McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[67th Tigers]

Hamilton didn't say troops merely "took cover." The Somme comparison is absurd.

He didn't, but he was wrong. The position was not abandoned.

The Somme comparison is very apt, because what happens were the suppressing barrage lifts? Come on, basic tactics...

 

[Saphroneth]

Hamilton in the report that is in the ORs states that the enemy were driven from the works and into the woods.

Now, the works are of the same basic structure as the heavy works at Dam #1 (where sustained bombardment by three batteries resulted in very few or no casualties to the defending batteries). So it's unlikely that three batteries would rapidly be causing casualties; if Hamilton is correct in the sense that the enemy vacated the works and entered the woods, they've not been broken by heavy casualties but have retired from a somewhat exposed position to a position that is not exposed.
In cover.

If Hamilton was saying that the enemy had not merely taken cover (moved out of the area where his guns stood even a small chance of hitting them) but had committed to not defending the works, then on what basis does he form this assessment? What has he seen, and what can he report, which indicates that the enemy has not simply taken cover?

 

[DanSBHawk]

He didn't, but he was wrong. The position was not abandoned.

The Somme comparison is very apt, because what happens were the suppressing barrage lifts? Come on, basic tactics...

I posted the Hamilton dispatch. People can read it themselves and see what he observed.

The fact remains that Hamilton did in fact propose attacking, and it was refused. Exactly as he claimed.

Still waiting to see evidence supporting your earlier detailed claim about Hamilton refusing to follow orders.

 

[Belfoured]

Effectively the quote is that, on the morning of 1st July, McClellan was exhausted. Hence he went to sleep for several hours whilst off with Rodgers to decide on whether the army would move to Harrison's Landing or Dancing Point. He issued an order placing Sumner in command during this period.

McClellan, of course, was exhausted. He had had no sleep at all on the night of the 30th June/1st July because he was busy reassembling his army on Malvern Hill, an unplanned for movement caused by Franklin quitting his position against orders. He'd had little sleep on preceeding nights.

The idea that the observation that a man who has been kept awake for several days is exhausted is hardly a biting psychological diagnosis. Just see potential SEALS during Hell Week...

It is, however, a "biting command diagnosis". And it wasn't limited to being "tired" on July 1. Potential SEALS during Hell Week aren't making important command decisions in a campaign. Looking over at the sidelines in the fourth quarter of the Super Bowl and seeing the HC in that state ain't exactly a confidence builder.

 

[Belfoured]

I posted the Hamilton dispatch. People can read it themselves and see what he observed.

The fact remains that Hamilton did in fact propose attacking, and it was refused. Exactly as he claimed.

Still waiting to see evidence supporting your earlier detailed claim about Hamilton refusing to follow orders.

That one seems to have wisely disappeared.

 

[Belfoured]

Hamilton didn't say troops merely "took cover." The Somme comparison is absurd.

The infatuation with the Somme is, to say the least, odd. This is far from the first time it has shown up in CWT threads. I'm afraid to post in any thread about Civil War railroading lest we go down a rabbit hole about Quintinshill.

 

[67th Tigers]

I posted the Hamilton dispatch. People can read it themselves and see what he observed.

The fact remains that Hamilton did in fact propose attacking, and it was refused. Exactly as he claimed.

Still waiting to see evidence supporting your earlier detailed claim about Hamilton refusing to follow orders.

What he believed he had observed. The problem is his claims that the position was abandoned, allowing him to occupy it with a brigade, were wrong.

The infatuation with the Somme is, to say the least, odd. This is far from the first time it has shown up in CWT threads. I'm afraid to post in any thread about Civil War railroading lest we go down a rabbit hole about Quintinshill.

It's an obvious tactical comparison - when the barrage lifts, the defenders can come out of cover and engage any attackers. This is a tactical problem, and Albert is the most obvious historical example of the problem.

So, Hamilton's battery ceases fire and he advances a brigade to occupy the "unoccupied" works. Whilst they are marching a mile forwards, what do the defenders do? They re-man the works and roll the guns back into the firing points...

 

[67th Tigers]

It is, however, a "biting command diagnosis". And it wasn't limited to being "tired" on July 1. Potential SEALS during Hell Week aren't making important command decisions in a campaign. Looking over at the sidelines in the fourth quarter of the Super Bowl and seeing the HC in that state ain't exactly a confidence builder.

Actually, officers on this sort of thing are assessed on their ability to make combat estimates etc. after 3-4 days awake. Some remain functional and some don't.

However, McClellan made no really bad judgement calls. Thus he was obviously functional. A lesser commander might have remained on Malvern Hill and lost his army. Indeed, when McClellan gave Sumner command whilst he was with Rodgers deciding the future of the army, Sumner had a visit from the good-idea fairy and tried to come off Malvern Hill to attack! Porter refused the order, and it got rather heated until McClellan returned, before any fighting, and countermanded Sumner.

Under the stress, McClellan remained functional and passed the test. Others fared less well. Smith and Franklin fared particularly badly. Sumner showed poor judgement at several points, and would do so again at Antietam. In fact, of the Corps Commanders, only FJ Porter really performed well under the stress. Sedgwick, Slocum and Hooker appear to have done the best at divisional command. Others, like Smith, McCall and Kearny, performed poorly.

 

[Belfoured]

Actually, officers on this sort of thing are assessed on their ability to make combat estimates etc. after 3-4 days awake. Some remain functional and some don't.

However, McClellan made no really bad judgement calls. Thus he was obviously functional. A lesser commander might have remained on Malvern Hill and lost his army. Indeed, when McClellan gave Sumner command whilst he was with Rodgers deciding the future of the army, Sumner had a visit from the good-idea fairy and tried to come off Malvern Hill to attack! Porter refused the order, and it got rather heated until McClellan returned, before any fighting, and countermanded Sumner.

Under the stress, McClellan remained functional and passed the test. Others fared less well. Smith and Franklin fared particularly badly. Sumner showed poor judgement at several points, and would do so again at Antietam. In fact, of the Corps Commanders, only FJ Porter really performed well under the stress. Sedgwick, Slocum and Hooker appear to have done the best at divisional command. Others, like Smith, McCall and Kearny, performed poorly.

Really? Among other things, according to you he had to be talked out of a sanguinary, sacrificial attack against what he believed were overwhelming numbers by Heintzelman during the 11 PM meeting on June 27.

 

[DanSBHawk]

What he believed he had observed. The problem is his claims that the position was abandoned, allowing him to occupy it with a brigade, were wrong.

There's really no evidence that Hamilton's observations on the 16th were wrong. The recce on the 17th certainly didn't prove him wrong. He didn't claim in his dispatch on the 16th that the confederate positions were entirely abandoned. He claimed they were drastically weakened.

You can attack Hamilton all you want, but he was a West Pointer and a combat veteran, and he was there. His view has high credibility as a primary source.

The important point is that he did indeed propose attacking, just as he later wrote.

 

[TallTallMan]

Quintinshill.

I had to look that up.

My brother is a former WWI buff and used to try and compete with the ACW by applying the cliches to the Somme (there were "more" casualties; "bad tactics") and other stuff. It was annoying. He now gets mad if I bring that up

 

[TallTallMan]

I guess WWI historians are ACW's jealous younger brothers?

 

[Belfoured]

I had to look that up.

My brother is a former WWI buff and used to try and compete with the ACW by applying the cliches to the Somme (there were "more" casualties; "bad tactics") and other stuff. It was annoying. He now gets mad if I bring that up

Lyn MacDonald did an excellent series of books about the BEF based on accounts/recollections by the lower levels of command and the "grunts". One of them has a great account of the Quintinshill crash.

 

[67th Tigers]

There's really no evidence that Hamilton's observations on the 16th were wrong. The recce on the 17th certainly didn't prove him wrong. He didn't claim in his dispatch on the 16th that the confederate positions were entirely abandoned. He claimed they were drastically weakened.

You can attack Hamilton all you want, but he was a West Pointer and a combat veteran, and he was there. His view has high credibility as a primary source.

The important point is that he did indeed propose attacking, just as he later wrote.

Huh, Hamilton claimed the enemy was gone and there were no guns in the embrassures. Someone was sent to have a look, and was killed no a gun in one of those "empty"embrassures. I think it's pretty clear Hamilton was wrong.

One should look at other accounts. The works were not weakened.

Heintzelman's journal reports he "directed General Hamilton to throw up a smalll work and this morning with this artillery prevented the Rebels from strengthening their works opposite. It developed ten Rebel guns but Captain Thompson silenced them."

Hamilton himself sent three messages, which are obviously out of order in the OR, initially (before 1500) stating their fire had developed the enemy guns,* and forced their working parties to stop. Then at 1830 he sent a message that they'd knocked out a rebel gun at 1500, and the enemy had ceased fire. Finally on the night of the 16th/17th (arriving mid-morning on the 17th at Heintzelman's) is the one you like to quote, stating all the infantry had abandoned their works and, in conjuction with his coversation on the morning of the 17th with Heintzelman, indicated the artillery was removed. He stated he would attack and hold the works with a single brigade.

* In case you don't know the meaning of "developed," it means caused them to open fire, revealing their positions. It is a standard tactic, and also a standard tactic to stop firing and, if possible, move firing points if this happens.

The rebel left, under DH Hill consisted of 8 brigades in essentially three divisions:

Rains' division at Yorktown, with Colquitt's and Featherston's brigades
Early's division in the redoubts, with Early's, Rodes' and Ward's brigades
Wilcox's division at Wynn's Mill, with Wilcox's, Colston's and Winston's brigades

Four regiments of GT Anderson's brigade had been stationed behind and between Wynn's Mill and Dam No. 1 the day before, but were sent to Dam No. 1. Heintzelman saw these four regiments moved over to the left.

Normally, only two regiments of Wilcox's division actually manned the front (including Wynn's Mill and the Upper Dam), doing 24 hour shifts. The other 8 full regiments were kept out of sight in the rear. Even if you suppress the regiment at the dam, 2 brigades are close enough to move up during the 20 minutes for Federal infantry to cross the intervening ground.

However, there are no mentions of the works being abandoned in any rebel source. It's a completely unsubstanciated claim made by Hamilton. That it was false is shown by Lt Wagner's death.

 

[67th Tigers]

Really?

Yes, McClellan made no significant mistakes during the Seven Days, given the actual situation. It's difficult to find any decisions that could have improved the situation had they done otherwise. That flukes happen, commanders disobey order orders etc. is an expected part of friction, and the judgement isn't whether everything went perfectly, but how well the commander adapted to the unexpected.

 

[Belfoured]

Yes, McClellan made no significant mistakes during the Seven Days, given the actual situation. It's difficult to find any decisions that could have improved the situation had they done otherwise. That flukes happen, commanders disobey order orders etc. is an expected part of friction, and the judgement isn't whether everything went perfectly, but how well the commander adapted to the unexpected.

In other words, he showed excellent judgment in - at least according to you - advocating that sacrificial attack against what he believed were overwhelming odds until Heintzelman talked him out of it. And, in the McClellan "up is really down" fun house, it was Heintzelman who did not perform well under stress. I need to reach for some glue ...

 

[DanSBHawk]

Huh, Hamilton claimed the enemy was gone and there were no guns in the embrassures. Someone was sent to have a look, and was killed no a gun in one of those "empty"embrassures. I think it's pretty clear Hamilton was wrong.

False. Hamilton's exact words: "...leaving only a few men in the works to man the guns..."

So in fact, there were a few men and there were guns. I think it's pretty clear that you're misrepresenting what Hamilton actually wrote.

 

[Belfoured]

False. Hamilton's exact words: "...leaving only a few men in the works to man the guns..."

So in fact, there were a few men and there were guns. I think it's pretty clear that you're misrepresenting what Hamilton actually wrote.

Same as it ever was.

 

[67th Tigers]

False. Hamilton's exact words: "...leaving only a few men in the works to man the guns..."

So in fact, there were a few men and there were guns. I think it's pretty clear that you're misrepresenting what Hamilton actually wrote.

That's his third out of four communications on this topic, each making wilder claims than the last. The next morning he told Heintzelman no guns were visible in the works.

Hamilton had come to the belief the works were abandoned. It was wrong.

 

[Saphroneth]

If Hamilton though he could take the Wynn's Mill works with a brigade, which is what he said, at a time when the actual troops available to defend it at need were multiple brigades behind works, which is what they actually were, then Hamilton's assertion is that the enemy were fundamentally not able to defend the works.

At best this is a total failure on his part to recognize that an enemy who is currently taking cover can stop taking cover and re-man their defensive positions when the threat environment changes.