McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[kevikens]

Every so often I read a book or two where McClellan comes up and it sets me to wondering how to evaluate that man. He appears to have thought a great deal of himself, which is certainly off putting, but if one can set aside his petty and quirky annoyances I wonder if he may have been more instrumental in the North winning the Civil War than he is usually credited with.

I must admit to being somewhat willing to cut him some slack . He had, I believe enormous talent to organize and inspire an army and I think he had considerable strategic sense. I wonder how many Union commanders in 1861 could have done as good a job of creating a competent fighting force, properly equipped and suitably inspired as he did in picking up the pieces after Bull Run. And despite his failure to take Richmond in the spring of 1862 I think the Peninsular Campaign was sound strategy.

Of course what McClellan is most remembered for is his lack of tactical skill. Though he could create a formidable army he was oddly incapable, or unwilling, to hurl it at an enemy. If winning is to be the measure of success as a general, McClellan falls far short of many other commanders. But if creating that formidable army and getting it near its enemy is the mark of a capable commander he should be recognized for that achievement. I am reminded of the remark made by Lee after the war that, while he feared no Union commander, he thought McClellan was the one general whose army he would never be able to utterly destroy.

Anyway I am certain that this topic has been debated before but I wonder if there are others who think that the man was not a total failure as a commander and deserves more respect that the books usually give him. I must confess to something that I bring to this discussion. I live close to the cemetery in Trenton, NJ where he is buried ( you'll have no trouble finding it as it towers over every other grave monument). When I visit, I always approach respectfully, salute the deceased general and mentally say "thank you" for your services as I believe what he accomplished with the Army of the Potomac was as essential to winning that war as what Meade or Grant did later. The tool they used effectively was forged by his skill and by his hand and I thank him for doing that.

 

[Elennsar]

To put it metaphorically, McClellan was paid the big bucks to be a swordsman, and his skills as a swordsmith need to be compared to the generals who were both able to make armies and use them.

Yes, he was an excellent organizer (except in regards to cavalry), and his troops loved him - but he never truly tested what his army could do the way Meade and Grant would.

And judging by the performance of the Army of the Tennessee, among other Federal forces, I am not sure that McClellan's skill as a swordsmith was best at producing a sharp blade.

The merits of the Peninsula campaign strategically need to be set against the slowness of his moves and his reluctance to heed Lincoln's wishes on the deployment of troops around Washington.

 

[Ryan M.]

He had the incredible opportunity to not once but twice to end the war in 1862 and failed both times. To me history has judged him correctly, he could build an army but wouldn't or didn't know how to use it.

 

[Billy Yank]

My compliments, Sgt. kevikens, Gen. McClellan definitely deserves a salute for building, outfitting, organizing and drilling the AoP. You have outlined his glaring weaknesses most adequately. I, for one, hold him accountable for his lack of aggressiveness and obvious timidity in the face of inferior numbers when called upon to use his forces. "A-" for his organizational abilities. "C-/D+" for his skills as a field commander.

 

[cash]

Check out Ethan Rafuse's book, McClellan's War for what I think is the best evaluation of Little Mac to date.

 

[67th Tigers]

Yes, he was an excellent organizer (except in regards to cavalry), and his troops loved him - but he never truly tested what his army could do the way Meade and Grant would.

Tested to destruction?

The merits of the Peninsula campaign strategically need to be set against the slowness of his moves and his reluctance to heed Lincoln's wishes on the deployment of troops around Washington.

His movements were fast, but were stopped twice by fortifications.

He actually more than obeyed Lincoln's desire, because in addition to over ca. 70-77,000 troops left to garrison Washington and the approaches he also intended leaving 2nd Corps until it was confirmed that Johnston was behind the Rappahanock, and 1st Corps were supposed to remain in Washington on ships awaiting an amphibious movement behind the enemy on the Peninsula.

Thus at the beginning of April McClellan indeed left merely ca. 150,000 men to defend Washington. Amazing it didn't fall.

 

[matthew mckeon]

He was a general, and he failed to defeat the enemy. Of course that puts him in the same boat as Lee later on, but whatever his virtues or excuses or other scapegoats you can find, he failed.

 

[matthew mckeon]

If McClellan created an army, what kind of army did he create?

A slow moving, cautious army. A poorly structured army(too many corps). An army without enough initiative at the corps and division level.

 

[matthew mckeon]

McClellan had a good eye for ground. He didn't make mistakes like Fredericksburg(or Pickett's Charge). But he had little sense of time. His enemies were not going to stand still while he spend days gathering his forces or making his preparations. The clock was always running in the war, but he didn't seem to realize it.

 

[Elennsar]

Some interesting information, taken from McClellan's official report:

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...=Blenker;view=image;seq=25;size=100;page=root

". . . Yorktown was surrounded by a continuous line of earthworks, with strong water batteries on the York River, and garrisoned by not less than 15,000 troops, under command of General J. B. Magruder.
. . .
Information which I had collected during the winter placed General Magruder's command at from 15,000 to 20,000 men, independently of General Huger's force at Norfolk, estimated at about 15,000."

"There were at Fort Monroe and in its vicinity on the 3d (of April) ready to move, two divisions of the Third Corps, two divisions of the Fourth Corps, and one division of the Second Corps, and Sykes's brigade of regular infantry, together with Hunt's artillery reserve and the regiments of cavalry before named* - in all about 58,000 men and 100 guns, besides the division artillery.
Richardson's and Hooker's divisions of the Second and Third Corps had not arrived, and Casey's division of the Fourth Corps was unable to move for want of wagons."

So versus what he estimates as 15-20,000 men, spread over twelve miles (http://www.nps.gov/york/historyculture/yorktown-in-the-civil-war.htm ), he has not quite three times that number by his reckoning as of his report, with about 85,000 present for duty once everyone he has is up.

By the 7th we see him estimating that the whole of Johnston's force will be facing him, "not less than 100,000 men".

Johnston's numbers three weeks later:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...4&node=waro0014:3&view=image&seq=481&size=100

Erring on the large side and assuming that effective strength is effectives as defined by the Confederates, effectives to present for duty gives us about 64,000 men at that point.

64,000 is not 100,000. Even allowing for men who arrived but were not present for one reason or another by the 30th, this is a significant level of overestimation.

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...aro0012;view=image;seq=423;page=root;size=100

Magruder's report, for comparison's sake.

I would dearly love to see where the count of 77,000 men for Washington and its approaches comes from. Which is to say, where those troops are positioned when.

 

[67th Tigers]

If McClellan created an army, what kind of army did he create?

A slow moving, cautious army. A poorly structured army(too many corps). An army without enough initiative at the corps and division level.

Too many corps? The corps were created by the President and their composition was dictated by the President.

Going to the Peninsula McClellan had initially two corps (3rd and 4th) each with 3 divisions (plus the regular brigade). Another corps joined him (2nd) with 2 divisions (the 3rd had been detached by Lincoln). He then managed to gain another division (Franklin's). He restructured these into 5 corps of 2 divisions each provisionally (creating a new 5th Corps, and also 6th Corps), which War Dept later made permanent.

Aside from Porter and Franklin the other five nominated Corps Commanders (McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, Keyes and Banks) were Presidential selections, which meant the Commanding General did not have authority to relieve them. The same is true of Burnside, and McClellan would have relieved him if he had the power too (Grant also could not relieve him, but when Burnside took a leave of absence and wanted to return Grant kept fobbing him off).

McClellan had one really bad division commander, Hamilton, and got rid of him, only to have the President try and pressure him into returning him to the army as he had powerful friends. McClellan protested and Lincoln backed down, but never forgot it.

Suffice to say, criticising someone for putting rudderless commanders into office is okay, but these are Lincoln's mistakes, and Lincoln's responsibility.

 

[Elennsar]

Lincoln bears responsibility for 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Corps (of those on the Peninsula), but McClellan bears responsibility for turning a nine plus change division army (three divisions for 2nd Corps, three for 3rd and 4th, plus Franklin) with three corps into a five corps army.

 

[kevikens]

I would venture to add one other deficiency as a battlefield commander, his apparent unwillingness to get to the front where the fighting was going on so that he would have a feel for what was happening where the two forces were engaged. I know the army commander is not supposed to get close enough to get himself killed but I think the war's most effective leaders were those who, on occasion, got close enough to the fighting to get a better sense of what was going on, and what was needed. His decision to view Antietam mostly by telescope rather than in the saddle may explain his decision not to throw his entire force at Lee or to resume the battle the next day. It is something like our reading of a battle only in a book but then going to the site and walking the field. We get a much more complete idea of what was happening on that field and why it was. Sometimes a commander needs to get on that saddle.

 

[1SGDan]

McClellan had both strategic vision and tactical blindness.

 

[Elennsar]

McClellan had both strategic vision and tactical blindness.

And it seems he had little confidence in his army's ability to take heavy damage and keep going. He comes off as very 18th century in that regard.

I suppose that's understandable to a point, but it was not the quality needed for success in a war like the ACW.

 

[whitworth]

Some generals lead battles but don't win many battles. And few are a Grant, a Sherman, a Patton or a Navy Nimitz.

 

[NedBaldwin]

I disagree with this assessment. McClellan did visit the front at Antietam and what he learned by doing so helps explain his decisions. He commanded the army on the bloodiest day of the war. When he visited the front Hooker was out, Mansfield was dead, Sumner was shaken; , the first Corps was basically wrecked, the 2nd and 12th had taken a beating. By visiting Sumner at the front he did get a better sense of what was going on and it explains his decision to hold.

I would venture to add one other deficiency as a battlefield commander, his apparent unwillingness to get to the front where the fighting was going on so that he would have a feel for what was happening where the two forces were engaged. I know the army commander is not supposed to get close enough to get himself killed but I think the war's most effective leaders were those who, on occasion, got close enough to the fighting to get a better sense of what was going on, and what was needed. His decision to view Antietam mostly by telescope rather than in the saddle may explain his decision not to throw his entire force at Lee or to resume the battle the next day. It is something like our reading of a battle only in a book but then going to the site and walking the field. We get a much more complete idea of what was happening on that field and why it was. Sometimes a commander needs to get on that saddle.

 

[Elennsar]

If McClellan felt that Lee's army was in better shape than his own, yes. That he thought so is part of the problem.

 

[brass napoleon]

...I am reminded of the remark made by Lee after the war that, while he feared no Union commander, he thought McClellan was the one general whose army he would never be able to utterly destroy...

I've heard this before, but never seen a primary source. Do you have a source for this?

 

[NedBaldwin]

If McClellan felt that Lee's army was in better shape than his own, yes. That he thought so is part of the problem.

Even if he felt Lee's army was in the same shape as his own, the conclusion would be the same. In my view, this line of criticism regarding the situation on the afternoon of September 17 1862 is misguided.