McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

How is "pro-Lincoln orthodoxy" relevant in a discussion about McClellan and his movement toward Antietam?

R

As the late Joseph Harsh observed, there is a tendency to put McClellan and Lincoln on a see-saw. For one to go up, the other must come down. Since these days Lincoln has undergone a transformation from the most unpopular president in US history (after all, no other president had states breaking away to get away from him) to a martyr it is always Lincoln that is going to be up, so McClellan is always going to be down.

When you sit down and examine who was right and who was wrong, it is invariably Lincoln that is wrong - or rather his government. You can't overstate the poisonness of Stanton.
 
Stanton may have been very poisonous, but McClellan bears considerable responsibility for his own actions and decisions and contributions to his situation - both in the field, where he had enough men to fight and beat Lee if they were well lead, and in Washington, where he failed to establish his position as one Lincoln had any reason to treat better than he did.

McClellan's view of being grossly outnumbered did more to damage his army than him losing Blenker's division did.
 
Most of the replies I'm seeing seem to indicate that their authors did not bother to read the links I provided before they responded.

This is from Dr. Ethan Rafuse's article "General McClellan and the Politicians Revisited" (Parameters: U.S. Army War College, Summer 2012):

In his engagement with McClellan during the Peninsula Campaign, Lincoln was often inconsistent, alternating between expressions of support for McClellan's efforts to implement his plans and expressions in word and deed or unmistakable hostility toward them.​

Probably the most important substantive factor in undermining Lincoln's and McClellan's ability to achieve concordance was their profound disagreement over operational planning. As McClellan had told Chase, he wanted to take his army to the rivers of the Lower Chesapeake and operate in the Virginia tidewater region east of Richmond. This, he believed, would compel the enemy to react in a manner that would produce conditions far more favorable to the Union than could be expected from another advance on Manassas Junction.26 When he learned about McClellan's plan, Lincoln made clear that he did not like it. Instead, the president preferred the general engage the enemy somewhere in the region between Alexandria and the Rappahannock River. While a number of factors contributed to Lincoln's thinking on the matter, none were as compelling as his concern about the security of the lower Shenandoah Valley and Washington if McClellan were to take his army to the Lower Chesapeake.27​

Finally, McClellan offered to put his plan of operations before his subordinate generals, believing it would facilitate concordance by providing a compelling demonstration of professional military judgment on a military rization to implement it. That concordance had not been achieved, and the president's intense dissatisfaction was unalleviated, was evident in his issuing orders that same day mandating the organization of the Army of the Potomac into a corps configuration. Indeed, Lincoln turned McClellan's appeal to professional military judgment against him by appointing corps command officers who openly shared his reservations about the general's plan. It was also evident in the president's complaint after hearing the results of the generals' deliberations, remarkable for what it suggests about Lincoln's mental character and confidence in his own judgment at that point in the war, that, "We can do nothing else than accept their plan . . . . We can't reject it and adopt another without assuming all responsibility in the case of the failure of the one we adopt."28 As a consequence, it is not surprising that McClellan's already innate suspicion of politicians and desire for Huntingtonian autonomy was inflamed to a white-hot pitch by the time he left Washington.29​

There is also the fact that Lincoln was almost certainly wrong on the substantive merits of the case. His decision in early April to withhold a corps commanded by Irvin McDowell from McClellan's army was a gross overreaction to the situation in the Shenandoah Valley. It also undermined McClellan's ability (his plan having been modified as a consequence of events into an advance from Fort Monroe up the York-James peninsula) to undertake a joint operation against the Confederate garrison at Yorktown. Such an operation could have quickly overcome the obstacle the Confederate defenders there presented and spared the Union army the month-long siege operation that eventually captured the town but strained Lincoln's patience. Then, as McClellan advanced on Richmond, Lincoln issued orders dictating that he use the York River Railroad as his line of communications and place his army in a position from which his right flank could link up with McDowell's command, which Lincoln directed to march south from Fredericksburg. McClellan complied with his superior's wishes, though in doing so he was compelled to put his army in an exceedingly problematic position astride the Chickahominy River with his right flank and rear vulnerable to a Confederate turning movement until McDowell arrived. In late May, Lincoln once again overreacted to problems in the Shenandoah Valley by diverting a significant portion of McDowell's command to the region in a move that, as McDowell presciently warned the president at the time, would not produce any measureable benefits for the Union cause.30 With mismanagement of McDowell's command preventing him from joining McClellan in a timely manner, the Confederates were able to take advantage of McClellan's vulnerable right wing and compel the Federal commander to make a risky move to a new position on the James River.31 (pp. 77-78)​
 
I can't speak for anyone else, but when Thorp expects us to take "civilians counted X men marching by" as a remotely reliable method of determining Lee's numbers at Antietam, miscounts the number of infantry PFD on September 22nd, and adds the reported Antietam losses to the reported figures for October 10 without regard for if the October 10 figures include returned wounded from losses in September or earlier already, just to name three notable issues with his first article, relying on him for a fair account of Lee's forces in the campaign is ill advised at best.

I see no reason to assume he's any more reliable in anything else.
 
I can't speak for anyone else, but when Thorp expects us to take "civilians counted X men marching by" as a remotely reliable method of determining Lee's numbers at Antietam, miscounts the number of infantry PFD on September 22nd, and adds the reported Antietam losses to the reported figures for October 10 without regard for if the October 10 figures include returned wounded from losses in September or earlier already, just to name three notable issues with his first article, relying on him for a fair account of Lee's forces in the campaign is ill advised at best.

I see no reason to assume he's any more reliable in anything else.

Yet his methodology gives a similar result to Harsh's methodology.
 
Yet his methodology gives a similar result to Harsh's methodology.

I do not own a copy of Harsh's works, but per
http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/...l-level-orders-of-battle-second-bull-run-oob/ the figure of 75,687 is for September 2 - two days before the vanguard of the ANV entered Maryland, and thus before any men who (for whatever reason) fell out of the ranks before the army entered Maryland have been subtracted.

That really doesn't answer one way or another how many men were actually present in Maryland in gray.

And the evidence Thorp uses to support his position actually suggests less than that were present for duty, not his 75,000+.

Steiner said (copy/pasted from a text version of the document, so pardon any errors in my transcription)
"Wednesday, September 10. At four o clock this morning the rebel army began to move from our town, Jackson's force taking the advance. The movement continued until eight o clock P. M., occupying sixteen hours. The most liberal calculations could not give them more than 64,000 men."
and
"Thursday, September 11. General Hill s division, numbering about eight thousand men, marched through the streets, on their route westward, this morning."

https://archive.org/details/reportlewissteiner00steirich

That means that the highest number for those Steiner saw marching by - assuming his count is accurate, which is not something I would put money on under any circumstances given the difficulty of avoiding double counting - was 72,000. And quite possibly less. But on top of that, it is the total number of men marching by. It is not the number of men present for duty, but at best the army's aggregate present.

Per the return for September 22 (I could pick another for comparison's sake, but it is the closest to September 10 we have, and thus hopefully more representative of the number of men "present but not present for duty" than a figure from earlier or later): The army's "aggregate present" in those units whose strength is reported is 41,529 men. The present for duty figures for those units reported is 36,418. Subtracting Walker's division (which did not march through Frederick) for a more precise comparison, we have 32990 present for duty, 37649 aggregate present.

If the same percent of present for duty out of the aggregate present was true of Steiner's 72,000 tops figure, we'd have around 63,090 men present for duty out of those marching by, plus the troops not counted by Steiner.

Stuart's cavalry (noted, at least in part, by Steiner, but whose numbers are not estimated) plus Walker's two brigades do not come anywhere near twelve thousand men present for duty.

And the other eye witness reports are all over the place, and some seem rather secondhand.

They cannot be used to confirm that Lee had not suffered an appreciable amount of men falling out of the ranks between September 2 and September 10, let alone between September 2 and September 17.

Point #2: Thorp gives the figure of present for duty in the entire army (except for the reserve artillery and cavalry) as the infantry present for duty on September 22. As the September 22 return specifically includes to two battalions of artillery (Walton's and Lee's), and it is reasonable to assume that the divisions include the artillery attached to them as well as the infantry, one wonders how closely he actually paid attention to the return in question.


Was Lee's army on September 2 larger Sears described it? Very probably (with limited records I'm reluctant to say "certainly"). But does that mean that McClellan actually had to deal with 70,000+ Rebels in Maryland? No. Thorp has given nothing to give that claim any more credibility than the opposite extreme of Lee having closer to 35,000 than 40,000 all totalled on September 17, and that claim can be poked full of holes without even relying on the latest research (even if possibly a dry read, it would be nice to see Harsh's work at least referenced as a more recent study than Sears in something written in 2012).
 
I've expanded my article by adding several sources and a few extracts from some of the sources. (Since I just uploaded the article last week, I'm not calling the new version the second edition. However, if I make any more changes, I will call the next revised version the second edition.)

http://www.mtgriffith.com/web_documents/smearingmcclellan.htm

Have a look at Harsh's PhD thesis. The magnum opus of his Maryland Trilogy was an expansion of his Masters thesis. His PhD would have been the first of five volumes on McClellan, and it's sad we'll never see them.

http://scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/14610/7023520.PDF?sequence=1
 
I do not own a copy of Harsh's works, but per
http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/...l-level-orders-of-battle-second-bull-run-oob/ the figure of 75,687 is for September 2 - two days before the vanguard of the ANV entered Maryland, and thus before any men who (for whatever reason) fell out of the ranks before the army entered Maryland have been subtracted.

That really doesn't answer one way or another how many men were actually present in Maryland in gray.

And the evidence Thorp uses to support his position actually suggests less than that were present for duty, not his 75,000+.

Steiner said (copy/pasted from a text version of the document, so pardon any errors in my transcription)
"Wednesday, September 10. At four o clock this morning the rebel army began to move from our town, Jackson's force taking the advance. The movement continued until eight o clock P. M., occupying sixteen hours. The most liberal calculations could not give them more than 64,000 men."
and
"Thursday, September 11. General Hill s division, numbering about eight thousand men, marched through the streets, on their route westward, this morning."

https://archive.org/details/reportlewissteiner00steirich

That means that the highest number for those Steiner saw marching by - assuming his count is accurate, which is not something I would put money on under any circumstances given the difficulty of avoiding double counting - was 72,000. And quite possibly less. But on top of that, it is the total number of men marching by. It is not the number of men present for duty, but at best the army's aggregate present.

It is the number fit to march, which is prettymuch the definition of "for duty".

Per the return for September 22 (I could pick another for comparison's sake, but it is the closest to September 10 we have, and thus hopefully more representative of the number of men "present but not present for duty" than a figure from earlier or later): The army's "aggregate present" in those units whose strength is reported is 41,529 men. The present for duty figures for those units reported is 36,418. Subtracting Walker's division (which did not march through Frederick) for a more precise comparison, we have 32990 present for duty, 37649 aggregate present.

This goes nowhere other than to point out a lot of men had fallen out of ranks in the immediate aftermath of the campaign.

In fact the stragglers are not uniformly distributed:

Longstreet (DR Jones): 2,777
Hood and Evans: 322
Jackson (JE Jones): 1,508
Ewell (Lawton): 979
AP Hill: 2,685
DH Hill: 732
Walker: 168
McLaws: 2,515
Anderson: 3,718

The units that straggled are Longstreet's division (DR Jones), and the four divisions that force-marched from Harper's Ferry, with the worst off being the one with the longest march. Essentially the units that got ragged around west of South Mountain, and that's where the dropouts were.
 
It is the number fit to march, which is prettymuch the definition of "for duty".

Per Steven H. Newton:
http://books.google.com/books?id=4_..."present for duty" "Steven H. Newton"&f=false

Where does your definition come from?

This goes nowhere other than to point out a lot of men had fallen out of ranks in the immediate aftermath of the campaign.

I suppose if you don't make a distinction between the combat strength of (for example) Hill's division and the total number of men present in his division, it doesn't go anywhere. But some of us would like to be able to compare the number of men who would see battle in one army to the other army with some approximation of precision, which means we need something trying to distinguish between present and fit to march and present and actually going to go into battle (with or without holding a musket).
 
I suppose if you don't make a distinction between the combat strength of (for example) Hill's division and the total number of men present in his division, it doesn't go anywhere. But some of us would like to be able to compare the number of men who would see battle in one army to the other army with some approximation of precision, which means we need something trying to distinguish between present and fit to march and present and actually going to go into battle (with or without holding a musket).

Now we get into ground that is perhaps not best trod, as there were a large number of human beings moving with that army not counted as soldiers on the rolls, and they freed up others to do the actual fighting.
 
I trust, however, we can at least see where your connection of "fit to march" and "present for duty" as one and the same as relates to Confederate armies is from.

Trying to discuss Lee's numbers is hard enough with limited records and interesting complications, but we are going to have a devil of a time comparing that to McClellan's army's count without a consistent standard of what we're measuring when trying to weigh numbers.

One thing I've been thinking about doing is taking the units given in the September 2 date order of battle - you've seen the page - for those we know were at Antietam, and adding up what that totals to. Obviously not all of them are going to be present, and some not there are going to be present, but it's at least a way to compare some of the units involved.
 
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Have a look at Harsh's PhD thesis. The magnum opus of his Maryland Trilogy was an expansion of his Masters thesis. His PhD would have been the first of five volumes on McClellan, and it's sad we'll never see them.

http://scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/14610/7023520.PDF?sequence=1

Wow! Awesome! Thank you!

On a related note, I've uploaded the second edition of my article because I found several more sources, one of them being a debate between Sears and Thorp on the McClellan telegram in which Thorp destroyed--and I mean absolutely destroyed--Sears on the issue. What's especially interesting is to see the reader comments, such as where a reader who was a fan of Sears' acknowledged that Sears simply did not answer Thorp's evidence.

http://www.mtgriffith.com/web_documents/smearingmcclellan.htm
 
Wow! Awesome! Thank you!

On a related note, I've uploaded the second edition of my article because I found several more sources, one of them being a debate between Sears and Thorp on the McClellan telegram in which Thorp destroyed--and I mean absolutely destroyed--Sears on the issue. What's especially interesting is to see the reader comments, such as where a reader who was a fan of Sears' acknowledged that Sears simply did not answer Thorp's evidence.

http://www.mtgriffith.com/web_documents/smearingmcclellan.htm

Also Richard McCoun's Master's thesis is interesting, but not freely available, and I'm not intending to break copyright by putting my copy online. However if you want to spend 38 USD for a PDF: http://dissexpress.umi.com/dxweb/results.html?QryTxt=&By=richard+mccoun&Title=mcclellan&pubnum=
 
Of course, if McClellan had been a Republican who favored immediate emancipation as a war measure, he would he hailed in all history books as one of the Union's top three generals.

One thing I've noticed is that McClellan's critics endlessly assail him for overestimating enemy troop strength. To read these critics' writings, you'd never know that McClellan was by no means the only person--general or otherwise--who did this, and they usually don't tell you that McClellen didn't just come up with his estimates out of thin air but based them on the intelligence reports he was given.

And McClellan's errors about enemy strength paled in comparison to Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck's irrational, wildly erroneous claims about the Confederate threat to D.C. I tend to agree with those scholars who suspect that those claims were not "honest mistakes" but were excuses to sabotage McClellan's operations.
 
Well, would you say McCoun's thesis is worth the money? Is it as good as Harsh's? Better? What is McCoun's main position?

Attached is a screencap of the abstract.
McCown abstract.png
 

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