"Lee Surprised by McClellan's Speed"

[JerryD]

Part of my issue with this - or at least with the idea that Lee has a read on McClellan that he's confident in - is that Lee doesn't really act that way in June, July and August.

On June 25, McClellan is attacking Richmond, and on June 26 Lee launches off a very poor-odds attack at Mechanicsville because he feels under time pressure - that he can't wait long enough for Jackson to arrive.

This costs a lot of Confederate casualties and it doesn't seem in keeping with the idea that Lee would read McClellan well enough to know that McClellan would be slow (that is, that the one thing we can say Lee was not on 26 June was "sure that McClellan would be slow"). If Lee was confident in expecting McClellan to be slow he could wait for Jackson.


During July, Lee is unwilling to detach most of his army from Richmond. He keeps at least 1,700 companies (the equivalent of 10+ Union divisions) in or within a day or so's march of Richmond at all times, even when Jackson is asking for reinforcement against Pope, and keeps this up until August when his opinion abruptly changes (some days into McClellan shipping off his sick in order to withdraw). Again, this is not consistent with the idea that Lee was comfortable in expecting McClellan to be inactive or slow.

My memory is not that Lee rushed forward without Jackson, but that AP Hill did. Hill was under orders to wait for Jackson and I am not aware that Lee ever changed those orders. So I don't think your account is accurate.

If you are seriously trying to argue that Little Mac always acted with lightening speed, LOL,, well, I guess folks are entitled to their opinions but the record is pretty clear that McClellan was usually cautious in his actions. Now, that is not necessarily a bad thing. Longstreet, Rosecrans and Thomas had similar reps, and they are usually highly thought of. Mac's disqualifying qualities lie elsewhere.

 

[Yankeedave]

Left McClellan on the Peninsula and now he pops up in Maryland.
More to the point Lee is strapped with Harper's Ferry on his right and his baggage is up behind his left..

 

[Saphroneth]

If you are seriously trying to argue that Little Mac always acted with lightening speed, LOL,, well, I guess folks are entitled to their opinions but the record is pretty clear that McClellan was usually cautious in his actions.

I'm not saying McClellan always acted with lightning speed - though there are certainly times when he moves quickly. The Loudoun Valley campaign (which is post-Maryland) certainly sees him move fast, though of course it doesn't inform Lee's opinion in the Maryland Campaign.


Most of the time on the Peninsula McClellan is either stopped (by a genuine serious barrier, like the Warwick line, the Chickahominy in need of bridging, or the Richmond defences themselves) or is waiting for promised reinforcement (actually pretty much constant after mid-May) or is, yes, moving slowly - but not that slowly. Logistics is a factor.

My memory is not that Lee rushed forward without Jackson, but that AP Hill did. Hill was under orders to wait for Jackson and I am not aware that Lee ever changed those orders. So I don't think your account is accurate.

Fair point, yes - though I'd expect Lee to have been accompanying AP Hill, offhand. Where was he on the 26th? If he sees the attack going in and doesn't countermand it then it's pretty similar in practical terms.

 

[67th Tigers]

My memory is not that Lee rushed forward without Jackson, but that AP Hill did. Hill was under orders to wait for Jackson and I am not aware that Lee ever changed those orders. So I don't think your account is accurate.

It is.

"Brent found Lee on the Mechanicsville road about 3 P.M. Lee said he was happy to see Brent and asked about the state of affairs with Magruder. Brent filled him in. Lee then said: "I suppose you have come to find out the cause of our delay, as Genl. Magruder must be anxious. We have been waiting for Genl. Jackson, from whom I have not heard, but I cannot wait longer, and have just sent orders to Genl. Hill to cross at Meadow Bridge." Brent's postwar account is supported by a letter from Thomas Goree, one of Longstreet's aides, written a few weeks after the battle. If these two accounts are to be credited, then Lee and Hill decided at the same point that the time had come, Jackson or no Jackson. It clears up the mystery of Lee's not censuring Hill for crossing the river. It also allows Lee to have a little more credit (or blame) for control of the day's events than he has been given—although if Hill's report is to be believed, he made the decision before he heard from Lee."

Burton, Brian K.. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles (pp. 64-65).

A frustrated Lee ordered AP Hill to cross the Meadow Bridge, which initiated contact with the enemy. Lee then leaned into the contact, fearful that if he wasn't attacking he'd be exposed to a counterattack. He did that a lot in the Seven Days.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

I wouldn't call Lee's knowledge of the Peninsula Campaign "second hand". Through it all, Lee was the military advisor to Jefferson Davis in Richmond, in regular communication with Johnston. He had a front row seat to the whole thing.

@JeffBrooks is completely right.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Thinking on it more, it's an unusual conclusion to come to. Lee personally had very little personal experience against McClellan, really just the Seven Days and the beginning of the Maryland Campaign. And while he would have second hand knowledge of the Peninsula Campaign there wasn't a lot to base McClellan being slow; The nature of the campaign and the constraints of the topography its self would limit rapid movements.

I think McClellan's methodical advance on Richmond was enough to convince Lee (and others) that McClellan was slow, whether deserved on not.

As someone also pointed out, Lee knew he had wrecked Pope at Second Manassas and McClellan was shipping up from the James River. It's a reasonable expectation that reorganization will take time.

Given Lee's contempt of Hooker, I don't think his contempt for McClellan is surprising - again, whether deserved or not.

Lee and McClellan worked together on Gen. Scott's staff in Mexico, and its very common to hear that officers had opinions on their fellow officers based on having been in the service together. I suspect Lee knew McClellan very well and probably had a very good idea of his tendencies.

Lee probably also understood the mind of the typical US Army engineering officer. McClellan had been a military and civilian engineer. Almost all of the engineers-turned-generals in the Civil War demonstrated excessive caution. Even Rosecrans, one of the more aggressive of these, was only aggressive after methodical preparations.

Lee had been in the US Army Corps of Engineers most of his career, during which time he met or knew by reputation most of the others. He was the supreme outlier - an army officer who knew engineering well but didn't have the engineer mentality. Perhaps that's why he had ended up superintendent of West Point and switched to the Cavalry a few years before the war.

 

[JerryD]

It is.

"Brent found Lee on the Mechanicsville road about 3 P.M. Lee said he was happy to see Brent and asked about the state of affairs with Magruder. Brent filled him in. Lee then said: "I suppose you have come to find out the cause of our delay, as Genl. Magruder must be anxious. We have been waiting for Genl. Jackson, from whom I have not heard, but I cannot wait longer, and have just sent orders to Genl. Hill to cross at Meadow Bridge." Brent's postwar account is supported by a letter from Thomas Goree, one of Longstreet's aides, written a few weeks after the battle. If these two accounts are to be credited, then Lee and Hill decided at the same point that the time had come, Jackson or no Jackson. It clears up the mystery of Lee's not censuring Hill for crossing the river. It also allows Lee to have a little more credit (or blame) for control of the day's events than he has been given—although if Hill's report is to be believed, he made the decision before he heard from Lee."

Burton, Brian K.. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles (pp. 64-65).

A frustrated Lee ordered AP Hill to cross the Meadow Bridge, which initiated contact with the enemy. Lee then leaned into the contact, fearful that if he wasn't attacking he'd be exposed to a counterattack. He did that a lot in the Seven Days.

Yeah, I am not giving any credence to this account. It just runs contrary to every account I have read. I am going with the prevailing wisdom on the topic and not some rando comment.

 

[Belfoured]

Yeah, I am not giving any credence to this account. It just runs contrary to every account I have read. I am going with the prevailing wisdom on the topic and not some rando comment.

Worse is this bucket of poster-added fiction: "fearful that if he wasn't attacking he'd be exposed to a counterattack. He did that a lot in the Seven Days."

Actually, it was McClellan who exposed his own "fear" in writing multiple times during that week, some of it verging on hysteria/panic. It's always interesting how a quotation from some source - primary or secondary - about one event is followed by editorial inflation of that to multiple events.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Worse is this bucket of poster-added fiction: "fearful that if he wasn't attacking he'd be exposed to a counterattack. He did that a lot in the Seven Days."

Actually, it was McClellan who exposed his own "fear" in writing multiple times during that week, some of it verging on hysteria/panic. It's always interesting how a quotation from some source - primary or secondary - about one event is followed by editorial inflation of that to multiple events.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Inasmuch as the term "Virginia Creeper" is offensive or off limits to some, I will call McClellan "The West Point Snail." He was definitely intelligent to have finished 2nd in his class at West Point, though, with no indicators of snail propensity.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Inasmuch as the term "Virginia Creeper" is offensive or off limits to some

The Virginia Creeper was a nice rail trail until Helene wrecked it.

 

[Saphroneth]

Since I've seen a number of mentions of the advance up the Peninsula as part of the cause of McClellan's reputation, what I wonder is whether McClellan is being blamed here for the time he was stopped (in front of Yorktown, by a strong defensive position) or for the time he was moving (from Yorktown up to the Chickahominy, and then across it).

The factors controlling the movement are different in different cases, but for the moving period the issue is logistical. What's going on there is that McClellan's army is relying on wagon supply with quite bad roads, and he has a large army which needs feeding every day from landed supplies.

From any given supply point, the army can operate a few days out - the exact number depends on how many wagons there are. The wagons need to bring supplies (chiefly food) from the supply point, to the army, distribute them, and then the wagons need to return to pick up new supplies. This is the "circuit" model of supply.

The roads on the Peninsula in this period are not especially good (the weather's been awful and they've been used by something like 160,000 men plus their animals) which means that the wagons can't move very far on any given day. This means that a supply base has to be set up, the army moved forwards as far as they can go from that supply base, and then a new one set up inside the area that the army protects - otherwise you're setting up a new supply base in advance of the army and it won't go very well.


Something vaguely analogous (though not a direct parallel) is the way that Sherman's advance on Atlanta is fundamentally logistically limited. He's rebuilding the rail head behind him, and when he's got supply he can generally overcome Johnston, but he can't just march ahead to Atlanta in a week because then he couldn't supply himself. He has to wait for his supply head to catch up and moves at about a mile per day as a result. (This doesn't seem to have earned him any derogatory nicknames, though I could have missed one.)

 

[67th Tigers]

Yeah, I am not giving any credence to this account. It just runs contrary to every account I have read. I am going with the prevailing wisdom on the topic and not some rando comment.

It's a quote from Burton. It is the prevailing wisdom; c.f. Harsh etc. as well.

 

[Belfoured]

It's a quote from Burton. It is the prevailing wisdom; c.f. Harsh etc. as well.

"He did that a lot in the Seven Days" is not from Burton - or from Harsh or from any qualified author. It's an opinion which has no factual support - sort of like Baghdad Bob's pronouncements.

 

[Jamieva]

My understanding was Lee expected to have more time to roam around the MD and PA countryside before Mac came out of the DC defenses to confront him. It's not 100% attributable to 191.

 

[Yankeedave]

Little of the army of the Potomac shipped north in time for Shapsburg. It was Pope's army plus Burnside's that would would do the majority of the fighting. The First Corps and the 12th are not aop. Valley and Northern Virginia troops..
How fast can McClellan gather this up and move. How aware was Lee of the Pope/McClellan/D.C. thing that they had going..
And fought Lee to a draw at worst...with somebody else's army...

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Little of the army of the Potomac shipped north in time for Shapsburg. It was Pope's army plus Burnside's that would would do the majority of the fighting. The First Corps and the 12th are not aop.

II, V, and VI Corps (and Couch's division from IV Corps) were AotP. Some had arrived in Northern Virginia in time to fight at Second Manassas under Pope.

I Corps was AotP that was held back from the Peninsula Campaign. It was under Hooker then Meade at Antietam; they had been in the Seven Days.

XII is the only corps that was solely Pope's, and it was under a new commander (Mansfield replaced Banks).

IX Corps was part Burnside's, part Cox's Kanawaha division that was technically assigned to Pope's army but didn't reach DC in time to participate in Pope's campaign.

 

[Yankeedave]

Thanks. Clarified what I said.

 

[Saphroneth]

Operational movement of the Union army on the way up the Peninsula


The Union army began advancing after Yorktown was abandoned. Some of the army was sent to Eltham's Landing by water, to attempt to block the Confederate retreat, while the rest of the army moved by land.

Williamsburg was fought on 5th May.


Queen's Creek (which lets out into the York just upriver of the Williamsburg line) was set up as a depot on the 8th May, and the advance guard and cavalry moved out as soon as they were fed. Note that until this depot was set up the Union main body had no means of resupply - they were working off the three days' rations that could be issued to each command at any given time, though the roads were so poor that the wagons available could not actually carry three days' supplies for the whole army.


Another depot at Bigler's Wharf (5 miles upriver from Queen's Creek) was set up the next day, and the day after that (the 10th) a depot was set up at Eltham's Landing. On this date AotP headquarters was at Roper's Church, Barhamsville, 16-19 miles from Williamsburg, though the rear of the army was behind it.

The next depots set up were Cumberland Landing (on the 13th, a point at which the rear of the army still hadn't all passed Eltham's) and White House (some supplies sent there on the 14th for the advance guard, main depot started on the 15th, and the Cumberland Landing materiel was towed upriver on the 19th).

As of the 15th, the right hand column was 6th Corps (about level with Cumberland Landing) leading 5th and 2nd, and the left hand column was 4th Corps leading 3rd. This suggests part of the problem - the number of roads is limited.


On the 10th the depot at Eltham's Landing is set up 5-6 miles from the army's headquarters.

On the 15th the depot at White House Landing is about as far from the head of the Union column (6th Corps).

If this is a "rule" then the Cumberland Landing depot would be set up about when the head of the Union column was at Slaterville or points nearby, which would be about 6-7 miles from Eltham's Landing.



The sequence that then results is that the Union army sets up a depot which is workable within a short distance of the depot. The Union army then advances to the limits of what that depot can allow, and a new depot is set up close enough that the army could lunge out and protect it if need be (i.e. if the Confederates lunge forward to try and destroy it).

Once set up, this new depot expands the range of movement of the army.

Shown: approximate positions of the army's main body when the later three depots are set up. The Cumberland Landing one is basically a guess but is derived as per the text above.



Once the White House Landing depot is set up and the army has caught up with it, the main limiting factor is to bridge the Chickahominy. At this point it's not about movement speed per se but on fully bridging an obstacle the army will need to split itself over.

 

[BuckPvt]

A couple people point out that Lee anticipated more time for the Union army to reorganize. This would be fair but by the time Lee is crossing the mountains his cavalry has had contact with parts of the Army of the Potomac, parts of the Army of Virginia, and Burnside's Corps. And the occupation of Sugarloaf mountain offered a fairly good perspective of the numbers moving out from DC. So Lee should have had a fairly reasonable guess about a large organized Union force moving on him by that point.