McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[Elennsar]

Even if he felt Lee's army was in the same shape as his own, the conclusion would be the same. In my view, this line of criticism regarding the situation on the afternoon of September 17 1862 is misguided.

I doubt it would be the same from Meade or Thomas (its pretty clear it wouldn't be Grant's conclusion).

McClellan's approach makes perfect sense if the primary goal is preservation of the Army of the Potomac even at the expense of possible triumph, but that attitude does not win wars.

http://antietam.aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=136

http://antietam.aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=188

How Franklin and Porter describe the role of their corps, for the curious.

http://antietam.aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=55

Sykes on the role of his division.

A general who believed the condition of the enemy was as bad as the condition of 1st, 2nd, and 12th Corps would not have found his army without troops to take advantage of such a thing.

 

[JCM6395]

On paper McClellan had military success written all over him. Nobody can argue about how he built the Army of the Potomac into a powerful force. But when it came to actually defeating the Rebs he just choked. Lincoln gave him many chances to prove himself....almost begging him to succeed. Like one AoP soldier said in the 1864 slugfest...if we had fought like this in 1862 the war would've been over already.

McClellan just thought too much of his own military skills and resented Lincoln instead of appreciating the chances Lincoln gave him when most other presidents would have canned him for insubordination. Grant called McClellan one of the great mysteries of the war.

 

[Billy Yank]

A fine machine is of no use if the operator doesn't know how to use it.

 

[Elennsar]

McClellan just thought too much of his own military skills and resented Lincoln instead of appreciating the chances Lincoln gave him when most other presidents would have canned him for insubordination. Grant called McClellan one of the great mysteries of the war.

What baffles me about this is that McClellan seems to have spent little time trying to ensure Lincoln understood exactly what he was doing. I'm not going to say he left Lincoln completely in the dark, but he didn't go out of his way to inform Lincoln on how what he was doing would work, either.

The Civil War could not be fought as a purely military affair with civilians being only relevant so far as they shoveled men and materials to the army, but McClellan's style of doing things seem to suggest he wasn't willing to accept that. It's not one of his more endearing points, whatever specific anecdotes we can disprove.

 

[NedBaldwin]

its pretty clear it wouldn't be Grant's conclusion

How is this clear to you?

McClellan's approach makes perfect sense if the primary goal is preservation of the Army of the Potomac even at the expense of possible triumph

McCellan's approach during Antietam makes little sense if the goal was preserving the army -- He fed most of the army into battle in an uncoordinated way, getting more US troops killed in a single day than any other US commander.

 

[Pat Answer]

What baffles me about this is that McClellan seems to have spent little time trying to ensure Lincoln understood exactly what he was doing. I'm not going to say he left Lincoln completely in the dark, but he didn't go out of his way to inform Lincoln on how what he was doing would work, either.

The Civil War could not be fought as a purely military affair with civilians being only relevant so far as they shoveled men and materials to the army, but McClellan's style of doing things seem to suggest he wasn't willing to accept that. It's not one of his more endearing points, whatever specific anecdotes we can disprove.

Still have much to read on this one, but I think this is the core of the issue. It seems to me McClellan would have been a very able 18th century commander, winning - not exclusively but primarily - on points with method and maneuver. (It is easy to forget that he possibly could have been in Richmond by the summer of 1862, if Lee hadn't changed the game.) But he - and in this he wasn't alone - seems to have missed the whole political side of things in a "people's war". It definitely hurt his relationship with Lincoln and perceptions of his leadership ever since.

 

[brass napoleon]

Still have much to read on this one, but I think this is the core of the issue. It seems to me McClellan would have been a very able 18th century commander, winning - not exclusively but primarily - on points with method and maneuver. (It is easy to forget that he possibly could have been in Richmond by the summer of 1862, if Lee hadn't changed the game.) But he - and in this he wasn't alone - seems to have missed the whole political side of things in a "people's war". It definitely hurt his relationship with Lincoln and perceptions of his leadership ever since.

This is true. A lot of it was arrogance and intransigence, but it was also fed by his abhorrence of "Black Republican" politics.

 

[matthew mckeon]

Check out Ethan Rafuse's book, McClellan's War for what I think is the best evaluation of Little Mac to date.

Cash,
My thinking on McClellan feels very stale to me. I'll see if I can't get hold of the Rafuse book.

 

[matthew mckeon]

A fine machine is of no use if the operator doesn't know how to use it.

I'm thinking he didn't build that fine a machine. Tough certainly, The AoP took a heck of a lot of punishment and a long string of defeats in 62-63, and still was full of fight. But a "command culture"(if I can borrow a term from Gary Gallenger) that was flawed.

 

[Elennsar]

How is this clear to you?

Not sure if serious.

McCellan's approach during Antietam makes little sense if the goal was preserving the army -- He fed most of the army into battle in an uncoordinated way, getting more US troops killed in a single day than any other US commander.

It makes even less sense if his goal was to destroy Lee's army. Dribs and drabs of commitment and hesitating to use his reserves to strike a blow are not the actions of a commander thinking of how best to destroy the enemy.

 

[Billy Yank]

I'm thinking he didn't build that fine a machine. Tough certainly, The AoP took a heck of a lot of punishment and a long string of defeats in 62-63, and still was full of fight. But a "command culture"(if I can borrow a term from Gary Gallenger) that was flawed.

I believe they were nothing more than a "rabble" when he took command. Final product certainly wasn't perfect, but I still give him an "A-" in this regard. (Compare First Bull Run.)

 

[Elennsar]

I believe they were nothing more than a "rabble" when he took command. Final product certainly wasn't perfect, but I still give him an "A-" in this regard. (Compare First Bull Run.)

In fairness to McDowell, First Bull Run is with much less time to work with to turn civilians into soldiers.

McClellan's forces in West Virginia seem to have run a little more smoothly, though, so that's a something on a more or less equal level.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Not sure if serious.

I am serious. Its not clear to me that assuming the events of the day were the same, a different general would have ended the day differently.

It makes even less sense if his goal was to destroy Lee's army. Dribs and drabs of commitment and hesitating to use his reserves to strike a blow are not the actions of a commander thinking of how best to destroy the enemy.

Agreed.

 

[Elennsar]

I am serious. Its not clear to me that assuming the events of the day were the same, a different general would have ended the day differently.

Given Grant's record on the whole, it seems a safe bet that if he felt that part of his forces were badly damaged and part of the enemy's forces were badly damaged, he would not have chosen to err on the side of caution.

There's no way to say anything on a speculative thing with absolute certainty, but the difference between how Grant handled heavy losses and how McClellan did is pretty striking and pretty consistent.

 

[FarawayFriend]

I've heard this before, but never seen a primary source. Do you have a source for this?

I think the original source (from which all kinds of variations and interpretations derive) might have been this, as described in D. S. Freeman's biography of Robert E. Lee:
"Lee used somewhat the same language, though he was more reserved, in replying to questions from B. H. Wright of Rome, N. Y., a West Pointer and an engineer. "The failure of the Confederate army at Gettysburg," Lee told Wright, "was owing to a combination of circumstances, but from which success might have been reasonably expected."33 In the remainder of this letter, Lee answered queries from Wright regarding Burnside's movements to Fredericksburg, and the feasibility, after the campaign of 1862, of an alternative plan of Federal operations devised by p477 Wright. "As regards General McClellan," said Lee, "I have always entertained a high opinion of his capacity, and have no reason to think that he omitted to do anything that was in his power." This letter to Wright was so cautiously written that publication would have done no harm. The answers to McDonald concluded with the request, "I must ask that you will consider what I have said as intended solely for yourself."
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/People/Robert_E_Lee/FREREL/4/26*.html

Freeman used this source:
R. E. Lee to B. H. Wright, Jan. 18, 1869; Jones, L. and L., 452‑53, the name and address being supplied from Lee's MS. Letter Book.

Most probably Lee had expressed his good opinion of McClellan likewise on certain occasions.
Wikipedia has it this way:
"Robert E. Lee, on being asked (by his cousin, and recorded by his son) who was the ablest general on the Union side during the late war, replied emphatically: "McClellan, by all odds!"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_B._McClellan
and gives this as primary source for the quote:
Lee, Robert E. Jr. Recollections and Letters of General Robert E. Lee. St. Petersburg, FL: Red and Black Publishers, 2008. ISBN 978-1-934941-13-3. First published 1904 by Doubleday, Page & Co.

 

[brass napoleon]

I think the original source (from which all kinds of variations and interpretations derive) might have been this, as described in D. S. Freeman's biography of Robert E. Lee:
"Lee used somewhat the same language, though he was more reserved, in replying to questions from B. H. Wright of Rome, N. Y., a West Pointer and an engineer. "The failure of the Confederate army at Gettysburg," Lee told Wright, "was owing to a combination of circumstances, but from which success might have been reasonably expected."33 In the remainder of this letter, Lee answered queries from Wright regarding Burnside's movements to Fredericksburg, and the feasibility, after the campaign of 1862, of an alternative plan of Federal operations devised by p477 Wright. "As regards General McClellan," said Lee, "I have always entertained a high opinion of his capacity, and have no reason to think that he omitted to do anything that was in his power." This letter to Wright was so cautiously written that publication would have done no harm. The answers to McDonald concluded with the request, "I must ask that you will consider what I have said as intended solely for yourself."
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/People/Robert_E_Lee/FREREL/4/26*.html

Freeman used this source:
R. E. Lee to B. H. Wright, Jan. 18, 1869; Jones, L. and L., 452‑53, the name and address being supplied from Lee's MS. Letter Book.

Most probably Lee had expressed his good opinion of McClellan likewise on certain occasions.
Wikipedia has it this way:
"Robert E. Lee, on being asked (by his cousin, and recorded by his son) who was the ablest general on the Union side during the late war, replied emphatically: "McClellan, by all odds!"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_B._McClellan
and gives this as primary source for the quote:
Lee, Robert E. Jr. Recollections and Letters of General Robert E. Lee. St. Petersburg, FL: Red and Black Publishers, 2008. ISBN 978-1-934941-13-3. First published 1904 by Doubleday, Page & Co.

Thanks, FF. I've seen both those quotes and believe he did say them, although the "McClellan, by all odds!" quote is still hard to swallow. I wasn't sure whether kevikens was paraphrasing one of these quotes, or if he knew of another quote where Lee said "McClellan was the one general whose army he would never be able to utterly destroy". That quote even has a believable ring to it, as McClellan was so protective of his army (although I do think it's an interesting implication that Lee COULD utterly destroy the armies of all of the other generals he faced.)

 

[67th Tigers]

McCellan's approach during Antietam makes little sense if the goal was preserving the army -- He fed most of the army into battle in an uncoordinated way, getting more US troops killed in a single day than any other US commander.

From the top level the commitment is absolutely fine. He sends 1st Corps, then 12th, then 2nd and finally 6th through the defiles formed by the bridge and ford in that sector prettymuch as fast as possible. Now one may argue he was too aggressive, and should have left Hooker and Sumner orders not to attack until at least three corps were lined up neatly.

Or one may argue that Hooker should have made an effort to coordinate his movements with Mansfield, and that Sumner should have tried to command his whole Corps instead of just Sedgwick. One should note that the attack on the sunken road position was not ordered by McClellan, but was rather a failure of command by Sumner. McClellan was watching from his CP (which was on the Ecker Knoll overlooking the middle bridge at this point of the battle) and if memory serves sent orders directly to Richardson's brigadiers due to Richardson being elsewhere.

However the overwhelming problem at Antietam was Burnside, who simply wouldn't attack when ordered. When people suggest Antietam was a draw (or in some cases a Confederate victory!!!?) I suggest it was a Union victory that should have been a decisive one except for the Burnside-Cox "team".

 

[Eagle eye]

Tested to destruction?



His movements were fast, but were stopped twice by fortifications.

He actually more than obeyed Lincoln's desire, because in addition to over ca. 70-77,000 troops left to garrison Washington and the approaches he also intended leaving 2nd Corps until it was confirmed that Johnston was behind the Rappahanock, and 1st Corps were supposed to remain in Washington on ships awaiting an amphibious movement behind the enemy on the Peninsula.

Thus at the beginning of April McClellan indeed left merely ca. 150,000 men to defend Washington. Amazing it didn't fall.

You must be reading Macs autobiography.… fortifications??? 150,00 to defend Washington?

 

[67th Tigers]

Thanks, FF. I've seen both those quotes and believe he did say them, although the "McClellan, by all odds!" quote is still hard to swallow. I wasn't sure whether kevikens was paraphrasing one of these quotes, or if he knew of another quote where Lee said "McClellan was the one general whose army he would never be able to utterly destroy". That quote even has a believable ring to it, as McClellan was so protective of his army (although I do think it's an interesting implication that Lee COULD utterly destroy the armies of all of the other generals he faced.)

There is also what Lee's daughter reported (in Hassler's GBM: Shield of the Union ref'ing Randall's Lincoln the President, but I haven't yet traced the quote back further):

"General McClellan was the only General Father dreaded"

 

[JCM6395]

Wasn't Lee supposed to have said that he hated Lincoln changing his commanders because he feared they'd finally find the right one? If so....then he must have not thought too much of McClellan.