McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[Pat Answer]

That quote even has a believable ring to it, as McClellan was so protective of his army (although I do think it's an interesting implication that Lee COULD utterly destroy the armies of all of the other generals he faced.)

The notion that one horse-and-musket era army could "utterly destroy" another similarly equipped and trained one in one climactic battle seems to have been a common hope (and how can you blame someone for wanting a short war?). But of course extraordinary circumstances were needed each time that actually happened - something generals usually understood slightly better than politicians.

 

[brass napoleon]

The notion that one horse-and-musket era army could "utterly destroy" another similarly equipped and trained one in one climactic battle seems to have been a common hope (and how can you blame someone for wanting a short war?). But of course extraordinary circumstances were needed each time that actually happened - something generals usually understood slightly better than politicians.

... unless the general's name was P.G.T. Beauregard!

 

[67th Tigers]

You must be reading Macs autobiography.… fortifications??? 150,00 to defend Washington?

He double counted a few regiments and was several thousand high.

However, the Washington defences included the approach routes. He reckoned:

Baltimore - 7,388

Washington - 10,600 manning the fortifications
11,400 disposable troops (i.e. a field force)
4,000 new troops in NY ordered to Washington
3,500 new troops in Pa ordered to Washington

Guarding the railroads in Md: 3,359

Abercrombie's force at Manassas: 7,780 (with 12 field guns)

In the Shenandoah was Banks' 5th Corps and Blenker division of 2nd Corps: 29,715 (with 24 field guns)

Also he intended to leave Sumner and his 2nd Corps at Manassas until it was confirmed the rebels had retreated. The 1st Corps was supposed to be the amphibious turning force, and was to hold at Washington until the navy had cleared one of the rivers for them.

So yes, Washington by McClellan's account had ca. 150,000 men.

In fact, the whole force in the theatre was 191,171 present, and McClellan took the following to the Peninsula:

HQ: 73
HQ Cavalry Escort: 113
3rd Corps: 35,842
4th Corps: 34,798
Regular inf.: 4,142
Regular cav.: 2,771

= 77,674

Leaving:

1st Corps: 35,943
2nd Corps: 27,907 (inc. Blenker)
5th Corps: 23,706
Washington dist: 20,795
Alexandria dist: 1,404
Provost-Marshal's Guard: 633 (actually small dets with all units)
Arty Res: 2,906
Regular engrs: 237 (attached to 1st Corps)

The following where not AoP commands:

Railroad Bde: 4,993 (April)
Baltimore: 6,717 (30th May)
Mountain Dept: 20,432 (April, not included by McClellan)

Thus I count 145,673 left immediately to defend Washington, and after 1st and 2nd Corps left (inc. Blenker) Washington would still have 81,823 defenders, far more than the 55,000 requirement.

McClellan estimated the Confederates had ca. slightly less than 90,000 in Northern Virginia, slightly less than 20,000 at Yorktown and about 15,000 at Norfolk. In this he's actually pretty close. Whatever choices he made were not the result of false estimates of enemy strength.

 

[kevikens]

Thanks, FF. I've seen both those quotes and believe he did say them, although the "McClellan, by all odds!" quote is still hard to swallow. I wasn't sure whether kevikens was paraphrasing one of these quotes, or if he knew of another quote where Lee said "McClellan was the one general whose army he would never be able to utterly destroy". That quote even has a believable ring to it, as McClellan was so protective of his army (although I do think it's an interesting implication that Lee COULD utterly destroy the armies of all of the other generals he faced.)

Actually I was referring to another incident from after the war when Lee told a Northern reporter what I said about not being able to destroy McClellan's army. Like you, I was startled by this, and embedded this in my memory, but it was some years ago and I have no idea of what book I got it from.

 

[damYankee]

From reading letters that McClellan sent to his wife and friends and from his statements during the presidential campaign, I can't help but conclude that McClellan never really committed himself to the destruction of the CSA. In his mind he was operating from the principle that his duty was to defend those lands not claimed by the CSA. More like he was defending with the idea of establishing a permanant boundry between the two. Where as Lincoln was hell bent on supressing the rebellion.
Where as Lincoln, Grant, Sherman and Sheridan and others refere to the "rebellion', McClellan referes to the Confederacy giving it, IMO, legitimacy that others refused to grant it.
He speaks of invading the enemies country, as if it were another nation, no longer part of the USA, but the CSA. IMO had he displaced Lincoln he would have negotiated a seperation of the two belligerents with recognition of the Confederacy as a nation.
He seemed to be very full of himself, he seldom speaks of the war or the stradegy of others without pointing out his superiority, and declaring all others ignorant. As if he were more important then the elected officials.
I doubt a man such as McClellan would ever study his own weaknesses as he was convinced he had none. This is a fatal flaw in any commander. In order to plan for every possible reaction by your enemy a great commander would understand what his own weakness is, because that is what the enemy will be exploiting.
Lee understood this, and played him like a fiddle.

 

[NedBaldwin]

From the top level the commitment is absolutely fine. He sends 1st Corps, then 12th, then 2nd and finally 6th through the defiles formed by the bridge and ford in that sector prettymuch as fast as possible. Now one may argue he was too aggressive, and should have left Hooker and Sumner orders not to attack until at least three corps were lined up neatly.

Or even wait for two corps to be together; but attacking one corps at a time was not the way to fight a battle.

However the overwhelming problem at Antietam was Burnside, who simply wouldn't attack when ordered. When people suggest Antietam was a draw (or in some cases a Confederate victory!!!?) I suggest it was a Union victory that should have been a decisive one except for the Burnside-Cox "team".

I emphatically disagree. I think you have a fundamentally different view of events than I do.

 

[67th Tigers]

Wasn't Lee supposed to have said that he hated Lincoln changing his commanders because he feared they'd finally find the right one? If so....then he must have not thought too much of McClellan.

When I try and trace the quote back it ends with a blank. The quote appears out of nowhere and the references in Freeman don't actually give it as best I can tell. Longstreet (pg 291) is the primary ref and he says:

"When informed of the change, General Lee expressed
regret, as he thought that McClellan could be relied upon
to conform to the strictest rules of science in the conduct
of war. He had been McClellan s preceptor, they had
served together in the engineer corps, and our chief thought
that he thoroughly understood the displaced commander.
The change was a good lift for the South, however ; Mc
Clellan was growing, was likely to exhibit far greater
powers than he had yet shown, and could not have given
us opportunity to recover the morale lost at Sharpsburg,
as did Burnside and Hooker."

The context is that McClellan didn't make war on southern civilians, but other commanders (e.g. Fremont, Pope etc.) had, and this seems to be the source of Lee's regret. With McClellan it was army vs army, war conducted to Christian principles, but with others it might be less civilised.

 

[NedBaldwin]

He double counted a few regiments and was several thousand high.

Seems to me that you do also and even add troops that were far off (the entire Mountain Department? troops in NY?).

 

[67th Tigers]

Or even wait for two corps to be together; but attacking one corps at a time was not the way to fight a battle.

Well from McClellan's PoV he'd already put in 12th Corps to assist Hooker, meaning 15 brigades on the right, and 8 on the left and only had 11 in the centre, of which 6 (Sedgwick's and French's division) were slated to cross the Antietam at first light and reinforce Hooker. Another 9 brigades that weren't on the field that morning would arrive during the day. Before 0720 McClellan had committed 21 brigades (of 32 present, i.e. 2/3rds of his available force) to a single strike on the right.

I emphatically disagree. I think you have a fundamentally different view of events than I do.

Following Jacob Cox's line?

 

[67th Tigers]

Seems to me that you do also and even add troops that were far off (the entire Mountain Department? troops in NY?).

Troops in NY were under orders to Washington, and could have arrived before 1st and 2nd Corps withdrew.

 

[kevikens]

I disagree with this assessment. McClellan did visit the front at Antietam and what he learned by doing so helps explain his decisions. He commanded the army on the bloodiest day of the war. When he visited the front Hooker was out, Mansfield was dead, Sumner was shaken; , the first Corps was basically wrecked, the 2nd and 12th had taken a beating. By visiting Sumner at the front he did get a better sense of what was going on and it explains his decision to hold.

Ned, if I am interpreting the books I have recently read correctly, most of the day he was at his headquarters and he did not venture far from that spot until late in the day. When he did, he was supposedly so shaken by the carnage, that he did, indeed, hesitate to throw in his largely unused reserves late that day or renew the battle the next day. The one book I have at hand is "Hearts in Conflict" by Curt Anders. He covers Antietam on pp. 245-258 where he certainly gives me the impression that McClellan parked himself at the Pry house two miles from the fighting: "None of this , however could the AoP commander see from the lawn...where battle... had been raging since sunrise". "Couriers had come and gone and McClellan read the messages wigwagged by signalmen". "Little Mac turned his attention to the one sector of the battlefield he could see through his telescope...". "Finally McClellan came himself". "Back at his headquarters, through his telescope, Little Mac could see...". "General McClellan saw their blue waves receding through his telescope."

Admittedly this is only from one chapter of the whole book but from what I recall from other books McClellan did not come very close to the actual fighting. Compare this with Lee riding from crisis point to crisis point, back and forth, issuing orders that were based on real time evidence and where he could see if they were being carried out or not. Constantly he rallied his men right at the front and disposed of his men with fine appreciation of what was going on at that moment. (A lapse in this method would cost him dearly at Gettysburg). This is what prevented the Union from triumphing at Antietam. Lee knew what was going on and McClellan, relying on couriers and wigwags and his telescope, did not. This was not the first time either. On the peninsula earlier that year he did the same thing depending on reports (like Pinkerton's) rather than coming up to the front himself to better appreciate the situation.

I go back to what I wrote earlier. One of McClellan's most egregious flaws was not going up closer to the fighting, moving about the battlefield and getting a "feel" for what was happening there.

 

[OpnCoronet]

It is part of human nature to always have some doubt's concerning most decisionmaking and the more important the results of any particular decision are, the bigger the doubts.
In leaders of great enterprises, of any type, a very few great leaders overcome those doubts by overachieving, and there are a few who allow themselves to be paralyzed by their doubts. everyone else falls some3 where inbetween those extremes. McClellan was, of course, the prime example of the latter type of leader.
Although, IMO, it was not necessarily McClellan, deoubted his abilities, so much as he doubted how he would be able stand in front of the mirror, if his doubts proved correct.

 

[67th Tigers]

Ned, if I am interpreting the books I have recently read correctly, most of the day he was at his headquarters and he did not venture far from that spot until late in the day. When he did, he was supposedly so shaken by the carnage, that he did, indeed, hesitate to throw in his largely unused reserves late that day or renew the battle the next day. The one book I have at hand is "Hearts in Conflict" by Curt Anders. He covers Antietam on pp. 245-258 where he certainly gives me the impression that McClellan parked himself at the Pry house two miles from the fighting: "None of this , however could the AoP commander see from the lawn...where battle... had been raging since sunrise". "Couriers had come and gone and McClellan read the messages wigwagged by signalmen". "Little Mac turned his attention to the one sector of the battlefield he could see through his telescope...". "Finally McClellan came himself". "Back at his headquarters, through his telescope, Little Mac could see...". "General McClellan saw their blue waves receding through his telescope."

How odd. McClellan moved at ca. 0800 to the Ecker Knoll, and did not return to the Pry House that day. The Ecker Knoll was the site of Porter's HQ and he continued to control the battle from there.

Lee OTOH hardly moved at all, because he couldn't. He had been injured on 31st August and both wrists were still in splints, so he couldn't grab the reins. The 17th September was the first he'd been on a horse since the accident, and he was lifted onto his horse Traveller and sat there whilst an aide led the horse onto a hill just north of Sharpsburg where he remained prettymuch for the whole battle.

 

[Eagle eye]

He double counted a few regiments and was several thousand high.

However, the Washington defences included the approach routes. He reckoned:

Baltimore - 7,388

Washington - 10,600 manning the fortifications
11,400 disposable troops (i.e. a field force)
4,000 new troops in NY ordered to Washington
3,500 new troops in Pa ordered to Washington

Guarding the railroads in Md: 3,359

Abercrombie's force at Manassas: 7,780 (with 12 field guns)

In the Shenandoah was Banks' 5th Corps and Blenker division of 2nd Corps: 29,715 (with 24 field guns)

Also he intended to leave Sumner and his 2nd Corps at Manassas until it was confirmed the rebels had retreated. The 1st Corps was supposed to be the amphibious turning force, and was to hold at Washington until the navy had cleared one of the rivers for them.

So yes, Washington by McClellan's account had ca. 150,000 men.

In fact, the whole force in the theatre was 191,171 present, and McClellan took the following to the Peninsula:

HQ: 73
HQ Cavalry Escort: 113
3rd Corps: 35,842
4th Corps: 34,798
Regular inf.: 4,142
Regular cav.: 2,771

= 77,674

Leaving:

1st Corps: 35,943
2nd Corps: 27,907 (inc. Blenker)
5th Corps: 23,706
Washington dist: 20,795
Alexandria dist: 1,404
Provost-Marshal's Guard: 633 (actually small dets with all units)
Arty Res: 2,906
Regular engrs: 237 (attached to 1st Corps)

The following where not AoP commands:

Railroad Bde: 4,993 (April)
Baltimore: 6,717 (30th May)
Mountain Dept: 20,432 (April, not included by McClellan)

Thus I count 145,673 left immediately to defend Washington, and after 1st and 2nd Corps left (inc. Blenker) Washington would still have 81,823 defenders, far more than the 55,000 requirement.

McClellan estimated the Confederates had ca. slightly less than 90,000 in Northern Virginia, slightly less than 20,000 at Yorktown and about 15,000 at Norfolk. In this he's actually pretty close. Whatever choices he made were not the result of false estimates of enemy strength.

With all due respect Tigers & the fact that I'm 2000 miles from my sources… IIRC & In My Opinion … Little Mac NEVER… including Antietm … faced a Rebel army of less then 200,000 men. Blame Mac or blame Pinkerton… before a battle he said " if I should lose this battle the blame does not lay with me… I've served under better L/Cpls then that man… in my opinion of course… please don't take this as an attack against you Tigers… take it that I have no respect for Mac as a "fighting" General. I do respect your opinion as I hope you will respect mine.
Eagle Eye

 

[Elennsar]

Rounding to the nearest hundred:
7,400+10,600+11,400 = 29,400
+4,000+3,500 +3,400 = 10,900
+7,800+29,700 =37,500

Total: 77,800.

Of course only 28,500 are in Washington itself (counting the new troops).

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=55,000;rgn=full text;idno=waro0015;didno=waro0015;view=image;seq=0244

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=covering force;rgn=full text;idno=waro0014;didno=waro0014;view=image;seq=0060

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar&cc=moawar&idno=waro0045&q1=covering force&view=image&seq=333&size=100


In short, this is not what was required for the defense of Washington, even giving all possible credit to McClellan's calculations of the size of forces involved.

 

[cash]

Cash,
My thinking on McClellan feels very stale to me. I'll see if I can't get hold of the Rafuse book.

I think he has a far better understanding of McClellan than Sears does.

 

[rpkennedy]

I think he has a far better understanding of McClellan than Sears does.

Sears comes across as rather hating McClellan. This is pretty clear even in his George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon.

R

 

[cash]

Sears comes across as rather hating McClellan. This is pretty clear even in his George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon.

R

Yes, he does, and it also comes across in Landscape Turned Red.

 

[67th Tigers]

In short, this is not what was required for the defense of Washington, even giving all possible credit to McClellan's calculations of the size of forces involved.

So you're suggesting that it was a mistake to take the offensive against the south? The north should have hunkered down in their forts and done nothing? Or did the north need more manpower?

How many men did Washington and its forts need? 100,000? 200,000? 300,000?

 

[Elennsar]

So you're suggesting that it was a mistake to take the offensive against the south? The north should have hunkered down in their forts and done nothing? Or did the north need more manpower?

How many men did Washington and its forts need? 100,000? 200,000? 300,000?

No, I'm suggesting that the deployment of the men available does not fulfill the requirement for Washington's defenses.

Assuming that the issue of a covering force could be taken care of by proper use of the troops elsewhere (although their deployment would need to be adjusted somewhat), I think 40,000 counting the artillerists to man the forts would be quite sufficient - but there are not 40,000 men defending Washington.

Nor are the other troops such as Banks positioned to effectively act as the covering force desired, which could be resolved in a number of ways, but counting them as part of Washington's defenses is almost as inappropriate as counting Jackson and Ewell's divisions as part of the forces McClellan faced on the Peninsula.