"Lee Surprised by McClellan's Speed"

[Yankeedave]

At one point Lee had to have wondered who was in command lol.

 

[Belfoured]

At one point Lee had to have wondered who was in command lol.

The same confusion an NFL defensive coordinator might have watching Dan Marino execute an RPO.

 

[Piedone]

Just out of curiosity: did anybody read something about the theory that the loss of special order 191 was nothing but a ruse of Lee's (hence he wouldn't have been surprised by McClellan's movements…)
Is there anything suggesting such a ruse could have been reality?
Or is it just nonsense?

 

[Yankeedave]

Just out of curiosity: did anybody read something about the theory that the loss of special order 191 was nothing but a ruse of Lee's (hence he wouldn't have been surprised by McClellan's movements…)
Is there anything suggesting such a ruse could have been reality?
Or is it just nonsense?

No, I haven't. A check Confederate positions relative to the order

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Is there anything suggesting such a ruse could have been reality?
Or is it just nonsense?

I don't think there is any evidence it was a ruse. That explanation was probably started by a Confederate apologist who believed Lee could do no wrong and thus it must be 4D chess.

There is also strong evidence against being a ruse. It accurately described Lee's movements; a ruse should have given false information. False information needs to find its way into the enemy's hands (such as allowing a courier to be captured); the lost orders were found by luck.

 

[67th Tigers]

The ruse idea might be old, but the recent advocate is Joe Ryan, and he's been advocating this idea on the interwebz since the 90's. No-one really takes it seriously.

 

[rvbgrif]

It wouldn't surprise me if Lee made this statement.

Lee was always prone to grandiose compliments and concealed criticisms.

Edit: Realized this was the Battle of Antietam, not the Seven Days Battles

The northern papers? Of course. They would exaggerate and characterize the whole war.

 

[JerryD]

A couple people point out that Lee anticipated more time for the Union army to reorganize. This would be fair but by the time Lee is crossing the mountains his cavalry has had contact with parts of the Army of the Potomac, parts of the Army of Virginia, and Burnside's Corps. And the occupation of Sugarloaf mountain offered a fairly good perspective of the numbers moving out from DC. So Lee should have had a fairly reasonable guess about a large organized Union force moving on him by that point.

I dont think anyone is saying McClellan jumped on Lee and Lee was unaware of his movement. I think the point is that Lee saw how quickly Mac was able to organize his troops and move out and how fast he was moving, and that is what surprised him and made him alter his plans.

But no one is saying Mac just showed up in his front one day and Lee was surprised.

 

[Belfoured]

I dont think anyone is saying McClellan jumped on Lee and Lee was unaware of his movement. I think the point is that Lee saw how quickly Mac was able to organize his troops and move out and how fast he was moving, and that is what surprised him and made him alter his plans.

But no one is saying Mac just showed up in his front one day and Lee was surprised.

One of the reasons we hear so much about this is because it was McClellan, in whose track record alacrity was not a prominent feature.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Reading Hartwig's first book on the Maryland campaign this comes up. Lee thought he'd have more time to deal with Harper's Ferry but because of the discovery of SO 191 McClellan surges forward with uncharacteristic speed throwing Lee's plans into turmoil. It's been a part of the story of Antietam and the Maryland campaign seemingly forever.

Does anyone know its origin though? Were there primary documents commenting on the Army of the Potomac's unusual speed? Was there a historian early on who originated it?

Thinking on it more, it's an unusual conclusion to come to. Lee personally had very little personal experience against McClellan, really just the Seven Days and the beginning of the Maryland Campaign. And while he would have second hand knowledge of the Peninsula Campaign there wasn't a lot to base McClellan being slow; The nature of the campaign and the constraints of the topography its self would limit rapid movements. And the parts of the army that had the space to make rapid movements (like McDowell's force in northern Virginia) did make some sudden and long distance moves showing the Union army (and forces acting with/under McClellan) perfectly capable or rapid advances.

While I'm not particularly a fan of McClellan's, the idea that he wouldn't be capable of faster movement, especially with a Confederate army in a northern state, doesn't necessarily seem like an obvious deduction in early September of 1862. That's why I was wondering if anyone knew where this came from originally. Did Lee or any of his close generals comment on this at the time, or after the war?

Back to the OP, Lee said this himself. He wrote that McClellan had advanced "more rapidly than was convenient" in a letter to Davis on September 16

 

[Saphroneth]

I have to admit that I don't think it's specifically post-SO191 that McClellan is ahead of schedule for Lee. The speed with which he moves post-SO191 is unusual (night marching is basically unusual by definition) but I have the suspicion that Lee didn't think that the Army of the Potomac could be reconstituted that fast. It's quite a quick bit of work.

In general though I think that if everything goes according to plan for Lee then McLaws, Jackson and Walker are in position around Harpers Ferry by Friday morning (September 12). He cannot really assume that they will take Harpers Ferry that day, and once they've done their jobs they will recombine with the main army at "Boonsboro or Hagerstown". In fact by that date Longstreet has moved to Hagerstown.

Let's assume for the moment that by noon on the 13th, if everything goes as Lee expects and there are no unanticipated delays, Harpers Ferry is occupied. But McCLellan has by that point (historically) got four corps into the Frederick area and another two corps further south.

McClellan's main body is actually as close to Boonsboro as Jackson is. Perhaps Lee anticipated that he'd be able to march north using South Mountain as a curtain of manoeuvre while Jackson etc. moved north to Hagerstown, but the moment that delay enters the picture things get more complex for Lee - if it's not until noon of the 14th that Harpers Ferry falls (still a day earlier than historical) then McClellan can by that point - and without his marching especially hard - attack South Mountain with his leading corps. And if he breaks through there he's in between Lee's columns.

And it would be much easier for Lee if he thought that might happen if Longstreet was back down at Boonsboro. That way he can use South Mountain as a curtain of manoeuvre more easily.

Consequently I think Lee thought he had more flex time in his schedule. Whether by assuming McClellan would move slower prior to reaching Frederick than he in fact did, or by assuming that it would take longer to reconstitute a field army after Second Bull Run. My picture of Lee's intent is that Lee was hoping to have his army recombining at Hagerstown before McClellan (or Pope?) reached the South Mountain gaps, and by then Lee can march into the Cumberland Valley.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I have to admit that I don't think it's specifically post-SO191 that McClellan is ahead of schedule for Lee.

Agreed. Lee was surprised that the Federals were in Frederick. He has expected (or later claimed to have expected) to have several weeks within which to operate before a new Federal army could be reorganized.

Regardless of one's opinions about McClellan, I believe everyone can agree that the fact he organized what amounted to a new army and got them on the march within a week is pretty impressive.

 

[Saphroneth]

Regardless of one's opinions about McClellan, I believe everyone can agree that the fact he organized what amounted to a new army and got them on the march within a week is pretty impressive.

This does rather seem to be a theme for him. The other examples that come to mind offhand are organizing the Ohio volunteers and bringing order to Washington after he arrived to take command.

Something I've been looking into is the duration of that reorganization period. My count is that

1 September - Chantilly
2 September - the combined armies retreat towards Washington. About now (today or tomorrow) is when the instruction is given to McClellan to form a field army; it's not yet settled who will actually lead it.
3 September - much of the army takes up defensive positions. 5th Corps is at Minor's Hill, 6th Corps at the seminary near Alexandria and Camp California.
4 September - 2nd and (future) 12th Corps to Tennallytown (i.e. already where they will eventually form the army vanguard) and Couch's division of 4th Corps is still on the move from being the army rearguard. This is also the day Lee starts crossing the Potomac.
5 September - McClellan orders Pope, Porter, Heintzelman and Franklin to place their commands in readiness to march, complete with rations and supplies. Could be that 2nd and 12th were already in readiness to march, but clearly at this point the constituency of the army is not yet settled - Heintzelman's corps will ultimately be left behind and so will Morell at first. 9th Corps moves to Meridian Hill, DC.
6th September - McClellan distributes over 30 new regiments to their new corps. This is also when he gets the verbal order to command the army. Sykes to Stone Tavern and 6th Corps starts moving out (one division starts today and won't stop, the other doesn't start until tomorrow); 2nd and 12th move to Rockville. Either today or yesterday, 1st Corps moved from Upton's Hill to Leesborough.
7th September: 9th Corps moves to Leesborough. This also seems to be roughly when the question of corps commanders (i.e. is Porter going to be under arrest, which corps is Hooker going to command etc.) gets sorted out.
8th September: the army marches out.


It's a real whirlwind of activity. Honestly it makes a lot of sense of the supply crisis in October - there simply was not time to get everything sorted out.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

This does rather seem to be a theme for him. The other examples that come to mind offhand are organizing the Ohio volunteers and bringing order to Washington after he arrived to take command.

Something I've been looking into is the duration of that reorganization period. My count is that

1 September - Chantilly
2 September - the combined armies retreat towards Washington. About now (today or tomorrow) is when the instruction is given to McClellan to form a field army; it's not yet settled who will actually lead it.
3 September - much of the army takes up defensive positions. 5th Corps is at Minor's Hill, 6th Corps at the seminary near Alexandria and Camp California.
4 September - 2nd and (future) 12th Corps to Tennallytown (i.e. already where they will eventually form the army vanguard) and Couch's division of 4th Corps is still on the move from being the army rearguard. This is also the day Lee starts crossing the Potomac.
5 September - McClellan orders Pope, Porter, Heintzelman and Franklin to place their commands in readiness to march, complete with rations and supplies. Could be that 2nd and 12th were already in readiness to march, but clearly at this point the constituency of the army is not yet settled - Heintzelman's corps will ultimately be left behind and so will Morell at first. 9th Corps moves to Meridian Hill, DC.
6th September - McClellan distributes over 30 new regiments to their new corps. This is also when he gets the verbal order to command the army. Sykes to Stone Tavern and 6th Corps starts moving out (one division starts today and won't stop, the other doesn't start until tomorrow); 2nd and 12th move to Rockville. Either today or yesterday, 1st Corps moved from Upton's Hill to Leesborough.
7th September: 9th Corps moves to Leesborough. This also seems to be roughly when the question of corps commanders (i.e. is Porter going to be under arrest, which corps is Hooker going to command etc.) gets sorted out.
8th September: the army marches out.


It's a real whirlwind of activity. Honestly it makes a lot of sense of the supply crisis in October - there simply was not time to get everything sorted out.

You reference it, but most impressive is the integration of all the new regiments.

Also, units were being integrated into the army that fought on September 17 as late as September 16 (Weber's brigade, 16th Connecticut).

While I have some issues with how McClellan fought on the peninsula (admittedly not an area I have studied too much in depth), I think his plan of attack at Antietam was solid. Its execution was not solid, and for that I do believe McClellan is partly to blame for not communicating his plans to his subordinates.

 

[Saphroneth]

The question of how much to communicate is an interesting one. My understanding of McClellan's command style is that he gives quite broad latitude to his corps commanders (I believe that's what Heintzelman says, might be journal or JCCW). In that light, I do want to flag up that we know what was in the orders McClellan gave (where they survive) but not what he said in conversations that we do know happened. It's possible (but cannot of course be proven or even really supposed) that the battle plan was discussed in more detail in those conversations.


There are two ways that Burnside's attack (for example) can go wrong, which is basically that it happens too early (and is repulsed before the attack in the north has been developed) and that it happens too late (and so it can't use the effect of the attack in the north). I'd hope that what we actually have in writing (from memory, basically, Burnside told in advance that he should be ready to go when so ordered on the morning of the 17th) would, if things had gone well, have resolved both of those, though I suppose as a practical matter Burnside might not have known the importance of his attack if it wasn't spelled out to him and might have assumed delay (for he wasn't ready as of 9AM - he should have had a lot more units right near the bridge, for example) was a-okay if all he was meant to do was a diversion.


At the same time, I have to wonder at the extent to which the attack on the left assumed additional importance because the fighting on the right sucked away McClellan's reserves. If what McClellan was originally planning was a manoeuvre sur les derrieres to weaken the centre and an attack up the middle by 5th and 6th Corps over the middle bridge, for example, then the need to commit 6th Corps to strengthen the right would have caused a change in the overall battle plan (which makes 9th Corps from an impactful diversion enabling the main effort into a main-effort sort of thing) without actually changing what 9th Corps is supposed to do (because 9th Corps is still meant to take the Rohrbach bridge as per orders already given, and once that's done further direction can be sent by optical telegraph).

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I believe McClellan's the Dunker Church plateau (identified in Hooker's report) was the initial objective. Once taken, the Army of the Potomac would be in position to flank the Cemetery Hill artillery position. This was the purpose of Sumner's orders to cross Antietam Creek prior to the disaster in the West Woods. If that were accomplished, Middle Bridge would be uncovered, allowing 5th and presumably 6th to cross there.

Although partially successful (plateau seized), the West Woods disaster derailed this plan. Sumner, possibly the mist aggressively-minded (recklessly -minded?) corps commander became more focused on holding his ground north of the Smoketown Road intersection than in any further offensive action. Even when Franklin advocated an attack that afternoon, Sumner rejected the idea.

The real question is Burnside's role. Was his attack intended to hold Confederates (Walker's division) it take advantage of the situation when Walker reinforced the Confederate left? (Or both?) If the purpose was to hold the Confederates, Burnside's attack should have started earlier than it did. If it was to take advantage of Walker's leaving the area, it could not/should not have happened much before 9.

 

[Saphroneth]

The real question is Burnside's role. Was his attack intended to hold Confederates (Walker's division) it take advantage of the situation when Walker reinforced the Confederate left? (Or both?) If the purpose was to hold the Confederates, Burnside's attack should have started earlier than it did. If it was to take advantage of Walker's leaving the area, it could not/should not have happened much before 9.

My assessment of the operational intent is that part of the goal here was to have the attacks (north and south) both going on at once - or, at least, to have the potential for both to be happening at once. That is, the goal was to prevent Lee using interior lines to first fight in the north and then the south, or vice versa.

Part of my reasoning behind this is that McClellan has Burnside on a "wait for orders" situation (as in, wait until I tell you to attack, and the "go" order is - based on the surviving copy - when everything is going well in the north, which means it's not in reaction to confirmation that the enemy has shifted their weight north) but Hooker etc. attack in the north straight off, and McClellan reinforces north - and indeed he reinforces further in the north when there's question over whether Franklin can mount an attack of his own. Given the choice between reinforcing his centre to exploit and assist Burnside's pressure or reinforcing his right to allow for widely separated attacks, McClellan picks the latter.

If McClellan can't attack in the north any more, Lee can turn south and squash Burnside - but if there's still a threat in the north, then Lee can't do that. Conversely, if Burnside's attack is still a going concern, Lee can't transfer forces north to help fend off the attacks in the north.

Note that when AP Hill stops Burnside's attack is when McClellan cancels the movements to prepare for "Franklin's attack".


I don't think that this is guaranteed, but I think it makes sense of the dynamic. McClellan is trying to put Lee in a situation where Lee can't adequately cover the whole frontage over which McClellan can attack. (I'll point out here as an aside that I don't know if McClellan had confirmation McLaws and Anderson had arrived until they steamed into the West Woods.)

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Walker's movement from the Snavely's Ford area to the West Woods is one of the most significant events of Antietam. It also seems to be left in the background of most general studies of the battle. But basically, in my opinion, that opened the door for Burnside's attack to become more than a diversion -- especially if Rodman had been able to reach the ford earlier.

This is an imperfect analogy, but since I assume more people are familiar with it than this, it's like Meade sending all the 12th Corps except Greene's brigade to the left, leaving Culp's Hill vulnerable if the Confederates could have taken advantage.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

(I'll point out here as an aside that I don't know if McClellan had confirmation McLaws and Anderson had arrived until they steamed into the West Woods.)

Obviously I dont know the answer to this, but I assume he didn't know the specific units involved. The Confederate reserves (McLaws's and R. H. Anderson) were generally hidden from view by the Hagerstown Pike ridges. I believe McClellan -- and I belong eve Sumner as well -- were concerned about Confederate reserves behind the hills, which they couldnt see. One reason the size of the Confederate army was inflated in their minds (the other being that they had no idea how much straggling had decimated Confederate ranks).

 

[Saphroneth]

Walker's movement from the Snavely's Ford area to the West Woods is one of the most significant events of Antietam. It also seems to be left in the background of most general studies of the battle. But basically, in my opinion, that opened the door for Burnside's attack to become more than a diversion -- especially if Rodman had been able to reach the ford earlier.

My understanding of the actual Bridge area and the associated fighting is that the Confederate artillery can be (and is) forced back by Union artillery in superior numbers on the heights, and that once that's happened the Confederates defending the actual bridge can be forced back by shelling. There's a big difference between trying to force a bridge with enemy artillery support and trying to force one with friendly artillery support...


The timing of the Snavely's Ford crossing (as far as I'm aware) is that it comes after the bridge is taken.

Obviously I dont know the answer to this, but I assume he didn't know the specific units involved. The Confederate reserves (McLaws's and R. H. Anderson) were generally hidden from view by the Hagerstown Pike ridges.

Yeah, I mean that I think McClellan wasn't sure that most of the Harpers Ferry forces were present until then. In terms of the management of reserves, the northern attack forces Lee to commit basically everything he has.