McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[67th Tigers]

And yet the fact remains - Hamilton did propose attacking. And he described the conditions which would have made an attack more likely to succeed. But it was not attempted.

So Hamlton's claim in his "narrative " letter is supported by the evidence.

The one where he claimed to have proposed attacking on the 14th rather than the night of the 16th for the 17th?

Yes, Hamilton said he could attack the abandoned enemy position and seize it. He was, however, wrong in that it was not abandoned. This is a failure of his comprehension.The right thing to do is recce the position first.

He, of course, never proposed assaulting the manned works at Wynn's Mill. In later movements, such as the seizeure of the advance rifle pits a few days later, he didn't assault and never contempated it.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

If McClellan created an army, what kind of army did he create?

A slow moving, cautious army. A poorly structured army(too many corps). An army without enough initiative at the corps and division level.

Yes......Slow indeed. That was McClellan.

 

[DanSBHawk]

The one where he claimed to have proposed attacking on the 14th rather than the night of the 16th for the 17th?

Yes, Hamilton said he could attack the abandoned enemy position and seize it. He was, however, wrong in that it was not abandoned. This is a failure of his comprehension.The right thing to do is recce the position first.

He, of course, never proposed assaulting the manned works at Wynn's Mill. In later movements, such as the seizeure of the advance rifle pits a few days later, he didn't assault and never contempated it.

No, the right thing to do would have been for McClellan to observe the position under the same set of conditions that Hamilton noted - an artillery bombardment causing a drastic weakening of the position.

Hamilton never claimed it was completely abandoned. The fact remains that Hamilton proposed attacking and it was not approved. Exactly as he later claimed.

 

[Nathan Towne]

No, the right thing to do would have been for McClellan to observe the position under the same set of conditions that Hamilton noted - an artillery bombardment causing a drastic weakening of the position.

Hamilton never claimed it was completely abandoned. The fact remains that Hamilton proposed attacking and it was not approved. Exactly as he later claimed.

Last time you were talking you were trying to state that the U.S. Army had brought up 55,000 men PFD to the Warwick Line, with Magruder having around 13,000 men PFD under his command on April 5th.

When I informed you that based on unit rolls, the Confederates had in excess of 18,000 men PFD on the morning of the 5th and slightly over 21,000 men PFD by the time of the storm hitting late on the 6th (per the unit rolls and returns of the units which had reached Magruder's command by that point) and that the U.S. Army had brought up in the vicinity of maybe 40,000-45,000 men PFD total on the 5th who would be able to conduct the attack and maybe slightly more on the 6th, all of whom would have to attack without the support of their heavy/siege artillery and via narrow corridors, you told me that I didn't know what I was talking about. You had no idea what units had reached Magruder's command, or what their approximate strengths were (admittedly, I have not seen the rolls for all of the Confederate units which had reached Magruder from the 27th of March onwards, but those are the rough figures that way.

So……………………

 

[Belfoured]

He was, but that is not sufficient for me, by any means, of course. I require far more than that on these types of things.

Have you seen Humphreys' assessment in his July 11, 1862 letter to his wife? It's hardly based on amateur psychoanalysis. It's based on his personal observations during the Seven Days. He was on the staff ...

 

[DanSBHawk]

Last time you were talking you were trying to state that the U.S. Army had brought up 55,000 men PFD to the Warwick Line, with Magruder having around 13,000 men PFD under his command on April 5th.

When I informed you that based on unit rolls, the Confederates had in excess of 18,000 men PFD on the morning of the 5th and slightly over 21,000 men PFD by the time of the storm hitting late on the 6th (per the unit rolls and returns of the units which had reached Magruder's command by that point) and that the U.S. Army had brought up in the vicinity of maybe 40,000-45,000 men PFD total on the 5th who would be able to conduct the attack and maybe slightly more on the 6th, all of whom would have to attack without the support of their heavy/siege artillery and via narrow corridors, you told me that I didn't know what I was talking about. You had no idea what units had reached Magruder's command, or what their approximate strengths were (admittedly, I have not seen the rolls for all of the Confederate units which had reached Magruder from the 27th of March onwards, but those are the rough figures that way.

So……………………

Completely irrelevant to my comment.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Have you seen Humphreys' assessment in his July 11, 1862 letter to his wife? It's hardly based on amateur psychoanalysis. It's based on his personal observations during the Seven Days. He was on the staff ...

I have seen it excerpted. If McClellan were on record telling someone, say Ellen, how he was feeling at that moment, that is one thing. Beyond that, we have to be very careful that way. It is worth taking note of regarding the larger mosaic.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Completely irrelevant to my comment.

Being that you are making the case that Hamilton was clearly correct in advocating for an attack in mid-April (which is what you clearly implied in an above comment), it would seem fair to take note of the fact that as was the case with the Iuka operation, the second Corinth campaign, the Tullahoma Campaign and the Chickamauga campaign, this is an area in which you are just talking off of the cuff based on suppositions, selected quotes and innuendo.

 

[Belfoured]

I have seen it excerpted. If McClellan were on record telling someone, say Ellen, how he was feeling at that moment, that is one thing. Beyond that, we have to be very careful that way. It is worth taking note of regarding the larger mosaic.

But the "larger mosaic" includes the tenor of several of his letters during that week, etc. Humphreys, as noted, was in a very good position to notice that something significant had changed that was obvious. The observations in his letter can't be simply dismissed as amateur psychoanalysis. In fact, anybody who's familiar with Humphreys would laugh at the suggestion.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Being that you are making the case that Hamilton was clearly correct in advocating for an attack in mid-April (which is what you clearly implied in an above comment), it would seem fair to take note of the fact that as was the case with the Iuka operation, the second Corinth campaign, the Tullahoma Campaign and the Chickamauga campaign, this is an area in which you are just talking off of the cuff based on suppositions, selected quotes and innuendo.

Obviously I disagree. And I would say that my opinion is just as valid and informed as anyone else here. And that includes you.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Obviously I disagree. And I would say that my opinion is just as valid and informed as anyone else here. And that includes you.

You can make that argument regarding the situation along the Warwick line. The key is that you need to do so on the basis of a strong position and that.

No one's positions are inherently superior to anyone else's. Never will be. That isn't the issue. The issue is that opinions are valuable when grounded in facts and a careful, judicious and balanced reading of the evidence, not conjecture and innuendo.

 

[DanSBHawk]

You can make that argument regarding the situation along the Warwick line. The key is that you need to do so on the basis of a strong position and that.

No one's positions are inherently superior to anyone else's. Never will be. That isn't the issue. The issue is that opinions are valuable when grounded in facts and a careful, judicious and balanced reading of the evidence, not conjecture and innuendo.

Perhaps the problem is that you believe that your opinions are more grounded in the facts than others here.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Perhaps the problem is that you believe that your opinions are more grounded in the facts than others here.

I try to ground my views in solely in a judicious, fair and comprehensive examination of the record. Not conjecture and innuendo. I do the best which I can at that.

You have passion for the subject matter. If you took it seriously and began to seriously study things in a fair and judicious manner rather than throw around insults about historical actors based on conjecture, innuendo and cherry-picking, you could probably make some good contributions. You have been highly insulting and it has almost invariably been coupled with ignorance of the subject matter. The more you know, the more you realize that you don't know. In addition, we don't want to "know" things which are simply not so.

Hopefully, you can take that constructively.

 

[1SGDan]

The real fact of the matter here is that no re-evaluation of McClellan is necessary. He was evaluated in real time and found wanting not just once but twice by his superiors. Those evaluations can not be undone by latter day arguments. McClellan was a failure when it counted most and paid the price for it. We can hem, haw, and question all we want but those decisions were made when it mattered not 170+ years later.

 

[DanSBHawk]

You have passion for the subject matter. If you took it seriously and began to seriously study things in a fair and judicious manner rather than throw around insults about historical actors based on conjecture, innuendo and cherry-picking, you could probably make some good contributions. You have been highly insulting and it has almost invariably been coupled with ignorance of the subject matter. The more you know, the more you realize that you don't know. In addition, we don't want to "know" things which are simply not so.

Hopefully, you can take that constructively.

No, I don't intend to take your condescension "constructively." My opinions are based on the evidence, and I'll continue to express them as I see fit. I'm very confident that my opinions are at least as well-grounded in the evidence as yours.

Perhaps you should block me again if my opinions offend you or agitate you. It's really not my problem. It's yours.

 

[Nathan Towne]

But the "larger mosaic" includes the tenor of several of his letters during that week, etc. Humphreys, as noted, was in a very good position to notice that something significant had changed that was obvious. The observations in his letter can't be simply dismissed as amateur psychoanalysis. In fact, anybody who's familiar with Humphreys would laugh at the suggestion.

I am not dismissing it. I place it as a read on someone by another individual and take it in as a piece of evidence as such, to be used with caution, obviously.

 

[67th Tigers]

I have seen it excerpted. If McClellan were on record telling someone, say Ellen, how he was feeling at that moment, that is one thing. Beyond that, we have to be very careful that way. It is worth taking note of regarding the larger mosaic.

Effectively the quote is that, on the morning of 1st July, McClellan was exhausted. Hence he went to sleep for several hours whilst off with Rodgers to decide on whether the army would move to Harrison's Landing or Dancing Point. He issued an order placing Sumner in command during this period.

McClellan, of course, was exhausted. He had had no sleep at all on the night of the 30th June/1st July because he was busy reassembling his army on Malvern Hill, an unplanned for movement caused by Franklin quitting his position against orders. He'd had little sleep on preceeding nights.

The idea that the observation that a man who has been kept awake for several days is exhausted is hardly a biting psychological diagnosis. Just see potential SEALS during Hell Week...

 

[67th Tigers]

No, the right thing to do would have been for McClellan to observe the position under the same set of conditions that Hamilton noted - an artillery bombardment causing a drastic weakening of the position.

Hamilton never claimed it was completely abandoned. The fact remains that Hamilton proposed attacking and it was not approved. Exactly as he later claimed.

I asked you previously whether you learned about the first day of the Somme in America. You never replied.

When under bombardment, troops take cover. If there is no advantage, guns can be rolled back off their platforms into cover. This prevents damage to the defenders. When the infantry advance, the defenders can come out from cover and engage the infantry.

Hamilton said he could occupy the "abandoned" works with a brigade. Except the works were not abandoned, the defenders simply took cover. The proper thing to do would be a recce. Said recce proved Hamilton wrong.

This speaks to Hamilton's faulty judgement.

 

[Saphroneth]

This speaks to the difference between what siege guns do to a defending position and what field guns do, at least in this period. Field guns can make the enemy take cover, but they can't destroy the works - and the enemy can reoccupy the positions.

Siege guns destroy the positions. They physically blow apart and demolish the defensive positions so they cannot be reoccupied.


While the mechanism is different to in WW1, in both cases a successful attack is one where the enemy cannot opt to defend their works against the attacking force. This is because the defended works are the problem.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I asked you previously whether you learned about the first day of the Somme in America. You never replied.

When under bombardment, troops take cover. If there is no advantage, guns can be rolled back off their platforms into cover. This prevents damage to the defenders. When the infantry advance, the defenders can come out from cover and engage the infantry.

Hamilton said he could occupy the "abandoned" works with a brigade. Except the works were not abandoned, the defenders simply took cover. The proper thing to do would be a recce. Said recce proved Hamilton wrong.

This speaks to Hamilton's faulty judgement.

Hamilton didn't say troops merely "took cover." The Somme comparison is absurd.