McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[rbasin]

And the idea that the base on the York was gone was based on his attitude, his perceptions, and his problems with anything that might possibly involve risk.

With due respect to his complaints that the navy was anything but cooperative (not his fault and not within his control), the spirit of McClellan's attitude towards changing his base was very much focused on his fears and with very little concern for what the enemy might fear him doing.

In an 18th century war, it would be one thing, in this war it was calculated to result in him falling short of what was needed to win it.



A politician calculating his actions based on political concerns in a situation where handling political affairs is all important? Shocking.

And especially Lincoln, whose every move was politically calculated

 

[67th Tigers]

McC 's behavior did, in effect, made every general since then very careful in dealing with the President. Can anyone on this board think of a general in WW I who treated Wilson the way McC treated Lincoln? I understand Stilwell reffered to FDR as "that **** cripple" but never made his opposition public.

and where is there public criticism of Lincoln by McClellan?

 

[kevikens]

Per Schulte in lieu of other information (if anyone has it I'd be delighted to see it):

Seven Pines/Fair Oaks:

Naglee (11th ME, 56th NY, 100th NY, 52nd PA, 104th PA): ~2,200 with 1753 in action.
Wessels (96th NY, 85th PA, 101st PA, 103rd PA): 2061 with ~1500 in action.
Palmer (81st NY, 85th NY, 92nd NY, 98th NY): ~2200

That should mean a total of ~6,461 for just the infantry.

No precise numbers for the divisional cavalry (one company) or artillery (four batteries)

Seven Days (using him again, in lieu of assignment on information on regiments elsewhere):
Naglee (11th ME, 56th NY, 100th NY, 52nd PA, 104th PA): 2083
Wessels (81st NY, 85th NY, 92nd NY, 96th NY, 98th NY, 85th PA, 10st PA, 103rd PA): 2853
Plus one battery (1st NY, Battery H -also present at Seven Pines: 95 men)



Where is the rebuffing reported? Trying to compare McClellan's and Porter's reports here.

And please, a link to the page would be preferred to a screen capture, if it's all the same to you.



Which raises the question of to what extent we count the troops at Petersburg as relevant to what McClellan had to fight at Richmond.

Certainly troops could be moved from Petersburg to Richmond relatively quickly by rail (I say relatively because moving large numbers of troops is never a smooth process), but if talking about the number of men at Richmond behind the defenses of whatever quality, Petersburg is not Richmond.



The only context half a mile forward is a significant offense is either trench warfare or tactical. Neither lead to McClellan being in a position to - or at least not choosing to - besiege Richmond (in the sense that he set up his siege artillery to "besiege Yorktown"), so I am dubious of its significance at this point.




McClellan's lack of willingness to fight there might have had something to do with Lincoln's confidence in that position. McClellan had not done anything to bring to life the idea that it was a better place to fight Lee than northern Virginia, which is not a position Lincoln seems to have held much faith in earlier either - perhaps if this area had delivered anything worthwhile, it would be another story.

But at the end of the Seven Days, McClellan is insisting he needs reinforcements to counterattack after being forced to fall back. That hardly recommends sticking around here.

And on the desertion issue, I must ask:



Average absence rate between Antietam and McClellan's removal from command (bolded dates): 37%
Average absence rate during Burnside's time in command (underlined dates): 31%, even counting the January 31 numbers as his responsibility.
Average for Joseph Hooker: 27.6% (or 26.75% if we consider the January 31 numbers to be from Burnside's time).

January 31 is also after the Mud March, which certainly ruined enthusiasm for Burnside in the army, so even if you consider that 2% increase to be related to the EP, it's not the only element and may not be even the primary element.

But the question, regardless of any influence by the EP, is why the Young Napoleon's army sees higher absence rates than Hooker's, if your argument is against the idea that they were confident in Hooker?

Confederate troops could have marched from Petersburg to Richmond in one day, especially in late spring with 14 hours of daylight.

 

[godofredus]

and where is there public criticism of Lincoln by McClellan?

How about when the President was at his house and McClellan went to bed? Aha - I see your point. McClellan made all his nasty comments about the baboon and the original gorilla to his wife. In public he was merely late for meetings or didn't show up at all. I would really have to search Little Mac saying to an aide that the President was an a** On the other hand was March, Pershing, Eisenhower or Marshall ever late for a meeting? The last general I heard about being late was MacArthur with Truman and even Harry cut him some slack....

 

[67th Tigers]

How about when the President was at his house and McClellan went to bed?

It may be an invention of Hays pen, certainly some have suggested as such. Of the others there, Lincoln, Stanton and McClellan, none ever mentioned it. Only years after everyone else was dead did Hay come out with the story, whilst writing their court history of Lincoln for his son and admitting they should be fair to everyone but McClellan.

Assuming it did happen there is certainly no "snub". Lincoln, Stanton and Hay turned up at McClellan's house uninvited and sat themselves down in his drawing room. McClellan was at a wedding, came back late, and probably intoxicated and went to bed without ever knowing they were there. McClellan next met Lincoln (with Fox) the next day and discussed McClellan's plans for amphibious desants against the enemy coast.

Aha - I see your point. McClellan made all his nasty comments about the baboon and the original gorilla to his wife. In public he was merely late for meetings or didn't show up at all.

He certainly did vent his frustration with Lincoln to his wife, and that's what it was, frustration. He is actually quoting Stanton who he'd fallen in with for a while.

We certainly know of at least one occasion where due to circumstances he was detained in the field he sent an aide with a written apology to Lincoln. If frustrated, he remained polite and correct.

I would really have to search Little Mac saying to an aide that the President was an a**

[/quote]

You can find the odd quote, but none like that. However you can also find McClellan writing about the proper position of the military (i.e. him) as subservient to the government and the president. Although McClellan was frustrated with the President he remained the dutiful military officer, and never said a word publicly against the President.

 

[Elennsar]

That's one of at least three messages claiming 100,000 attacking him, the others being to Halleck and Julia Grant.

Grant of course did not advance on the rebels, and didn't really pursue. Halleck ultimately assembled a force of 125,000 (aggregate present) against Beauregard's 74,000 (same measure) and didn't think that was enough to permit an assault.

BTW At Ft Donelson Grant had estimated the rebels at 40,000 strong, and hence had decided to adopt a prolonged regular siege. The rebels had also overestimated Grant (at 40,000) and decided they couldn't hold out against those numbers.

"I propose to move immediately upon your works."

Yet it is not bad by the standards of the time. Remember Meade overestimated Lee at Gettysburg by more than 33% and the numbers would indicate Meade was outnumbered, and Pinkerton is long gone.

And yet Meade pushed forward to engage Lee, with the Pipe Creek Line plan as secondary at best, whereas McClellan was so busy looking at all the problems with engaging Lee that wondering what he could do to make Lee the one having to follow and not lead the dance got left as "when I get more reinforcements".

We see this over and over and over again. McClellan always has some reason that more aggressive behavior is not an option. It is the 18th century kind of "preserving the army is more important than winning victories" from his plans that lead to the Peninsula on to November of 1862.

We see him deploy his troops so as to cover all things that might be attacked in the SEven Days, but not TO concentrate his forces to attack. We see him at Antietam keeping 5th and 6th Corps largely out of the fight and even to the extent they were called on it was trifling compared to any attempts to press or gain an advantage. We see him post-Antietam focusing on his forces needing to be resupplied but without addressing whether or not Lee's army is even worse off.

Whether or not those reasons are made up is not the problem, but that they never stop coming is. There is no campaign that doesn't become bogged down in 'but because of this list of problems I can't keep going until those are fixed."

No general in the war is perfect there, but its understandable, even right, for Lincoln to see if someone else can go further before that comes up.

 

[godofredus]

It may be an invention of Hays pen, certainly some have suggested as such. Of the others there, Lincoln, Stanton and McClellan, none ever mentioned it. Only years after everyone else was dead did Hay come out with the story, whilst writing their court history of Lincoln for his son and admitting they should be fair to everyone but McClellan.

Assuming it did happen there is certainly no "snub". Lincoln, Stanton and Hay turned up at McClellan's house uninvited and sat themselves down in his drawing room. McClellan was at a wedding, came back late, and probably intoxicated and went to bed without ever knowing they were there. McClellan next met Lincoln (with Fox) the next day and discussed McClellan's plans for amphibious desants against the enemy coast.



He certainly did vent his frustration with Lincoln to his wife, and that's what it was, frustration. He is actually quoting Stanton who he'd fallen in with for a while.

We certainly know of at least one occasion where due to circumstances he was detained in the field he sent an aide with a written apology to Lincoln. If frustrated, he remained polite and correct.

You can find the odd quote, but none like that. However you can also find McClellan writing about the proper position of the military (i.e. him) as subservient to the government and the president. Although McClellan was frustrated with the President he remained the dutiful military officer, and never said a word publicly against the President.[/QUOTE]

No point in debating here. McClellan was frustrated with Lincoln, but remained a dutiful officer. It was Lincoln who said nasty things about McClellan; or Hay who invented stories; - I quote some supposed jokes Lincoln said about McC (although all of these could have, using the logic above been invented by the writer)


McClellan's "slows" generated a number of stories that Mr. Lincoln shared with visitors to his office: "McClellan's tardiness reminds me of a man in Illinois whose attorney was not sufficiently aggressive. The client knew a few law phrases, and finally, after waiting until his patience was exhausted by the non-action of his counsel, he sprang to his feet and exclaimed: "Why don't you go at his with a fi.fa., demurrer, a capias, a surrebutter, or a ne exeat, or something, and not stand there like a nudum pactum, or a non est."10 On other occasion, the President told a visitor: "With all his failings as a soldier, McClellan is a pleasant and scholarly gentleman. He is an admirable engineer, but he seems to have a special talent for a stationary engine."11 The President told assistant William O. Stoddard "Well, Stoddard, for organizing an army, for preparing an army for the field or for fighting a defensive campaign, I will back General McClellan against any general of modern times—I don't know but of ancient times also. But I begin to feel as if he would never get ready to fight!'" http://www.mrlincolnswhitehouse.org/inside.asp?ID=137&subjectID=2

The Harrison Landings letter - McC to Lincoln on the conduct of the war - strikes me as a little odd. Can you find an equivalent from Pershing; March. Marshall, Eisenhower ----or anyone else of equal rank to McC?

As for all his soldiers loving him, here is one who didn't: http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/31/what-private-sneden-saw/
The loss of McClellan's maps was just one example of what Sneden deemed the commander's utter failure of leadership. At Malvern Hill, he wrote, "McClellan was not on the ground (as usual) until the battle was over." Instead he was 10 miles down the James River, scouting out a safer position for the troops aboard the gunboat Galena. In Sneden's view, the Army had been saved in spite of McClellan's ignorance and cowardice. In fact, the soldiers fought so many battles without the commander "that he is not missed when the fighting commences!"

 

[67th Tigers]

"I propose to move immediately upon your works."

"Appearances now indicate that we will have a protracted siege here. The ground is very broken and the fallen timber extending far out from the breast works I fear the result of attempting to carry the place by storm with raw troops. I feel great confidance however of ultimately reducing the place. As yet I have had no batteries thrown up hoping with the aid of the Gunboats to obviate the necessity. The present high water has prevented my extending the right to the river."

- Grant to Cullum, 14th February 1862

Had the Confederates not staged a successful breakout, then returned to the fort due to confused orders there is little doubt Grant would have conducted a regular siege, because that's what he said he was going to do. However, when he returned from meeting Foote and found the situation he writes:

"I must order a charge to save appearances."

- Grant to Foote, 15th February 1862

This charge managed to occupy part of the Confederate works unopposed, and in the judgement of the Confederate commanders present renders the fort indefensible. When Buckner send word he wishes to surrender Grant replies:

"Yours of this date proposing Armistice, and appointment of commissioners, to settle terms of capitulation is just received. No terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted.
I propose to move immediately upon your works."

-Grant to Buckner, 16th February 1862

However, this is basically a bluff. Grant is by no means certain about the attack he's ordered by his last usable element, Wallace, will succeed. If one wanted to construct an argument against Grant there is ammunition there. Grant indeed did decide to conduct a regular siege, didn't think the troops could handle an assault, was worried about supplies, missed the bulk of the actual fighting, gave very cursory orders when he did arrive and admitted at the time that the charge he ordered (actually allowed) was only to save face. However, the rebs unexpectantly surrender and Grant gains a reputation.

No doubt had this been McClellan we'd focus on the negative elements, and the charge that gain the rebs rightmost works would be ascribed to Wallace.

In fact Grant response to reaching Ft Donelson and McClellans to reaching the Warwick line are essentially identical. Both decide the enemy is too strong to attack head on, and both try and get the navy to attack. Foote of course tries and fails, whereas Misroon keeps refusing. Had the rebs at Fort Donelson not attacked then precipitously surrendered then Grant was planning on bringing up siege guns and making regular approaches, like McClellan at the Warwick line. I don't think if you swapped Grant and McClellan the results would be substancially different.

And yet Meade pushed forward to engage Lee, with the Pipe Creek Line plan as secondary at best, whereas McClellan was so busy looking at all the problems with engaging Lee that wondering what he could do to make Lee the one having to follow and not lead the dance got left as "when I get more reinforcements".

At Gettysburg, kind of. The fight at Gettysburg was a fait accompli forced on Meade by Buford and Reynolds. Meades pursuit was hesitant, he didn't attack at Falling Waters, he lost the face to the Rapidan and then didn't act for months (citing his reduced numbers), then his one movement he aborted.

In fact Meade didn't conduct a single attack on Lee ever, at least until Grant arrived and started pulling the strings.

We see this over and over and over again. McClellan always has some reason that more aggressive behavior is not an option. It is the 18th century kind of "preserving the army is more important than winning victories" from his plans that lead to the Peninsula on to November of 1862.

Which is an odd statement, because McClellan often did act very aggressively, such as in West Virginia, the mobile parts of the Peninsula campaign and in Maryland. Yes, other times he did not act aggressively, but then the circumstances, at least given the available information, where such that aggressive action is unlikely to succeed.

So we can in fact say sometimes McClellan acted aggressively, and sometimes he didn't. There he has a lot in common with most successful generals.

Oh and "winning victories" is good for ones career, but does not always advance the national war aims.

We see him deploy his troops so as to cover all things that might be attacked in the SEven Days, but not TO concentrate his forces to attack. We see him at Antietam keeping 5th and 6th Corps largely out of the fight and even to the extent they were called on it was trifling compared to any attempts to press or gain an advantage. We see him post-Antietam focusing on his forces needing to be resupplied but without addressing whether or not Lee's army is even worse off.

At Antietam the only forces McClellan does not commit to the battleline are Barnes' brigade, Morell's Division, 5th Corps, and 4 regular battalions of Sykes' division (3rd US, 2/12th US, 1st/6th US (consolidated) and 1/17th US). As a proportion of available forces it's more than Lee committed over 3 days at Gettysburg (or indeed Meade).

After Antietam McClellan indeed made several moves, putting 5th Corps over the Potomac at Boteler's Ford, blocking Lee's re-entry to Maryland at Williamsport and reoccupying the Maryland Heights with 12th and 2nd Corps, and then asking permission to cross the Potomac at Harper's Ferry and sever Lee's supply lines. Halleck of course denied permission and the campaign wound down on 26th September with Lee admitting he couldn't reenter Maryland and McClellan admitting he wasn't allowed to cross the Potomac.

A month later, even though supplies were still not arriving he is across the Potomac and racing for the Rapidan, and is finally relieved after he's separated Lee's two wings and is about to attack Longstreet.

 

[67th Tigers]

You can find the odd quote, but none like that. However you can also find McClellan writing about the proper position of the military (i.e. him) as subservient to the government and the president. Although McClellan was frustrated with the President he remained the dutiful military officer, and never said a word publicly against the President.

No point in debating here. McClellan was frustrated with Lincoln, but remained a dutiful officer. It was Lincoln who said nasty things about McClellan; or Hay who invented stories; - I quote some supposed jokes Lincoln said about McC (although all of these could have, using the logic above been invented by the writer)
[/quote]

Yes, Lincoln could be very crass and insensitive, in fact downright rude and offensive. Yet McClellan took this with grace. And yes, Hay did indeed go out of his way to **** McClellan, and I would not consider his writings reliable.

McClellan's "slows" generated a number of stories that Mr. Lincoln shared with visitors to his office: "McClellan's tardiness reminds me of a man in Illinois whose attorney was not sufficiently aggressive. The client knew a few law phrases, and finally, after waiting until his patience was exhausted by the non-action of his counsel, he sprang to his feet and exclaimed: "Why don't you go at his with a fi.fa., demurrer, a capias, a surrebutter, or a ne exeat, or something, and not stand there like a nudum pactum, or a non est."10 On other occasion, the President told a visitor: "With all his failings as a soldier, McClellan is a pleasant and scholarly gentleman. He is an admirable engineer, but he seems to have a special talent for a stationary engine."11 The President told assistant William O. Stoddard "Well, Stoddard, for organizing an army, for preparing an army for the field or for fighting a defensive campaign, I will back General McClellan against any general of modern times—I don't know but of ancient times also. But I begin to feel as if he would never get ready to fight!'" http://www.mrlincolnswhitehouse.org/inside.asp?ID=137&subjectID=2

Indeed, see how supportive Lincoln is being of his principle military commander?

The Harrison Landings letter - McC to Lincoln on the conduct of the war - strikes me as a little odd. Can you find an equivalent from Pershing; March. Marshall, Eisenhower ----or anyone else of equal rank to McC?

It may strike you as odd but it isn't. Lincoln was besieged by advice from all sides. At least McClellan is consulting Lincoln unlike Fremont or Grant (expulsion of the Jews) who had to have the President overrule them.

As those brighter than me have pointed out, the letter was a wonderful opportunity for Lincoln to talk with McClellan and tell McClellan what government policy was. With a definite policy McClellan would have implemented it, but throughout his entire military command he could never get an answer out of Lincoln, and so muddled through making policy as best he could.

As for all his soldiers loving him, here is one who didn't: http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/31/what-private-sneden-saw/
The loss of McClellan's maps was just one example of what Sneden deemed the commander's utter failure of leadership. At Malvern Hill, he wrote, "McClellan was not on the ground (as usual) until the battle was over." Instead he was 10 miles down the James River, scouting out a safer position for the troops aboard the gunboat Galena. In Sneden's view, the Army had been saved in spite of McClellan's ignorance and cowardice. In fact, the soldiers fought so many battles without the commander "that he is not missed when the fighting commences!"

Of course he's totally wrong about McClellan's position at Malvern Hill, and indeed when I looked at his Malvern Hill map it's clear it was done from memory several years later, as Slocum is commanding "12th Corps" (which doesn't exist yet) and Sedgwick is labelled as "6th Corps". Indeed it's a fanciful map, but largely inaccurate with troop positions (for example Sykes regulars moved northwards to meet Magruder, but Sneden shows Magruder charging both the position he actually charged and Sykes' original position, with Magruder's division thus appearing twice).

McClellan was at his headquarters during much of the battle, after personally checking the dispositions of all the divisions. Which is of course where a commanding general should be.

 

[Lt R. Blackwell 4th Texas]

67th, I don't agree with all of your points, but no one can deny your diligence in defending your points. Thank you for the research, analysis, and original thinking.

 

[OpnCoronet]

While little mac's disloyalty to the Union, may be debatabel, that he was disloyal to the Lincoln Administrations, is certainly less so.

 

[Elennsar]

At Antietam the only forces McClellan does not commit to the battleline are Barnes' brigade, Morell's Division, 5th Corps, and 4 regular battalions of Sykes' division (3rd US, 2/12th US, 1st/6th US (consolidated) and 1/17th US). As a proportion of available forces it's more than Lee committed over 3 days at Gettysburg (or indeed Meade).

I apologize for focusing on this rather than your other points, but I want to address this because I think what you have to say is severely at variance to the description given by everyone else to the point that I don't think its credible.

Unfortunately we don't have a report for Porter, but we do have the following:
http://antietam.aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=55 Sykes
"On the 17th some light batteries and cavalry, under General Pleasonton, were thrown across the Antietam via the turnpike bridge. Their position being one of great exposure, and General Pleasonton desiring some infantry to protect his guns, I sent the battalion of the Second and Tenth U.S. Infantry, under Capt. J. S. Poland, Second Infantry, to his support. Subsequently, the ammunition of Pleasonton's batteries having been exhausted, I was ordered to relieve his guns by my own, and accordingly (against my judgment) sent Randol's and Van Reed's batteries across the Antietam, and with them four additional battalions of regular infantry, under the command of Capt. H. Dryer, Fourth Infantry."

http://antietam.aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=158 Dryer: "We remained on this ground until about 2 o'clock on Wednesday, when General Sykes gave me an order to cross the Antietam with the Fourth and First Battalion of the Fourteenth, and to take command of all the regular infantry of his division on that side of the creek, consisting in all of the Second and Tenth, commanded by Lieutenant Poland; Fourth, and First Battalion Twelfth, Captain Blunt; First Battalion Fourteenth, Captain Brown; and Second Battalion Fourteenth Captain McKibbin"

So at most five battalions/regiments/collections of companies out of twelve in the division, not counting Warren's two regiments, which is not even mentioned in Sykes's report (sadly no report of his own), let alone described as doing anything outside of reserve.

And you say that McClellan has committed everything from that divisiion except four regular units?

Based on what inquiring minds want to know?

Griffin reports his brigade's (and Stockton's) actions as follows:

"
On the 17th the brigade was not in action. About 4 p. m. an order was received from Major-General Porter to move to the support of General Franklin's command. The brigade moved about half a mile to the right, where it was halted, together with the Third Brigade, same division, by General McClellan, with directions to remain there until further orders, and returned to the position occupied in the morning, just before sunset, by direction of the general commanding, and encamped for the night."

I suppose you could technically say that those two brigades weren't just left in reserve to twiddle their thumbs, but "moved half a mile to the right and then halted without any form of action" . . .

I suppose that's better than forgetting they existed and leaving them completely idle, but to describe them as "committed to the battleline" is well beyond what is described in Griffin's report.

McClellan's own report - http://antietam.aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=153 - says the following on 5th Corps:

"
General Porter's corps, consisting of General Sykes' division of Regulars and Volunteers and General Morell's division of Volunteers, occupied a position on the east side of Antietam Creek, upon the main turnpike leading to Sharpsburg, and directly opposite the center of the enemy's line. This corps filled the interval between the right wing and General Burnside's command, and guarded the main approach from the enemy's position to our trains of supply. It was necessary to watch this part of our line with the utmost vigilance, lest the enemy should take advantage of the first exhibition of weakness here to push upon us a vigorous assault for the purpose of piercing our center and turning our rear, as well as to capture or destroy our supply trains. Once having penetrated this line, the enemy's passage to our rear could have met with but feeble resistance, as there were no reserves to re enforce or close up the gap.

Toward the middle of the afternoon, proceeding to the right, I found that Sumner's, Hooker's, and Mansfield's corps had met with serious losses. Several general officers had been carried from the field severely wounded, and the aspect of affairs was anything but promising. At the risk of greatly exposing our center, I ordered two brigades from Porter's corps, the only available troops, to re-enforce the right. Six battalions of Sykes' Regulars had been thrown forward across the Antietam Bridge on the main road to attack and drive back the enemy's sharpshooters, who were annoying Pleasonton's horse batteries in advance of the bridge. Warren's brigade, of Porter's corps, was detached to hold a position on Burnside's right and rear, so that Porter was left at one time with only a portion of Sykes' division and one small brigade of Morell's division (but little over 3,000 men) to hold his important position.
. . .
General Sykes' division had been in position since the 15th, exposed to the enemy's artillery and sharpshooters. General Morell had come up on the 16th, and relieved General Richardson, on the right of General Sykes. Continually under the vigilant watch of the enemy, this corps guarded a vital point.

The position of the batteries under General Pleasonton being one of great exposure, the battalion of the Second and Tenth U.S. Infantry, under Captain Poland, Second Infantry, was sent to his support. Subsequently four battalions of regular infantry, under Captain Dryer, Fourth Infantry, were sent across to assist in driving off the sharpshooters of the enemy.

The battalion of the Second and Tenth Infantry, advancing far beyond the batteries, compelled the cannoneers of a battery of the enemy to abandon their guns. Few in numbers and unsupported they were unable to bring them off. The heavy loss of this small body of men attests their gallantry."


Yes, it might involve some element of risk to use 5th and 6th Corps aggressively to smash Lee in the hopes of rendering his army unable to launch a vigorous assault "for the purpose of piercing our center and turning our rear, as well as to capture or destroy our supply trains.", but set against that is that if things go well it might even pierce Lee's center and turn his rear.


McClellan is not in the 18th century fighting a limited war with a too-expensive-to-readily-replace army or fighting in a situation where his army remaining intact but inflicting heavy casualties is more of a victory than capturing ground and claiming victory on the idea that he left the battlefield after his opponent.

In one of those situations, it would make sense for him to be concerned with Sumner advising caution, even if the enemy might also be heavily battered. There are others, but those are more relevant than talking Byzantine history in the 9th century.

In this situation, it would be far better service to the national cause for Lee's center to be pierced and his rear threatened at a bloody price than for McClellan to opt out of the risks and costs of using 5th and 6th Corps in the hope of doing so.

 

[67th Tigers]

I apologize for focusing on this rather than your other points, but I want to address this because I think what you have to say is severely at variance to the description given by everyone else to the point that I don't think its credible.

Unfortunately we don't have a report for Porter, but we do have the following:
http://antietam.aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=55 Sykes
"On the 17th some light batteries and cavalry, under General Pleasonton, were thrown across the Antietam via the turnpike bridge. Their position being one of great exposure, and General Pleasonton desiring some infantry to protect his guns, I sent the battalion of the Second and Tenth U.S. Infantry, under Capt. J. S. Poland, Second Infantry, to his support. Subsequently, the ammunition of Pleasonton's batteries having been exhausted, I was ordered to relieve his guns by my own, and accordingly (against my judgment) sent Randol's and Van Reed's batteries across the Antietam, and with them four additional battalions of regular infantry, under the command of Capt. H. Dryer, Fourth Infantry."

http://antietam.aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=158 Dryer: "We remained on this ground until about 2 o'clock on Wednesday, when General Sykes gave me an order to cross the Antietam with the Fourth and First Battalion of the Fourteenth, and to take command of all the regular infantry of his division on that side of the creek, consisting in all of the Second and Tenth, commanded by Lieutenant Poland; Fourth, and First Battalion Twelfth, Captain Blunt; First Battalion Fourteenth, Captain Brown; and Second Battalion Fourteenth Captain McKibbin"

So at most five battalions/regiments/collections of companies out of twelve in the division, not counting Warren's two regiments, which is not even mentioned in Sykes's report (sadly no report of his own), let alone described as doing anything outside of reserve.

Warren's brigade was sent to Burnside as a reinforcement.

Sykes' division had the following battalions

Over the creek:
2nd & 10th US (consolidated)
4th US
1/12th US
1/14th US
2/14th US

Behind the creek
1st & 6th US (consolidated)
3rd US
11th US
2/12th US
17th US (consolidated)

And you say that McClellan has committed everything from that divisiion except four regular units?

Based on what inquiring minds want to know?

The reports, maps etc.

Morell's division was ordered to send two brigades to Sumner. Hence they went, but were recalled when Burnside collapsed.

Griffin's report says:

"On the 17th the brigade was not in action. About 4 p. m. an order was received from Major-General Porter to move to the support of General Franklin's command. The brigade moved about half a mile to the right, where it was halted, together with the Third Brigade, same division, by General McClellan, with directions to remain there until further orders, and returned to the position occupied in the morning, just before sunset, by direction of the general commanding, and encamped for the night."

Hence when the supposed gap opens up all that is available is the rest of Sykes' regulars (ca. 1,200 bayonets) and Barnes' brigade (ca. 1,500 bayonets, half of which is the green 118th Pennsylvania who will find out at Shepherdstown their muskets don't work).

I suppose you could technically say that those two brigades weren't just left in reserve to twiddle their thumbs, but "moved half a mile to the right and then halted without any form of action" . . .

but they weren't available when the so called opportunity opens.

I suppose that's better than forgetting they existed and leaving them completely idle, but to describe them as "committed to the battleline" is well beyond what is described in Griffin's report.

Well, that's exactly what they were from the operational level at the moment in question. They were marching towards the upper bridge. When Burnside's crisis erupted McClellan halted their movement.

McClellan's own report - http://antietam.aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=153 - says the following on 5th Corps:

"
General Porter's corps, consisting of General Sykes' division of Regulars and Volunteers and General Morell's division of Volunteers, occupied a position on the east side of Antietam Creek, upon the main turnpike leading to Sharpsburg, and directly opposite the center of the enemy's line. This corps filled the interval between the right wing and General Burnside's command, and guarded the main approach from the enemy's position to our trains of supply. It was necessary to watch this part of our line with the utmost vigilance, lest the enemy should take advantage of the first exhibition of weakness here to push upon us a vigorous assault for the purpose of piercing our center and turning our rear, as well as to capture or destroy our supply trains. Once having penetrated this line, the enemy's passage to our rear could have met with but feeble resistance, as there were no reserves to re enforce or close up the gap.

Toward the middle of the afternoon, proceeding to the right, I found that Sumner's, Hooker's, and Mansfield's corps had met with serious losses. Several general officers had been carried from the field severely wounded, and the aspect of affairs was anything but promising. At the risk of greatly exposing our center, I ordered two brigades from Porter's corps, the only available troops, to re-enforce the right. Six battalions of Sykes' Regulars had been thrown forward across the Antietam Bridge on the main road to attack and drive back the enemy's sharpshooters, who were annoying Pleasonton's horse batteries in advance of the bridge. Warren's brigade, of Porter's corps, was detached to hold a position on Burnside's right and rear, so that Porter was left at one time with only a portion of Sykes' division and one small brigade of Morell's division (but little over 3,000 men) to hold his important position.
. . .
General Sykes' division had been in position since the 15th, exposed to the enemy's artillery and sharpshooters. General Morell had come up on the 16th, and relieved General Richardson, on the right of General Sykes. Continually under the vigilant watch of the enemy, this corps guarded a vital point.

The position of the batteries under General Pleasonton being one of great exposure, the battalion of the Second and Tenth U.S. Infantry, under Captain Poland, Second Infantry, was sent to his support. Subsequently four battalions of regular infantry, under Captain Dryer, Fourth Infantry, were sent across to assist in driving off the sharpshooters of the enemy.

The battalion of the Second and Tenth Infantry, advancing far beyond the batteries, compelled the cannoneers of a battery of the enemy to abandon their guns. Few in numbers and unsupported they were unable to bring them off. The heavy loss of this small body of men attests their gallantry."


Yes, it might involve some element of risk to use 5th and 6th Corps aggressively to smash Lee in the hopes of rendering his army unable to launch a vigorous assault "for the purpose of piercing our center and turning our rear, as well as to capture or destroy our supply trains.", but set against that is that if things go well it might even pierce Lee's center and turn his rear.

6th Corps as well?

6th Corps is occupying the battleline when Sumner's corps should have been. The situation at the supposed gap is thus:

with the arrow indicating the gap (taken from 1720 hrs map). The overall situation as the gap develops is (1630 map):

So, 6th Corps is in battleline at the base of the Dunker Church ridge. Whether they should have charged it is a question, and a valid one. Sumner objected on the grounds that he wasn't strong enough to assault that ridge, which had already claimed 1st Corps, 12th Corps and Sedgwick's division in attempts to seize it. Hence McClellan sends his last available reserve (2 brigades of Morell) that way to reinforce an attack there, and they're about at the bridge when Burnside collapses and Cox orders a general retreat against the objections of his division commanders.

"My right was all secure but Rodman & Scammon were pressed & the extreme left, Sturgis was in danger. I told Rodman's brigade commanders that we could hold the ground & would & agreed with them & Scammon to assist the left by a charge bayonet (our ammunition being exhausted) along the whole line, when we were ordered to fall back near the bridge." (letter from Willcox to his wife, 25th September 1862, emphasis in original. From Willcox, Forgotten Valor, 366).

McClellan answers Burnside's request for reinforcements to stop him being overwhelmed thus: "I have no infantry... Tell General Burnside this is the battle of the war-he must hold his ground till dark at any cost…Tell him if he cannot hold his ground, then the bridge, to the last man! always the bridge! If the bridge is lost, all is lost!"

So, with the disposition of 6th Corps dealt with, and 2 of Morell's brigades away we are indeed dealing with Sykes' regulars and Barnes' brigade to "pierce the centre", about 4,000 men, nearly a quarter of whom are green as grass and have never even test fired their muskets (and as it turns out they don't work). They have to advance over about half a mile of open ground under a crossfire from 27 guns from an elevated position, then deal with about 13 (small) confederate brigades in the general area. It's much less likely to succeed than, say, Pickett's charge.

McClellan is not in the 18th century fighting a limited war with a too-expensive-to-readily-replace army or fighting in a situation where his army remaining intact but inflicting heavy casualties is more of a victory than capturing ground and claiming victory on the idea that he left the battlefield after his opponent.

Actually not. Remember that the recruiting stations were shut down before McClellan even reached Yorktown, and men were not being replaced, whereas at that very moment the Confederacy was instituting a draft. The spring through autumn of 1862 is in fact a comparative low for Federal strength vs Confederate strength. In September of 1862 Lincoln realises his folly and reopens recruiting and uses the expanded militia act to "call out militia" for 9 months, heading off the problem that the Federals have.

McClellan's campaigns are mainly confined to this period where the USG is not prepared to commit the full financial resources of the US to the war, and when the printing presses start rolling late in '62 to finance the war it is Burnside, Hooker etc. who benefit from having more robustness in the state military system.

 

[Elennsar]

Warren's brigade was sent to Burnside as a reinforcement.

Sykes' division had the following battalions

Over the creek:
2nd & 10th US (consolidated)
4th US
1/12th US
1/14th US
2/14th US

Behind the creek
1st & 6th US (consolidated)
3rd US
11th US
2/12th US
17th US (consolidated)

So barely a brigade sent across the Antietam, with Warren being sent to Burnside to . . . be left out of the fighting. Neither Burnside or Cox even mention it being present, which hardly suggests it played much of a role in their decisions and deployments.

That still leaves most of the division uninvolved.

Morell's division was ordered to send two brigades to Sumner. Hence they went, but were recalled when Burnside collapsed.

Griffin's report says:

"On the 17th the brigade was not in action. About 4 p. m. an order was received from Major-General Porter to move to the support of General Franklin's command. The brigade moved about half a mile to the right, where it was halted, together with the Third Brigade, same division, by General McClellan, with directions to remain there until further orders, and returned to the position occupied in the morning, just before sunset, by direction of the general commanding, and encamped for the night."

Hence when the supposed gap opens up all that is available is the rest of Sykes' regulars (ca. 1,200 bayonets) and Barnes' brigade (ca. 1,500 bayonets, half of which is the green 118th Pennsylvania who will find out at Shepherdstown their muskets don't work).

That leaves the period up to 4 PM to examine, even if we accept McClellan's decision of that hour.

http://antietam.aotw.org/maps.php?map_number=8a - 1 PM.

Well, that's exactly what they were from the operational level at the moment in question. They were marching towards the upper bridge. When Burnside's crisis erupted McClellan halted their movement.

They are not firing on the enemy or fired upon by the enemy. Calling a unit in that state "on the battleline" robs the term of any just meaning.

So, 6th Corps is in battleline at the base of the Dunker Church ridge. Whether they should have charged it is a question, and a valid one. Sumner objected on the grounds that he wasn't strong enough to assault that ridge, which had already claimed 1st Corps, 12th Corps and Sedgwick's division in attempts to seize it. Hence McClellan sends his last available reserve (2 brigades of Morell) that way to reinforce an attack there, and they're about at the bridge when Burnside collapses and Cox orders a general retreat against the objections of his division commanders.

"My right was all secure but Rodman & Scammon were pressed & the extreme left, Sturgis was in danger. I told Rodman's brigade commanders that we could hold the ground & would & agreed with them & Scammon to assist the left by a charge bayonet (our ammunition being exhausted) along the whole line, when we were ordered to fall back near the bridge." (letter from Willcox to his wife, 25th September 1862, emphasis in original. From Willcox, Forgotten Valor, 366).

None of Wilcox, Scammon, Fairchild, or Harland in their reports mention any discussion of assisting the left by a bayonet charge - in fact, I have trouble seeing Harland claiming that his brigade was in any position to assist anyone, as opposed to receiving assistance.

6th Corps as well?

6th Corps is occupying the battleline when Sumner's corps should have been. The situation at the supposed gap is thus (snip)

6th Corps as well because neither corps was engaged in heavy fighting, but the post focused on 5th Corps due to McClellan dispersing its strength rather than concentrating it to attack.

So, with the disposition of 6th Corps dealt with, and 2 of Morell's brigades away we are indeed dealing with Sykes' regulars and Barnes' brigade to "pierce the centre", about 4,000 men, nearly a quarter of whom are green as grass and have never even test fired their muskets (and as it turns out they don't work). They have to advance over about half a mile of open ground under a crossfire from 27 guns from an elevated position, then deal with about 13 (small) confederate brigades in the general area. It's much less likely to succeed than, say, Pickett's charge.

"In the general area" is only useful if we count Federal troops in "the general area" too. And for that matter, define "the general area".

Actually not. Remember that the recruiting stations were shut down before McClellan even reached Yorktown, and men were not being replaced, whereas at that very moment the Confederacy was instituting a draft. The spring through autumn of 1862 is in fact a comparative low for Federal strength vs Confederate strength. In September of 1862 Lincoln realises his folly and reopens recruiting and uses the expanded militia act to "call out militia" for 9 months, heading off the problem that the Federals have.

Men not being replaced is a very temporary thing, and does not change that the recruiting stations were reopened by July. Even if we count this as a blunder, and I'm not saying we shouldn't, we should not overestimate how much it actually changed matters as far as army strength goes.

But recruiting has been reopened and calls for new regiments made considerably before September.

http://books.google.com/books?id=B4...Recruiting offices" closed by Stanton&f=false

More to the point, by Antietam, the Confederate forces in the East are not "comparatively high". Any advantage from the draft keeping Confederate ranks relatively full in spring or summer has been exhausted by men not staying in the ranks for one reason or another by autumn.

I would sacrifice a goat to have fuller information (all numbers following are PFD), but at most Lee has something around 50,000 men at Antietam, and McClellan has around 90,000. Even ignoring new troops that are still half trained, that gives him a 3 to 2 advantage by that estimate of Lee's numbers.

Even if we count the ratio of troops engaged via Carman, McClellan had around a 4 to 3 advantage in numbers (55,956 to 37,351) - and that's ignoring troops not engaged, which per Carman is five of six brigades in 6th Corps and all but five battalions of 5th Corps on McClellan's side.

McClellan's campaigns are mainly confined to this period where the USG is not prepared to commit the full financial resources of the US to the war, and when the printing presses start rolling late in '62 to finance the war it is Burnside, Hooker etc. who benefit from having more robustness in the state military system.

The state military system's ability to handle the consequences of serious losses for the AotP was never tested by McClellan, so whether or not his successors benefited from a stronger system is beside the point.

 

[NedBaldwin]

So barely a brigade sent across the Antietam, with Warren being sent to Burnside to . . . be left out of the fighting. Neither Burnside or Cox even mention it being present, which hardly suggests it played much of a role in their decisions and deployments. ....

67th Tigers seems to be trying to make a very specific point, one that I agree with.
There is a claim floating around that McClellan had a large reserve in the center with which he could have attacked and broken Lee's line in the center. But he didnt. He had parceled away forces that had been in reserve to support other parts of the line such that at the point of decision he had little at hand.

 

[Elennsar]

67th Tigers seems to be trying to make a very specific point, one that I agree with.
There is a claim floating around that McClellan had a large reserve in the center with which he could have attacked and broken Lee's line in the center. But he didnt. He had parceled away forces that had been in reserve to support other parts of the line such that at the point of decision he had little at hand.

While I agree that by late afternoon McClellan does not have any concentrated reserve in the center, we don't see Morrel's division dispersed until 4 PM, and there's no reason elsewhere on the battlefield Sykes's division cannot be concentrated and thrust forward (McClellan does not say when Warren's brigade was sent to Burnside, only that it has happened by midafternoon.

And the cavalry is certainly present - 4,320 men (counting the horse artillery batteries) could surely lend themselves to support any attack by Morrell and Sykes were McClellan to make such an attack.

Only 6th Corps has been sent away by afternoon, and even that could be recalled or ordered forward as desired.

 

[67th Tigers]

On the cavalry, a while ago I went through all the regimental histories of the present cavalry regiments I could to find out what their dispositions were as most histories are quite vague. What I got was this, including estimates of strength assuming all coys are equal:

Pleasonton's Cavalry Division in the centre was only part of his cavalry force. The average strength of a company was ca. 28 men so:

"Cavalry Division" (Pleasonton) near the middle bridge:

5th US Cavalry (possibly all 12 coys) -336

Farnsworth's Brigade
8th Illinois Cavalry (possibly all 12 coys) -336
1st Massachusetts Cavalry (only 8 coys) – 224
3rd Indiana Cavalry (all 6 coys) – 168

Rush's Brigade
4th Pennsylvania Cavalry (all 10 coys?) – 280
6th Pennsylvania Cavalry (only 7 coys) – 196

On the right flank was another major cavalry formation which was attached to Hooker's Corps to spearhead the right flank:

Davis's Brigade
3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry (12 coys)* – 336
8th New York Cavalry (12 coys) – 336
Det., 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry – less than 200 (started the campaign with 200)

6th New York was the left flank guard attached to 9th Corps.

6th New York Cavalry (8 coys) – 224

Not present on the field during the Battle of Antietam (16th-18th Sept):

McReynold's Brigade (+) consisting of the below listed were detached on a recce towards Gettysburg on the 13th and arrived at Antietam on the 18th:
8th Pennsylvania Cavalry
1st New York Cavalry
12th Pennsylvania Cavalry

6th US Cavalry – in the Pleasant Valley with Couch, remained to screen his movement

Maine Cavalry (no number until 2nd ME Cav formed) – at Frederick guarding PoWs.

This of course ignores a number of escort sqns etc.

* Skirmishers of the 3rd PA Cav fired the first shots of the battle as they moved ahead of Hooker's Corps on the afternoon of the 16th.

Thus there were approximately 1,500 cavalrymen in that area.

 

[rbasin]

Not to belabor the point, but when one looks at the casualties of the two sides, McClellan was winning the Seven Days' Campaign. Had he realized how much damage he had inflicted on the Confederates up to and including Malvern Hill and launched a counterattack he, not Lincoln might be on the five dollar bill.

If McClellan had just stood still and let Lee attack him over and over, he might have been alright. Lincoln's attempt at playing general was a huge failure.

 

[Elennsar]

Thus there were approximately 1,500 cavalrymen in that area.

Where is your source for the 6th Regulars being detached to cover Couch? Looking for a mention of it in official reports and it seems ignored.

If McClellan had just stood still and let Lee attack him over and over, he might have been alright. Lincoln's attempt at playing general was a huge failure.

Except that Lee would have no reason to attack him over and over if McClellan is just sitting there, so McClellan would wind up just sitting there waiting for Lee to attack.

What would you say Lincoln should have done here, in the knowledge that McClellan's plans for offensive operation have been at best disrupted and at worst screwed up?



Also, in the same spirit as the more exhaustive analysis of the ANV, here are September 20 numbers for the Army of the Potomac: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar&cc=moawar&idno=waro0028&q1=Cavalry division&view=image&seq=338&size=150

Counting 1st Corps, 2nd Corps, 5th Corps (minus six thousand for Humphrey's division based on his report of "at least six thousand present" on the 18th, and as it could not be expected earlier it is left out when trying to guesstimate strength on the 17th), 6th Corps, 9th Corps, 12th Corps and the cavalry (minus 1640 on the assumption of the five detached regiments being sixty companies of the same average as 67th Tigers calculated).

72, 036. Casualties suffered at Antietam were 12,469 per McClellan's official report, which would mean 84,505 men present for duty (which does not count men detached for special duty, or sick, or under arrest) assuming no regiments other than Humphrey's came up between the 17th and the 20th.

McClellan's official report estimates the following:

First Corps 14,856
Second Corps 18,813
Fifth Corps (one division not arrived) 12,930
Sixth Corps 12,300
Ninth Corps 13,819
Twelfth Corps 10,126
Cavalry Division 4,320
Total in action 87,164

But if we subtract 1640 for the detached regiments of the cavalry, we are left with 85, 524 - a figure close enough to the above calculation based on the morning report as to mean that either both are wrong, or that the information is approximately accurate (allowing for individual brigades possibly being over or under depending on which we rely on).

It is not clear if McClellan's report of "total in action" for 1st Corps includes (for example) the 16th Maine (730 officers and men) anymore than it is clear if the cavalry division's reported numbers are including detached regiments, but assuming not would move McClellan's numbers closer to 80,000.

That is still a larger disparity of numbers than that enjoyed by Meade at Gettysburg, if less so than Hooker had at Chancellorsville (owing in part to nine of Lee's infantry brigades being detached at that time), and I haven't checked for Fredericksburg yet.

 

[damYankee]

If there was ever a man who was an authority on frustration in would be McClellan.