McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[Nathan Towne]

Has it ever been stated or theorized that Burnside's promotion was for tattling on the McClellan clique?

Burnside had made it clear on every occasion in which it been broached with him that McClellan was the best person for the position and that he would not like to replace him.

 

[TallTallMan]

Burnside had made it clear on every occasion in which it been broached with him that McClellan was the best person for the position and that he would not like to replace him.

Yeah but he was evaluated after the anti-administration Mac clique was told on.

 

[Belfoured]

It isn't all that difficult to see some of the mental stress which McClellan was enduring from the correspondence. The Confederate Army had been permitted to consolidate to roughly parity with his Army in numerical strength (and he believed to a size nearly double that of how own Army), with the recruiting stations having been closed and vast resources not being utilized. He certainly had some right to feel as he did and the stress is understandable.

What isn't particularly useful is the psychoanalysis regarding the Galena incident, or lots of other examples, in which others ascribe motives and explanations to his actions which they were not necessarily in a position to judge that way and go well beyond what is actually known.

This isn't about his "right to feel as he did" - all of which can be debated. It's about his reaction to the stress. If it affects his command and control it is absolutely an appropriate subject. Just as one can read some of his letters written during that week and conclude that he was behaving erratically. Humphreys was taken back enough to note it. Humphreys was in a "position to judge" as McClellan's Chief Topo Engineer on the Peninsula. And he cannot be accurately labeled a McClellan basher.

 

[Belfoured]

And I agree with the conclusion of the Schofield Commission that Porter's comments to Burnside were probably not appropriate for an officer to be stating about the commanding general (Pope).

They did put it somewhat more definitively, of course.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Since we've been given a reference to what Marvel said regarding the Hamilton incident in Radical Sacrifice, let's look at everything Marvel said about that. (Perhaps the Kindle version isn't as "complete" as the hard copy book).

According to Marvel at p. 117, Hamilton wasn't the only officer complaining about Porter's actions as "Director of the Siege". At p. 118 Marvel states that the "grumbling" about Porter involved three generals in III Corps; that one suggested the only way he could gain recognition "would be to change his name to Porter"; and that this "probably" was Hamilton, whom McClellan "sent home the next day."

While we're using Marvel and Radical Sacrifice as an authoritative source, it bears mention that at p. 172 he describes McClellan's mental state during the Seven Days as "hobbled" and dependent on Porter. This is not inconsistent with Andrew Humphreys' July 1862 assessment of McClellan's mental condition during the Seven Days nor with Rafuse's modern assessment.

Interesting. So there is evidence to support what Hamilton wrote in his 1864 "narrative" letter. We know that he proposed an attack on the Warwick Line which was refused. And we know there was discontent pertaining to McClellans favoritism towards Porter.

I think if an officer believes his men are being treated unfairly, then it's his obligation to protest. If his troops were being dangerously overworked, then Hamilton was certainly justified in complaining.

So far, no evidence has been presented that Hamilton was in any way incompetent as commander of a division. I think this may all have been caused by thin skin on McClellan's part.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Here is what Hamilton proposed on April 16th. He clearly wants to attack.

 

[Nathan Towne]

This isn't about his "right to feel as he did" - all of which can be debated. It's about his reaction to the stress. If it affects his command and control it is absolutely an appropriate subject. Just as one can read some of his letters written during that week and conclude that he was behaving erratically. Humphreys was taken back enough to note it. Humphreys was in a "position to judge" as McClellan's Chief Topo Engineer on the Peninsula. And he cannot be accurately labeled a McClellan basher.

He was, but that is not sufficient for me, by any means, of course. I require far more than that on these types of things.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Yeah but he was evaluated after the anti-administration Mac clique was told on.

I think that you mean, he was "elevated?"

I would actually disagree with that. He was elevated when Lincoln made the decision to relieve McClellan, which Lincoln stated came about on the basis of the Confederate Army being able to move Longstreet's Corps to intercede between the Army of the Potomac and Richmond amongst the London Valley Campaign, which Lincoln had stated that he had made the test for himself with McClellan.

 

[DanSBHawk]

The above user has absolutely no idea other than conjecture and speculation, just so that everyone knows.

Very petty. Feel better now?

 

[Nathan Towne]

It is the number fit to march, which is prettymuch the definition of "for duty".



This goes nowhere other than to point out a lot of men had fallen out of ranks in the immediate aftermath of the campaign.

In fact the stragglers are not uniformly distributed:

Longstreet (DR Jones): 2,777
Hood and Evans: 322
Jackson (JE Jones): 1,508
Ewell (Lawton): 979
AP Hill: 2,685
DH Hill: 732
Walker: 168
McLaws: 2,515
Anderson: 3,718

The units that straggled are Longstreet's division (DR Jones), and the four divisions that force-marched from Harper's Ferry, with the worst off being the one with the longest march. Essentially the units that got ragged around west of South Mountain, and that's where the dropouts were.

There is plenty which can be disputed with these numbers, but the general thrust is essentially accurate in so far as many of the divisions highlighted were concerned.

@Saphroneth has attempted to claim that D.H. Hill's Division experienced unusually heavy straggling, but really the opposite was the case.

 

[Nathan Towne]

There are three Lee quotes, I know of, and I'll throw in one that is almost certainly Longstreet (name another high ranking general in Lee's army that joined the Republicans):

"McClellan, by all odds! I think he is the only man on the Federal side who could have organized the army as it was. Grant had, of course, more successes in the field in the latter part of the war, but Grant only came in to reap the benefits of McClellan's previous efforts. At the same time, I do not wish to disparage General Grant, for he has many abilities, but if Grant had commanded during the first years of the war, we would have gained our independence. Grant's policy of attacking would have been a blessing to us, for we lost more by inaction than we would have lost in battle. After the first Manassas the army took a sort of 'dry rot', and we lost more men by camp diseases than we would have by fighting."

- either Lee or Mosby (Mosby may have said this quoting Lee, and is on record as being much, much more critical)

"General McClellan was the only General Father dreaded"

- R.E. Lee's daughter

"As regards General McClellan, I have always entertained a high opinion of his capacity, and have no reason to think he omitted anything that was in his power"

- R.E Lee to B.H. Wright

and Longstreet's opinion:

"There was no Union general whom we so much dreaded as much as McClellan. We would always tell when he was in command by the way the Union troops were handled, and the number of our dead and wounded. We received the blows, and we knew who dealt the heaviest ones. We were sorry when we heard he had been restored to command, after we had defeated Pope, and were glad when we was retired.... [McClellan] had, as we thought, no equal."

- unattributed Republican Confederate General (almost certainly James Longstreet) to Hugh McCulloch, 1874

Here again you make this claim regarding the McCulloch quote. He does not state that the general was a Republican. We don't know who he was quoting.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Elennsar, I have addressed your comments line-by-line below:

ELENNSAR:
Your first link (in your post above) asserting that we can determine Lee's starting strength by adding the campaign's causalities to the October return risks double counting anyone noted as a causality at some point during the campaign but who had returned to the ranks as of the October 10, or any men who had not been present at the start of the campaign returning to the ranks in time for the October 10 count being accidentally included as part of the campaign start count.

THORP:
I certainly hope you will read my first link because in it I have already addressed the potential issue of double counting.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/artsandliving/civilwar/mcclellan-graphic/?tab=2

ELENNSAR:
This is less troubling than reporting Lee's "infantry PFD" based on a return that includes two artillery battalions as well as divisional artillery (certainly it is not listed as missing, and is usually given when divisional totals are), but it is not any better than anyone else's guesstimate.


THORP:
"Infantry" present for duty should be "troops" present for duty.

The statement about Lee's Sept. 22 return in my article should read [changes in caps]:
Lee filed his first return five days after the battle, noting the count is "very imperfect" and does not include cavalry or RESERVE artillery. It states that on Sept. 22, he had at least 36,418 TROOPS present for duty.

I am unclear as to why you are so deeply troubled by this minor error. The fact that I wrote INFANTRY instead of TROOPS does not change my stated total for Lee's army of "about 41,000" on Sept. 22. Is it correct for you to encourage others to discount everything else I have written because of it?

ELENNSAR:
And your use of eyewitness head counts to justify claims of Lee's numbers does not address that even were those headcounts 100% accurate that they would be counting the total men marching by - a poor basis for determining Lee's present for duty as distinct from his aggregate present, and yet used as if these totals were both certainly reliable and certainly of present for duty only.

THORP:
If historians cannot consider eye witness accounts, first hand scout reports, Confederate tri-monthly reports and sworn statements made immediately afterwards by Union officers, then what are we supposed to use? The accounts I published are copied verbatim from these sources. You will note that most first-hand accounts are larger than the present for duty numbers that I used. Does that not reinforce the notion that these witnesses were seeing aggregate present? Where are your better sources to contradict mine? And where in my text do I claim that my totals are "certainly reliable and certainly of present for duty only?" My actual words were, "If more than 75,000 men were with Lee during the Antietam campaign, sightings of the different parts of Lee's army should generally match the estimated number of troops from the chart above. In the map below, two-dozen accounts, taken from newspapers, civilians, intelligence reports and the sworn statements of officers, are located on the march routes. The correlation is surprisingly close."
Expired Image Removed

It should be noted that additional eye witness accounts which I did not publish from Sept. 2 to Sept. 9, also correlate with Lee's estimated troop strengths. What is your superior method to calculate the size of Lee's army during that time period?

ELENNSAR:
I have no doubt about your interest in documenting Lee's numbers, but the soundness of your writing I find doubtful based on that being offered as supporting your conclusion.

THORP:
Again, what is your better method? Should we just not question Taylor's and Sears' numbers?

ELENNSAR:
As for the issue of Lee having lost more men than he is generally acknowledged as losing, that is not an area I have investigated myself to any extent, and given that it's a pretty recognizable fact that both sides undercounted their own losses it would not surprise me to see that happen here as well.

THORP:
So is it incorrect to add back in the extra losses to Lee's army? They had to have been present in Maryland during the time period from Sept. 13 to Sept. 18, did they not? Regarding Union troop losses during the Antietam Campaign, what evidence do you have that specifically shows the Union undercounted their losses anywhere close to the extent of the Confederates? A conservative estimate shows the rebels had at least 3,500 additional casualties and that is only including killed and prisoners of war. I do not even attempt to consider additional wounded, of which there certainly many .

ELENNSAR:
But it does not address the issue of the strength of his army being too much for McClellan's own forces, which is my main concern in regards to McClellan's actions, and thus is not one I find particularly convincing as relates to the defense of McClellan's actions.

THORP:
On Sept. 7 or there about, McClellan only had about 60,000 men. (I don't have the exact number at hand, but I can produce it.) If Lee had 75,000 present for duty in the Frederick area, then McClellan's caution at that time is more than justifiable. (Not withstanding Halleck's bickering that McClellan was moving too fast!) For the record, I do not advocate that McClellan could not have beaten Lee more soundly. However, judging by how harshly Lee handled Burnside, Hooker, and Grant in later conflicts, when the odds were much better for the Union, I think it is unrealistic to believe that Lee could easily have been destroyed at Antietam. What I am tired of is arm-chair historians constantly writing that throughout the campaign, McClellan outnumbered Lee 2 to 1 when Lee's own reported numbers do not support that conclusion.

ELENNSAR:
Frankly, I feel that neither this or Sears are convincing, and look to find better information in other sources when they're available.

THORP:
What new sources do you expect to become available? Again, what numbers are we supposed to use in the meantime and why?

This was all written in haste, but I would like to address your post of Aug. 29, 2014 next.

Those Federal figures for the Army of the Potomac on September 7th are just not serious, unfortunately and directly repudiated by what we know.

 

[Nathan Towne]

No, Confederate returns often have an intermediate figure of "total present" which is between PFD and aggregate. This adds in the extra-duty men. Confederate PFD figures are "effectives".

Steiner reports seeing 72,000 men pass through Frederick. He did not see Walker's division or Stuart's cavalry (about 11,000 PFD between them), and probably part of DH Hill's division.

This Confederate PFD=effectives argument is simply silly, sadly. I have demonstrated in other threads how it is just clearly not accurate, objectively speaking.

 

[JackADriscoll]

Those Federal figures for the Army of the Potomac on September 7th are just not serious, unfortunately and directly repudiated by what we know.

What you are responding to is like a decade old

 

[67th Tigers]

That is probably correct, because McClellan never specified the grounds. That includes the initial claim in these posts that Hamilton was relieved because he "disobeyed orders". Under the doctrine of relief for cause

No such doctrine. It didn't exist at the time. It's a mid-20th century innovation in the officer reporting system.

There were four ways to remove an officer at the time:

1. Arresting the officer for a military offense.
2. Arresting the officer for negligence.
3. For volunteer officers upto Colonel only;* by examination for competence by a military commission. (per the Volunteer Act of 22nd July 1861).
4. Reassignment by a competent authority,** i.e. the General-in-Chief (excepting direct Presidential appointees - Corps Commanders and some Departmental Commanders) or the President (or the Secretary-of-War acting in the name of the President).

The closest thing the "relief-for-cause" was examination by a military commission which, like relief-for-cause, could never apply to general officers.

In this case, since McClellan is General-in-Chief, he has the authority to reassign officers below Corps Commander at will. If Heintzelman were to get rid of Hamilton, as McKeever said he should, he would have to arrest Hamilton.

* These are state-appointed officers, and hence the Federal government had the right to remove them. All regulars and volunteer generals held Federal rank from the President and Senate, and so were not covered by this. The President had asserted their competence, and the Senate had agreed.

** Competent in the legal sense - holding sufficient authority to undertake an action.

 

[67th Tigers]

This Confederate PFD=effectives argument is simply silly, sadly. I have demonstrated in other threads how it is just clearly not accurate, objectively speaking.

However, this is exactly what WH Taylor stated, and is the standard interpretation.

 

[67th Tigers]

Here is what Hamilton proposed on April 16th. He clearly wants to attack.
View attachment 520937
View attachment 520938

This was written at the end of the 16th. It's his daily report of events to his superior (Heintzelman). It was given to Heintzelman the next morning, Heintzelman went to see himself, conversed with Hamilton and then reported to McClellan:

"Gen Hamilton reports that no guns are visible this morning [17th April] on the enemys works in his front[,] the guns having been withdrawn from the embrasures. A few men are visible along their line of entrenchments. A few shells have been thrown into their works this morning. Genl Hamilton thinks he can carry the works to his front with small loss."

In response GHQ sent Lt Wagner to perform a recce and see if this report was true. It wasn't, and Wagner was killed.

Herein we see the mental dysfunction of Hamilton - a lack of object permanence. As he wouldn't see the enemy, he assumed they were no longer there. Of course, this is not true, and the enemy had simply taken cover.

Yes, Hamilton wants to attack. However, Hamilton was wrong in his assessment. McClellan performed the correct course of action; he sent out a recce. This proved Hamilton wrong, at the cost of Lt Wagner's life. This is much better than the thousands of lives that would have been lost in a doomed attack.

 

[67th Tigers]

It's accessible in the Lincoln Papers online at the LOC by original and by pdf transcription. That's how I found it - feel free to do the same.

Really? Hamilton's letter to McClellan is in the Lincoln papers? Please, post a link.

 

[Nathan Towne]

However, this is exactly what WH Taylor stated, and is the standard interpretation.

Respectfully, it isn't.

I noted your above comment regarding the competency of the Division commanders within the Army to the effect that all of the Division commanders within the Army were sufficiently competent other than Hamilton and Casey. That is an interesting comment. I have to study Seven Pines in substantially more depth, but overall, Casey strikes me as having been competent.

I would be interested in hearing your views regarding Kearny at some point. Very interesting case. I think that we could use a new great biography on Kearny.

 

[Saphroneth]

I noted your above comment regarding the competency of the Division commanders within the Army to the effect that all of the Division commanders within the Army were sufficiently competent other than Hamilton and Casey.

I think that depends on the meaning of "sufficient". It would be quite reasonable as a logically consistent statement to say that Hamilton and Casey have problems even outside combat in the mere administration of their division, while Kearny and Hooker (say) had problems within the sphere of combat.