Elsewhere I commented that Ewell was as good as Longstreet and got some push back. So here is why I think Ewell is misjudged. Looking at Gettysburg and later the wilderness, Ewell gets a lot of flak which I think is undeserved because his orders from Lee are not exactly clear. Ewell appears to have had a more realistic view of what his men could achieve than Lee.
After 1st Manassas/bull run Ewell recommended the slaves be freed, no one seems to give him praise for that, yet later Lee calling for slaves to be conscripted is portrayed as some kind of Great emancipator. Was Ewell perfect, of course not but it arguable that he had a more realistic vision of what it would take the confederacy to win and a more realistic view of what the army could actually achieve.
While Lee did remove Ewell from command, he is also the one who appointed him to Corp command.
In conclusion I submit that Ewell was as good as any Corp commander in the Confederate army.
Interested in your opinions and hope everyone has a good new year ahead.
I've been meaning to get my hands on Don Pfanz's Ewell biography for a while, and only my frugalness has presented me from doing so. I want to do a deep dive on Ewell because the more I read about him, particularly when he gets promoted to corps command, the more my view of him improves.
I can name four, arguably five, distinct battles Ewell fought in command of Confederate Second Corps:
-Second Winchester
-Gettysburg
-The Wilderness
-Spotsylvania (maybe seperate Harris' Farm as it's own battle?)
I am not too familiar with the Fall Campaigns, but it doesn't seem he had much of a showing there compared to A. P. Hill and Jubal Early.
In the first instance, he and his men overwhelmed Milroy's command, capturing thousands of prisoners and opening the way to Pennsylvania for Lee's host. I am not a Gettysburg expert, but from what I have gleaned, he performed brilliantly up until July 1st. I know there's a lot of debate about Ewell not taking the heights at the end of the first day, which it seems the current thesis is that the matter was overblown, that Ewell's freshest troops hadn't arrived until nightfall. I have heard criticisms about his handling of the fighting at Culp's Hill.
I'm much more familiar with the Overland Campaign, and can say safely that the Wilderness was Ewell's high water mark as a corps commander. He deftly repelled Warren and Sedgwick on his own on May 5th; and from Rhea's perspective, it was Ewell, not Lee, who authorized Gordon's flank attack on May 6th. I know Gordon would have loved to have attacked earlier, but Ewell's delay was fortuitous if it wasn't intentional. Gordon would have just two brigades to make the attack, a small force. If he had attacked earlier, he may have seen similar success, but union reserves would have repelled him with heavy losses. As it was, when he did attack, he did significant damage to two Union brigade, while it was far too late in the day for Union reserves to counter him. Sadly, it looks like Gordon never realized this, for it affected his thinking at Cedar Creek and Fort Stedman, where he tried to pull off similar surprise attacks earlier in the day, with initial success prior to a Union counter attack wiping away his gains.
Spotsylvania, however, is where Ewell reached his nadir. He and Martin L. Smith insisted on maintaining the Mule Shoe despite Lee's worries. Certainly, Lee didn't help on May 11th when he ordered Ewell to pull out his guns from the line on the false belief that Grant was retreating. And keep in mind, he did well assisting Anderson on May 8th and helped contain and repell Upton's attack on the 10th.
I should make note of William Allen, Lee's chief of ordnance, who recalled a postwar conversation with Lee about Ewell. Lee found "Ewell perfectly prostrated by the misfortune of the morning, and too much overwhelmed to be effective". Ewell supposedly was cursing and striking at his broken soldiers, to which Lee scolded him: "How can you expect to control these men, when you have lost control of yourself! If you cannot repress your excitement, you had better retire". I've taken this account at face value, that Ewell broke under the pressure on May 12th, but looking at Allen's supposed retelling of Harris' Farm a week later, I'm starting to doubt this.
Ewell did make up for this May 18th, when he repelled Hancock's final attack on the left, before taking part in a recon-in-force at Harris' Farm the next day. I've found the literature regarding this battle baffling. Ewell had some initial success versus the inexperienced heavy artillerists in his front, inflicting heavy loss on the seven Union battalions present. Wikipedia's page on the battle says that the Union lost only 694 killed, wounded or captured compared to Ewell's loss of 904, but these figures seem low; looking at the heavy units engaged, the Union forces lost at least 947 in the 1st Massachusetts, 1st Maine, and 4th New York Heavies, and reinforcements brought the losses up to approximately 1500. While he failed to land a heavy blow, he had succeeded in delaying Grant's move to the North Anna by an additional day, making the battle a minor Confederate victory.
And yet, according to Colonel William Allen of Lee's staff, writing years afterwards, Ewell "lost all prescense of mind, and Lee found him prostrate on the ground, and declaring he could not get Rodes' Division out". This is quoted by Darrell Collins, Rodes' biographer, who mentions that Lee was nowhere near the Harris Farm battlefield for this to make a lick of sense, but accepts it as it is in line with his perception of Ewell (Collins,
Major General Robert E. Rodes of the Army of Northern Virginia, 378-379). This does not hold up at all, given how things played out. While a Union counterattack did rout at least Terry's consolidated brigade of Gordon's DIvision, the matter was stabilized, and the danger to Ewell's Corps was exaggerated.
When Ewell's health failed near the end of the month and Early took command, Lee effectively blocked Ewell from returning, leaving him in command of the Richmond department until the end fo the the war. And even then, when Union forces threatened Richmond, Lee put other subordinates in field command of the sector and bypassed Ewell.
I think there's a lot of factors as to why Ewell was sidelined. First of all, unlike A. P. Hill, Ewell had only breifly served under Lee in 1862 before his wounding, and unlike Hill, had not directly reported to Lee. He was more Jackson's subordinate than Lee, and therefore, Lee had little reporte with Ewell.
Second, Ewell had lost favor with his subordinates. Rodes and Gordon, who had served in Ewell's Brigade at First Manassas, appear to be the most vocal critics. In Spring 1863, Rodes wanted Ewell to take over D. H. Hill's Division before his own promotion. In spring 1864, Rodes question "who commanded the Second Corps, Mrs. Ewell, General Ewell, or Sandie Pendleton, hoping it was the last" (Collins, 352). It seems there was no groundswell of support for Ewell to return either.
I'd say health was a factor, as it was the reason Early got the corps at Bethesda Church. However, given how Hill was kept around despite recurrent illness and more egregious record, I discount this really being a serious reason. After all, Ewell was petitioning to return to corps command, either in Virginia or even in Tennessee.
Forum Host
Bringing the