"Lee Surprised by McClellan's Speed"

[BuckPvt]

Reading Hartwig's first book on the Maryland campaign this comes up. Lee thought he'd have more time to deal with Harper's Ferry but because of the discovery of SO 191 McClellan surges forward with uncharacteristic speed throwing Lee's plans into turmoil. It's been a part of the story of Antietam and the Maryland campaign seemingly forever.

Does anyone know its origin though? Were there primary documents commenting on the Army of the Potomac's unusual speed? Was there a historian early on who originated it?

Thinking on it more, it's an unusual conclusion to come to. Lee personally had very little personal experience against McClellan, really just the Seven Days and the beginning of the Maryland Campaign. And while he would have second hand knowledge of the Peninsula Campaign there wasn't a lot to base McClellan being slow; The nature of the campaign and the constraints of the topography its self would limit rapid movements. And the parts of the army that had the space to make rapid movements (like McDowell's force in northern Virginia) did make some sudden and long distance moves showing the Union army (and forces acting with/under McClellan) perfectly capable or rapid advances.

While I'm not particularly a fan of McClellan's, the idea that he wouldn't be capable of faster movement, especially with a Confederate army in a northern state, doesn't necessarily seem like an obvious deduction in early September of 1862. That's why I was wondering if anyone knew where this came from originally. Did Lee or any of his close generals comment on this at the time, or after the war?

 

[Mississippian1861]

Wasn't it Phil Kearney who called McClellan the "virginia creeper"? IIRC some of the southern papers also mocked the rather slow advance up the Peninsula.

 

[Andrew]

It has been a while since I studied this, but if I recall Lee's surprise wasn't based on McClellan's reputation. Rather, Lee did not have accurate information about where McClellan's troops were located. I think it may have been a failure of his cavalry to keep Lee informed that the Army of the Potomac was closer to Lee than he thought. The surprise was due to poor intelligence, not McClellan acting contrary to his reputation.

And I also recall that finding the orders really just confirmed what McClellan already pretty much suspected and was acting on. After finding the orders, I think he sent cavalry to confirm their accuracy and then continued his current plan with only slight modifications. I don't know that finding the orders sped up McClellan's pursuit all that much.

 

[bankerpapaw]

Lincoln said, "If McClellan's not using his army, I would like to borrow it for a while."

 

[67th Tigers]

Lincoln said, "If McClellan's not using his army, I would like to borrow it for a while."

Providing I can find something to do with it. McClellan volunteered to send part of the Army of the Potomac to East Tennessee in January '62, which is what is frustrating Lincoln, but Lincoln could not find a good use for them...

 

[67th Tigers]

Wasn't it Phil Kearney who called McClellan the "virginia creeper"? IIRC some of the southern papers also mocked the rather slow advance up the Peninsula.

The phrase first appears in print in 1893, in Morse's Lincoln biography, and it attributed not to a general but to Republican politicians decrying the lack of a mid-winter campaign in January 1862. He is likely right that a clique of Republican politicians used this behind closed door, since one mentions "no allusion to McClellan" when discussing the creepers in his garden in June '62.

It was 1937 before anyone claimed a general said it - it was Thomas Kearny appropriating it for his late uncle, Phil Kearny. It appears nowhere in any of Kearny's letters etc., and it's clear that Thomas simply made it up because it sounded good.

 

[Saphroneth]

IIRC some of the southern papers also mocked the rather slow advance up the Peninsula.

The idea that McClellan moved slowly on the Peninsula is a bit weird - there's a few phases, but they amount to:

Yorktown siege - stopped, obviously, there is a strong defensive line in the way
Yorktown siege to the Chickahominy - from about 5 to 17 May up bad roads. Not super fast but not especially slow either (several moves of supply base, which are necessary, the army's running on wagon supply from that supply base), and at least one battle.
17 May to the end of May: bridging the Chickahominy, then Seven Pines
June: rained out and rail repairs going on, no offensive moves possible; McClellan starts moving again a day before Lee


Most of the time he's stopped, not slow, and that's because the problem is a serious obstacle. Sustaining an advance over bad roads that have just had another whole army go over them is difficult and the supply base needs to be moved stepwise; this is not especially surprpsing. The obstacles



There are certainly cases where McClellan moves fairly fast, at least given the constraints of moving a large army. Loudoun Valley is probably the best example, but the controlling factor during the Maryland campaign is not how fast his vanguard can move but his need to create good conditions when the armies collide - thus a couple of days are consumed spreading out en route to Frederick so his army is moving in parallel on multiple roads (the alternative being to try and attack with a single road column several days long) while the movement on the 13th-15th is pretty quick.



Lee's behaviour in Maryland seems to indicate that he did not think that the Federal response would be as quick as it was. He was enormously vulnerable when South Mountain happens; either he didn't think the Union army would move that fast (in terms of how quickly the army moved) or he didn't think they would sally out that fast (in terms of how many days they'd had to move by the 14th). The second might be more likely - the process of rebuilding the Federal army and sending it out is very quick, it's not very common to find a defeated army turned around and capable of offensive campaigning that fast.

 

[Yankeedave]

I am sure it's not the full part of it, but Lee knew that McClellan's army was Pope's. How fast can McClellan gather up that army and move, with vague orders from the government and a vague understanding of where Pope's army is.

 

[Saphroneth]

I am sure it's not the full part of it, but Lee knew that McClellan's army was Pope's. How fast can McClellan gather up that army and move, with vague orders from the government and a vague understanding of where Pope's army is.

McClellan's army was put together from parts! As of August 30 you have

The Army of Virginia (1st, 2nd and 3rd Corps)
The Army of the Potomac (2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th Corps, with 4th Corps partly left down on the Peninsula)
And Extras (9th Corps, Washington Defences)
And newly arriving (and very green) regiments.

That lot is put together into a field army extremely quickly, absorbing over a dozen new regiments, being grouped up into wings, the question of who is to command the field army is a complex one that undergoes multiple iterations (at one point McClellan offers it to Pope but Pope refuses) and at the point when it moves out it's not yet finished. There's multiple notional corps commander changes over the period and a question of whether Porter will get court-martialled.

The corps that would become 12th Corps isn't called 12th Corps yet and doesn't have Mansfield in charge of it yet - it moves out as "2nd (Banks') Corps, late Army of Virginia" and it's grouped with Sumner's 2nd Corps AoP as a wing.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Wasn't it Phil Kearney who called McClellan the "virginia creeper"? IIRC some of the southern papers also mocked the rather slow advance up the Peninsula.

You are correct, it was Kearney, but others quickly agreed with the moniker.

 

[Saphroneth]

You are correct, it was Kearney, but others quickly agreed with the moniker.

So what I think has happened here - and 67th has already pointed this out - is that it has been attributed to Kearny well after the fact. Kearny died in 1862 - if the first source attributing it to Phil Kearny is 1937 by his relative, then this source should not be considered trustworthy.

 

[lelliott19]

Wasn't it Phil Kearney who called McClellan the "virginia creeper"? IIRC some of the southern papers also mocked the rather slow advance up the Peninsula.

In a search for the terms at newspapers dot com, the earliest/first mention of McClellan with the term "Virginia creeper" is this one published March 20, 1862. Perhaps someone else knows who Professor Agassiz is?

The Enterprise and Vermonter. (Vergennes, Vermont), March 20, 1862, 2.

EDIT TO ADD: I apologize. That entry is actually incorrectly indexed as March 20, 1862. The newspaper is actually March 20, 1863. Back to the drawing board.

 

[Saphroneth]

Perhaps someone else knows who Professor Agassiz is?

...given my education as a geologist, it was momentarily strange to realize some wouldn't recognize the name!

Louis Agassiz - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

It's this chap. I'm quite certain.



As for the complaint about him in March 1862, though, it's certainly a bit silly - this is during the period when McClellan is switching at breakneck speed from the plan he'd been preparing to kick off as soon as the campaign season opened (Urbana) to the Peninsular campaign which had been imposed by a vote of his corps commanders as a less risky but more certain alternative. At that, Hooker and Grant both opened their campaigns at the start of May, so the Union army in the East moved earlier in 1862 than any other year of the war.

 

[lelliott19]

As for the complaint about him in March 1862, though, it's certainly a bit silly -

Yes. My apologies. See my edit above. That newspapers edition was incorrectly indexed as 1862, but was actually March 1863.

The article I posted above, in the Enterprise & Vermonter March 1863 seems to be a reprint of this one from the Springfield Daily Republican.

The Springfield Daily Republican. (Springfield, Massachusetts), March 16, 1863, 2.

 

[Saphroneth]

That does make more sense, at least as a complaint. It's pretty known information that the newspaper perception of how quickly the Union would win was unrealistic!

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

So what I think has happened here - and 67th has already pointed this out - is that it has been attributed to Kearny well after the fact. Kearny died in 1862 - if the first source attributing it to Phil Kearny is 1937 by his relative, then this source should not be considered trustworthy.

.........an old discussion that I will not re-enter.

 

[Belfoured]

.........an old discussion that I will not re-enter.

Wisely ... very wisely

 

[JeffBrooks]

Lee personally had very little personal experience against McClellan, really just the Seven Days and the beginning of the Maryland Campaign. And while he would have second hand knowledge of the Peninsula Campaign there wasn't a lot to base McClellan being slow

I wouldn't call Lee's knowledge of the Peninsula Campaign "second hand". Through it all, Lee was the military advisor to Jefferson Davis in Richmond, in regular communication with Johnston. He had a front row seat to the whole thing.

 

[JerryD]

Reading Hartwig's first book on the Maryland campaign this comes up. Lee thought he'd have more time to deal with Harper's Ferry but because of the discovery of SO 191 McClellan surges forward with uncharacteristic speed throwing Lee's plans into turmoil. It's been a part of the story of Antietam and the Maryland campaign seemingly forever.

Does anyone know its origin though? Were there primary documents commenting on the Army of the Potomac's unusual speed? Was there a historian early on who originated it?

Thinking on it more, it's an unusual conclusion to come to. Lee personally had very little personal experience against McClellan, really just the Seven Days and the beginning of the Maryland Campaign. And while he would have second hand knowledge of the Peninsula Campaign there wasn't a lot to base McClellan being slow; The nature of the campaign and the constraints of the topography its self would limit rapid movements. And the parts of the army that had the space to make rapid movements (like McDowell's force in northern Virginia) did make some sudden and long distance moves showing the Union army (and forces acting with/under McClellan) perfectly capable or rapid advances.

While I'm not particularly a fan of McClellan's, the idea that he wouldn't be capable of faster movement, especially with a Confederate army in a northern state, doesn't necessarily seem like an obvious deduction in early September of 1862. That's why I was wondering if anyone knew where this came from originally. Did Lee or any of his close generals comment on this at the time, or after the war?

Lee and McClellan worked together on Gen. Scott's staff in Mexico, and its very common to hear that officers had opinions on their fellow officers based on having been in the service together. I suspect Lee knew McClellan very well and probably had a very good idea of his tendencies.

 

[Saphroneth]

Lee and McClellan worked together on Gen. Scott's staff in Mexico, and its very common to hear that officers had opinions on their fellow officers based on having been in the service together. I suspect Lee knew McClellan very well and probably had a very good idea of his tendencies.

Part of my issue with this - or at least with the idea that Lee has a read on McClellan that he's confident in - is that Lee doesn't really act that way in June, July and August.

On June 25, McClellan is attacking Richmond, and on June 26 Lee launches off a very poor-odds attack at Mechanicsville because he feels under time pressure - that he can't wait long enough for Jackson to arrive.

This costs a lot of Confederate casualties and it doesn't seem in keeping with the idea that Lee would read McClellan well enough to know that McClellan would be slow (that is, that the one thing we can say Lee was not on 26 June was "sure that McClellan would be slow"). If Lee was confident in expecting McClellan to be slow he could wait for Jackson.


During July, Lee is unwilling to detach most of his army from Richmond. He keeps at least 1,700 companies (the equivalent of 10+ Union divisions) in or within a day or so's march of Richmond at all times, even when Jackson is asking for reinforcement against Pope, and keeps this up until August when his opinion abruptly changes (some days into McClellan shipping off his sick in order to withdraw). Again, this is not consistent with the idea that Lee was comfortable in expecting McClellan to be inactive or slow.