McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[Nathan Towne]

This isn't really worth responding to.

View attachment 520814

A serious issue, based on overwhelming evidence which leads to important inquiries, but alright.

 

[tony_gunter]

It was my understanding that McPherson was commanding the detachment of the Army of the Tennessee present at Second Corinth. If not, however, then presumably someone was commanding the detachment - if he's a directly reporting subordinate of Rosecrans then the same basic principle applies (i.e. not just standing around) and if he's under whoever was commanding the detachment then they're the one who should be exercising that principle.

I note that McPherson's report says that he bivouacked in the town according to orders, and moved in pursuit "shortly after daylight Sunday morning".

Yeah, not sure if McPherson sent someone to find Rosecrans or if not then why. But you can't say he didn't fulfill the order.

McPherson was in command of a brigade reporting to Rosecrans that arrived just after the battle. The brigade was fresh except for the marching. Not sure why he wasn't sent ahead in the afternoon to at least harass the rear guard.

 

[Saphroneth]

Yeah, not sure if McPherson sent someone to find Rosecrans or if not then why. But you can't say he didn't fulfill the order.

It gets to, well, an important concept, which is well worth remembering - that an army commander simply cannot be everywhere at once. Our view on this can be badly distorted by strategy computer games, which genuinely do let a commander do everything.

Now, as it happens I tend to view Rosecrans as liable to get overly focused in on the details during a battle, which is a problem for a high level commander. Heintzelman could have the same problem (IIRC it comes up at Glendale). Meade had the same problem at Gettysburg. It's not an insuperable one, though, and it's a common flaw in the ACW - the commanders are "used" to their previous level, but not comfortable at it, so operating at a lower level feels like a natural amount of problems and they don't have mental capacity to spare to realize they should be stepping back.

McClellan seems to be pretty good at avoiding this, and in defining areas of responsibility. Porter is a good example of a corps commander who exercises his initiative and also displays the ability to know what's important when he reports up the chain (at Malvern Hill, for example).

 

[Nathan Towne]

Wait, are you saying that Rosecrans didn't fumble the pursuit?

When McPherson arrived at the end of the battle, Rosecrans gave him an order to "have your men formed on the road by first light and ready to pursue." The men formed and stood in the road for hours. When Rosecrans stumbled upon them mid-morning and asked why they had not begun the pursuit, McPherson simply pulled out the order and read it back to him.

The issue of pursuing on the night of the 4th is a difficult one because you have to pursue the enemy, not just use the roads and the area was incredibly densely forested. You have to pursue the enemy where they move. Also, provision had to be made for the wounded, including the Confederate wounded who had been left and the Army then organized for the pursuit. You also face the reality that the Confederate force was as large as the U.S. force and could always be trying to draw the Army out of their works, which needs to be appreciated.

The pursuit opened the next morning. That is a different issue though. I was merely noting what I was suspecting would be said next by a particular individual. It is so easy to see it all coming.

Now, regarding the other thread, everyone can see that I addressed the central point. I then asked the pertinent question from there.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I was merely noting what I was suspecting would be said next by a particular individual. It is so easy to see it all coming.

And yet you were the one that brought it up. Perhaps you should have just shut up and let it go.

 

[TallTallMan]

Other than the New Testament and McClellan's Sermon on the Mount. The Chicago Tribune published a couple of stories about the Hamilton incident which put a different slant on what happened - unsurprisingly, of course.

Relying on newspapers for facts or "general" opinions is very dangerous, considering, you know, slants.

On another level where in heck did Rosecrans come from?

 

[Belfoured]

Relying on newspapers for facts or "general" opinions is very dangerous, considering, you know, slants.

On another level where in heck did Rosecrans come from?

Oh, you bet it is. You may have noticed that I wasn't first to rely on a newspaper report ...

Of course, it was Hamilton leaking and putting it as all about his poor soldiers, going sick because they were being asked to do too much work. In the same articles, you will note, Hamilton freely admits to threatening to go over McClellan's head to Lincoln. That was certainly insubordination.

McClellan, of course, initially said nothing. It was the done thing not to throw people under the bus, and officers who intrigued against others, like Hamilton did, were often found out.

Marvel characterises Hamilton as a "well-connected, calculating backbiter"(1) and a "querulous man." (2) He has letters wherein Hamilton is smearing other officers to get ahead of them. He notes that Hamilton's division shed huge numbers of stragglers, who because marauders, and Porter gave orders to his pickets to shoot them if they were outside of their lines. Marvel notes a stream of notes from Hamilton complaining that his division was being asked to do an equal share of the work, which is the root cause of the issue.

Hamilton certain wasn't a team-player, perhaps even more so than Hooker or Kearny, since I've never seen anything from those two that suggests they didn't perform their duty, whereas Hamilton was certainly lax. Hamilton apparently believed his political connections made him immune to the normal discipline of the army, but they didn't.

Of the division commanders, two were clearly imcompetent to command a division - Hamilton and Casey. The others at least had the basics, even if they weren't very good at commanding in battle.



(1) Marvel, William. Radical Sacrifice: The Rise and Ruin of Fitz John Porter (Civil War America) (p. 109). The University of North Carolina Press. Kindle Edition.

(2) ibid, 117

And on and on and on it goes. McClellan makes Mother Teresa look like a self-infatuated narcissist. As for that better "team player" Kearney, show me where Hamilton accused McClellan in unvarnished terms of "cowardice" and "treason".

 

[Saphroneth]

So here's a thought - roughly speaking, the commanders of significantly sized forces in the Peninsular campaign and Seven Days on the Confederate side were:

Jackson (9 bdes)
DH Hill (5 bdes)
Magruder (6 bdes in the Seven Days)
Longstreet (6 bdes)
Huger (5 bdes)
AP Hill (6 bdes)

In addition, Holmes commanded some of the units which are counted under Huger, and GW Smith had earlier held command of a large division (5 bdes) and a wing (9 bdes) but was ill during the Seven Days themselves.

Out of these men, whose role in span of command is roughly equivalent to McClellan's corps commanders, I think it would be fair to say that Lee rejected several of them for further use in this command role where possible - those being Magruder, Huger and DH Hill, plus Holmes to some extent. In addition Magruder trialled McLaws in the subsequent Maryland Campaign, then rejected him as well, and only switched to a three-corps structure at a point he could avoid making DH Hill a corps commander. (It happens that Jackson died shortly afterwards.)

The large Confederate division structure effectively let Lee "try out" many of these commanders, and he also had the latitude to get rid of several of his senior commanders - had he been stuck with seniority rules in the same way that McClellan was, Lee's main corps commanders would have been (counting down from the top) GW Smith, Longstreet, Holmes, Jackson, Magruder, DH Hill. Longstreet and Jackson are second and forth, and having Longstreet in particular so high up the seniority list is a great advantage, but one can't really imagine Second Bull Run going the same without Jackson.

 

[Belfoured]

Relying on newspapers for facts or "general" opinions is very dangerous, considering, you know, slants.

On another level where in heck did Rosecrans come from?

To follow up, we also know that McClellan's intimate circle knew how to use the newspapers. During these events, for example, the "Director of the Siege" whose requirements were involved here - "Old Fitz" - had his own ongoing correspondence with one Manton Marble of the anti-administration New York World. Of course, I'm sure that the saintly McClellan knew nothing about that because he surely would have directed Porter to cease immediately.

 

[DanSBHawk]

This is from Civil War to the Bloody End, The Life & Times of Major General Samuel P. Heintzelman, by Jerry D Thompson:

Here is the note:

So if this is right, Hamilton became angry because after he had seen a vulnerability in the confederate line and he had asked permission to attack, and McClellan had refused. It would be interesting to read the letters he sent to Washington that were "deemed disrespectful." I suspect it was about McClellan's lack of aggressiveness, and perhaps about the favoritism shown Porter.

 

[Belfoured]

This is from Civil War to the Bloody End, The Life & Times of Major General Samuel P. Heintzelman, by Jerry D Thompson:

View attachment 520819

Here is the note:
View attachment 520823

So if this is right, Hamilton became angry because after he had seen a vulnerability in the confederate line and he had asked permission to attack, and McClellan had refused. It would be interesting to read the letters he sent to Washington that were "deemed disrespectful." I suspect it was about McClellan's lack of aggressiveness, and perhaps about the favoritism shown Porter.

This is the relevant text of the March 20, 1864 letter to Breck:

"Fond du Lac, Wis March 20th 64
Major,

In answer to your Circular of February 17th 64. asking for my Military history since March 4th 61, I submit the following narrative. I was appointed Colonel of the 3rd Regiment Wisconsin Volunteers,my Commission bearing date May 11th 61. I was mustered into the United States Service, with my Regiment 1000 Strong, for three years Service on the 30th day of June 1861, at Fond du Lac Wisconsin.On the 12th of July following, under orders from Lieut Genl. Scott the Regt. left Wisconsin to report to Major Genl. Patterson, and reached Sandy Hook Md on the 18th of the same month. I was at once assigned by Genl. Patterson to the Command of Maryland Heights & Sandy Hook. On the 5th of August following I was Confirmed as Brigadier General of Volunteers, with rank from May 17th 61, and was at once assigned to the Command of the 3d Brigade Banks Division. I was in command of this Brigade until March 15th 62, and in Command of the Joint Brigade of Genl. A. S.Williams and the Division of Brig Genl. Shields at the head of which forces I Entered Winchester Va on the 15th of Mch. I was releived Mch 15th 62 by Maj Gen McClellan, & ordered to Alexandria Va & assigned to the Command of 3d Div, 3 Army Corps (Heintzelmans) which I embarked on the 17th for the Peninsula and reached Hampton on the 18th, On the 13th of April following while in front of Yorktown, I sought permission of Gen McClellan to storm the Enemys lines. It is proper to say that in pursuance of McClellans timid policy, the request was not granted. I remained in command
until the 2d of May following, when I was releived by order of McClellan, on the specious plea of disrespect, in Entering an Earnest protest against the inhuman overworking of my division, while the troops of Fitz John Porter were Comparatively idle. I was ordered to report in person to the Adjt Genl. of the Army at Washington. ...."

 

[Nathan Towne]

And yet you were the one that brought it up. Perhaps you should have just shut up and let it go.

I will just note the tone of this message and that it, like most of your messages, doesn't reflect well on you, to say the least.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I will just note the tone of this ridiculous message and that it, like most of your messages, doesn't reflect well on you, to say the least.

And your personal vendettas don't reflect well on you either. Give it a rest.

 

[Nathan Towne]

And your personal vendettas don't reflect well on you either. Give it a rest.

I don't have "personal vendettas." I merely love the history and am studious, fair, judicious and careful.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Wait, are you saying that Rosecrans didn't fumble the pursuit?

When McPherson arrived at the end of the battle, Rosecrans gave him an order to "have your men formed on the road by first light and ready to pursue." The men formed and stood in the road for hours. When Rosecrans stumbled upon them mid-morning and asked why they had not begun the pursuit, McPherson simply pulled out the order and read it back to him.

Rather than pulling something random out like that (which, by the way, is completely inaccurate), it is probably best to work to accumulate the relevant sources and then judiciously work from there. You were by no means the worst offender, but that is how the whole train ran off the cliff together regarding the Iuka operation in the other thread and didn't even know the relevant correspondence, or the relevant facts. Second Corinth is a topic which I know some about and I will get into with you at some point, but you have to begin by being careful and responsible and put all of the relevant sources together, on any topic which you look at.

When you look at the evidence in a responsible, judicious and comprehensive way, on any subject, you can begin to learn a lot about things very quickly.

 

[Saphroneth]

I would argue that in grand strategy and in strategy in general McClellan's preferred approach was fundamentally correct - he correctly recognized that a Union force operating on the rivers of the lower Chesapeake could compel the Confederates to keep the bulk of their army close to Richmond so as to defend it. In addition to that, his preferred approach after Antietam (to launch an offensive against Lee directly) is intended to minimize strategic threat and obviate the possibility that would otherwise exist of Lee concentrating superior force against his moving column; the chance of beating Lee to Richmond when Lee has a shorter distance to move for his closest units is minimal, while the advantage that can accrue from McClellan being able to freely use almost his entire force on the subsequent advance south rather than having to leave enough troops to beat Lee on the Potomac is considerable.


Operationally things seem quite reasonable as well. The times when McClellan commands a manoeuvering army he is operating the army as a whole army, and aware of possible enemy intentions which he works to minimize the harm of and exploit the weaknesses of. On multiple occasions he moves forces to attempt to cut off the retreat of a significant enemy force (coincidentally twice the force attempting the cut-off is commanded by Franklin), and during Loudoun Valley in particular McClellan's movements are fluid and prevent the enemy from getting into his rear. McClellan concentrates superior force at every point where the Confederates could fight him, using mountain gaps to protect his supply train, then gives up the mountain gaps as soon as they are no longer needed.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I would argue that in grand strategy and in strategy in general McClellan's preferred approach was fundamentally correct - he correctly recognized that a Union force operating on the rivers of the lower Chesapeake could compel the Confederates to keep the bulk of their army close to Richmond so as to defend it. In addition to that, his preferred approach after Antietam (to launch an offensive against Lee directly) is intended to minimize strategic threat and obviate the possibility that would otherwise exist of Lee concentrating superior force against his moving column; the chance of beating Lee to Richmond when Lee has a shorter distance to move for his closest units is minimal, while the advantage that can accrue from McClellan being able to freely use almost his entire force on the subsequent advance south rather than having to leave enough troops to beat Lee on the Potomac is considerable.


Operationally things seem quite reasonable as well. The times when McClellan commands a manoeuvering army he is operating the army as a whole army, and aware of possible enemy intentions which he works to minimize the harm of and exploit the weaknesses of. On multiple occasions he moves forces to attempt to cut off the retreat of a significant enemy force (coincidentally twice the force attempting the cut-off is commanded by Franklin), and during Loudoun Valley in particular McClellan's movements are fluid and prevent the enemy from getting into his rear. McClellan concentrates superior force at every point where the Confederates could fight him, using mountain gaps to protect his supply train, then gives up the mountain gaps as soon as they are no longer needed.

I commented on the grand strategic conception in the following thread, among plenty of other places.

McClellan - McClellan vs. Scott | Famous People of the Late Unpleasantness

Reading Allan Rafuse's book, McClellan's War, and wanted to highlight Mac's efforts to oust Winfield Scott from office and secure his position for himself. From past readings I had known that Mac had often been rude to Scott, but I was not aware of just how despicable he was in his ruthless, and...

civilwartalk.com

Over the first half of '62, the basic principles which would being carried into operation were tearing the Confederacy apart. There is no question about that whatever. In fact, I would argue that if the Confederacy had any real military chance of surviving, it was essentially destroyed in the first half of '62. That has been my view for a long, long time and is overwhelmingly supported by the evidence, in my view.

 

[Saphroneth]

In fact, I would argue that if the Confederacy had any real military chance of surviving, it was essentially destroyed in the first half of '62.

I'm not so sure, because it's hard to evaluate war weariness but it is a thing that can exist. The operational environment of central VA is quite favourable to the CSA (the Rapidan is a good river to defend behind) and there's only so much stomach for catastrophic failures.

If we assume unlimited Union resolve then we assume a situation that doesn't really exist in reality.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I'm not so sure, because it's hard to evaluate war weariness but it is a thing that can exist. The operational environment of central VA is quite favourable to the CSA (the Rapidan is a good river to defend behind) and there's only so much stomach for catastrophic failures.

If we assume unlimited Union resolve then we assume a situation that doesn't really exist in reality.

I would take it further and make the above case which I just stated generally, prior to the first half of '62, but the consequences of the first half of '62 were just devastating to the Confederacy and put it in a box from which it really never recovered.

Of course, U.S. resolve was not unlimited, but that is the second issue.

 

[Saphroneth]

I would take it further and make the above case which I just stated generally, prior to the first half of '62, but the consequences of the first half of '62 were just devastating to the Confederacy and put it in a box from which it really never recovered.

In the sense that the York and James were opened up to Union shipping, I would concur with reservations. Any offensive against Richmond that doesn't rely on a completely impractical amount of effort to secure rail lines stretching dozens of miles through central Virginia against any Confederate offensive relies on the York and James being opened up, and once that was done the primary remaining questions for a Union offensive against Richmond were whether they'd be willing to put in enough men to play the numbers game in the Overland - or willing to support the amphibious approach with the men needed to succeed, which is a smaller number of men than Overland.

I'm not so sure about the offensive operations in the West, though they do make significant progress. What I keep running into is that the Confederacy can afford to trade space for time repeatedly in the West, and they simply cannot in the East, so the loss of Forts Henry and Donelson and the loss of Corinth is merely painful.


The manpower cost of the Seven Days-Second Bull Run-Antietam sequence is separate and not all in the first half of 1862, but it does seem to have permanently reduced the maximum size of the army the Confederates could support in the field.