McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[KeyserSoze]

It's not surprising that McClellan has taken a beating from scholars, since he felt that the Radical Republicans were waging war for reasons that went well beyond the restoration of the Union and the constraints of the Constitution, that Lincoln had abused his executive powers, that Republican economic policies were harmful and divisive, that American needed to return to a sound currency, and that the tactics being used by some Union generals were dishonorable.

All in your humble opinion no doubt.

... that hundreds of Democratic newspapers had been shut down...

I've seen that claim made by you Southern die-hards on many occasions so I'll ask you the same question I asked them. Can you name them? Don't bother with all of them unless you can point us to a website that lists them all, but can you name, oh, 100 Democrat newspapers that were shut down? How about 75? 50? 30?

It's also interesting to note that McClellan won a larger share of the popular vote than Lincoln won in 1860.

Of course there were only two candidates in 1864 vs. four in 1860. You don't suppose that might have had something to do with it?

Lincoln received less than 40% of the vote in 1860, 39.8% to be exact (but won because the population had become heavily concentrated in the North and the conservative vote was split between the three other candidates).

Your studies of the 1860 election are sadly lacking. Lincoln won 17 states and 180 electoral votes. Of the states he won, he took an absolute majority in 15 states with 173 electoral votes. So no, Mr. Griffith, spliting the conservative vote had nothing to do with Lincoln's win. The Democrats could have rallied behind a single candidate and Linoln would still have won.

If the South had participated in the 1864 election, McClellan may well have won the popular vote by a substantial margin.

Popular vote? Perhaps. It might depend if Lincoln were allowed on the ballot that time. Bus still, where it counts Lincoln took 212 electoral votes in 1864, winning 22 states all by absolute majorities. Even assuming that McClellan swept the Southern Confederate states, and switching Missouri back to the Democrats, Lincoln still wins 201 electoral votes to 102.

I've read your website, Mr. Griffith. I realize that you are a Confederate supporter of the DiLorenzo/Kennedy/Adams school and I can't imagine why you're here except to try and sway some people over to your neo-confederate side. If that's true then I'm not sure how much you will accomplish. Those here who support the Confederate side are far better at defending their cause than you have shown to be. And as for the Union supporters? Well let me put it this way. I consider myself very well versed on the history of the War of Southern Rebellion, far better than the average person. But I will freely admit that on this site I'm the village idiot compared to many of the people who post here. So please stay, Mr. Griffith. Post your opinions, start your own threads. But prepare to be schooled by people who have likely forgotten more about the history of the rebellion than you will ever know.

 

[BillO]

So first This thread is about McClellan and not Lincoln suppressing opposition to his war. Second if I thought you were actually interested I could try to produce some numbers of newspapers that were shut down because they didn't tow the line but then if you are that interested in a number you could find it yourself.

 

[KeyserSoze]

So first This thread is about McClellan and not Lincoln suppressing opposition to his war. Second if I thought you were actually interested I could try to produce some numbers of newspapers that were shut down because they didn't tow the line but then if you are that interested in a number you could find it yourself.

Humor me please. The claim was made that hundreds were shut down. You seem to agree with that. So if it was in the hudred then naming only a hundred of them or fifty of them shouldn't be such a stretch.

And I assure you I am interested.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Little Mac, was almost always, in the process of of almost beginning some 'grand advance', but he always managed to delay just long enough to always relinquish the initiative. A fatal defect, for a military commander who must, by the very nature of the war, invade and occupy enemy territory, to win his war.
Actually, McClellan had more confidence in Lee and the ANV, than he did in himself or the AoP. He talked offensive, but acted defensively and, as is usually the case, his actions must be measured against his actions to determine their validity(truthfulness?)

 

[rbasin]

I always thought that McClellan's biggest fault was that he fell in love with his army, and couldn't bear to see it slaughtered.

 

[brass napoleon]

I always thought that McClellan's biggest fault was that he fell in love with his army, and couldn't bear to see it slaughtered.

That was certainly one of his faults. Another fault is that he was in love with himself, and he knew his army was in love with him also, and he couldn't bear to risk the loss of either of those affections.

 

[Elennsar]

Remember, he was beginning the final "grand offensive" when the Seven Days broke. Simply by getting to Richmond he is in a club of two generals, and the club for those that rapidly broke the Richmond defences has no members.

The change of base is actually vital, because an army must be able to sustain itself. McClellan's position was dictated by the fact that his supply base had been dictated to him by Stanton, and he was not free to base on the James, which was always his preferred base, and indeed was Grant's preferred base. Once the base on the York was gone there is no option but to open a new supply base, and because his forces can't cover the whole of the ground from the James to the Chickahominy he has to move the army.

And the idea that the base on the York was gone was based on his attitude, his perceptions, and his problems with anything that might possibly involve risk.

With due respect to his complaints that the navy was anything but cooperative (not his fault and not within his control), the spirit of McClellan's attitude towards changing his base was very much focused on his fears and with very little concern for what the enemy might fear him doing.

In an 18th century war, it would be one thing, in this war it was calculated to result in him falling short of what was needed to win it.

However, there was considerable pressure brought to bear on Lincoln to remove McClellan from his own party, and the timing of the removal shows a political motive. This occurs extremely early and continues.

A politician calculating his actions based on political concerns in a situation where handling political affairs is all important? Shocking.

 

[Lnwlf]

McClellan? I have never understood the man, and honestly, I don't think anyone else has either. I appreciate all that have contributed to this thread. Mac is still clear as mud to me, but your other viewpoints have been interesting, and to a degree, enlightening.

 

[67th Tigers]

And the idea that the base on the York was gone was based on his attitude, his perceptions, and his problems with anything that might possibly involve risk.

With due respect to his complaints that the navy was anything but cooperative (not his fault and not within his control), the spirit of McClellan's attitude towards changing his base was very much focused on his fears and with very little concern for what the enemy might fear him doing.

In an 18th century war, it would be one thing, in this war it was calculated to result in him falling short of what was needed to win it.

Ultimately what the enemy is doing is one of the most important things for any army commander, surely?

The base at White House Landing is just gone. There is nothing anyone could have done to save it. The army could not sustain itself without food, let alone ammunition, and so a change of base was required.

The navy of course had been very uncooperative throughout the campaign, and only the rude shock of Drewry's Bluff gave them pause to think they might need the army and clear the fortifications out of the way so they could steam up the James. The great shame is that this happened at the same time as Stanton issued an absolute order that the army would be base on the York, so as to cover the railroads north of Richmond to defend Washington.

That the navy wanted to retreat 27 miles from the position they occupied at Glendale, which McClellan regarded as unacceptable. He wanted the most forward point possible, which the navy gave him, a mere 8 miles back.

A politician calculating his actions based on political concerns in a situation where handling political affairs is all important? Shocking.

Not shocking, but true.

 

[67th Tigers]

Little Mac, was almost always, in the process of of almost beginning some 'grand advance', but he always managed to delay just long enough to always relinquish the initiative. A fatal defect, for a military commander who must, by the very nature of the war, invade and occupy enemy territory, to win his war.
Actually, McClellan had more confidence in Lee and the ANV, than he did in himself or the AoP. He talked offensive, but acted defensively and, as is usually the case, his actions must be measured against his actions to determine their validity(truthfulness?)

Yet he in fact did begin his long planned offensive. Both he and Lee were waiting for the same thing - the rain to stop and the ground harden enough for troop movements. So no surprise both acted simultaneously when it did. No amount of "willpower" will change the weather....

 

[Elennsar]

Ultimately what the enemy is doing is one of the most important things for any army commander, surely?

The base at White House Landing is just gone. There is nothing anyone could have done to save it. The army could not sustain itself without food, let alone ammunition, and so a change of base was required.

http://books.google.com/books?id=Ko...t White House Landing were undamaged.&f=false

http://www.alu.army.mil/alog/issues/Marapr96/ms809.htm

"Just gone"?

To answer your question: That's the problem. "What McClellan is doing" is not hovering over Lee's shoulder about to pounce at any point. McClellan spent so much time reacting to what Lee did that Lee could have multiple attacks fail tactically and even Gaines' Mill be far from decisive on the field and still see McClellan stayed reactive instead of proactive.

It's not the way wars are won. A general who ignores what his enemy is doing is heading for trouble, but a general who is entirely absorbed by what his enemy is doing at the expense of making his foe care about what he's doing will wind up with no shortage of reasons why his conduct was rational and prudent, but no closer to victory.

 

[67th Tigers]

http://books.google.com/books?id=KoO0fjwBD-sC&pg=PA192&lpg=PA192&dq=He made the point that the railroad and the supply base at White House Landing were undamaged.&source=bl&ots=6QM3Fqode7&sig=9pd4fnm9803Pm4m91EP-vdWipyM&hl=en&sa=X&ei=E_u0U-mnNazoiwKD3IAo&ved=0CB8Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=He made the point that the railroad and the supply base at White House Landing were undamaged.&f=false

So what? It is now isolated from the army and if not destroyed will simply provide the Confederates with a lot of supplies.

http://www.alu.army.mil/alog/issues/Marapr96/ms809.htm

This article once provoked a bitter argument between myself and another individual because it makes some quite fundamental errors, even claiming the AoP changed base to the James before the Seven Days - a nonsense.

To answer your question: That's the problem. "What McClellan is doing" is not hovering over Lee's shoulder about to pounce at any point. McClellan spent so much time reacting to what Lee did that Lee could have multiple attacks fail tactically and even Gaines' Mill be far from decisive on the field and still see McClellan stayed reactive instead of proactive.

The decision to change base was not a simple reaction. McClellan understood the situation, the options and acted upon it. McClellan decided on the 26th to change the supply base, but to hold position. To that end McClellan sent Slocum's division (6th Corps), Richardson's Division (-) (2nd Corps, and McClellan also ordered the 3rd brigade to go as well)) and despite protests from Keyes ordered to send Peck's division (-) to reinforce 5th Corps. Heintzelmann's forces had just advanced (25th) and he managed to avoid sending forces north despite being asked. Thus McClellan committed half his army (16 out of 33 brigades) to defend the line north of the Chickahominy. This is because it was his intention to hold his position whilst the supply base moved to the James, and adsorb Lee's pressure.

Porter broke anyway, and when he broke Slocum was in line with the other three divisions, Richardson was in reserve and protected the fleeing 5th Corps and Peck's division were just crossing the bridges, then halted and held them during the withdrawal and fired them. Once this has happened the Army of the Potomac is exposed - Lee can cross the Chickahominy east of the army and conduct a Kesselschlacht, and the only way of winning is not to be in the cauldron.

Thus McClellan pulled back to a strong position on the line of the White Oak, and intended to stay there, but Franklin quit his position without orders and hence they withdraw to the next good position, Herring Creek (via Malvern Hill, which is was a good anchor to the White Oak position, but a terrible position in itself).

It's not the way wars are won. A general who ignores what his enemy is doing is heading for trouble, but a general who is entirely absorbed by what his enemy is doing at the expense of making his foe care about what he's doing will wind up with no shortage of reasons why his conduct was rational and prudent, but no closer to victory.

However, you have to absorb enemy pressure. When the enemy builds up to make an offensive you can't ignore it. McClellan dealt with the problem quite well. Yes, it would have been nice if Porter managed to hold his position of the 27th for several more days to enable McClellan to stay at Richmonds door whilst retaining supplies. Would have been nice if Franklin hadn't quit position, and forced a further withdrawal of 8 miles. However, the realities of war happened and McClellan coped quite well with them.

 

[OpnCoronet]

For little mac to give up his base, is to admit defeat for his campaign of taking Richmond. Without that base, he cannot use his beloved siege train, i.e., heaven forbid that he should fight for his supply line and base.

 

[67th Tigers]

For little mac to give up his base, is to admit defeat for his campaign of taking Richmond. Without that base, he cannot use his beloved siege train, i.e., heaven forbid that he should fight for his supply line and base.

He is not giving up. He is ensuring he can continue.

He simply can't defend that supply line. To do so would require him to abandon Richmond. Far better to move the base to the river that actually goes to Richmond.

 

[OpnCoronet]

He is not giving up. He is ensuring he can continue.
He simply can't defend that supply line. To do so would require him to abandon Richmond. Far better to move the base to the river that actually goes to Richmond.

As Yorktown proved, McClellan did not believe Richmond could be taken without siege and thus, by his logic without his siege train and no way to move it close to his target from his new base, except by building a railway system, if he did.
Defeating Lee in open battle(the last thing little mac wanted or planned for) in battle for his supply line, delivers Richmond as the prize.

 

[KeyserSoze]

A story I recall, which may or may not be apocryphal, said that shortly after Lincoln appointed Grant commander in chief he present to Grant an idea for a march on Richmond which was basically a repeat of McClellans Penninsula Campaign. Lincoln argued that the river on both sides protected the army's flanks. Grant pointed out, something that apparently escaped McClellan, that the rivers also prevented him from maneuvering and gave him no choice but to attack head on. Lincoln said no more of his plan and the story, if true, also demonstrates that between him and McClellan, Grant was by far the better tactician

 

[67th Tigers]

As Yorktown proved, McClellan did not believe Richmond could be taken without siege and thus, by his logic without his siege train and no way to move it close to his target from his new base, except by building a railway system, if he did.
Defeating Lee in open battle(the last thing little mac wanted or planned for) in battle for his supply line, delivers Richmond as the prize.

What Yorktown proved was no such thing. McClellan advanced fully expecting to envelop Yorktown with Keyes' Corps moving via Lee's Mills. Keyes tried twice on the 6th and 16th April, and only that night did McClellan order "regular approaches". After Keyes could not overrun either of the forts on the east side of the river covering the bridges, which were fronted with abatis and a boggy swamp and covered from the west bank by artillery and riflemen, and the navy refused to run past Yorktown it's basically his last option. So McClellan would have preferred to turn Magruder/ Johnston out of position, but when those options were denied him he chose regular approaches rather than hurling brigades in set up killing field that the Rebs had been preparing for a whole year.

How does defeating Lee in a battle for the supply lines deliver Richmond? It, if anything, denies McClellan Richmond, for a time at least. There are still 45,000 men left in the entrenchments, which is about the same number Lee held Richmond with against Grant in 1864-5. Now if Grant's army, much stronger than McClellan's, couldn't break the Richmond lines, what chance does McClellan have of a quick dash?

 

[67th Tigers]

A story I recall, which may or may not be apocryphal, said that shortly after Lincoln appointed Grant commander in chief he present to Grant an idea for a march on Richmond which was basically a repeat of McClellans Penninsula Campaign. Lincoln argued that the river on both sides protected the army's flanks. Grant pointed out, something that apparently escaped McClellan, that the rivers also prevented him from maneuvering and gave him no choice but to attack head on. Lincoln said no more of his plan and the story, if true, also demonstrates that between him and McClellan, Grant was by far the better tactician

No, Grant's original plan was to avoid fighting Lee completely. He proposed an amphibious movement to the Carolinas and then basically to run around wrecking stuff and ignore Lee. Essentially a strategy of raiding. Then he proposed an amphibious move onto the James. Then when saddled with the overland approach he made for the James.

Grant essentially agreed with McClellan, as did Meade and most senior generals.

 

[OpnCoronet]

What Yorktown proved was that when push came to shove, little mac always reverted to the defensive, if the enemy shoved back, and it proved that he had no answers, if events did not meet his expectations. Did McClellan try to find a weak spot, before ordering an attack. After Keyes failure? Did he try to find or develop a plan to take advantage of his superior numbers?
Was McClellan on the peninsula, to take Richmond by not defeating the confederate army defending it, does it really matter if little mjac defeats Lee while defending his supply lines in the open or behind entrenchments at the gates of Richmond?
Defeating Lee in a battle, to secure his supply line, so that he could continue his plan of defeating the confederate forces with his matchless siege guns, would be the validation of the whole point of his presence on the Peninsula in the first place, in 1862.
Please be serious, the ANV or 1862, was not the same army in 1864.
The point is though, your views confirms that Lee was only thinking to assume the offensive ASAP, where there is little or not proof of the same intent from little mac.

 

[Elennsar]

So what? It is now isolated from the army and if not destroyed will simply provide the Confederates with a lot of supplies.

So, there's a difference between "isolated", which can be fixed without a complete withdrawal, and "destroyed", which leaves those supplies up in smoke.

However, you have to absorb enemy pressure. When the enemy builds up to make an offensive you can't ignore it. McClellan dealt with the problem quite well. Yes, it would have been nice if Porter managed to hold his position of the 27th for several more days to enable McClellan to stay at Richmonds door whilst retaining supplies. Would have been nice if Franklin hadn't quit position, and forced a further withdrawal of 8 miles. However, the realities of war happened and McClellan coped quite well with them.

Would be even better than nice if McClellan with seventeen brigades did as much as Porter did with the men he had. No one is asking McClellan to ignore what Lee did, only to respond in a way to interfere instead of relying on Porter to hold against whatever forces Lee brings to bear while meanwhile the general commanding has all his attention on the rear.

McClellan had the circumstances he had and chose to respond to them as he did. His forces are up to more than just "coping with" Lee being a more aggressive general.

It's not even advocating "the best defense is a good offense". But Lee at this point is able to focus most of his army of whatever precise strength on attacking McClellan because McClellan isn't doing anything to deter him from doing so. This increases the pressure on Porter and decreases the danger to Richmond.