McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[brass napoleon]

Considering McClellan's organizational ability I wonder if he would have made a good "General in Chief" a la Halleck. I know he briefly held that position early in the war but Lincoln pulled him from that role so the general could concentrate on the Peninsula. As Lincoln put it, even if he cannot fight he excels at making others fight. Not to disparage Halleck, who, despite the "first rate clerk" crack did a pretty fair job of keeping the armies informed and supplied, but McClellan might have made a good embryonic chief of staff if employed properly. I guess, though, that after a bad case of the "slows" post Antietam and some rancorous remarks to each other, the atmosphere was so poisoned that Lincoln would not have made that offer and McClellan would have snubbed it. Too bad. I think Little Mac, in an office in the War Department, would have been in the right place at the right time, for once.

Donald Stoker, in his book The Grand Design, makes the case that McClellan was indeed a competent grand strategist, and in fact as a grand strategist was moderately aggressive. But he was only able to make aggressive plans for other generals, not himself. So I think there's some merit to what you're saying - at least in the beginning of the war. But as the war progressed and it became clear a harder war was going to be necessary, it also became clear McClellan just wasn't the man, no matter what his role.

 

[67th Tigers]

Donald Stoker, in his book The Grand Design, makes the case that McClellan was indeed a competent grand strategist, and in fact as a grand strategist was moderately aggressive. But he was only able to make aggressive plans for other generals, not himself. So I think there's some merit to what you're saying - at least in the beginning of the war. But as the war progressed and it became clear a harder war was going to be necessary, it also became clear McClellan just wasn't the man, no matter what his role.

but was the hard war a necessity? Perhaps it became a necessity as the Confederacy hardened, but a massive initial application of military force, focused on the Confederate state, but respecting the people may have rendered it unnecessary.

See Rafuse's lecture here:

(and following parts)

 

[kevikens]

Sixty-seventh Tigers, had matters gone well in early 1862 for the North after Forts Henry and Donelson, Shiloh, the capture of New Orleans and the coastal bases in the Carolinas and if Richmond had fallen to McClellan that Spring, before the war hardened beyond all expectation, I think the war might have ended as most Northerners still thought it would. And it would have ended the way McClellan envisioned it, with the Union restored as it was. That of course, would have meant not only no hard war but also no emancipation and slavery remaining intact. If that had happened we would all be looking at the face of Little Mac on a fifty dollar bill. But as Lincoln surmised there might be some Divine plan at work and that the war must continue until the Divine purpose was fulfilled so perhaps it was in the stars that McClellan's very limited war had to yield to hard war and, having done his job of creating a powerful Army of the Potomac, it was mete and just that he relieved of command.

 

[Elennsar]

Whether or not it was in the stars, it would have taken much more than was delivered by the non-hard war commanders to end the war.

On the issue of McClellan as chief of staff, I think that his loathing of the "Black Republicans" would have made it difficult for him and Lincoln. At least in the field he wouldn't be dealing with them directly.

Not to say that the field was a better position - I think McClellan's weak points were too serious for him to be as useful as Lincoln and McClellan would have wished.

 

[brass napoleon]

but was the hard war a necessity? Perhaps it became a necessity as the Confederacy hardened, but a massive initial application of military force, focused on the Confederate state, but respecting the people may have rendered it unnecessary.

See Rafuse's lecture here:

(and following parts)

Well, I watched 12 minutes of it and it doesn't seem to be getting anywhere any time soon. If you can make the argument yourself, I'd appreciate it. Otherwise I tend to agree in large part with what kevikens said in Post #83

 

[Old_Glory]

When I visit, I always approach respectfully, salute the deceased general and mentally say "thank you" for your services as I believe what he accomplished with the Army of the Potomac was as essential to winning that war as what Meade or Grant did later. The tool they used effectively was forged by his skill and by his hand and I thank him for doing that.

He was greatly underrated. I feel it is mostly because of his opposition to Lincoln. Anyone seen as a rival to Lincoln is generally spat upon in history. He fought a completely different Confederate army than Grant or Sherman fought. It isn't even fair to compare the victories and losses. The Johnny-come-latelys get the lion share of the glory in the Union army at the expense of others, especially McClellan.

 

[rpkennedy]

He was greatly underrated. I feel it is mostly because of his opposition to Lincoln. Anyone seen as a rival to Lincoln is generally spat upon in history. He fought a completely different Confederate army than Grant or Sherman fought. It isn't even fair to compare the victories and losses. The Johnny-come-latelys get the lion share of the glory in the Union army at the expense of others, especially McClellan.

Maybe history would be kinder to him if he displayed as much competence in the field as he did in his correspondence.

R

 

[Pat Answer]

I believe that at the very beginning of McClellan's command, when planning for his campaign, he estimated an army of 125,000 men and, he apparently, believed Lincoln and his administration could supply the men and equipment, if he only would.
In any case, whether consciously, or not, he seems to have been determined to resist any temptation(or attempts) for any major campaigning , until he got all the men he believed he needed, no matter how long that might require.

Donald Stoker, in his book The Grand Design, makes the case that McClellan was indeed a competent grand strategist, and in fact as a grand strategist was moderately aggressive. But he was only able to make aggressive plans for other generals, not himself. So I think there's some merit to what you're saying - at least in the beginning of the war.

I was about to cite this very book. "In the East, after garrisoning Washington, Baltimore, Fortress Monroe, and other critical points with a total force of 38,000 men, he [McClellan] called for the creation of a 273,000-man army for field operations." (p. 58) This figure didn't include diversionary forces for amphibious landings on the coast.
"McClellan did mention that a smaller force than what he had proposed might do the job, but he intimated that this would not fulfill what he [my italics] understood was the government's task: reestablishing order as quickly as possible.... McClellan planned to use his grande armee 'not only to drive the enemy out of Virginia and occupy Richmond, but to occupy Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans' " (p. 59) [!]

Stoker argues that McClellan was convinced that the right approach was an overwhelming but purely military tour de force. It could have worked had the war been a purely military struggle [and I believe we made this point back on the second page of this thread]. The problem was that in this most literate and critical of nations [then and now LOL], the struggle was not purely military, something McClellan probably continued to struggle with until the 1864 election. The fundamental reason he is bickering with Lincoln about this or that corps is because he feels that any number under 273,000 is not enabling him to prosecute the kind of war he wants to.

I will have to watch the video later, but I have seen Rafuse before and he makes some good points. That being said, this surely is a sound conclusion:

But as the war progressed and it became clear a harder war was going to be necessary, it also became clear McClellan just wasn't the man, no matter what his role.

 

[Old_Glory]

Maybe history would be kinder to him if he displayed as much competence in the field as he did in his correspondence.

R

When you are facing Robert E. Lee in the strongest days of the Confederate army, it's a lot harder to be "competent". Something many so-called "competent" Union generals who found great success fighting in the west and later fighting a depleted and starving Confederate army would know nothing about.

 

[Elennsar]

When you are facing Robert E. Lee in the strongest days of the Confederate army, it's a lot harder to be "competent". Something many so-called "competent" Union generals who found great success fighting in the west and later fighting a depleted and starving Confederate army would know nothing about.

When you're facing Robert E. Lee in the strongest days of the Confederate army, you can still perform well or poorly, and McClellan performed poorly.

The Army of Northern Virginia was a considerably greater threat in July of 1863 than September of 1862, to compare Lee's two invasions. Yet we see a sounder display of generalship in the former on the part of the Union and much more serious consequences as a result.

Nor was the Army of Northern Virginia in 1864 a mere shadow that would collapse in a stiff breeze. That defeat took hard fighting and good leadership right up until 1865.

I'm going to let the students of the Western theater describe how the Union generals fighting there and their Confederate opponents look, my study isn't complete enough to properly compare it to McClellan and Lee.

 

[NedBaldwin]

The Army of Northern Virginia was a considerably greater threat in July of 1863 than September of 1862, to compare Lee's two invasions. Yet we see a sounder display of generalship in the former on the part of the Union and much more serious consequences as a result.

I have not read that deeply on Gettysburg, but I have the impression that Meade displayed the traits that McClellan gets criticized for. If Lee hadnt attacked him, there wouldn't have been a battle of Gettysburg since Meade was cautious and defensive minded. When faced with similar situations -- Lee with his back to the Potomac-- it was McClellan who was the aggressive one; Meade held back. Still in both situations Lee escaped across the river. I suppose the consequences of this were more serious in 1863 -- Lincoln seemed to feel so when he wrote (in an unsent letter) " I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape. "

 

[Elennsar]

I have not read that deeply on Gettysburg, but I have the impression that Meade displayed the traits that McClellan gets criticized for. If Lee hadnt attacked him, there wouldn't have been a battle of Gettysburg since Meade was cautious and defensive minded. When faced with similar situations -- Lee with his back to the Potomac-- it was McClellan who was the aggressive one; Meade held back. Still in both situations Lee escaped across the river. I suppose the consequences of this were more serious in 1863 -- Lincoln seemed to feel so when he wrote (in an unsent letter) " I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape. "

If Lee hadn't attacked him, Meade was still moving to fight him. And Lee with his back the Potomac in July of 1863 is also with a much better prepared line than he had at Antietam - even ignoring Meade's plans to attack on the 14th.

 

[NedBaldwin]

If Lee hadn't attacked him, Meade was still moving to fight him.

My understanding of Meade's plan -- the Pipe Creek Line -- was that he intended to act defensively

 

[Elennsar]

My understanding of Meade's plan -- the Pipe Creek Line -- was that he intended to act defensively

Any description of Meade's plans should include sending Reynolds (with 1st, 11th, and 3rd Corps) forward to advance towards Gettysburg. The Pipe Creek Line plan was only there "in the event it was unable to fight the enemy on its 'own terms' elsewhere", as Edwin B. Coddington put it.

I highly recommend getting a copy of his book ( The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command), if I had to name one book to describe Meade's intentions - its not by any means the most recent (copyright 1968) or best in other regards, but it's a very good account of the strategic operations leading up to the battle and passable for the actions after (for that, One Continuous Fight is best).

 

[Sons of Liberty]

McClellan, the man "with the slows" as old Abe put it, managed to get it right at Malvern Hill.

 

[Elennsar]

And then claimed he needed reinforcements after barely saving his army from disaster.

 

[Old_Glory]

When you're facing Robert E. Lee in the strongest days of the Confederate army, you can still perform well or poorly, and McClellan performed poorly.

The Army of Northern Virginia was a considerably greater threat in July of 1863 than September of 1862, to compare Lee's two invasions. Yet we see a sounder display of generalship in the former on the part of the Union and much more serious consequences as a result.

Nor was the Army of Northern Virginia in 1864 a mere shadow that would collapse in a stiff breeze. That defeat took hard fighting and good leadership right up until 1865.

I'm going to let the students of the Western theater describe how the Union generals fighting there and their Confederate opponents look, my study isn't complete enough to properly compare it to McClellan and Lee.

I think what he performed poorly at the most was political rear end kissing which is what the Union army was full of. He faced the Confederacy at its finest. He was asked to do the almost impossible by a desperate President Lincoln. You can try all you want to make the 1864-1865 Confederates the same as the Confederates McClellan faced, but it's a mockery of the truth.

 

[Elennsar]

I think what he performed poorly at the most was political rear end kissing which is what the Union army was full of. He faced the Confederacy at its finest. He was asked to do the almost impossible by a desperate President Lincoln. You can try all you want to make the 1864-1865 Confederates the same as the Confederates McClellan faced, but it's a mockery of the truth.

What was so superior about Magruder and Holmes and Huger to Wilcox, Anderson, and Heth?

Just to look at the first area of difference of consequence.

Treating the 1864-1865 Confederates as if they were pushover opponents would baffle anyone who fought them. Including the survivors of the 1862 battles.

 

[rpkennedy]

I think what he performed poorly at the most was political rear end kissing which is what the Union army was full of. He faced the Confederacy at its finest. He was asked to do the almost impossible by a desperate President Lincoln. You can try all you want to make the 1864-1865 Confederates the same as the Confederates McClellan faced, but it's a mockery of the truth.

You're right that he wasn't very good on the political side of things. Unfortunately for him, he wasn't very good at commanding an army on the battlefield either.

And I would dispute that the AoNV was at its finest in the summer of 1862. There were still a bunch of commanders who were unreliable and many of the troops were still fairly green. The AoNV was at its peak in the winter of 1862-63, IMO.

R

 

[Elennsar]

You're right that he wasn't very good on the political side of things. Unfortunately for him, he wasn't very good at commanding an army on the battlefield either.

And I would dispute that the AoNV was at its finest in the summer of 1862. There were still a bunch of commanders who were unreliable and many of the troops were still fairly green. The AoNV was at its peak in the winter of 1862-63, IMO.

R

And it must be noted on the political side of things that McClellan went to the other extreme from sucking up, so for him to be in political trouble is not with a reasonable effort to be on good terms with his boss, but rather an attitude of active hostility to the administration - an attitude hardly appropriate for civilian-military relations.