McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[NedBaldwin]

McClellan: 87,164 present for duty excluding Morell's division, apparently as of the 16th-17th. Humphreys's division with 6,000+ men arrived early the 18th (according to his report), so I presume it is not counted for the strength of the 16th and 17th. http://antietam.aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=187
...

One odd thing about this is that Livermore's reference is to McClellan's report in which the 87,164 is shown from adding up the Corps with the 5th Corps noted as 'one division not yet arrived'. I would think the missing division would be Humphreys and thus the 87,164 should include Morrell.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Here is a numbers question regarding Antietam I would like to see 67th Tigers and Elennsar weigh in on. A few days after the battle Meade submitted a table showing that on the day after the battle the 1st Corps only had 6,364 PFD but 4 days later it had 15,239 PFD, an increase of over 8,000 from collecting up stragglers etc.

My question is did all the decrease happen during the battle on the 17th or do we think the 1st shed some of these men during the previous week?

 

[rpkennedy]

Here is a numbers question regarding Antietam I would like to see 67th Tigers and Elennsar weigh in on. A few days after the battle Meade submitted a table showing that on the day after the battle the 1st Corps only had 6,364 PFD but 4 days later it had 15,239 PFD, an increase of over 8,000 from collecting up stragglers etc.

My question is did all the decrease happen during the battle on the 17th or do we think the 1st shed some of these men during the previous week?

I would think that it would be a combination of minor wounded from the Second Manassas campaign and South Mountain returning to their units, stragglers over the course of the previous month or so returning, and a couple units that had been detached returning to the corps (the 16th Maine comes to mind). Although, that is a huge jump unless they received some kind of reinforcement.

R

 

[Elennsar]

Here is a numbers question regarding Antietam I would like to see 67th Tigers and Elennsar weigh in on. A few days after the battle Meade submitted a table showing that on the day after the battle the 1st Corps only had 6,364 PFD but 4 days later it had 15,239 PFD, an increase of over 8,000 from collecting up stragglers etc.

My question is did all the decrease happen during the battle on the 17th or do we think the 1st shed some of these men during the previous week?

Alright, looking at relevant reports:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...dx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Meade;rgn=full text;
idno=waro0028;didno=waro0028;view=image;seq=0351 - the one you refer to.

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...o=waro0028;didno=waro0028;view=image;seq=0338 The army as of the 20th, giving 1st Corps as 13,093.

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...o=waro0027;didno=waro0027;view=image;seq=0083 and McClellan's claim as to what was present "at the battle".

If McClellan's figures for "at the battle" for his own army are correct, a great many men were knocked loose from their commands (disproportionately from Ricketts' division) on the 17th, and not herded back into line until the 20th or 22nd. Stragglers and other returnees from before would not account for the difference between the 17th and the the 20th.

 

[Lt R. Blackwell 4th Texas]

Do you have any specific references to cite for comparison?

Not trying to make an argument, just wondering what you've read to compare it to Tenney's thesis.

Lee's numbers have tended to be underestimated.

A little over 20 years ago a graduate student at George Mason University named Leon Walter Tenney wrote a thesis paper called "Seven Days in 1862: Numbers in Union and Confederate Armies Before Richmond". Its become the standard reference for troops strength during the campaign.

I am reading General Lee's Army by Joseph Glatthaar, and he doesn't even cite Tenney. He puts the ANV at somewhat less than 90,000. Page 136. This is a recent work by an author who put in a prodigious amount of research.

Another recent book is Seven Days Before Richmond by Rudolph J Schroeder. He has the ANV at 88,500 at the beginning of the Seven Days. I don't think he cites Tenney either.

 

[Elennsar]

Okay, per my checking just now (tell me if I'm looking at the wrong thing):

http://books.google.com/books?id=2IeprlRuaJwC&pg=PA459&lpg=PA459&dq=Army of Northern Virginia "Rudolph J Schroeder"&source=bl&ots=eNKTsyzqew&sig=U6pKW7c7T2AWs6SsJyBeQy_vhls&hl=en&sa=X&ei=UuukU9qUOsL5oATTr4GADQ&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=numbers&f=false

"With Jackson's Valley Army, Lee would have 92,400 men at his disposal."

I wonder if he or Glatthaar are including all of what in Tenney's write up are "miscellaneous". Not counting the Richmond defenses (heavy artillery and militia mostly) would subtract six thousand from the numbers he gives for Lee's total forces.

 

[67th Tigers]

Here is a numbers question regarding Antietam I would like to see 67th Tigers and Elennsar weigh in on. A few days after the battle Meade submitted a table showing that on the day after the battle the 1st Corps only had 6,364 PFD but 4 days later it had 15,239 PFD, an increase of over 8,000 from collecting up stragglers etc.

My question is did all the decrease happen during the battle on the 17th or do we think the 1st shed some of these men during the previous week?

Meade stated he had only 9,000 men present on the morning of the 17th, and Carman calculates 8,619 infantry present from Meades data.

If the whole army had straggled as bad as 1st Corps then the Federals would only have 52,000 present on the 17th.

The paper I'd like to see is Perceptions not Realities: The Army of the Potomac in the Maryland Campaign by Daniel Vermilya, which is available from the Antietam Bookstore, but I've not yet got a copy.

 

[Elennsar]

Where exactly does Meade claim to have had only 9,000 men present on the 17th?

 

[67th Tigers]

Where exactly does Meade claim to have had only 9,000 men present on the 17th?

These are the numbers he gave, and are quoted in Carman.

Carman estimates:

1st Corps: 8,619 inf and 819 art
2nd Corps: 15,206 inf and 859 art
5th Corps: 1,684 inf (only the five reg bns that crossed the creek) and 1,540 art (inc. arty res)
6th Corps: 1,684 inf (Irwin's bde only) and 901 art
9th Corps: 11,714 inf and 979 art
12th Corps: 7,239 inf and 392 art
Cavalry: 4,320 PFD (including regiments not present and the horse artillery)

Carman does not estimate for the 4 unengaged regular battalions, Morell's division of 3 bdes or the 5 brigades of 6th Corps that did not make an attack.

The 4 regular battalions of Lovell's brigade are 1,040 on the 20th, and this is a good estimate of the unengaged portion.

The PFD of Morell is 5,409, which is obviously more than effectives.

In B&L Franklin estimated his 5 brigades engaged at South Mountain at 6,500 effectives, and they took slightly 533 casualties, and so they have ca. 6,000 effectives. The missing brigade is Hancocks, with a PFD of 2,114.

Thus Carman gives 55,946 engaged. To this we can add:

4 regular battalions: 1,040*
Morell's division: less than 5,409*
5 of Franklin's brigades: + 6,500+2,114*-533-1684 = 6,397

(* note these are PFD and thus an overestimate of effectives)

Unengaged but present = 12,846

Total = 68,792

Now this is likely too high, but should be viewed as the maximum number of effectives McClellan had on the field. A few thousand should be knocked off for the non-effectives in Morell's div and Hancock's bde. Moreover, some of the numbers Carman reports he admits are the PFD, as no estimate of effectives was available. Where there was no available data he used the largest available figures for the Federals, and thus is overestimating a bit.

Take the case of the 132nd Pennsylvania. The colonel reported he took 750 men into action, but that evening they only had 364 present after taking 152 casualties. This implies that the effective strength of the regiment was 516, and that a third of those claimed to be in action were not.

 

[Elennsar]

Confederate forces, for comparison:
http://books.google.com/books?id=d-D3LGXXG8EC&pg=PA454&lpg=PA454&dq=1st Corps: 8,619 infantry CArman&source=bl&ots=djJhAUCvJo&sig=xU_zjvUloZSlgwG0MeQyQRxa7j0&hl=en&sa=X&ei=sK2lU5vxNoHioAT94IC4DQ&ved=0CCkQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=1st Corps: 8,619 infantry CArman&f=false

By his figures, 37,351 Confederates engaged.

For those who haven't read it: the report for the 132nd Pennsylvania: http://antietam.aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=292

"We brought into action 750 men, and brought out 364 men, exclusive of officers." (my italics)

How many do you add to allow for officers not counted with the 364 brought out? Obviously not two hundred odd, but they do need to be considered - and officer strength is certainly relevant to both the numbers and combat effectiveness of units involved.

 

[kevikens]

How odd. McClellan moved at ca. 0800 to the Ecker Knoll, and did not return to the Pry House that day. The Ecker Knoll was the site of Porter's HQ and he continued to control the battle from there.

Lee OTOH hardly moved at all, because he couldn't. He had been injured on 31st August and both wrists were still in splints, so he couldn't grab the reins. The 17th September was the first he'd been on a horse since the accident, and he was lifted onto his horse Traveller and sat there whilst an aide led the horse onto a hill just north of Sharpsburg where he remained prettymuch for the whole battle.

Whether Lee could ride about on the day of the battle. I have before me an article from the special 2002 issue of Antietam, the Commemorative Issue put out by the editors of America's Civil War and Civil War Times. On page 56 the author of the article, "Horrors of Bloody Lane" notes that lee was kept out of the saddle until 9/16 and Don Troiani's painting, Until Sundown, has Lee with one hand bandaged but the other grasping the reins and clearly in control of a moving horse by himself. As for Lee not moving about from that one spot on the hill I must admit I have not been able to track his movements on the day of Antietam but, for some reason, I have always gotten the impression that Lee moved around the field encouraging his men. Is my image of Lee incorrect for this battle?

 

[67th Tigers]

Whether Lee could ride about on the day of the battle. I have before me an article from the special 2002 issue of Antietam, the Commemorative Issue put out by the editors of America's Civil War and Civil War Times. On page 56 the author of the article, "Horrors of Bloody Lane" notes that lee was kept out of the saddle until 9/16 and Don Troiani's painting, Until Sundown, has Lee with one hand bandaged but the other grasping the reins and clearly in control of a moving horse by himself. As for Lee not moving about from that one spot on the hill I must admit I have not been able to track his movements on the day of Antietam but, for some reason, I have always gotten the impression that Lee moved around the field encouraging his men. Is my image of Lee incorrect for this battle?

Yes. Both wrists were still splinted and his right arm was still in a sling. He was lifted onto Traveller and an aide held the reins. He seems to have been a bit mobile, with Traveller being led, but he wasn't fully mobile. When he visited McLaws he was compelled to dismount and walk, and the aide brought Traveller along behind. When he visited Jackson he remained on Traveller, but the aide led the horse.

Going by Harsh's account that is.

 

[Lt R. Blackwell 4th Texas]

Okay, per my checking just now (tell me if I'm looking at the wrong thing):

http://books.google.com/books?id=2IeprlRuaJwC&pg=PA459&lpg=PA459&dq=Army of Northern Virginia "Rudolph J Schroeder"&source=bl&ots=eNKTsyzqew&sig=U6pKW7c7T2AWs6SsJyBeQy_vhls&hl=en&sa=X&ei=UuukU9qUOsL5oATTr4GADQ&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=numbers&f=false

"With Jackson's Valley Army, Lee would have 92,400 men at his disposal."

I wonder if he or Glatthaar are including all of what in Tenney's write up are "miscellaneous". Not counting the Richmond defenses (heavy artillery and militia mostly) would subtract six thousand from the numbers he gives for Lee's total forces.

That's the right book. In Appendix A is where he indicates Lee's Army at 88,500, broken down by unit. That number may well exclude the Richmond defense forces.

 

[Elennsar]

Since I don't own a copy (thus google searching), I'll take your word for it.

Seems low to me, but not unbelievable if its not counting the heavy artillery around Richmond and the like.

Lee certainly had his largest ever army at this point, this seems agreed upon by all sources.

 

[67th Tigers]

That's the right book. In Appendix A is where he indicates Lee's Army at 88,500, broken down by unit. That number may well exclude the Richmond defense forces.

It does miss the defences. However what is really important is that these numbers are estimates of the number of combatants taken into the field. That is a good number, but not PFD.

To get the equivalent Federal figure you need to deduct the Federal forces not present, taking the 105,000 down to about 96,000. Then you have to multiply that by 80% (approx) to derive the equivalent figure of about 77,000.

In fact a few Federal brigades ISTR gave their musket strength during the Seven Days, and most were much less than their official PFD. It would make an interesting project.

 

[OpnCoronet]

All commanders play a numbers game when reporting the size of their commands to a certain extent. It is just that little mac raised such obfuscation to a fine art, in his attempts to free himself from any restraints(that he did not approve) from his superiors.

 

[Mike Griffith]

It's not surprising that McClellan has taken a beating from scholars, since he felt that the Radical Republicans were waging war for reasons that went well beyond the restoration of the Union and the constraints of the Constitution, that Lincoln had abused his executive powers, that Republican economic policies were harmful and divisive, that American needed to return to a sound currency, and that the tactics being used by some Union generals were dishonorable. So, I'm not surprised that scholars have given him a beating.

What is truly amazing is that McClellan got 41% of the vote in late 1864, in spite of the fact that Democratic soldiers were pressured not to vote or to vote Republican, that Democrats in some parts of the North were being violently persecuted (see, for example, Jennifer Weber's book Copperheads), that there were numerous reported cases of election irregularities, that thousands of Northern war opponents had been illegally jailed, that hundreds of Democratic newspapers had been shut down, and that victory over the South seemed very probable. It's nothing short of amazing, and rather revealing, that he got 41% of the vote under those circumstances.

It's also interesting to note that McClellan won a larger share of the popular vote than Lincoln won in 1860. Lincoln received less than 40% of the vote in 1860, 39.8% to be exact (but won because the population had become heavily concentrated in the North and the conservative vote was split between the three other candidates). If the South had participated in the 1864 election, McClellan may well have won the popular vote by a substantial margin.

McClellan's 1864 acceptance speech makes for some very interesting, insightful reading:

http://www.sonofthesouth.net/union-generals/mcclellan/mclellan-1864-democratic-nomination.htm

 

[67th Tigers]

McClellan's 1864 acceptance speech makes for some very interesting, insightful reading:

http://www.sonofthesouth.net/union-generals/mcclellan/mclellan-1864-democratic-nomination.htm

Indeed. The Democratic nomination was heavily contested, and the Peace Democrats ended up inserting a recall clause on McClellan's nomination to allow them to get rid of him if he repudiated the peace plank. He promptly did this with his acceptance letter, and many wished to get rid of him then.

Of course, the implication of that preservation of the Union trumped the Presidency in McClellan's mind. He was willing to give up the nomination rather than split the Union. He also later indicated in correspondence he'd give it up for command of his old army@:

"should the wish of my heart ever be realized - and that is to command the Army of the Potomac in one more great campaign - that badge [General Sedgwick's, sent to McClellan after he was killed] will go with me, and share whatever of good or ill fortune I may meet with."

For all my readings of McClellan I find no indication he desired to be President (and certainly not in 1862), and his greatest desire seems to have been a Lieutenant Generalcy.

 

[Peedeel]

It seems to me, McClellan inflated the enemy numbers even after the fact, when it should have been obvious what he faced. To me that means he is doing it on purpose to make him look better, or is unable to use his army to gather intelligence. Either is a sin for a battlefield commander.

I also chalked Lee's comments up to human nature. He considered Antietam his greatest battle, so McClellan would be his greatest foe.

All in all, he was a better than average administrator, but in my opinion he was terrible tactically. He didn't have the "killer instincts" needed to WIN. To use a modern sports term, he wasn't "clutch". To me he was the second best commander the AOP ever had. (a distant second, but silver is silver.)

Jim

In war battles never go quite as expected; battle, ultimately, is a test where the most solid bodies can prove themselves ethereal and dissolve, where the clearest minds can become clouded, and where the most laudable initiatives result in unexpected and unmitigated catastrophe.

We armchair generals with our great hindsight express indignant surprise or shock; we try to find causes and reasons and even make excuses for this or that regrettable incident. Above all we love to summon before our court of "Historical Fact" the shades of the performers of those long ago acts, in close company with the spirits of their long turned-to-dust chroniclers; we then subsequently fight battles ourselves over their actions, their words, or torture their limited testimony to such an extent that it'll meet the requirements of this or that theory which, of course, is deeply held by US, and as such is obviously the TRUTH…for now. For today.

How many of you, like me, have longed for a "Tardis" to enable a voyage back in time to witness the steady tramp of feet heading for some field of slaughter, or to stand beside McClellan and listen to him explaining to Pinkerton why estimates of confederate strength must be "made large".

Yes, to stand with McClellan on a high blue afternoon, the air heavy with the scent of nearby cypresses, while he explains his thinking behind another hesitation, another retreat. Always a man shrouded in controversy, this "thirty-four-year old erstwhile captain of cavalry" was promoted rapidly - meteorically - to such high and exalted military positions!

A great administrator doesn't necessarily make a great military commander. McClellan with an ego the size of one of the smaller moons of Jupiter saw himself, messiah-like, as the savior of the North. But he was surrounded by politicians, little people, who wished to bring him down, or interfere with his plans (real or imaginary), and this belief helped fuel his innate paranoia. Even the President "was not a man of very strong character," he wrote. Embroiled in disputes with his superiors (and just about anyone else he considered an obstruction to whatever path he'd embarked on) throughout both his military and civilian careers. And there was only ever one common denominator in these disputes - McClellan himself!

August 8, 1861 was the day he announced the Confederates were poised to attack – with a 100,00 strong army. This tripling of the size of the rebel force facing him was his own invention. General Scott wouldn't accept such an inflated estimate of enemy strength, so General Scott would have to go...

And, of course, this initial "error" in estimation of rebel strength fed on itself. Once he was outnumbered, the outnumbering force grew bigger. And bigger. And yet bigger still – at least in his own mind. While McClellan, like the grand old Duke of York, marched his army about, but very slowly. The moral of his army might have been high; his troops might have been well disciplined and well drilled. But they did not win decisive battles.

Their commander could not win a decisive battle (despite grandiose plans). And therein lies McClellan's failure. In war governments want victories. Instead McClellan provided hesitation and excuses. His expertise as an administrator was not enough to get him through. He would in turn have to go...

 

[rpkennedy]

It's not surprising that McClellan has taken a beating from scholars, since he felt that the Radical Republicans were waging war for reasons that went well beyond the restoration of the Union and the constraints of the Constitution, that Lincoln had abused his executive powers, that Republican economic policies were harmful and divisive, that American needed to return to a sound currency, and that the tactics being used by some Union generals were dishonorable. So, I'm not surprised that scholars have given him a beating.

What is truly amazing is that McClellan got 41% of the vote in late 1864, in spite of the fact that Democratic soldiers were pressured not to vote or to vote Republican, that Democrats in some parts of the North were being violently persecuted (see, for example, Jennifer Weber's book Copperheads), that there were numerous reported cases of election irregularities, that thousands of Northern war opponents had been illegally jailed, that hundreds of Democratic newspapers had been shut down, and that victory over the South seemed very probable. It's nothing short of amazing, and rather revealing, that he got 41% of the vote under those circumstances.

It's also interesting to note that McClellan won a larger share of the popular vote than Lincoln won in 1860. Lincoln received less than 40% of the vote in 1860, 39.8% to be exact (but won because the population had become heavily concentrated in the North and the conservative vote was split between the three other candidates). If the South had participated in the 1864 election, McClellan may well have won the popular vote by a substantial margin.

McClellan's 1864 acceptance speech makes for some very interesting, insightful reading:

http://www.sonofthesouth.net/union-generals/mcclellan/mclellan-1864-democratic-nomination.htm

He doesn't usually take a beating because of his anti-Republican politics (although his belief that he should be directing policy is disturbing); he takes a beating because he wasn't terribly competent in the field and probably wasted opportunities to end the war early on.

R