McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[Lt R. Blackwell 4th Texas]

Ned, if I am interpreting the books I have recently read correctly, most of the day he was at his headquarters and he did not venture far from that spot until late in the day. When he did, he was supposedly so shaken by the carnage, that he did, indeed, hesitate to throw in his largely unused reserves late that day or renew the battle the next day. The one book I have at hand is "Hearts in Conflict" by Curt Anders. He covers Antietam on pp. 245-258 where he certainly gives me the impression that McClellan parked himself at the Pry house two miles from the fighting: "None of this , however could the AoP commander see from the lawn...where battle... had been raging since sunrise". "Couriers had come and gone and McClellan read the messages wigwagged by signalmen". "Little Mac turned his attention to the one sector of the battlefield he could see through his telescope...". "Finally McClellan came himself". "Back at his headquarters, through his telescope, Little Mac could see...". "General McClellan saw their blue waves receding through his telescope."

Admittedly this is only from one chapter of the whole book but from what I recall from other books McClellan did not come very close to the actual fighting. Compare this with Lee riding from crisis point to crisis point, back and forth, issuing orders that were based on real time evidence and where he could see if they were being carried out or not. Constantly he rallied his men right at the front and disposed of his men with fine appreciation of what was going on at that moment. (A lapse in this method would cost him dearly at Gettysburg). This is what prevented the Union from triumphing at Antietam. Lee knew what was going on and McClellan, relying on couriers and wigwags and his telescope, did not. This was not the first time either. On the peninsula earlier that year he did the same thing depending on reports (like Pinkerton's) rather than coming up to the front himself to better appreciate the situation.

I go back to what I wrote earlier. One of McClellan's most egregious flaws was not going up closer to the fighting, moving about the battlefield and getting a "feel" for what was happening there.

Sears makes the same charge in To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. And as far as I know he is correct. I am pretty sure he stayed on the south side of the Chickahominy during the first two battles. After that (per Wikipedia, but I believe accurate):

On Sunday, June 29, the bulk of McClellan's army concentrated around Savage's Station on the Richmond and York River Railroad, a Federal supply depot since just before Seven Pines, preparing for a difficult crossing through and around White Oak Swamp. It did so without centralized direction because McClellan had personally moved south of Malvern Hill after Gaines's Mill without leaving directions for corps movements during the retreat nor naming a second in command.
....
Most elements of the Union Army had been able to cross White Oak Swamp Creek by noon on June 30. About one third of the army had reached the James River, but the remainder was still marching between White Oak Swamp and Glendale. After inspecting the line of march that morning, McClellan rode south and boarded the ironclad USS Galena on the James.

I don't know offhand where he was during Malvern Hill.

 

[Lt R. Blackwell 4th Texas]

I also think he went out of his way to slow reinforcements going to Pope leading up to Second Manassas, and took a measure of satisfaction from Pope's defeat.

 

[Elennsar]

I also think he went out of his way to slow reinforcements going to Pope leading up to Second Manassas, and took a measure of satisfaction from Pope's defeat.

I don't know if he went out of his way or not, but

"Oh, wait, Sumner can't move his artillery. Guess we'll have to wait for more logistical support to come up, can't send the infantry now and the artillery later, nope. Gotta send it all together." style effort feels like he wasn't trying very hard. Even if the logistical problems were real, his response was not to do the most he could with what he had.

"Better something now than everything but too late." was not McClellan's style at all.

 

[KansasFreestater]

He had the incredible opportunity to not once but twice to end the war in 1862 and failed both times. To me history has judged him correctly, he could build an army but wouldn't or didn't know how to use it.

Well, but some argue that it was Lincoln himself who kept sabotaging McClellan.
See:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifes...trarian-view/2012/02/27/gIQAeSLqmR_story.html

 

[KansasFreestater]

What baffles me about this is that McClellan seems to have spent little time trying to ensure Lincoln understood exactly what he was doing. I'm not going to say he left Lincoln completely in the dark, but he didn't go out of his way to inform Lincoln on how what he was doing would work, either.

The Civil War could not be fought as a purely military affair with civilians being only relevant so far as they shoveled men and materials to the army, but McClellan's style of doing things seem to suggest he wasn't willing to accept that. It's not one of his more endearing points, whatever specific anecdotes we can disprove.

You have a point. Per the Disunion blog article I linked earlier, McClellan was sabotaged by Lincoln, and probably had a right to be pissy afterward -- but it would appear that McClellan was dismissive of Lincoln even before that. He may have tried, in the beginning, to "respect the office" -- but I don't think he ever got over being utterly scandalized by the election of a man he considered beneath his notice.

 

[Elennsar]

You have a point. Per the Disunion blog article I linked earlier, McClellan was sabotaged by Lincoln, and probably had a right to be pissy afterward -- but it would appear that McClellan was dismissive of Lincoln even before that. He may have tried, in the beginning, to "respect the office" -- but I don't he ever got over being utterly scandalized by the election of a man he considered beneath his notice.

I greatly dispute that McClellan was "sabotaged" by Lincoln. The men held back by Lincoln were held back precisely because the 55,000 supposed there to defend Washington for Washington weren't there. And McClellan did get McCall and Franklin from McDowell's corps, which were no small reinforcements.

Plus with McClellan directing the Army of the Potomac in the field, someone had to handle the other troops mentioned - and it being the Secretary of War is not a particularly outlandish notion.

Closing the recruiting offices is something I don't know enough about to defend or criticize - but it would have little immediate impact on McClellan or anyone else - turning any new recruits his regiments got into useful soldiers would take weeks at least.

I can understand McClellan not feeling comfortable with all these decisions, but saying that "You have done your best to sacrifice this army" (McClellan, June 28: http://facweb.furman.edu/~bensonlloyd/civwar/LincolnMcClellan.htm ) is grotesquely unprofessional even if we assume the absolute worst of Lincoln's decisions referred to above.

It's not just arrogant. It's what in a different kind of state would be lèse-majesté. And even in a democracy (or republic if you prefer), it's highly insulting.

 

[JKG3117]

It seems to me, McClellan inflated the enemy numbers even after the fact, when it should have been obvious what he faced. To me that means he is doing it on purpose to make him look better, or is unable to use his army to gather intelligence. Either is a sin for a battlefield commander.

I also chalked Lee's comments up to human nature. He considered Antietam his greatest battle, so McClellan would be his greatest foe.

All in all, he was a better than average administrator, but in my opinion he was terrible tactically. He didn't have the "killer instincts" needed to WIN. To use a modern sports term, he wasn't "clutch". To me he was the second best commander the AOP ever had. (a distant second, but silver is silver.)

Jim

 

[Elennsar]

It seems to me, McClellan inflated the enemy numbers even after the fact, when it should have been obvious what he faced. To me that means he is doing it on purpose to make him look better, or is unable to use his army to gather intelligence. Either is a sin for a battlefield commander.

I also chalked Lee's comments up to human nature. He considered Antietam his greatest battle, so McClellan would be his greatest foe.

All in all, he was a better than average administrator, but in my opinion he was terrible tactically. He didn't have the "killer instincts" needed to WIN. To use a modern sports term, he wasn't "clutch". To me he was the second best commander the AOP ever had. (a distant second, but silver is silver.)

Jim

Meade, Hooker, McClellan, Burnside, Pope (counted for having command over parts of the Army of the Potomac despite technically never being in charge of that army), in my opinion. Rating Hooker specifically for his time as army commander.

Hard to call between Hooker and McClellan, as one disorganized his artillery organization (and all but dismissed his artillery chief) and the other didn't try to put forward an effective cavalry organization. Both are pretty awful mistakes in an area entirely within their control.

 

[67th Tigers]

Sears makes the same charge in To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. And as far as I know he is correct. I am pretty sure he stayed on the south side of the Chickahominy during the first two battles. After that (per Wikipedia, but I believe accurate):

On Sunday, June 29, the bulk of McClellan's army concentrated around Savage's Station on the Richmond and York River Railroad, a Federal supply depot since just before Seven Pines, preparing for a difficult crossing through and around White Oak Swamp. It did so without centralized direction because McClellan had personally moved south of Malvern Hill after Gaines's Mill without leaving directions for corps movements during the retreat nor naming a second in command.

At Beaver Dam Creek he was at Porter's HQ. The next day (Gaines Mill) he was at Army HQ after dispatching two divisions to Porter whilst organising a possible movement.

The night before Savage's Station McClellan summoned and personally briefed his corps commanders and gave them maps of their designated locations south of the White Oak. When the HQ left the Trent House it relocated to the Britton house, just south of White Oak Swamp in communication with both wings of his army. HQ didn't relocate to the Haxall house until the 30th.

He must have been in communication with the Corps commanders as he knew of Sumner's failure to pull back and reiterated the order, sending Col. Sacket with a sealed order for the arrest of Sumner if he continued to disobey orders.

That's the essential story of Savage Station - orders still came from McClellan, but Sumner initially refused to obey the order to cross the White Oak, whereas Heintzelman and Franklin did obey their orders, leaving Sumner out on a limb.

....
Most elements of the Union Army had been able to cross White Oak Swamp Creek by noon on June 30. About one third of the army had reached the James River, but the remainder was still marching between White Oak Swamp and Glendale. After inspecting the line of march that morning, McClellan rode south and boarded the ironclad USS Galena on the James.

I don't know offhand where he was during Malvern Hill.

At Glendale he boarded Galena at around 1600 hrs, having seen the trains over the hill and noting the lack of any action along his lines. He'd made sure there was a signals detachment on the Galena and stayed in contact with his commanders and controlled the battle.

At Malvern Hill he was at army HQ, controlling the whole army.

 

[1SGDan]

The number of troops required for the Washington defenses provided a convenient excuse for Mac but leaves the real question unanswered. With the troops he DID have on hand could he have accomplished more on the Peninsula and at Antietam? The answer in my mind is unquestionably yes.

Every commander wants more but the best succeed with what they have. Mac tried to find blame for his tactical inadequacies in others because he could not (would not) find it in himself.

 

[67th Tigers]

I also think he went out of his way to slow reinforcements going to Pope leading up to Second Manassas, and took a measure of satisfaction from Pope's defeat.

In fact he went out of his way to expedite the passage of reinforcements to Pope. Copying and pasting myself from another thread:

Well, the problem is that initially McClellan has no authority over Franklin or Sumner. He is ordered to remain at Aquia creek, where Sumner lands, whilst Franklin lands at Alexandria and both are officially detached to Pope, and under Popes and Hallecks command authority. Due to the unholy mess at Alexandria Halleck orders McClellan to send an "efficient officer" to Alexandria to sort things out on the 26th. McClellan goes himself, finds Franklin and both his division commanders have granted themselves leave to visit Washington and Hancock is acting corps commander. Only the three most junior brigadiers in the corps are with it (as acting CC and DCs). McClellan spends the 26th sorting the mess out and trying to get a straight answer from Halleck as to exactly where Pope is and where the troops are supposed to go, and aside from an order to push forward a brigade or two to Bull Run bridge and stop it being burnt no instructions are forthcoming.

Hence the night of the 26th McClellan boards USS Ariel and head to Washington, and arrives at Hallecks house after midnight, wakes him up and gets orders directly. He returns to Alexandria the next morning after they've located Franklin and the missing generals.

Taylor does indeed lead out a force to Bull Run Bridge, but they ran straight into AP Hill's division and were cut to pieces. In the aftermath. Hence it is confirmed the enemy is between Franklin and Pope. Halleck initially orders Franklin to hold tight, and allows McClellan to concentrate 2nd and 4th Corps with it, and is intending to send Burnside's remaining division (at Aquia as well) to him.

On the afternoon of the 28th Halleck changes his mind, and orders Franklin to move, allowing them to stop at Annandale if the enemy is found to be in the way. The 6th Corps marches out at dawn on the 29th and Franklin's lead division commander, Smith, exercises this option. McClellan is still at Alexandria (he has no authority to take to the field), and it turns out so is Franklin. Halleck is furious, and the march resumes the next day, and around the time Longstreet is hitting Pope's open flank sixth corps is deploying at Cub Run. Upon seeing the fleeing remnants of Pope's army Franklin withdraws to Centreville and entrenches, and is joined by Sumner. The next day sees the Battle of Chantilly, with the whole of the Army of the Potomac, bar 4th Corps, on the field under Pope's command.

As I say, McClellan didn't do much wrong. Without his intervention 2nd and 6th Corps would never have reached Pope at all. The question remains as to why Smith stopped at Annandale on the 29th, and if it would have done better had they pushed on another few miles. McClellan did not make this decision, Smith did, although McClellan probably gave it to him as an option, since that was Halleck's order. McClellan did however move to protect his subordinate by endorsing the decision after the fact.

 

[NedBaldwin]

In fact he went out of his way to expedite the passage of reinforcements to Pope. Copying and pasting myself from another thread:

Well, the problem is that initially McClellan has no authority over Franklin or Sumner. He is ordered to remain at Aquia creek, where Sumner lands, whilst Franklin lands at Alexandria and both are officially detached to Pope, and under Popes and Hallecks command authority. Due to the unholy mess at Alexandria Halleck orders McClellan to send an "efficient officer" to Alexandria to sort things out on the 26th...

Copying and pasting my response from that other thread:
McCellan did have authority over Franklin and Sumner; neither were officially detached to Pope.
He was never ordered to remain at Aquia Creek and Halleck did not order him to send an "efficient officer" (not sure what you are quoting), he told McClellan to come himself: "Perhaps you had better leave General Burnside in charge at Aquia Creek and come to Alexandria, as very great irregularities are reported there."

 

[Ryan M.]

Well, but some argue that it was Lincoln himself who kept sabotaging McClellan.
See:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifes...trarian-view/2012/02/27/gIQAeSLqmR_story.html

McCellan kept sabotaging himself, and there is several errors in that article

 

[Pat Answer]

@ 67th Tigers and Ned Baldwin: You are obviously on opposite sides of this "re-evaluation" but I appreciate your knowledge here and am curious about sources. Would I be able to find correspondence between Halleck and McClellan from, say, their Aug 3 meeting to the eve of Second Manassas in the OR?

 

[67th Tigers]

@ 67th Tigers and Ned Baldwin: You are obviously on opposite sides of this "re-evaluation" but I appreciate your knowledge here and am curious about sources. Would I be able to find correspondence between Halleck and McClellan from, say, their Aug 3 meeting to the eve of Second Manassas in the OR?

McClellan reproduced the correspondence in his memoirs, along with his thoughts on it:
https://archive.org/stream/mcclellansownst00unkngoog#page/n517/mode/2up

 

[NedBaldwin]

@ 67th Tigers and Ned Baldwin: You are obviously on opposite sides of this "re-evaluation" but I appreciate your knowledge here and am curious about sources. Would I be able to find correspondence between Halleck and McClellan from, say, their Aug 3 meeting to the eve of Second Manassas in the OR?

Its not all in one place in the OR. Both of them attached some correspondence to their official reports. Other correspondence is just included chronologically in the correspondence volumes. Also the compilers of the OR separated the material for the peninsula campaign from that for the northern Virginia campaigns. But the time in question involved a shift of McClellan from one area to the other, so some correspondence is in one place and some in the other.

 

[67th Tigers]

McCellan kept sabotaging himself, and there is several errors in that article

If you'd be so kind as to suggest what the "errors" are, then we can discuss them.

 

[OpnCoronet]

I believe that at the very beginning of McClellan's command, when planning for his campaign, he estimated an army of 125,000 men and, he apparently, believed Lincoln and his administration could supply the men and equipment, if he only would.
In any case, whether consciously, or not, he seems to have been determined to resist any temptation(or attempts) for any major campaigning , until he got all the men he believed he needed, no matter how long that might require.

 

[John Winn]

OK, so I'm going to vote. I don't think he was an effective general and don't see anything to re-evaluate that would make for a different assessment.

While I recognize McClellan's organizational ability there's not much point in organizing something that you can't or won't utilize effectively. Also, not knowing how many men his enemy had seems to me to show that he wasn't able to implement effective intelligence gathering. Isn't that what cavalry was for ? If you don't know, and you've got six months to organize, send somebody to find out ! Geez.

None of his campaigns got anybody anywhere really. Then, when the war was obviously won, he runs for President on the 'let's make a deal' ticket. It just don't add up for me.

 

[kevikens]

Considering McClellan's organizational ability I wonder if he would have made a good "General in Chief" a la Halleck. I know he briefly held that position early in the war but Lincoln pulled him from that role so the general could concentrate on the Peninsula. As Lincoln put it, even if he cannot fight he excels at making others fight. Not to disparage Halleck, who, despite the "first rate clerk" crack did a pretty fair job of keeping the armies informed and supplied, but McClellan might have made a good embryonic chief of staff if employed properly. I guess, though, that after a bad case of the "slows" post Antietam and some rancorous remarks to each other, the atmosphere was so poisoned that Lincoln would not have made that offer and McClellan would have snubbed it. Too bad. I think Little Mac, in an office in the War Department, would have been in the right place at the right time, for once.