McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[67th Tigers]

Where is your source for the 6th Regulars being detached to cover Couch? Looking for a mention of it in official reports and it seems ignored.

http://www.archive.org/stream/fromyorktowntosa00cartrich#page/58/mode/2up/search/antietam

They rejoined at Sharpsburg 21st September.

Except that Lee would have no reason to attack him over and over if McClellan is just sitting there, so McClellan would wind up just sitting there waiting for Lee to attack.

I'm slightly confused, because McClellan did indeed resume offensive operations, Shephardstown etc.. His planned assault of the morning of the 18th was suspended awaiting the arrival of Couch and Humphreys, but was ordered for the morning of the 19th instead. Had Lee not retreated then he would have been attacked again.

Also, in the same spirit as the more exhaustive analysis of the ANV, here are September 20 numbers for the Army of the Potomac: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar&cc=moawar&idno=waro0028&q1=Cavalry division&view=image&seq=338&size=150

Counting 1st Corps, 2nd Corps, 5th Corps (minus six thousand for Humphrey's division based on his report of "at least six thousand present" on the 18th, and as it could not be expected earlier it is left out when trying to guesstimate strength on the 17th), 6th Corps, 9th Corps, 12th Corps and the cavalry (minus 1640 on the assumption of the five detached regiments being sixty companies of the same average as 67th Tigers calculated).

72, 036. Casualties suffered at Antietam were 12,469 per McClellan's official report, which would mean 84,505 men present for duty (which does not count men detached for special duty, or sick, or under arrest) assuming no regiments other than Humphrey's came up between the 17th and the 20th.

McClellan's official report estimates the following:

First Corps 14,856
Second Corps 18,813
Fifth Corps (one division not arrived) 12,930
Sixth Corps 12,300
Ninth Corps 13,819
Twelfth Corps 10,126
Cavalry Division 4,320
Total in action 87,164

But if we subtract 1640 for the detached regiments of the cavalry, we are left with 85, 524 - a figure close enough to the above calculation based on the morning report as to mean that either both are wrong, or that the information is approximately accurate (allowing for individual brigades possibly being over or under depending on which we rely on).

It is not clear if McClellan's report of "total in action" for 1st Corps includes (for example) the 16th Maine (730 officers and men) anymore than it is clear if the cavalry division's reported numbers are including detached regiments, but assuming not would move McClellan's numbers closer to 80,000.

That is still a larger disparity of numbers than that enjoyed by Meade at Gettysburg, if less so than Hooker had at Chancellorsville (owing in part to nine of Lee's infantry brigades being detached at that time), and I haven't checked for Fredericksburg yet.

This was gone over in a previous post:

http://civilwartalk.com/threads/re-evaluating-george-mcclellan.100689/page-7#post-894644

Via Carman the total effective force for McClellan on the field (deducting absent cavalry at 1,400) would be 67,428. That's probably an overestimate as a considerable number of the new regiments men dropped out but the commanders didn't report it, and Morell's strength is definitely PFD. In round figures McClellan probably had about 48,000 effectives on the field at dawn of the 17th, with another 12,000 coming in during the morning and forenoon.

Lee had probably 40-50,000. Going by Carman (a low estimate) Lee had 35,000 on the field with about 3,000 reinforcements (AP Hill).

At Gettysburg 93,500 Union effectives held off about 70,000 Confederates. (link).

 

[Elennsar]

http://www.archive.org/stream/fromyorktowntosa00cartrich#page/58/mode/2up/search/antietam

They rejoined at Sharpsburg 21st September.

Thank you.

I'm slightly confused, because McClellan did indeed resume offensive operations, Shephardstown etc.. His planned assault of the morning of the 18th was suspended awaiting the arrival of Couch and Humphreys, but was ordered for the morning of the 19th instead. Had Lee not retreated then he would have been attacked again.

I think your confusion is due to me being insufficiently clear on the circumstances I referred to - Lee has no reason to attack McClellan at Malvern Hill "over and over again" if McClellan is just sitting there, as his position is only a threat to Richmond if he (McClellan) advances. As such, if McClellan doesn't do anything his army is going to be irrelevant to Lee.

This was gone over in a previous post:

http://civilwartalk.com/threads/re-evaluating-george-mcclellan.100689/page-7#post-894644

Via Carman the total effective force for McClellan on the field (deducting absent cavalry at 1,400) would be 67,428. That's probably an overestimate as a considerable number of the new regiments men dropped out but the commanders didn't report it, and Morell's strength is definitely PFD. In round figures McClellan probably had about 48,000 effectives on the field at dawn of the 17th, with another 12,000 coming in during the morning and forenoon.

Lee had probably 40-50,000. Going by Carman (a low estimate) Lee had 35,000 on the field with about 3,000 reinforcements (AP Hill).

The only possible way to get Lee to have 50,000 men at Antietam is PFD. If we're counting effectives, its not credible, even if we use the September 2 ~75,000 men PFD figure via Allen.

At Gettysburg 93,500 Union effectives held off about 70,000 Confederates. (link).

Per the morning reports:

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar&cc=moawar&idno=waro0043&node=waro0043:3&view=image&seq=171&size=150

June 30 figures would give us 101, 676 officers and men PFD - ignoring the army Provost Guard, the engineer brigade, and other stuff (but corps level headquarters escorts and provost guards beneath army level may still be counted in here).

I'd have to check the June 30 figures for the reinforcements, but given results of the study made below for Lee's post-May 31 additions, I don't trust the link you posted to give an accurate count.

Lee:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar&cc=moawar&idno=waro0040&q1=May 31&view=image&seq=847&size=150
29,171 officers and men PFD (infantry) in 1st Corps (including staff)
30,277 officers and men PFD (infantry) in 2nd Corps (including staff)
10,292 officers and men PFD in the cavalry
4702 officers and men PFD in the artillery not counting Garnett's or Alexander's battalions
74,442 officers and men PFD not counting army staff.

If we grant Alexander and Garnett the same number of men per gun as the battalions who did report, we get (per http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...ro0040&q1=Garnett&view=image&seq=840&size=100 on the number of guns for their battalions used in this calculation): 968 officers and men present for duty.

Lee's gains after May 31: 2,577 officers and men (per http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=May 31;rgn=full text;idno=waro0026;didno=waro0026;view=image;seq=1102) in Davis's brigade, 3685 officers and men (including the 44th North Carolina) in Pettigrew's, the 1st Maryland Infantry Battalion (400 officers and men at Gettysburg, I have yet to find any numbers for May 31 or June), and Jenkins's and Imboden's cavalry brigades.

(EDIT: Realized I posted the wrong link for Davis's and Pettigrew's brigades)

In lieu of reliable information on the numbers of the last three or Corse's brigade I'm reluctant to rely on the following figures, but using their figures for the cavalry we would get

2577+3685+3600=9862 (not including the 1st MD) gained, 3350 lost = 6,512 gained.

That means as of May 31 Lee's Gettysburg force (including the brigades of Imboden, Jones, and Robertson) would be over eight-two thousand men.

To be fair, we should also discount Imboden's brigade as not present - it was with the army but no more on the field than the detachments that are deducted, and Robertson and Jones were not present either, which means a subtraction of 1,135 officers and men (per http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar&cc=moawar&idno=waro0040&q1=May 31&view=image&seq=825&size=150 ) for Robertson and perhaps 1,800 odd (the 6th, 7th, and 11th Virginia have 1,477 total per Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg, but the 12th Virginia seems to have been a small regiment by what I've seen for Brandy Station) for Jones. The 1st MD was 400 strong at Gettysburg, so perhaps roughly 2,000 gained from May 31 counting only units present.

So a total of 77,410 officers and men before losses of those units between May 31 and July 1.

I have no idea what their basis for determining that the month's losses of various sorts should equal 10% of this figure is.

Long, long drawn out argument short: Lee's strength at Gettysburg has been just as regularly and badly underestimated as his strength at any battle McClellan fought, and the figures presented on the Thomas Legion site are an example of this in action.


The following is presented merely for the sake of comparison.

Per
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=field return;rgn=full text;idno=waro0031;didno=waro0031;view=image;seq=1073

Lee's PFD at Fredericksburg should be around 78,513 men.

Per http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=present for duty;rgn=full text;idno=waro0031;didno=waro0031;view=image;seq=1137

Burnside's PFD (in the three Grand Divisions) would be 118, 952.

PFDE (here or elsewhere) cannot be compared without some basis of determining such data on Lee's part, however.

 

[67th Tigers]

I think your confusion is due to me being insufficiently clear on the circumstances I referred to - Lee has no reason to attack McClellan at Malvern Hill "over and over again" if McClellan is just sitting there, as his position is only a threat to Richmond if he (McClellan) advances. As such, if McClellan doesn't do anything his army is going to be irrelevant to Lee.

I apologise for my error.

Malvern Hill is interesting because Lee never ordered the attack that went in.

Infantry formations in the 19th century were formed by "directing units". In every brigade one battalion was designated as the "directing battalion", and all the other battalions conformed to it. It meant that when the brigadier wanted something to happen he issued the order to the commander of that battalion, and the rest simply held their relative position.

The same is true with larger formations. In a division, and even corps one of the brigades was the nominated directing formation and all other units conformed. At Malvern Hill the directing brigade for Magruder was Armistead, and Magruder was the directing division for DH Hill etc. Hence when Lee wanted an attack all he needed to do was order Armistead in, and everyone would follow.

However, Lee had other plans. His intent at Malvern Hill was to sweep around to the east of MH with Stuart's cavalry and Longstreet and AP Hills divisions and isolate McClellan's forces on the hill. Once McClellan was cut off they'd attack along the whole line and pin him on the hill where he was effectively isolated.

However, Berdan's sharpshooters were seriously annoying Armistead by shooting down his gunners, and he decided to advance a strong skirmish line from his brigade to drive them off. Then all hell broke loose - on seeing "the directing brigade" advance Magruder's whole division launched in the attack, and seeing that DH Hill launched, then Jackson's wing. It snowballed from a small event.

Lee was rather shocked by this development. As the first attacks launched he was conferring with Longstreet and AP Hill who were marching their divisions out. He suspended the movement and rode over to see what was happening, but was unable to stop attacks which had already launched.

The next day Longstreet's wing did sweep round, but McClellan had pulled back out of the trap.

Hence I like to point out Lee did not order the attack on Malvern Hill, and so can't be damned for it, although he might be damned for having a system that allowed it to happen.

There is a book about how Glendale was almost a smashing victory leading to the destruction of McClellan's army. I don't agree but Malvern Hill could have been. McClellan had been forced by circumstance to stand on a hill by a river without any geographic features to restrict Lee's movements and could have been isolated and destroyed. Hence I find no fault about moving off Malvern Hill. Quitting the position at Glendale was a mistake, but it was Franklin's, who quit the line of the White Oak without orders and without telling anyone, leading to the desperate stand on Malvern Hill.

Excuse me on the other stuff, I think it's best to discuss what I have time too now, and will go incommunicado in a few days for a short while.

 

[Elennsar]

No worries - take your time. I'm partially posting it in hopes someone else can tell something from these figures - there seems to be a serious shortage of consistent and coherent information when these things are discussed, even if its possible to uncover.

I think the main problem with Malvern Hill as a position to attack is - well, what it ran into OTL.

Had the AotP been as shaken up as Lee hoped, even what happened OTL would be a hard thing for it to face. But cut off or not, it wasn't vulnerable enough to crumble so easily. And what a more coordinated and directed attack might have done would require one launched, which I think the Seven Days to this point have shown is nightmarishly hard with the system Lee had ("wings" or no).

 

[Mike Griffith]

The Washington Post published some interesting pro-McClellan articles by Gene Thorp in 2012:

In Defense of McClellan at Antietam
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifes...a0e5cc-f131-11e1-892d-bc92fee603a7_story.html
Thorp proves that McClellan did not dawdle after confirming the authenticity of Lee's orders and that his conduct of the battle was sound and effective.

In Defense of McClellan: A Contrarian View
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifes...arian-view/2012/02/27/gIQAeSLqmR_story_2.html
Thorp defends McClellan's handling of his assault on Richmond.

Defending McClellan: In Depth
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/artsandliving/civilwar/mcclellan-graphic/?tab=1
A more in-depth defense of McClellan's response after confirming that Lee's orders were genuine.

Also, Google Books has James Campbell's book McClellan: A Vindication of the Military Career of General George B. McClellan available in its entirety:

http://books.google.com/books?id=sz...ce=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false

One reason that McClellan was unpopular with so many Republicans and is unpopular with most traditional Civil War scholars is that he opposed total war and argued for the kind of honorable warfare that he was taught at West Point. Here's one example of his view on proper warfare--this is from his July 7, 1862, letter to Lincoln:

This rebellion has assumed the character of a War: as such it should be regarded; and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian Civilization. It should not be a War looking to the subjugation of the people of any state, in any event. It should not be, at all, a War upon population; but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of states or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. In prosecuting the War, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected; subject only to the necessities of military operations. All private property taken for military use should be paid for or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited; and offensive demeanor by the military towards citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths not required by enactments Constitutionally made should be neither demanded nor received. Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political rights.​

 

[Elennsar]

The author refers to eyewitness accounts - which even if perfectly accurate (I believe one of our more statistically savvy posters made a comment about the weakness of headcounting as a system) would only show the total number of men in the ranks marching by, not the number available in battle, as a meaningful evidence of numbers.

I lost any faith in the author knowing what he's talking about at that point.

But because I'm a detail nut, I'd like to note three further things:

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=September 22;rgn=full text;idno=waro0028;didno=waro0028;view=image;seq=0623

The author fails to discount the artillery that is listed (those of Lee's and Walton's battalions, and those assigned to the infantry divisions), and instead gives us the total present for duty of the September 22 figure as if all of that was infantry. A relatively minor error? Perhaps. But when asserting that Lee had "at least" so many infantry, it would be nice if the author could be bothered to tell the difference between the total PFD of all forces with a report and the PFD for just the infantry.

And while technically it may be true that Lee hadn't received any new regiments by October 10 (I am tempted to look up when certain regiments like the 61st Virginia joined given what has been noticed as an error), counting Thomas's brigade and the 2nd Virginia would make five regiments not present at Antietam that are present by October 10. Some other units would also have to be counted, if not of significant size. But to ignore that entirely as if every regiment and battery whose numbers are in the October 10 count is at Antietam shows that the author hasn't bothered to check the details.

Finally: How does the author compare the organization of October 10 - where Pickett is listed as commanding a division - to the organization present at Antietam (where D.R. Jones commanded a six brigade division that would be split up in the army's post-Maryland reorganization? Sure, all the brigades are still there, but given the errors noted, I don't trust the author being able to tell how many men are "Antietam causalities returned" with any accuracy.

And any attempt to give a better count than the ~40,000 figure had d--- better go over every detail with a fine tooth comb.

 

[rbasin]

The Washington Post published some interesting pro-McClellan articles by Gene Thorp in 2012:

In Defense of McClellan at Antietam
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifes...a0e5cc-f131-11e1-892d-bc92fee603a7_story.html
Thorp proves that McClellan did not dawdle after confirming the authenticity of Lee's orders and that his conduct of the battle was sound and effective.

In Defense of McClellan: A Contrarian View
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifes...arian-view/2012/02/27/gIQAeSLqmR_story_2.html
Thorp defends McClellan's handling of his assault on Richmond.

Defending McClellan: In Depth
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/artsandliving/civilwar/mcclellan-graphic/?tab=1
A more in-depth defense of McClellan's response after confirming that Lee's orders were genuine.

Also, Google Books has James Campbell's book McClellan: A Vindication of the Military Career of General George B. McClellan available in its entirety:

http://books.google.com/books?id=sz...ce=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false

One reason that McClellan was unpopular with so many Republicans and is unpopular with most traditional Civil War scholars is that he opposed total war and argued for the kind of honorable warfare that he was taught at West Point. Here's one example of his view on proper warfare--this is from his July 7, 1862, letter to Lincoln:

This rebellion has assumed the character of a War: as such it should be regarded; and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian Civilization. It should not be a War looking to the subjugation of the people of any state, in any event. It should not be, at all, a War upon population; but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of states or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. In prosecuting the War, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected; subject only to the necessities of military operations. All private property taken for military use should be paid for or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited; and offensive demeanor by the military towards citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths not required by enactments Constitutionally made should be neither demanded nor received. Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political rights.​

That's an interesting letter. I have read the whole thing before. My thought is that Mac didn't understand that the war he wanted has never been fought. Its not possible.

 

[rpkennedy]

The Washington Post published some interesting pro-McClellan articles by Gene Thorp in 2012:

In Defense of McClellan at Antietam
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifes...a0e5cc-f131-11e1-892d-bc92fee603a7_story.html
Thorp proves that McClellan did not dawdle after confirming the authenticity of Lee's orders and that his conduct of the battle was sound and effective.

In Defense of McClellan: A Contrarian View
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifes...arian-view/2012/02/27/gIQAeSLqmR_story_2.html
Thorp defends McClellan's handling of his assault on Richmond.

Defending McClellan: In Depth
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/artsandliving/civilwar/mcclellan-graphic/?tab=1
A more in-depth defense of McClellan's response after confirming that Lee's orders were genuine.

Also, Google Books has James Campbell's book McClellan: A Vindication of the Military Career of General George B. McClellan available in its entirety:

http://books.google.com/books?id=sz...ce=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false

One reason that McClellan was unpopular with so many Republicans and is unpopular with most traditional Civil War scholars is that he opposed total war and argued for the kind of honorable warfare that he was taught at West Point. Here's one example of his view on proper warfare--this is from his July 7, 1862, letter to Lincoln:

This rebellion has assumed the character of a War: as such it should be regarded; and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian Civilization. It should not be a War looking to the subjugation of the people of any state, in any event. It should not be, at all, a War upon population; but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of states or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. In prosecuting the War, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected; subject only to the necessities of military operations. All private property taken for military use should be paid for or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited; and offensive demeanor by the military towards citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths not required by enactments Constitutionally made should be neither demanded nor received. Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political rights.​

All that letter shows is that McClellan had no grounding in reality. He wanted war to be idealistic and no war has ever been that.

R

 

[67th Tigers]

All that letter shows is that McClellan had no grounding in reality. He wanted war to be idealistic and no war has ever been that.

R

Hardly, it is in fact fully in accord with established government policy as it existed, and in line with at least what Sherman believed. See Rowland: http://www.amazon.com/dp/B00F2I8J0I/?tag=civilwartalkc-20

In fact it's an odd tale. For almost a year before this McClellan had been asking Lincoln what his policy was on making war, and had never gotten an answer, so McClellan had had to make policy in the absence of any leadership from the President. Best left to Rowland though.

 

[67th Tigers]

The Washington Post published some interesting pro-McClellan articles by Gene Thorp in 2012:

In Defense of McClellan at Antietam
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifes...a0e5cc-f131-11e1-892d-bc92fee603a7_story.html
Thorp proves that McClellan did not dawdle after confirming the authenticity of Lee's orders and that his conduct of the battle was sound and effective.

In Defense of McClellan: A Contrarian View
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifes...arian-view/2012/02/27/gIQAeSLqmR_story_2.html
Thorp defends McClellan's handling of his assault on Richmond.

Defending McClellan: In Depth
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/artsandliving/civilwar/mcclellan-graphic/?tab=1
A more in-depth defense of McClellan's response after confirming that Lee's orders were genuine.

Also, Google Books has James Campbell's book McClellan: A Vindication of the Military Career of General George B. McClellan available in its entirety:

http://books.google.com/books?id=sz...ce=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false

One reason that McClellan was unpopular with so many Republicans and is unpopular with most traditional Civil War scholars is that he opposed total war and argued for the kind of honorable warfare that he was taught at West Point. Here's one example of his view on proper warfare--this is from his July 7, 1862, letter to Lincoln:

You may like to watch the arguments between Sears, and Thorpe and d'Aoust, which is essentially Thorpe and d'Aoust continually *****slapping Sears for his ignorance of the primary record. It caused a bit of a stir.

See
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/artsandliving/civilwar/civil-war-email-exchange/

and

http://cwbn.blogspot.be/2014/03/guest-post-maurice-daoust-on-famous.html and following posts

 

[cash]

In my opinion, the most realistic view of Little Mac is provided by Ethan Rafuse in his book, McClellan's War. He corrects the misapprehensions of The Young Napoleon put out by Sears, but without the lack of balance of Thorp.

 

[67th Tigers]

In my opinion, the most realistic view of Little Mac is provided by Ethan Rafuse in his book, McClellan's War. He corrects the misapprehensions of The Young Napoleon put out by Sears, but without the lack of balance of Thorp.

It's a pretty good book, but there are areas he simply refused to touch, which is a shame.

He was on CWTR and is worth a listen if you have an hour: http://impedimentsofwar.org/singleshow.php?show=323

 

[cash]

It's a pretty good book, but there are areas he simply refused to touch, which is a shame.

He was on CWTR and is worth a listen if you have an hour: http://impedimentsofwar.org/singleshow.php?show=323

I'll listen to this a bit later, thanks. Ethan is a careful scholar, and if there are areas he didn't touch, I would assume it's because he didn't have definitive evidence, or perhaps the areas were outside the scope of his book.

 

[rbasin]

Hardly, it is in fact fully in accord with established government policy as it existed, and in line with at least what Sherman believed. See Rowland: http://www.amazon.com/dp/B00F2I8J0I/?tag=civilwartalkc-20

In fact it's an odd tale. For almost a year before this McClellan had been asking Lincoln what his policy was on making war, and had never gotten an answer, so McClellan had had to make policy in the absence of any leadership from the President. Best left to Rowland though.

In all fairness, thought, it wasn't McClellan's job to make policy.

 

[ErnieMac]

Thanks to Mike Griffith and 67th Tigers for the links. They made interesting reading. My opinion of McClellan's performance during the Maryland Campaign has changed as I've diversified my reading on the subject and gotten away from the standard campaign studies. I have a substantially higher opinion of him than I did a year ago.

 

[Jantzen]

Fascinating thread. Has anyone here read McClellan's Other Story by William Styple? Styple explores the relationship between McClellan and Thomas Key, and while I think he overstates his conclusions, he points to a lot of oddities about McClellan's handling of the Peninsular campaign and Antietam that really call into question what he was doing. I look forward to reading more of the scholarship on Little Mac referenced here. Thanks for the great discussion!

 

[Mike Griffith]

Some may want to rely on Stephen Sears' attempt to refute the new evidence regarding when McClellan received Lee's lost orders and when he sent his telegram to Lincoln. Part of the new evidence is the discovery--or publication--of Lincoln's copy of McClellan's telegram, which shows the telegram was sent at 12 midnight, not 12 noon. Sears' reply came in response to Maurice D'Aoust's October 2012 article "Little Mac Did Not Dawdle" in the Civil War Times, in which D'Aoust presented evidence that the telegram was sent at midnight and that McClellan took quick action after receiving it and after confirming its authenticity. A few months ago, D'Aoust took apart Sears' arguments point by point in a long article published on the Civil War Bookshelf website:

http://cwbn.blogspot.com/2014/03/guest-post-maurice-daoust-responds-to.html

Here's an excerpt from D'Aoust's article:

Ultimately, three very strong pieces of evidence were uncovered that, in combination, went far in disproving the notion McClellan was (1) aware of the Lost Order just before noon that day or (2) that he could possibly have sent that telegram to Lincoln at "12M". First there were the two primary source accounts, one being furnished by Dr. Tom Clemens, confirming that Barton Mitchell, the Lost Order's discoverer, did not even reach Frederick with his regiment until noon on the 13th. When considering all of the steps that would have had to take place after Mitchell broke ranks (making his way to the recently abandoned Rebel encampment, finding Lee's Lost Order, the time it would have then taken for the document to make its way through the various headquarters etc., etc.), it becomes clear that it would have been impossible for the Lost Order to have reached McClellan anywhere near noon. It simply does not make any logical sense. The second piece of evidence negating the 12M or noon version of the telegram was contained within the message itself when McClellan states, "we have possession of Catoctin. By "Catoctin," the General was referring to the mountain pass over the Catoctin range, west of Frederick. According to all accounts, that defile was not taken until 2 p.m. on the 13th, a full two hours past "12m" [noon]. At this point, it becomes quite clear that the time-stamp on the Official Records version is wrong.​

The above evidence was presented in my "McClellan Did Not Dawdle" article (Civil War Times, October, 2012 issue.) Mr. Sears forwarded a rebuttal to Civil War Times and this together with my own response, were published in the December issue. Never, either in his Civil War Times response nor in this latest rebuttal, has Mr. Sears ever addressed or even acknowledged that evidence. This only leads me to conclude that he simply has no answer. In truth, there is no answer other than to concede that the Lost Order could not have reached McClellan before noon and neither could that message to Lincoln have been written at "12M [noon]". . . .

Of course, all of this alters the timeline of events on September 13th. According to Sears, the clock had, by virtue of a supposed "12M" message, started ticking at noon. In light of the 12 Midnight document and the strong evidence supporting it, that starting time must now be shifted to 3 p.m., when McClellan makes his first written reference to the Lost Order in his communication to Alfred Pleasonton. On that note, if a supposed 12M reference was good enough for Sears and others to prove that the Lost Order was in McClellan's hands shortly before noon, why should an alternate 3 p.m. reference not be sufficient in proving it must have reached him shortly before 3 p.m.? When viewed in that context it can no longer be argued that McClellan sat on the information for over six hours before acting on it. Quite to the contrary, it is now clear that he acted with due diligence by promptly sending his cavalry forward to confirm its contents. . . .

By documentation, I'm assuming Mr. Sears is referring to the War Department copy on which that "Official Records" stamp has been affixed, the same stamp as was placed on the War Department copy of that September 11th message to Halleck, which we now know for certain to be incorrect. Or is he referring to the various carbon copies on which the error is repeated over and over again? Are these also the "documents" that supposedly trump all alternate theories? I don't mean to be flippant but the idea that some officious stamp would automatically render a document more valid than another truly is "theatre of the absurd." As for "evidentiary standards," Mr. Sears seems bent on ignoring the conclusive evidence surrounding the 27th Indiana's arrival time and that surrounding the Catoctin aspect. Will he also ignore Thorp's and Clemens's corroborating, albeit circumstantial, evidence surrounding the September 11th message to Halleck? With all due respect to Mr. Sears, it is he who is warping the facts to fit with the clearly flawed "12M" telegram. . . .

Since the discovery of Lincoln's 12 Midnight version of the telegram and the overwhelming evidence supporting it, historians such as Tim Reese, Tom Clemens and Scott Hartwig have, via their respective publications, been chipping away at the long standing myth wherein McClellan wasted six hours after coming into possession of Lee's Lost Order. It's hoped that Clemens's and Thorp's amazing piece of historical research will encourage even more historians to join in and that eventually, the 12M myth will be completely dispelled. ("Maurice D'Aoust responds to Stephen Sears on McClellan's telegram," 3/28/2014, http://cwbn.blogspot.com/2014/03/guest-post-maurice-daoust-responds-to.html)
​

Again, this is just an excerpt. D'Aoust's article is quite long, but it's a good read and definitely worthwhile.

One interesting fact that has come to light is that Sears came across the Lincoln copy of McClellan's telegram some 30 years ago and decided not to mention it on the grounds that it was an "anomaly."

The D'Aoust-Sears exchange is another good example of what happens when outside scholars challenge pro-Lincoln orthodoxy with facts and logic. Sears clearly has no good answer for the new evidence that McClellan's telegram was sent at midnight, but he's unwilling to adjust to the facts.

 

[rpkennedy]

Some may want to rely on Stephen Sears' attempt to refute the new evidence regarding when McClellan received Lee's lost orders and when he sent his telegram to Lincoln. Part of the new evidence is the discovery--or publication--of Lincoln's copy of McClellan's telegram, which shows the telegram was sent at 12 midnight, not 12 noon. Sears' reply came in response to Maurice D'Aoust's October 2012 article "Little Mac Did Not Dawdle" in the Civil War Times, in which D'Aoust presented evidence that the telegram was sent at midnight and that McClellan took quick action after receiving it and after confirming its authenticity. A few months ago, D'Aoust took apart Sears' arguments point by point in a long article published on the Civil War Bookshelf website:

http://cwbn.blogspot.com/2014/03/guest-post-maurice-daoust-responds-to.html

Here's an excerpt from D'Aoust's article:

Ultimately, three very strong pieces of evidence were uncovered that, in combination, went far in disproving the notion McClellan was (1) aware of the Lost Order just before noon that day or (2) that he could possibly have sent that telegram to Lincoln at "12M". First there were the two primary source accounts, one being furnished by Dr. Tom Clemens, confirming that Barton Mitchell, the Lost Order's discoverer, did not even reach Frederick with his regiment until noon on the 13th. When considering all of the steps that would have had to take place after Mitchell broke ranks (making his way to the recently abandoned Rebel encampment, finding Lee's Lost Order, the time it would have then taken for the document to make its way through the various headquarters etc., etc.), it becomes clear that it would have been impossible for the Lost Order to have reached McClellan anywhere near noon. It simply does not make any logical sense. The second piece of evidence negating the 12M or noon version of the telegram was contained within the message itself when McClellan states, "we have possession of Catoctin. By "Catoctin," the General was referring to the mountain pass over the Catoctin range, west of Frederick. According to all accounts, that defile was not taken until 2 p.m. on the 13th, a full two hours past "12m" [noon]. At this point, it becomes quite clear that the time-stamp on the Official Records version is wrong.​

The above evidence was presented in my "McClellan Did Not Dawdle" article (Civil War Times, October, 2012 issue.) Mr. Sears forwarded a rebuttal to Civil War Times and this together with my own response, were published in the December issue. Never, either in his Civil War Times response nor in this latest rebuttal, has Mr. Sears ever addressed or even acknowledged that evidence. This only leads me to conclude that he simply has no answer. In truth, there is no answer other than to concede that the Lost Order could not have reached McClellan before noon and neither could that message to Lincoln have been written at "12M [noon]". . . .

Of course, all of this alters the timeline of events on September 13th. According to Sears, the clock had, by virtue of a supposed "12M" message, started ticking at noon. In light of the 12 Midnight document and the strong evidence supporting it, that starting time must now be shifted to 3 p.m., when McClellan makes his first written reference to the Lost Order in his communication to Alfred Pleasonton. On that note, if a supposed 12M reference was good enough for Sears and others to prove that the Lost Order was in McClellan's hands shortly before noon, why should an alternate 3 p.m. reference not be sufficient in proving it must have reached him shortly before 3 p.m.? When viewed in that context it can no longer be argued that McClellan sat on the information for over six hours before acting on it. Quite to the contrary, it is now clear that he acted with due diligence by promptly sending his cavalry forward to confirm its contents. . . .

By documentation, I'm assuming Mr. Sears is referring to the War Department copy on which that "Official Records" stamp has been affixed, the same stamp as was placed on the War Department copy of that September 11th message to Halleck, which we now know for certain to be incorrect. Or is he referring to the various carbon copies on which the error is repeated over and over again? Are these also the "documents" that supposedly trump all alternate theories? I don't mean to be flippant but the idea that some officious stamp would automatically render a document more valid than another truly is "theatre of the absurd." As for "evidentiary standards," Mr. Sears seems bent on ignoring the conclusive evidence surrounding the 27th Indiana's arrival time and that surrounding the Catoctin aspect. Will he also ignore Thorp's and Clemens's corroborating, albeit circumstantial, evidence surrounding the September 11th message to Halleck? With all due respect to Mr. Sears, it is he who is warping the facts to fit with the clearly flawed "12M" telegram. . . .

Since the discovery of Lincoln's 12 Midnight version of the telegram and the overwhelming evidence supporting it, historians such as Tim Reese, Tom Clemens and Scott Hartwig have, via their respective publications, been chipping away at the long standing myth wherein McClellan wasted six hours after coming into possession of Lee's Lost Order. It's hoped that Clemens's and Thorp's amazing piece of historical research will encourage even more historians to join in and that eventually, the 12M myth will be completely dispelled. ("Maurice D'Aoust responds to Stephen Sears on McClellan's telegram," 3/28/2014, http://cwbn.blogspot.com/2014/03/guest-post-maurice-daoust-responds-to.html)
​

Again, this is just an excerpt. D'Aoust's article is quite long, but it's a good read and definitely worthwhile.

One interesting fact that has come to light is that Sears came across the Lincoln copy of McClellan's telegram some 30 years ago and decided not to mention it on the grounds that it was an "anomaly."

The D'Aoust-Sears exchange is another good example of what happens when outside scholars challenge pro-Lincoln orthodoxy with facts and logic. Sears clearly has no good answer for the new evidence that McClellan's telegram was sent at midnight, but he's unwilling to adjust to the facts.

How is "pro-Lincoln orthodoxy" relevant in a discussion about McClellan and his movement toward Antietam?

R

 

[Mike Griffith]

Here's a follow-up exchange between D'Aoust and Sears:

http://cwbn.blogspot.com/2014/04/guest-post-mcclellan-letter-response.html

Interesting stuff.

 

[OpnCoronet]

That's an interesting letter. I have read the whole thing before. My thought is that Mac didn't understand that the war he wanted has never been fought. Its not possible.

And in any case, even if such were possible, the flaw for little mac, was that he had to gain credibility for his 'thoughts' on that subject, and the best way to do that was to reinforce them with success in the field. If not, then his lack of success can be percieved as the result of the failure of his ideas in how to fight the war to a successful conclusion.