. There were two basic ways to go about that.

One, cautious focus on defense alone.

Two, trying to keep Lee on his guard so Lee can't interfere with the stuff going on in changing a base of operations.

McClellan never seems to have felt up to leading the dance, but had to follow Lee setting the tune and the step. That aspect of his lack of aggressiveness is simply not adequate to the situation.

 

[67th Tigers]

This. That's why McClellan being so close to Richmond doesn't impress me - yes, he got there, and then what did he do?

Let's assume for discussion's sake that changing his base in the Seven Days was justified and even potentially useful. Fine. There were two basic ways to go about that.

One, cautious focus on defense alone.

Two, trying to keep Lee on his guard so Lee can't interfere with the stuff going on in changing a base of operations.

McClellan never seems to have felt up to leading the dance, but had to follow Lee setting the tune and the step. That aspect of his lack of aggressiveness is simply not adequate to the situation.

Remember, he was beginning the final "grand offensive" when the Seven Days broke. Simply by getting to Richmond he is in a club of two generals, and the club for those that rapidly broke the Richmond defences has no members.

The change of base is actually vital, because an army must be able to sustain itself. McClellan's position was dictated by the fact that his supply base had been dictated to him by Stanton, and he was not free to base on the James, which was always his preferred base, and indeed was Grant's preferred base. Once the base on the York was gone there is no option but to open a new supply base, and because his forces can't cover the whole of the ground from the James to the Chickahominy he has to move the army.

In fact Harrison's Bar was much further back than McClellan intended to move. He was intending to stop around Glendale, but the naval commander claimed he couldn't supply McClellan beyond the mouth of the Chickahominy. Harrison's landing was the furthest west the navy would supply McClellan until they held both banks of the James. The army however scrambled back from Glendale after Franklin quit his position along the White Oak, leading to McClellan having another night without sleep.

From Harrison's Bar McClellan's intent was to land troops on the NC bank, occupy City Point and advance up the river. He'd slated Burnside to land on the NC side, and lead that wing of the army. Hence the month of July is consumed awaiting Burnside and a pontoon bridge he'd sent Marcy to Washington to acquire (and when the army finally got it they'd give good service at Fredericksburg and ultimately Grant's crossing of the James). When it's clear Burnside isn't coming he lands a force (Pennsylvania Reserves) at City Point and goes forward without any reinforcement at all, only to be recalled.

 

[67th Tigers]

Plus, his political desire to basically bring back the Confederate states with the antebellum status quo was absurd.

R

Absurd, it simply isn't true.

McClellan objected to the Emancipation Proclamation on military grounds. It would cause friction in the army (and indeed after it was issued he had to clamp down on dissent against Lincoln in his army), and it made the war as existential struggle for the South, meaning a negotiated reentry of the states was impossible.

 

[67th Tigers]

To elaborate on this: Many other (Hancock, if one wants an example) generals were Democrats, and yet their records on the field define how they're seen.

If anything, Lincoln's favorite generals seem to be men whose political positions were of no consequence (whatever their leanings) - such as Grant - not men of "his own party", most of which were if anything more problematic from the standpoint of how generals need to be able to get along with the boss than the majority of Democratic generals.

But unlike for example Fremont, McClellan was not removed for failing to accept the political desires of the president, he was removed for failing to accept the military desires (so far as these can be kept separate) - for being a failure as a general rather than setting policies Lincoln disapproved of.

However, there was considerable pressure brought to bear on Lincoln to remove McClellan from his own party, and the timing of the removal shows a political motive. This occurs extremely early and continues.

Yet ultimately every single general in the east was a failure to Lincoln, even Grant who Lincoln thought almost most Washington, requiring Lincoln to have a private bollocking session with Grant and threaten to bring McClellan back! Lincoln simply had standards that no mortal could meet.

 

[brass napoleon]

... requiring Lincoln to have a private bollocking session with Grant and threaten to bring McClellan back!...

Source please?

 

[rpkennedy]

Absurd, it simply isn't true.

McClellan objected to the Emancipation Proclamation on military grounds. It would cause friction in the army (and indeed after it was issued he had to clamp down on dissent against Lincoln in his army), and it made the war as existential struggle for the South, meaning a negotiated reentry of the states was impossible.

If he seriously believed that a negotiated reentry was possible by the autumn of 1862, his grip on reality was tenuous at best.

R

 

[67th Tigers]

Source please?

http://books.google.be/books?id=k-y...g=PA161#v=onepage&q=lincolns generals&f=false

 

[brass napoleon]

http://books.google.be/books?id=k-yQW4DdxIsC&lpg=PP1&dq=lincolns generals&pg=PA161#v=onepage&q=lincolns generals&f=false

Well, I have to admit my high school German has become a bit rusty over the years. Would you happen to have that in English?

 

[67th Tigers]

Well, I have to admit my high school German has become a bit rusty over the years. Would you happen to have that in English?

Should be a direct link. It's Simon's article in Borrit (ed.), Lincoln's Generals. http://www.amazon.com/dp/B006D87I3U/?tag=civilwartalkc-20

He discusses the existence the 31st July '64 meeting, and notes that Grant omitted it from his memoirs, and we have only Lincoln's handwritten agenda for the meeting. Lincoln added McClellan to the list of generals considered for command in the Shenandoah.

 

[brass napoleon]

Should be a direct link. It's Simon's article in Borrit (ed.), Lincoln's Generals. http://www.amazon.com/dp/B006D87I3U/?tag=civilwartalkc-20

He discusses the existence the 31st July '64 meeting, and notes that Grant omitted it from his memoirs, and we have only Lincoln's handwritten agenda for the meeting. Lincoln added McClellan to the list of generals considered for command in the Shenandoah.

OK, I'm actually not going to bother. That Lincoln might have considered giving McClellan a command in the Shenandoah is quite different than your earlier statement:

...Yet ultimately every single general in the east was a failure to Lincoln, even Grant who Lincoln thought almost most Washington, requiring Lincoln to have a private bollocking session with Grant and threaten to bring McClellan back! Lincoln simply had standards that no mortal could meet.

The fact is that Grant did meet Lincoln's standards. McClellan, Burnside, Pope did not.

 

[Ed McCaul]

In my opinion McClellan, today, would make an excellent operations/planning officer, but he lacked the killer instinct to be a great commander.