McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[Belfoured]

Yep. It all started with him disobeying orders, which was compounded by an increasing refusal to "shut up and soldier."

He'd already shown terrible judgement but his days were numbered when kept failing to send in the complete 0700 report, unlike every other division commander in the army, compaining it was impossible (23rd April), and then failed send out the working parties he was ordered, and then complained about it (24th). He kept complaining about it in a series of letters.

He then disputed Porter's authority over him (27th) and finally his general of the trenches for the 28th (Birney) quit his post without being properly relieved, and was not disciplined. At the same time, he writes to McClellan telling him he is going to go over his head to the highest authorities of the government.

Meanwhile, the Chief-of-Staff of 3rd Corps has told Heintzelman that he would compel him to arrest Hamilton. He has been passing all of Hamilton's bluster to Corps directly to GHQ.

At this point McClellan finally has had enough. He asks for the seniority of Hamilton's brigadiers in preparation of relieving Hamilton.

Obviously, Hamilton's incompetance, captiousness, lack of judgement, continual failure to obey lawful orders and finally his inability to discipline his own officers made him a bad officer. His threat to subvert the chain-of-command and go directly to Lincoln was fatal.

"We learn that Gen. HAMILTON does not attempt to explain away anything. He admits the worst that is said against him. He insists that he has done nothing that a good soldier and gentleman might not honorably do." Damning. He admits to his refusal to obey orders and insubordination, but insists he was right to do so.

There is a lot going on with Hamilton. Ultimately, he simply wasn't a good soldier and needed to be gotten rid of. McClellan probably tolerated him for too long.

And so you keep proving my point that everything for you is about "argument" and not actual facts. Show us the orders that he "disobeyed" and where McClellan stated that Hamilton had "disobeyed orders". As you may or may not understand, officers who "disobey orders" are promptly relieved, charged under Article 9, and court martialed. Not so, of course, with officers who are relieved for cause for other reasons and do not get a court martial but may request a court of inquiry if they want.

You make the case that McClellan actually was an ineffective buffoon because you claim Hamilton's "continual failure to obey lawful orders". For all of my criticisms of McClellan, none have stated that he was stupid or was intimidated into failing to perform his duty to take action against a subordinate who "continually" disobeyed orders. Congratulations.

 

[Saphroneth]

?

You were previously denying that Magruder would do this, despite him actually ordering it several times. Because you didn't like the idea, you argued that, despite it being Magruder's stated plan and the orders being on file, he never would. Independent will of the enemy etc.

However, 5,000 would be plenty to hold Yorktown against storm. It would require siege works, which would take 4-6 weeks.

Based on my notes, so far as I'm aware it amounts to:


Existing garrison and their strength on the May report:
6th GA 703
13th AL 474
"19 batteries, Yorktown" 1151
23rd GA 370

Total 2,698 on this report*

In addition, two regiments were to be added if the Confederates were forced to retire. Those being:

26th AL 283
46th VA 356

These add 639 to the garrison (using the May report), giving a total of 3,337. If these strengths exclude extra and daily duty (unlike Union strengths) then it's in the area of of 4,000 by contemporary Union PFD in those units at the time of the May report. (About 4,150 if using the 1864 AoP's PFD to special/extra/daily ratio.)


You may be including loss of strength for those units as a result of the siege? I don't know which units Newton tracked, but if the ones he computes strength loss from are not Yorktown garrison units then I think assuming that the 10%-20% strength loss applies to the Yorktown garrison may not be correct; if on the other hand it includes a Yorktown garrison unit then obviously we can take that as read.


* I will note that, according to Magruder in his May 3 report, his garrisons at Gloucester, Mulberry Island and Yorktown amounted to 6,000 men. Those units, on the May report, are (to my understanding of the dispositions):

Yorktown garrison
6th GA, 13th AL, 19 batteries, 23rd GA - given above, 2,698

Mulberry Island
5th LA 744
Noland's bn 162
Total 906

Gloucester Point
21st VA Mil 39
61st Va Mil 201
9th VA Mil 29
Armistead 46
Det Cav 18
Det East Shore 58
Heavy Art 332
Matthews Lt Dr 40
Total 763

These sum - on the May report - to 4,367. There may additionally be the 26th VA included in the description, but as of the 5th the 26th VA was no longer at Gloucester Point and was at the redoubts instead, and no strength for the 26th VA is in my notes. Similarly the 5th LA was

These units are what Magruder calls 6,000 men; consequently, Magruder is giving his garrison strength as about 37% more than the same units are on the May report. This would put the Yorktown garrison (before reinforcement) as 3,707, Gloucester Point as 1,048 and Mulberry Island as 1,245 (which add to 6,000).

 

[DanSBHawk]

Except the direct statement of Hamilton, and the letters, many of which are accessable, and the diary of Heintzelman. But yes, no evidence if you ignore all the evidence...

Then provide links.

 

[DanSBHawk]

?

You were previously denying that Magruder would do this, despite him actually ordering it several times. Because you didn't like the idea, you argued that, despite it being Magruder's stated plan and the orders being on file, he never would. Independent will of the enemy etc.

However, 5,000 would be plenty to hold Yorktown against storm. It would require siege works, which would take 4-6 weeks.

And I still doubt that Lee would allow 5000 men to get trapped on the Peninsula when he was trying to accumulate as large a force as necessary to give battle closer to Richmond.

At one point, I believe you two were claiming that it would have been 3000 left behind at Yorktown. Now it's 5000. Anything to make excuses for McClellan.

 

[Belfoured]

Then provide links.

We appear to be working with a flexible definition of "disobeying orders". Johnny Cochrane would have had a field day at Hamilton's court martial - the one that never took place, of course.

 

[1SGDan]

 

[JerryD]

Yep, which is why I keep trying to insist we "play the ball." It's bizarre to watch the "anti-McClellan cult," to borrow Belfoured turn of phrase, act like the defendant in this KITH sketch:

"Anti-McClellan cult".. Hilarious. Here's a hint. When the vast majority of people agree on something, its not a cult. Its the norm. Its the outliers who constitute a "cult", if there is one. McClellan has a well deserved rep as a failure as a battlefield commander. Sure, some folks take contrary position, but its undeniable that the majority opinion is that Little Mac had no business leading an army on a battlefield. Quartermaster, sure. But he just did not have the instinct or the mental stability to lead an army.

 

[67th Tigers]

To be clear, there were six brigades of infantry on the Warwick/Yorktown line on the 5th April. Their infantry strengths by the late April memo were, going south to north were:

--- 2nd Division under McLaws ---
August's Brigade: 2,712 effective men, plus 8 batteries (inc. Cabell's Reserve Arty)
Colston's Brigade: 1,750
Wilcox's Brigade: 2,892 plus a battery
Winston's Brigade: ca. 2,700 plus a battery (32nd VA Bn estimated)
--- 1st Division under Rains ---
Ward's Brigade: 2,769 plus 3 batteries (includes dismounted cavalry etc.)
Colquitt's Brigade: 3,204, including fixed arty (about half of whom were drawn from the infantry) and Bohannan's Bn, plus a battery.

The order of the 7th is for 2 regiments of Winston's Brigade (639 effective men) to be added to the 1st Division to defend the place. The cavalry (923 effective men) would leave, giving 5,689 effective infantry, plus 4 additional batteries, at Yorktown.

By the 7th, the army had been reorganised into three divisions thus:

--- 2nd Division under McLaws ---
August's Brigade: 2,712 effective men, plus 8 batteries (inc. Cabell's Reserve Arty)
Colston's Brigade: 1,750
Cobb's Brigade: 2,524 (only 4 regts confirmed arrived on the 6th) plus a battery
Kershaw's Brigade: 2,214 plus a battery
Division strength = 9,200 effective enlisted infantry plus 10 batteries

--- 3rd Division under Wilcox ---
Wilcox's Brigade: 2,892 plus a battery
Winston's Brigade: ca. 2,700 plus a battery (32nd VA Bn estimated)
Rodes' Brigade: 2,480 plus a battery (9th AL reduced to 700)
Division strength = 8,072 plus 3 batteries

--- 1st Division under Rains ---
Ward's Brigade: 2,769 plus 3 batteries (includes dismounted cavalry etc.)
Colquitt's Brigade: 3,204, including fixed arty (about half of whom were drawn from the infantry) and Bohannan's Bn, plus a battery.
Early's Brigade: 2,284 plus a battery
Division strength = 8,257 plus 6 batteries

Magruder's estimate of 5,000 defending Yorktown is reasonably accurate.

At one point, I believe you two were claiming that it would have been 3000 left behind at Yorktown. Now it's 5000. Anything to make excuses for McClellan.

A search reveals 3,000 was your number. I see Saph took the late April garrison and added the 2 regiments mentioned at one point, getting to about 3,500. This doesn't account for Ward's brigade etc.

 

[Belfoured]

"Anti-McClellan cult".. Hilarious. Here's a hint. When the vast majority of people agree on something, its not a cult. Its the norm. Its the outliers who constitute a "cult", if there is one. McClellan has a well deserved rep as a failure as a battlefield commander. Sure, some folks take contrary position, but its undeniable that the majority opinion is that Little Mac had no business leading an army on a battlefield. Quartermaster, sure. But he just did not have the instinct or the mental stability to lead an army.

And the dispositive proof of a cult is a belief that their hero never made a single mistake and exhibited qualities otherwise attributed only in the New Testament.

 

[TallTallMan]

I like how this reached an impasse and then suddenly Yorktown gets an analysis. I'm not even in these things and already I'm seeing flames before my monitor in my imagination. Maybe something other than Mac would be healthy.

 

[67th Tigers]

I've been looking into the Hamilton affair recently, and will post a major update. What is interesting is that Hamilton was NOT claiming Wynn's Mill was abandoned and he could take it with one brigade. He was claiming the Beaver Dam Creek line (i.e. the Red and White Redoubts and their three lines of entrenchments) was abandoned...