McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[Saphroneth]

Respectfully, it isn't.

To quote Taylor:

In the field returns there was a column for the "officers present for duty," and one for "enlisted men present for duty" ; the sum of the two would give the "effective total" as generally understood — that is, the fighting strength.

In the monthly report the arrangement was different: there was a column for each grade of officers, both of the line and staff, and also a column for sergeants, one for corporals, and one for privates-enlisted men. There was then a column headed "effective total," which embraced only the enlisted men present for duty — that is, the non-commissioned staff, sergeants, corporals, and privates; there being no column for the aggregate of the commissioned officers present for duty.

There are many methods of comparing the strength of opposing armies.The one adopted by me was to take the "effective total," or the sum of the officers and enlisted men present for duty, [240] excluding all consideration of the special or extra-duty men, those sick, and those in arrest.As this manner of estimating was applied to both armies, it seemed to me the most equitable and satisfactory.

What this means is that Taylor is saying:
1- "Officers PFD" in Confederate field returns, plus "Enlisted men PFD" in Confederate field returns, when added give the "effective total" which is fighting strength.
2- Taylor also defines "Effective total" to be the sum of officers and enlisted men PFD, excluding special and extra duty, sick men and men who are under arrest.


Consequently, Taylor is saying that Confederate PFD is effectives, which is fighting strength (part 1) and that this excludes special or extra duty men (part 2).

So this seems to entirely substantiate 67th's point that Confederate PFD is effectives.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I think that depends on the meaning of "sufficient". It would be quite reasonable as a logically consistent statement to say that Hamilton and Casey have problems even outside combat in the mere administration of their division, while Kearny and Hooker (say) had problems within the sphere of combat.

I have studied the Maryland, London Valley and Fredericksburg Campaigns (all five offensives) and the Chancellorsville and Pennsylvania Campaigns, along with the Western campaigns, more intensely than I have studied the Peninsula and Northern Virginia campaigns still, but I must tell you that I really regard Hooker very highly, even though he admittedly could be a difficult subordinate at times, for sure.

 

[Saphroneth]

I have studied the Maryland and Fredericksburg Campaigns (and the Chancellorsville Campaign), along with the Western campaigns, more intensely than I have studied the Peninsula and Northern Virginia campaigns still, but I must tell you that I really regard Hooker very highly.

My reason for bringing up Hooker was so that there was more than one name in consideration when talking about DCs who were able to administer their forces properly but who would have issues in combat (since my main focus was, well, the logical consistency of the point). The reason why I included Hooker is the events of Williamsburg and the aftermath, where - like Kearny - Hooker complained about not being praised, and said that that he'd clearly done the important fighting because he took lots of casualties.

Hooker certainly grew into command over time and became reasonably effective as a commander, but in his first test of significant combat as a divisional commander Hooker was not yet there.

 

[Nathan Towne]

To quote Taylor:




What this means is that Taylor is saying:
1- "Officers PFD" in Confederate field returns, plus "Enlisted men PFD" in Confederate field returns, when added give the "effective total" which is fighting strength.
2- Taylor also defines "Effective total" to be the sum of officers and enlisted men PFD, excluding special and extra duty, sick men and men who are under arrest.


Consequently, Taylor is saying that Confederate PFD is effectives, which is fighting strength (part 1) and that this excludes special or extra duty men (part 2).

So this seems to entirely substantiate 67th's point that Confederate PFD is effectives.

As you know, officers were included in Confederate PFD figures. Below is the July 20th return, for instance.

The War of the Rebellion : a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate armies. / Pub. under the direction of the ... Secretary of War ... ser.1:v.11:pt.3:Correspondence.

 

[Nathan Towne]

My reason for bringing up Hooker was so that there was more than one name in consideration when talking about DCs who were able to administer their forces properly but who would have issues in combat (since my main focus was, well, the logical consistency of the point). The reason why I included Hooker is the events of Williamsburg and the aftermath, where - like Kearny - Hooker complained about not being praised, and said that that he'd clearly done the important fighting because he took lots of casualties.

Hooker certainly grew into command over time and became reasonably effective as a commander, but in his first test of significant combat as a divisional commander Hooker was not yet there.

Yeah. I wasn't making a definitive statement that way regarding Kearny. I was just taking note of it is all.

It is a fair point regarding Hooker. We are all fully aware of the challenges which he could present.

 

[Saphroneth]

As you know, officers were included in Confederate PFD figures. Below is the July 20th return, for instance.

I don't think that's a counterpoint in any sense to the argument that 67th was making about Confederate returns. He was saying that Confederate PFD is effectives, which is fighting strength and is Union regulation PFD minus non-fighting duties like special and extra duty; Taylor says exactly the same thing (that Confederate PFD is effectives, which is fighting strength and is less than Union regulation PFD).

 

[Nathan Towne]

I don't think that's a counterpoint in any sense to the argument that 67th was making about Confederate returns. He was saying that Confederate PFD is effectives, which is fighting strength and is Union regulation PFD minus non-fighting duties like special and extra duty; Taylor says exactly the same thing (that Confederate PFD is effectives, which is fighting strength and is less than Union regulation PFD).

What you guys are trying to do is simply not done. Taylor himself even states in that piece that Present for Duty strength is the appropriate manner of comparing respective strengths.

 

[Saphroneth]

What you guys are trying to do is simply not done. Taylor himself even states in that piece that Present for Duty strength is the appropriate manner of comparing respective strengths.

But what Taylor also says is that Confederate PFD is Effectives, and that when he says Present for Duty he is talking about using the sum of the officers and enlisted men present for duty, excluding all consideration of the special or extra-duty men, those sick, and those in arrest.

Bolded is the key point here.

Confederate PFD, as Taylor has explained, excludes special or extra duty men.

Early war Union PFD, however, includes these categories.


This is the thing that has to be understood. The armies do not always mean the same thing as one another when they call something PFD. Confederates explicitly exclude special and extra duty men, which is not something the Union does in the early war.


To use a comparison, "income" can be gross income or net income. You can't just assume that an income of 10,000 dollars must be twice an income of 5,000 dollars, especially if you have reason to believe that the former is gross and the latter is net.

 

[Nathan Towne]

But what Taylor also says is that Confederate PFD is Effectives, and that when he says Present for Duty he is talking about using the sum of the officers and enlisted men present for duty, excluding all consideration of the special or extra-duty men, those sick, and those in arrest.

Bolded is the key point here.

Confederate PFD, as Taylor has explained, excludes special or extra duty men.

Early war Union PFD, however, includes these categories.


This is the thing that has to be understood. The armies do not always mean the same thing as one another when they call something PFD. Confederates explicitly exclude special and extra duty men, which is not something the Union does in the early war.


To use a comparison, "income" can be gross income or net income. You can't just assume that an income of 10,000 dollars must be twice an income of 5,000 dollars, especially if you have reason to believe that the former is gross and the latter is net.

No. You both have been shown the relationship between PFD and PFDE on numerous occasions, which 67th erroneously attempted to detail regarding the April 30, 1864 returns and I quickly demonstrated was simply not accurate in Post #406 of this thread.

His statement to the effect that a massive change came about in which 20,000 men PFD were removed from that classification while Burnside commanded the Army is easily disproven via the the returns, which I also quickly demonstrated to him in another thread.

 

[Saphroneth]

No. You both have been shown the relationship between PFD and PFDE on numerous occasions, which 67th erroneously attempted to detail regarding the April 30, 1864 returns and I quickly demonstrated was simply not accurate in Post #406 of this thread.

Okay, so here's the thing - what we have here is that Taylor states how Confederate PFD returns are calculated.

Is it your contention that, in March 1862, Union PFD returns were calculated the way that Taylor says?

 

[67th Tigers]

As you know, officers were included in Confederate PFD figures. Below is the July 20th return, for instance.

The War of the Rebellion : a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate armies. / Pub. under the direction of the ... Secretary of War ... ser.1:v.11:pt.3:Correspondence.

View attachment 521002

Now, compare to the AoP for 10th July:

PFD (inc. offrs): 89,549 (of whom about 5,000 are reinforcements post-Seven Days)
Sick and Wounded (given by McClellan's 15th July to Lincoln): 16,619
Present: 106,466
PFD plus sick = 106,168 (99.7% of present)
Present and Absent: 144,884

or 10th August:

PFD: 89,407 (almost identical to 10th July, 142 less) - 87.5% of Present (vs 84.1% a month before)
Present: 102,184 (decrease of 4,282 on 10th July)
Sick: around 11,574 per Letterman
PFD plus sick = ca. 100,981 (98.8% of Present)
Present and Absent: 138,020 (decrease of 6,864 on 10th July)

In these cases, the extra-duty etc. are obviously included in PFD, and thus PFD is not combatant strength.

Meanwhile, the percentage of Present who are "For Duty" is much lower in the rebel return, 74.1%. However, if you graph the two for all ANV returns:

See the obvious outlier? It's the return above.

Now, WH Taylor, who actually made the returns since he was the AAG, told us that the returns do not include the sick, extra-duty etc. in the PFD column. Now, if at an earlier timepoint they did, then the outlier would be below the trendline, not above it.

As to why there is an outlier; there are about 8,500 non-effective more than expected, which seems to be battle casualties as part of the force that generated the casualties has been sent away.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Okay, so here's the thing - what we have here is that Taylor states how Confederate PFD returns are calculated.

Is it your contention that, in March 1862, Union PFD returns were calculated the way that Taylor says?

No, that isn't my contention. It is ultimately irrelevant due to the actual differences between PFD and PFDE, which tended to be pretty marginal (5% was common), but I have good evidence showing that Confederate PFD figures were calculated in essentially the same way.

You can see my debunking of the claims which 67th has put forward in this and in previous threads.

 

[Saphroneth]

No, that isn't my contention. It is ultimately irrelevant due to the actual differences between PFD and PFDE, which tended to be pretty marginal (5% was common), but I have good evidence showing that Confederate PFD figures were calculated in essentially the same way.

It is very much relevant if the Confederates calculate things one way (excluding special and extra duty, the way Taylor says they do) and the Union calculates things the other (including special and extra duty). We know from Taylor that the Confederates excluded logistics, and we know from the examples 67th has given above that the Union in 1862 included it; we also know from the case of the Army of the Potomac in May 1864 (per Humphreys) that at that point the Army of the Potomac did not include it, and furthermore that "special, extra and daily duty" amounted to about an extra 20%.

Which means that Union PFD during the Peninsular campaign (includes logistics) was about 115% to 120% of how the same force would be reported in Confederate numbers (per Taylor) or Union 1864 numbers (per Humphreys)


So we have that the definitions are different, and that for the Army of the Potomac they changed. When this happened is a separate point, but that the definitions changed is substantively demonstrated.

 

[Nathan Towne]

It is very much relevant if the Confederates calculate things one way (excluding special and extra duty, the way Taylor says they do) and the Union calculates things the other (including special and extra duty). We know from Taylor that the Confederates excluded logistics, and we know from the examples 67th has given above that the Union in 1862 included it; we also know from the case of the Army of the Potomac in May 1864 (per Humphreys) that at that point the Army of the Potomac did not include it, and furthermore that "special, extra and daily duty" amounted to about an extra 20%.

Which means that Union PFD during the Peninsular campaign (includes logistics) was about 115% to 120% of how the same force would be reported in Confederate numbers (per Taylor) or Union 1864 numbers (per Humphreys)


So we have that the definitions are different, and that for the Army of the Potomac they changed. When this happened is a separate point, but that the definitions changed is substantively demonstrated.

I responded to @67th Tigers claims in Post #406 and in this thread, among other other places:

Devise a Way McClellan Could Have Successfully Assaulted the Warwick Line on the 5th or 6th April. | Eastern Theater

To just cite the statements, or testimony, of a number of people who were there and their opinion on something when they were operating with impartial information, e.t.c. Is kind of silly, frankly. You can make any argument you want anywhere in the war doing that. I mean, James Biddle was there...

civilwartalk.com

 

[Saphroneth]

I responded to @67th Tigers claims in Post #406 and in this thread, among other other places:

Okay, so you've agreed that the Union returns on the Peninsula were not calculated the way that Taylor says.

We also have Humphreys showing that the Union returns in 1864 were calculated the way that Taylor says, in that they didn't include "special, extra and daily" in the PFD column.

So... could you clarify what your view is on whether this changed?

 

[Nathan Towne]

Okay, so you've agreed that the Union returns on the Peninsula were not calculated the way that Taylor says.

We also have Humphreys showing that the Union returns in 1864 were calculated the way that Taylor says, in that they didn't include "special, extra and daily" in the PFD column.

So... could you clarify what your view is on whether this changed?

That is just not accurate.

Please read my post at #406 and at #675 and #678 in the other thread.

 

[Saphroneth]

That is just not accurate.

Well...

Is it your contention that, in March 1862, Union PFD returns were calculated the way that Taylor says?

No, that isn't my contention.

So is it your contention that, in April 1864, Union PFD returns were not calculated the way that Taylor says?

To put it another way -

Were Extra Duty included in Union PFD returns in April 1862?
Were Extra Duty included in Union PFD returns in April 1864?

 

[67th Tigers]

No, that isn't my contention. It is ultimately irrelevant due to the actual differences between PFD and PFDE, which tended to be pretty marginal (5% was common), but I have good evidence showing that Confederate PFD figures were calculated in essentially the same way.

You can see my debunking of the claims which 67th has put forward in this and in previous threads.

The difference between PFD and PFDE is the exclusion of unarmed or unhorsed men. A cavalryman without a horse would be "not equipped." Any man without a weapon, such as a chaplain, doctor etc. would also be "not equipped." The number of soldiers who should have a weapon but didn't was generally negligable. Dismounted cavalry was more common.

However, men on extra, daily and special duty were generally "equipped." If on duty as a teamster, for example, a soldier would still have his musket.

PFDE is not in itself synonynous with "combat effectives," but can be if the special, extra and daily duty men are already excluded. This is how things were calculated in the April 1864 return, but not the April '62 one. Hence the same "aggregate present" (ca. 127,000) produces a very different "present for duty" because one has excluded extra, special and daily duty men and the other has included them.

PFDE, excluding extra, special and daily duty men is approximately synonymous with the ANV PFD column. That's how they calculated it.

If you go through rebel brigade returns for Gettysburg, for example, there are the following definitions used:

PFD: excludes extra-duty, sick etc. Sometimes includes officers and sometimes doesn't.
Effective total: enlisted men for duty, including extra-duty and under arrest.

If you have an "effective total" then it excludes officers, but includes the enlisted men "for duty" as defined in, say April '62. To convert an effective total into PFD, multiply by 1.08.

The same definitions were not used in the army consolidated returns of the time.

 

[DanSBHawk]

This was written at the end of the 16th. It's his daily report of events to his superior (Heintzelman). It was given to Heintzelman the next morning, Heintzelman went to see himself, conversed with Hamilton and then reported to McClellan:

"Gen Hamilton reports that no guns are visible this morning [17th April] on the enemys works in his front[,] the guns having been withdrawn from the embrasures. A few men are visible along their line of entrenchments. A few shells have been thrown into their works this morning. Genl Hamilton thinks he can carry the works to his front with small loss."

In response GHQ sent Lt Wagner to perform a recce and see if this report was true. It wasn't, and Wagner was killed.

Herein we see the mental dysfunction of Hamilton - a lack of object permanence. As he wouldn't see the enemy, he assumed they were no longer there. Of course, this is not true, and the enemy had simply taken cover.

Yes, Hamilton wants to attack. However, Hamilton was wrong in his assessment. McClellan performed the correct course of action; he sent out a recce. This proved Hamilton wrong, at the cost of Lt Wagner's life. This is much better than the thousands of lives that would have been lost in a doomed attack.

And yet the fact remains - Hamilton did propose attacking. And he described the conditions which would have made an attack more likely to succeed. But it was not attempted.

So Hamlton's claim in his "narrative " letter is supported by the evidence.

 

[Nathan Towne]

The difference between PFD and PFDE is the exclusion of unarmed or unhorsed men. A cavalryman without a horse would be "not equipped." Any man without a weapon, such as a chaplain, doctor etc. would also be "not equipped." The number of soldiers who should have a weapon but didn't was generally negligable. Dismounted cavalry was more common.

However, men on extra, daily and special duty were generally "equipped." If on duty as a teamster, for example, a soldier would still have his musket.

PFDE is not in itself synonynous with "combat effectives," but can be if the special, extra and daily duty men are already excluded. This is how things were calculated in the April 1864 return, but not the April '62 one. Hence the same "aggregate present" (ca. 127,000) produces a very different "present for duty" because one has excluded extra, special and daily duty men and the other has included them.

PFDE, excluding extra, special and daily duty men is approximately synonymous with the ANV PFD column. That's how they calculated it.

If you go through rebel brigade returns for Gettysburg, for example, there are the following definitions used:

PFD: excludes extra-duty, sick etc. Sometimes includes officers and sometimes doesn't.
Effective total: enlisted men for duty, including extra-duty and under arrest.

If you have an "effective total" then it excludes officers, but includes the enlisted men "for duty" as defined in, say April '62. To convert an effective total into PFD, multiply by 1.08.

The same definitions were not used in the army consolidated returns of the time.

I am honestly at a bit of a loss as to what to even say to you on this anymore.

I already walked through how and why it is we know that nothing of the sort happened in the time frame which you have attempted to claim that it did when I pressed you on it. I will repost here:

I am certainly aware of the lack of Confederate PFD returns on the Peninsula. We have covered that extensively before. We can match earlier returns to the best of our ability and supplement them with unit rolls, as we have covered in great depth between us and you yourself have done a fair amount of.

As for the rest of the comment, I am not really sure where to go with it. The point is that we cannot be comparing artificially manufactured U.S. effectives returns, which you are formulating via reverse conversions, cutting out officers and the like, with Confederate PFD returns. That is not workable, or appropriate.

Present for duty is not the same as effectives. As you know, what was included in Confederate "effectives" figured varied depending on the return. You can't slip and slide through them as you are doing. In order to ascertain what was being measured in an effectives return, you need to line it up with a PFD return. We can separate them for purposes of understanding.

Where are you getting the 72,000 number for the Present for Duty strength of the Army of Northern Virginia at the end of May? Newton put it at slightly over 87,000 men PFD going into Seven Pines/Fair Oaks, albeit via a means of getting there which I admittedly find to be somewhat problematic.

I asked previously whether you could find the returns on each side of the boundary in which this supposedly changed in the Army of the Potomac? We can then do the math on it.

You tell us that PFD included this 20,000 men in extra-duty personnel at the time of the November 10th return. On the November 10th returns there were 130,458 men PFD, with 150,441 Aggregate Present, excluding Eleventh Corps, with over 15,000 men PFD by the December 10th returns, which was not included in the November 10th returns. You tell us that they had been taken out and moved into Aggregate Present by the end of December monthly returns. On the December 31st returns the Army of the Potomac reported 156,771 men PFD, including Eleventh Corps and 185,386 men Aggregate Present. That is after the campaigning of November and December, including the sustaining of twelve and an half thousand casualties at Fredericksburg and we know that disease and sickness was up somewhat in November and December. I would highly recommend reading Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg! by George Rable on that. The difference between Aggregate Present and PFD is up in nominal terms from 19,983 on November 10th to 28,615 on December 31st, with the addition of an entire additional infantry Corps which, at least per the December 31st returns, would account for 2,698 of that right there. 28,615-19,983=8,632. 8,632-2698=5,934. That is after Fredericksburg, the somewhat higher sick rate and the backlogs in getting men back to reserve hospitals in the cities (but also after the new units had reached the Army). Now, on the December 31st returns, Eleventh Corps numbered 17,221 men PFD. Subtract them from 156,771 and you get 139,550 men PFD. Up approximately 9,000 men PFD from November 10th. If you then track the reinforcements and replacement estimates which reached the Army and were allocated to the other seven Corps, plus the cavalry and the artillery and account for the fact that some of the wounded returned to the ranks, despite sickness being up some and this all lines up easily. You know what the PFD to Aggregate present ratios are on those two returns, which is the metric which you were advocating before? 86.72% and 84.56%.

November 10th returns:

The War of the Rebellion : a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate armies. / Pub. under the direction of the ... Secretary of War ... ser.1:v.19t.2:Reports Correspondence.

December 31st returns:

The War of the Rebellion : a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate armies. / Pub. under the direction of the ... Secretary of War ... ser.1:v.21:Operations.

Where are the 20,000 men who were moved out of PFD and into Aggregate Present? Where is the sudden overnight drop in PFD by 20,000 and the sudden overnight increase in Aggregate Present by the same number?

But, you stated that this occurred between the November 10th and the December 10th returns, so let's take a look there. On the December 10th returns the Army registered 149,733 men PFD. Aggregate Present was 176,401. That is a difference of 26,668. 26,668-19,983=6,685. 6,685-2698=3,987.

December 10th returns:

The War of the Rebellion : a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate armies. / Pub. under the direction of the ... Secretary of War ... ser.1:v.21:Operations.

So, it didn't happen there either.

Furthermore, I would like for you to find the order issued by Burnside.

Regarding Cedar Mountain, we were talking in terms of PFD strength, which would be relative to Confederate PFD strength. If what you were saying was correct, then the U.S. Army would have fielded 6,600 men at Cedar Mountain relative to the Confederate force in the same category, which is obviously not the case.

I continue to be amazed at how you slide between terms in order to obfuscate, as well. You tell us that Confederate PFD strengths were really "effective" strengths and hence we need to implement "conversions" in order to add officers, which were already included, as has been shown to you many times already. How you can take PFD returns which explicitly include officers and then tell us that they are really effective returns and consequently need to be "converted' in order to include officers, is simply astounding. The whole point of Newton was to convert actual effectives returns to PFD returns, which I object to regardless whenever it can be avoided, but you then are telling us that you want to take PFD returns and "convert" them on top yet again. It is bizarre because sometimes you cite accurate figures, but when it suits a narrative which you need to push, you seem to reverse course again and go back to this silliness regarding Confederate figures. What you are attempting to do regarding U.S. figures is simply fraudulent.

Regarding the April of '64 returns, you are simply not right, as has been shown to you above and you are not even being consistent on the issue, as I have previously discussed, as well.