McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

And it must be noted on the political side of things that McClellan went to the other extreme from sucking up, so for him to be in political trouble is not with a reasonable effort to be on good terms with his boss, but rather an attitude of active hostility to the administration - an attitude hardly appropriate for civilian-military relations.

Very true.

R
 
And I would dispute that the AoNV was at its finest in the summer of 1862. There were still a bunch of commanders who were unreliable and many of the troops were still fairly green. The AoNV was at its peak in the winter of 1862-63, IMO.
R

I wouldn't argue with early 1863, but Elennsar is trying to pass off the 1864-1865 Confederate armies as anything like what McClellan faced. I think that is absurd.
 
What was so superior about Magruder and Holmes and Huger to Wilcox, Anderson, and Heth?

Treating the 1864-1865 Confederates as if they were pushover opponents would baffle anyone who fought them. Including the survivors of the 1862 battles.

The morale, health, and numbers were far better as just the tip of the iceberg. I never said they were pushovers, that is a strawman. My post was about McClellan and how he is measured as though Grant fought the same army that he did and won while McClellan lost (which he did not).
 
The morale, health, and numbers were far better as just the tip of the iceberg. I never said they were pushovers, that is a strawman. My post was about McClellan and how he is measured as though Grant fought the same army that he did and won while McClellan lost (which he did not).

I'm not sure how you compare morale - being an intangible, as opposed something we can find concrete data on (such as weaponry), numbers depend on when we're talking about (McClellan fought fewer Confederates at Antietam, even by the most generous assessment of numbers, than Grant did in the Overland campaign), although health certainly favored the Confederates early on compared to later on.

But on the other side, weaponry and experience and leadership quality have also gone considerably upward since the Seven Days.

And your description of the 1864 army makes it sound like Grant was facing an easy situation where as McClellan was asked to do the "almost impossible" as you put it, which is not a fair assessment of the 1864 fighting at all.
 
If you'd be so kind as to suggest what the "errors" are, then we can discuss them.
Well i am currently reading Stephen Spears book to the gates of richmond, and the main differences im seeing is the numbers. McClellan was supposed to keep i believe around 50,000 troops around Washington, and threw his math he was counting a division which was going to Fremont in the mountain department, and part of Banks army in the valley and there was a certain amount of troops that didnt exist i can't remember the exact number. That's why Lincoln and Stanton held back troops. Also i don't ever remember seeing where the confederates had anywhere close to 115,000 men ever at any time in the ANV. Im guessing also that when it says there was 60,000 troops sitting idle in the valley after Jackson slipped away they were counting McDowell's corps which was in Fredricksburg not the valley. I could be wrong about this so if i am let me know, always willing to learn
 
The highest figures I've seen for Lee's army is something over a hundred thousand - here: http://www.icsm.it/secessione/cb02oob.html and here: http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/regimental-level-orders-of-battle/regimental-level-orders-of-battle-the-seven-days-oob/ - with the former giving about 105,000 and the latter about 110,000, counting all commands.

Schulte's site gives McClellan about 100,000 not counting McDowell's three divisions (but with Franklin's and McCall's divisions counted in with McClellan's numbers), the first site gives him slightly higher numbers.

I'd vouch for both of those as well researched information and certainly with more effort than Sears put into calculating Lee's numbers.

McClellan may not have used the men he had well, and he most certainly overcounted the men Lee had, but Lee did have a pretty formidable army in the Seven Days if we're counting heads.

But even if we grant McClellan being outnumbered eleven to ten, many generals have won despite inferior numbers, and the Confederate command did not perform at such levels in the Seven Days as to make the most use of its forces.

McClellan, being more concerned with changing his base than whether Lee left any openings, was not concerned about that.
 
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In
The highest figures I've seen for Lee's army is something over a hundred thousand - here: http://www.icsm.it/secessione/cb02oob.html and here: http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/regimental-level-orders-of-battle/regimental-level-orders-of-battle-the-seven-days-oob/ - with the former giving about 105,000 and the latter about 110,000, counting all commands.

Schulte's site gives McClellan about 100,000 not counting McDowell's three divisions (but with Franklin's and McCall's divisions counted in with McClellan's numbers), the first site gives him slightly higher numbers.

I'd vouch for both of those as well researched information and certainly with more effort than Sears put into calculating Lee's numbers.

McClellan may not have used the men he had well, and he most certainly overcounted the men Lee had, but Lee did have a pretty formidable army in the Seven Days if we're counting heads.

But even if we grant McClellan being outnumbered eleven to ten, many generals have won despite inferior numbers, and the Confederate command did not perform at such levels in the Seven Days as to make the most use of its forces.

McClellan, being more concerned with changing his base than whether Lee left any openings, was not concerned about that.
In my decades of reading about the Civil War I have never seen any reference to Lee having over 90,000 troops (including Jackson's recently arrived command) at the beginning of the Seven Days.
 
In

In my decades of reading about the Civil War I have never seen any reference to Lee having over 90,000 troops (including Jackson's recently arrived command) at the beginning of the Seven Days.

A little over 20 years ago a graduate student at George Mason University named Leon Walter Tenney wrote a thesis paper called "Seven Days in 1862: Numbers in Union and Confederate Armies Before Richmond". Its become the standard reference for troops strength during the campaign.
 
In

In my decades of reading about the Civil War I have never seen any reference to Lee having over 90,000 troops (including Jackson's recently arrived command) at the beginning of the Seven Days.

Do you have any specific references to cite for comparison?

Not trying to make an argument, just wondering what you've read to compare it to Tenney's thesis.

Lee's numbers have tended to be underestimated.
 
In

In my decades of reading about the Civil War I have never seen any reference to Lee having over 90,000 troops (including Jackson's recently arrived command) at the beginning of the Seven Days.

Long ago I transcribed appendix 2c of Harsh's Confederate Tide Rising. Here it is:

"In his memoirs, Joseph Johnston referred to Lee's forces on June 26 as "the largest Confederate army that ever fought." He estimated Lee's reinforcements as follows: 15,000 from North Carolina, 22,000 from South Carolina and Georgia and 16,000 from Jackson, for a total of 53,000. When combined with the 73,000 Johnston had on May 31, this would have given Lee 126,000 men. Johnston later admitted his figures were too high. For example, he counted Lawton twice (with Jackson and with Georgia); he included forces that did not arrive until July and August; and he overestimated Holmes by 150%.

Johnston's claims affronted that plank of the "Lost Cause" myth that insisted the Confederates had always been heavily outnumbered, and his figures were emphatically rejected by Charles Marshal, Jubal Early, Jefferson Davies, the Reverend J. William Jones, and Walter Taylor, who insisted Lee had 80,000 men or fewer. These defenders of Confederate meagreness indulged in a bad habit of mixing apples and oranges." They used the figure for their own "effectives", a stripped down statistic, whilst employing "present for duty" figures for the enemy. Their 80,000 may be fairly effective for Lee's combat effectives, but then it should be compared to the approximately 70,000 McClellan had in the same category.

The total of 112,220 present for duty for the Army of Northern Virginia…. Breaks down as follows:

Attacking Column North of the Chickahominy

Army of Northern Virginia
Longstreet: 14,291
A.P. Hill: 16,411
D.H. Hill: 12,318
Stuart: 2,109
Total: 45,129

Army of the Valley
Jackson: 9,604
Ewell: 6,353
Whiting: 5,537
Cavalry: 605
Total: 22,099

Confederate defensive forces south of the Chickahominy:
McLaws: 4,915
D.R. Jones: 4,503
Magruder: 5,671
Huger: 6,160
Holmes: 9,018
Reserve artillery: 1,680
Cavalry: 2,000
Richmond defenses: 9,136
Petersburg defenses: 1,909
Total: 44,992 "

Note that Lee left ca. 45,000 men manning the defenses, and this must be taken into account. 45,000 men in permanent works is not the sort of thing you can just waltz over. McClellan himself on the 26th sent inquiries to his corps commanders about the strength south of the Chickahominy, and all replied they could see no dimutation of strength, correctly as the forces Lee shifted north were not manning the defences, but were behind Richmond.

Even more interesting is Steven Newton's Joseph E. Johnston and the Defence of Richmond. He estimates Johnston had 72,739 PFD on the Peninsula, and on 1st June had 94,813 PFD before deducting the Seven Pines casualties, excluding the Richmond defences etc.

The Confederates were much stronger than is usually supposed.
 
And your description of the 1864 army makes it sound like Grant was facing an easy situation where as McClellan was asked to do the "almost impossible" as you put it, which is not a fair assessment of the 1864 fighting at all.

McClellan was asked to take Richmond with a slightly smaller force than that defending it, whilst Grants force was more than twice the strength of the defenders. This alone is a huge factor, Grant got that massive advantage in numbers McClellan suggested were necessary for a quick, easy victory.
 
We must give credit where credit is due. Mac was responsible for the expansion of the finest branch of the Army - ENGINEERS.

ESSAYONS RULE!

Okay I admit I am a little biased but without Mac's support the growth of this branch probably would have, at the very least, been delayed to much later in the war.
 
I'm not sure how you compare morale - being an intangible, as opposed something we can find concrete data on (such as weaponry), numbers depend on when we're talking about (McClellan fought fewer Confederates at Antietam, even by the most generous assessment of numbers, than Grant did in the Overland campaign), although health certainly favored the Confederates early on compared to later on.

But on the other side, weaponry and experience and leadership quality have also gone considerably upward since the Seven Days.

And your description of the 1864 army makes it sound like Grant was facing an easy situation where as McClellan was asked to do the "almost impossible" as you put it, which is not a fair assessment of the 1864 fighting at all.

Lee invaded Maryland with about 75-82,000 men PFD (by two methodologies, both excluding those travelling with the army who were not soldiers). There is a major question where did they all go at the Battle of Antietam, because they were back at Fredericksburg. Were half Lee's army truly scattered across Maryland and Virginia? If so then this is surely because of McClellan's rapid movements.

The most generous estimates of the number of combatants is Livermore's second estimate of 59,284 "effectives" (Numbers of Losses, 93). Lee and a lot of Confederate generals and their supporters have tried to decrease the estimates of the size of Lee's force at Antietam to excuse the defeat.

In fact it seems very likely the Confederates were much stronger at Antietam than Lee's apologists argue. In the 19th century there were a slew of Federal writers saying this, but since Catton came down on the Lost Cause side of the fence on this one the debate seems to have died.
 
McClellan was asked to take Richmond with a slightly smaller force than that defending it, whilst Grants force was more than twice the strength of the defenders. This alone is a huge factor, Grant got that massive advantage in numbers McClellan suggested were necessary for a quick, easy victory.

Only by June is McClellan facing the 100,000-110,000 man force eventually mustered. Up until that point he has numerical superiority.

Grant vs. Lee, per Livermore: Total engaged (in the Wilderness) 101,895 vs. Lee's 61,025 effectives.
https://archive.org/stream/numberlossesinci00live_0#page/110/mode/1up/search/Grant+Wilderness

If you wish to count the forces of Sigel and Butler, I would be happy to add them, but we have to count the Confederates opposed to them too, obviously.

Antietam
https://archive.org/stream/numberlossesinci00live_0#page/92/mode/2up/search/Antietam

McClellan: 87,164 present for duty excluding Morell's division, apparently as of the 16th-17th. Humphreys's division with 6,000+ men arrived early the 18th (according to his report), so I presume it is not counted for the strength of the 16th and 17th. http://antietam.aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=187

Lee: 51,844 "total engaged".

Fredericksburg is three months later. That stragglers and other men temporally (for whatever reason) not with their commands at Antietam would be back by then is not a sign Lee had greater numbers than the above.


For those comparing the two battles, Gettysburg, also per Livermore:

88,289 men "total engaged" (Meade) - this not counting 12/37ths of 6th Corps - vs. estimated 75,000 effectives (Lee).

https://archive.org/stream/numberlossesinci00live_0#page/103/mode/1up/search/Gettysburg
 
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Only by June is McClellan facing the 100,000-110,000 man force eventually mustered. Up until that point he has numerical superiority.


Antietam per Numbers and Losses: https://archive.org/stream/numberlossesinci00live_0#page/92/mode/2up/search/Antietam

McClellan: 87,164 present for duty excluding Morell's division, apparently as of the 16th-17th. Humphreys's division with 6,000+ men arrived early the 18th (according to his report), so I presume it is not counted for the strength of the 16th and 17th. http://antietam.aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=187

Lee: 51,844 "total engaged".

Fredericksburg is three months later. That stragglers and other men temporally (for whatever reason) not with their commands at Antietam would be back by then is not a sign Lee had greater numbers than the above.

If Lee had about 52,000 engaged, that would put his present for duty strength around 65,000 or so, a fairly accurate number, IMO.
R
 
If Lee had about 52,000 engaged, that would put his present for duty strength around 65,000 or so, a fairly accurate number, IMO.
R

While crunching numbers, how do you calculate 65,000 present for duty from 52,000 engaged?

Translating effectives into "present for duty" is doable but annoying (for me, at least) given the cavalry vs. infantry & artillery difference in how many are effectives, which is why I haven't tried to run the math based on Livermore's formulas there just yet, just noted what he states.

So if you have and will post it, I could hug you with joy.
 
While crunching numbers, how do you calculate 65,000 present for duty from 52,000 engaged?

Translating effectives into "present for duty" is doable but annoying (for me, at least) given the cavalry vs. infantry & artillery difference in how many are effectives, which is why I haven't tried to run the math based on Livermore's formulas there just yet, just noted what he states.

So if you have and will post it, I could hug you with joy.

Just an educated guess based on proportions for other Civil War battles.

R
 
We must give credit where credit is due. Mac was responsible for the expansion of the finest branch of the Army - ENGINEERS.

ESSAYONS RULE!

Okay I admit I am a little biased but without Mac's support the growth of this branch probably would have, at the very least, been delayed to much later in the war.

My late father in law agrees wholeheartedly with you. Wherever he is.
 
I appreciate everyone's research and input, but I am pretty sure Gallagher (who is no Lost Causer) has used the traditional estimates in his works - 90,000 at Seven Days, appr. 56,000 at Second Manassas (two divisions left in Richmond), and 40,000 at Antietam.

I'll do some research this weekend and see what I can find out.

Thx
 
I appreciate everyone's research and input, but I am pretty sure Gallagher (who is no Lost Causer) has used the traditional estimates in his works - 90,000 at Seven Days, appr. 56,000 at Second Manassas (two divisions left in Richmond), and 40,000 at Antietam.

I'll do some research this weekend and see what I can find out.

Thx

Harsh puts the ANV, exclusive of the Richmond defences, at 92,400 PFD in late August '62. This includes the 6,000 men of GW Smith's division who did not participate in the campaign.

On 27th August '62:

At Bristoe and Manassas with Jackson:
Ewell: 7,900
Taliaferro: 6,800
AP Hill: 10,000
Stuart: 3,500

At Orleans and Salem with Longstreet:
Kemper: 5,700
Wilcox: 5,700
DR Jones: 4,800
Evans: 6,900
Artillery: 600

At Waterloo:
Anderson: 6,100

At Hanover Junction and Petersburg under GW Smith:
DH Hill: 9,500
McLaws: 7,700
GW Smith: 6,000 (brigades of Wise, Daniel, Martin and French)
Walker: 6,500
Hampton: 1,500
Reserve Artillery: 3,200
Richmond Defences: 4,000

Total: 96,400, or which 86,400 is heading north.

He calculates Pope's main body at 82,500, the various reinforcements en route at 31,300 (Franklin, Sumner, Burnside and Cox) and garrisons of Washington, Baltimore, Yorktown etc. at 61,600.
 

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