McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[Elennsar]

Yes, that one. The PFD I had was closer, but darned if I can find it.

What I did find is Keyes calling attention to the massive drop in strength in Casey's Division on the 22nd May: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=casey;rgn=full text;idno=waro0014;didno=waro0014;view=image;seq=188;page=root;size=100

and Casey put forward a defence: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=casey;rgn=full text;idno=waro0014;didno=waro0014;view=image;seq=199;page=root;size=100

Judging by his Fair Oaks's report, Casey still finds his raw division to be ill used and ill prepared.

Absolutely. Which is why "aggregate present"is usually the best statistic to judge relative army strengths.

Army strengths when talking how many mouths have to be fed (among other such concerns) perhaps, but of almost no use in understanding how many men are available for duty (or special duty), let alone how many were fighting or supporting the fighting men directly (as in, stretch bearers or file closers).

His estimates of regiments are here, and I've long intended to analyse them: https://archive.org/stream/spyofrebellionbe00inpink#page/588/mode/2up

Well, via Tenney, we can see how it looks.

It's the only one I've seen with brigade positions.

Which is probably important here, so it will do.

Wilcox's brigade from Johnston, and Colston's brigade from Huger arrived before McClellan reached Yorktown, and Featherston's and Pryor's brigades were formed there from spare regiments sent and there already, giving Magruder 8 brigades manning the line, rather than the 4 he claims.

Four brigades, eight brigades . . . how many men? Three brigades of fifteen hundred men are just as many soldiers as two of 2,250.

The "effective strength" of the forces present on the 6th April taken from the 30th April estimate were:

1st Division (Yorktown)
Rains: 1,830
Featherston: 2,224 (the wikipedia article says this was from Johnston, but the OR shows Featherston was assigned to a new brigade created on the Peninsula initially under Col GB Anderson)
(Gloucester Point garrison: 1,119)
Yorktown garrison: 1,151

2nd Division (Lee's Mill)
McLaws: 2,084
Cobb: 3,796
10th Ga (unbrigaded): 582

3rd Division (Wynn's Mill)
Wilcox: 2,616
Colston: 1,750
Pryor: 2,301
Ward's demi-brigade: 890

= 19,224, excluding Gloucester Point. Newton suggests increasing the numbers by 10% to account for sickness = 21,146, and this excludes a small cavalry force (no numbers available).

On the day McClellan reach Yorktown the first two brigades of Johnston's army were boarding steamers in Richmond to travel to King's Mill Wharf at Williamsburg. Thus Rodes (3,040 + 10% = 3,344) and Early (2,380 + 10% = 2,618) arrive during the 7th or so bringing the defenders upto 27,108. Another 7 brigades reach Yorktown over the next week, and 5 more remain at Williamsburg (there is literally no space in the line to put them).

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=McClellan;rgn=full text;idno=waro0014;didno=waro0014;view=image;seq=79;page=root;size=100

And yet McClellan refers to Johnston arriving with "heavy reinforcements" in this message on the 7th. To go from ~21,146 inclusive of sick to 27,108 is not a heavy reinforcement.

It may be reasonable to conclude that with the force he has available that ~27,000 men behind good fortifications is too many to storm - McClellan reports at most 85,000 PFD with everyone up at that point. But the determination how strong Magrduer's lines are is at best a mistake and the sort of thing suggesting McClellan was even more cautious than might be explained by the actual numbers.

Yes, it's from "the reports of prisoners", not merely a whim in his head, but its up to him how seriously to take that, so actions and plans based on it remain his responsibility.

The artillery was back in the old position. That's essentially ALL the available infantry after other tasks are covered, and I'm impressed a local 2:1 advantage in that sector was possible.

But that is not the planning or deployment of one intent on concentrating for an offensive strike, which is the problem. As stated previously, it is always possible to find excuses for failure, but McClellan is paid the big bucks to find solutions.

My reading is he intended to hold his position and move his supply base to the James, using the Chickahominy as a curtain of maneouver. He doesn't make the decision to cross the White Oak with the whole army until the evening of the 28th, after a council of war with his corps commanders (sans Keyes) nixes the idea of making an attack against Richmond.

Is the council of war in charge of the army, or is General McClellan? Certainly there is no harm in consulting one's subordinates, and taking their views into due consideration - but it does not speak well of McClellan as an army commander to determine what to do solely on that basis.

And before you get into talking about cutting slack for others but not McClellan with their councils of war:
Unlike Meade on July 14 a year later, McClellan has been an army commander for several months. This is not a situation where he's needing to get used to a new role or where he's still establishing his authority to men who have been his peers rather than his subordinates.

This really is not the way to win the war.

 

[67th Tigers]

I may not reply for a day or two as I've printed out Pinkerton's regimental estimates and I'm going through marking off the mistakes. Having done Va inf regts I find he's added six regiments:

36th Va - SW Va
45th Va - SW Va
51st Va - was at Fort Donelson in Feb, partially escaped and reassigned to SW Va
59th Va - had been captured at Roanoke island, exchanged at was in June '62 the 26th Virginia Battalion, assigned to Wise's command (26th Va Bn is not on Pinkerton's list)
61st Va - a shell of this regiment was forming at Petersburg
65th Va - no 65th Va was ever formed

It's immediately clear that when commanders changed Pinkerton had a hard time working this out. Hence when Elzey's brigade was reassigned to Early it's composite regiments are reported in two separate brigades, essentially creating a brigade out of nothing.

 

[67th Tigers]

I may not reply for a day or two as I've printed out Pinkerton's regimental estimates and I'm going through marking off the mistakes. Having done Va inf regts I find he's added six regiments:

36th Va - SW Va
45th Va - SW Va
51st Va - was at Fort Donelson in Feb, partially escaped and reassigned to SW Va
59th Va - had been captured at Roanoke island, exchanged at was in June '62 the 26th Virginia Battalion, assigned to Wise's command (26th Va Bn is not on Pinkerton's list)
61st Va - a shell of this regiment was forming at Petersburg
65th Va - no 65th Va was ever formed

It's immediately clear that when commanders changed Pinkerton had a hard time working this out. Hence when Elzey's brigade was reassigned to Early it's composite regiments are reported in two separate brigades, essentially creating a brigade out of nothing.

So, the full infantry regiments Pinkerton places at Richmond that aren't are:

Va - 36th, 43rd, 45th, 51st, 59th, 61st, 65th
Ga - 25th, 33rd, 37th, 40th, 41st, 43rd, 46th, 47th, 51st, 52nd, 55th, 56th, 58th, 59th
NC - 29th, 32nd, 39th
Tn - 26th
La - 3rd, 4th, 13th
Ala - 18th, 19th, 21st
SC - 11th, 19th
Ark - 1st, 2nd
Tx - 2nd

= 36 full infantry regiments over. He also adds the 2nd NC Cavalry, but the miscellaneous units is a bit of a mess.

Given Pinkerton was filling unknowns at 700 per regiment, this alone adds 25,900 to the roster.

 

[Elennsar]

So, the full infantry regiments Pinkerton places at Richmond that aren't are:

Va - 36th, 43rd, 45th, 51st, 59th, 61st, 65th
Ga - 25th, 33rd, 37th, 40th, 41st, 43rd, 46th, 47th, 51st, 52nd, 55th, 56th, 58th, 59th
NC - 29th, 32nd, 39th
Tn - 26th
La - 3rd, 4th, 13th
Ala - 18th, 19th, 21st
SC - 11th, 19th
Ark - 1st, 2nd
Tx - 2nd

= 36 full infantry regiments over. He also adds the 2nd NC Cavalry, but the miscellaneous units is a bit of a mess.

Given Pinkerton was filling unknowns at 700 per regiment, this alone adds 25,900 to the roster.

That's a pretty substantial overcount even before looking at the units that were there. Thirty six regiments would make a couple of divisions and greatly alter the picture of things.

 

[67th Tigers]

That's a pretty substantial overcount even before looking at the units that were there. Thirty six regiments would make a couple of divisions and greatly alter the picture of things.

Aye, and another thing I note is that as brigade and division commanders changed Pinkerton didn't detect these as changes, but created new formations.

The biggest effect is the creation of a whole new division, because he has AP Hill and GW Smith listed, whereas AP Hill's Division was a reorganisation of Smith's. There are several brigades created in a similar manner, for example Elzey and Early both have brigades under Ewell, whereas they're the same brigade.

I'm currently shifting stuff around to create the "Pinkerton orbat" with notes as to what is wrong.

 

[Elennsar]

Aye, and another thing I note is that as brigade and division commanders changed Pinkerton didn't detect these as changes, but created new formations.

The biggest effect is the creation of a whole new division, because he has AP Hill and GW Smith listed, whereas AP Hill's Division was a reorganisation of Smith's. There are several brigades created in a similar manner, for example Elzey and Early both have brigades under Ewell, whereas they're the same brigade.

I'm currently shifting stuff around to create the "Pinkerton orbat" with notes as to what is wrong.

That is sounding like McClellan had a truly ridiculously distorted vision (metaphorically) of what was going on even before he as the brain (metaphorically) had to piece all those images together into a picture. I wonder if he ever questioned that.

I don't mean that to make it all his responsibility, but did it ever struck him that that's an awful lot of Confederates here and might those numbers be erring unrealistically high?

Even allowing for believing (as I believe he did) that everything would be concentrated on Richmond - I have a sneaky suspicion of him mentioning that in at least one message to the government, but I can't recall exactly where or when - considering whether or not the Confederates could do this after finding out by personal experience the amount of effort it takes to assemble an army of 105,000 PFDE ought to have been weighed with skepticism.

But first we need to see what information he got to determine how nonsensical it looks. Everyone made mistakes on enemy numbers, and different generals did differently from there, but we need to know the size of the mistake before wondering how much McClellan should have wondered what Pinkerton was on and how to make sure he didn't inhale any second hand.

 

[67th Tigers]

That is sounding like McClellan had a truly ridiculously distorted vision (metaphorically) of what was going on even before he as the brain (metaphorically) had to piece all those images together into a picture. I wonder if he ever questioned that.

I don't mean that to make it all his responsibility, but did it ever struck him that that's an awful lot of Confederates here and might those numbers be erring unrealistically high?

He's hardly alone in overestimating. Grant was estimating at least 200,000 Confederates in the west in April '62 and reported repulsing 100,000 at Shiloh.

Have a look at the Grant papers, which are online: http://digital.library.msstate.edu/cdm/landingpage/collection/USG_volume and find the correspondence around Shiloh. In fact download them all, they're fascinating reading.

Even allowing for believing (as I believe he did) that everything would be concentrated on Richmond - I have a sneaky suspicion of him mentioning that in at least one message to the government, but I can't recall exactly where or when - considering whether or not the Confederates could do this after finding out by personal experience the amount of effort it takes to assemble an army of 105,000 PFDE ought to have been weighed with skepticism.

OTOH He assumed the rebel government would be more sensible than his own, which to a point it was.

But first we need to see what information he got to determine how nonsensical it looks. Everyone made mistakes on enemy numbers, and different generals did differently from there, but we need to know the size of the mistake before wondering how much McClellan should have wondered what Pinkerton was on and how to make sure he didn't inhale any second hand.

Certainly there is skepticism in his message about a possible 200,000, because it's based on a (false) report Beauregard had come east. Of course the man himself was in Richmond, but Federal int hadn't detected that he'd been fired. The Federals had also lost track of Bragg's forces which were last seen boarding trains heading east, in fact towards Chattanooga, but it opened the possibility at least.

The inflation otherwise is in the force already at Richmond, and 36 extra regiments would account for it....

 

[Nytram01]

Extremely strong maybe, but also extremely undermanned until after McClellan has decided to rely on his siege guns rather than taking advantage of Magruder's thin lines. I don't have an exact date on when Johnston started arriving, but his forces are not up until after McClellan has begun to call up his heavy artillery.

So it was certainly not a pitched battle. "The preliminary to siege operations"?

I'm not using "siege" as a slur here. Sometimes, the big guns are an effective military solution.

Steven Newton's Joseph E. Johnston and the Defence of Richmond says that between March 22nd and April 17th there were no clean orders reaching Johnston at the Rappahannock line from the Richmond Authories.

On March 25th Davis asked Lee to contact Johnston and find out whether he could transfer 20-30,000 troops to support Magruder. Lee did so but emphasised this was Davis's idea and at the same time wrote to Magruder downplaying this potential transfer and saying he was not prepared to make such a large transfer until the enemies intentions were totally clear. When Johnston wrote to confirm that he would be able to move immediately with 25,000 troops should he be summoned to Richmond Lee wrote to him on March 27th telling him not to but instead to sent 10,000 troops to Richmond, which Johnston did though he didn't see the point.

Lee then wrote Johnston two letters. The first saying he hadn't recieved Johnston's confirmation of his ability to transfer 25,000 men immediately and passing responsibility onto him for how many troops he transfer without clarifying whether Northern or Eastern Virginia was considered more important by the Government while at the same time telling him the order to transfer 10,000 men to Richmond had come from Davis because the president wanted a central reserve. In the second he emphasised his own opinion that the loss of the Shenandoah Valley would be the greatest disaster to befall the confederacy despite Johnston having been told less than a month earlier by Davis that the loss of Norfolk would be that greatest disaster. Understandably, Johnston decided against sending any more troops without specific orders to do so.

Between March 29th and April 2nd no further correspondence on the military situation was sent to or from Johnston's HQ or Richmond. On April 3rd Johnston at last recieved orders to move those 10,000 troops to Richmond but there had been enemy activity in front of Fredericksburg so he cabled back to the capital information about that and requests for definitive orders. While waiting for those orders he prepared 10,000 troops to move. Johnston recieved definitive orders to move those troops and sent confirmation that they were on their way on April 5th.

Reinforcements were arriving with Margruder by at least April 8th - the same day Johnston recieved orders to report to Richmond with all the troops from Northern Virginia save for a token force to screen the movement - though what portion of that was from Johnston's army I'm not sure. Johnston himself arrived in Richmond on April 11th or 12th and set out for Yorktown the next day to assess the situation personally. By April 14th he was back in Richmond and that night took part in a high-command conferance. Johnston boarded a steamer for Yorktown on April 17th and arrived on April 18th.

It seems likely then that his army arrived at Yorktown sometime around April 18. That said, I dont know when McClellan started to bring up his seige guns.

 

[67th Tigers]

Steven Newton's Joseph E. Johnston and the Defence of Richmond says that between March 22nd and April 17th there were no clean orders reaching Johnston at the Rappahannock line from the Richmond Authories.

On March 25th Davis asked Lee to contact Johnston and find out whether he could transfer 20-30,000 troops to support Magruder. Lee did so but emphasised this was Davis's idea and at the same time wrote to Magruder downplaying this potential transfer and saying he was not prepared to make such a large transfer until the enemies intentions were totally clear. When Johnston wrote to confirm that he would be able to move immediately with 25,000 troops should he be summoned to Richmond Lee wrote to him on March 27th telling him not to but instead to sent 10,000 troops to Richmond, which Johnston did though he didn't see the point.

Of course the OR shows that an order to Johnston to immediately dispatch two brigades to Richmond was issued on the 22nd March, and actioned by Johnston the next day:

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...o=waro0014;didno=waro0014;view=image;seq=0394

One of these, Wilcox's, was immediate dispatched to the Peninsula. There are communications in the OR dated 7th April to Brig. Gen. Wilcox commanding "3rd division" at Wynn's Mill, including the arrival of Rodes' brigade on the 7th, which was temporarily halted near Lee's Mill due to Keyes:

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...o=waro0014;didno=waro0014;view=image;seq=0428

and http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...aro0014;view=image;seq=429;page=root;size=100

Early's brigade left with Rodes, but I when checking one of the regimental histories they disembarked late and didn't march to the Warwick line from Williamsburg until dawn of the 8th.

Arrival dates seem to be:

Brigades present on the morning of the 8th:
Mclaws
Cobb (to which are attached 3 spare regiments making a "double brigade")
Early
Rodes
Ward (demi-brigade)
Colston
Wilcox
Pryor
Rains
Featherston

Griffith's Brigade arrived the night of the 9th/10th (from 13th Mississippi book: http://www.amazon.com/dp/1494764113/?tag=civilwartalkc-20 )

Kershaw's Brigade was in a division with Griffith, and moved with it, and the brigades of Toombs and Jones (Semmes) also arrived 10th-11th (Sears, Gates of Richmond).

GW Smith's division embarked on ships at Richmond on the 15th at the latest (Hood's brigade arrived 15th). Apparently they didn't go into camp near Williamsburg immediately, but marched to the Warwick line, then marched back when relieved by Longstreet.

Longstreet's division (3 bdes) embarked on ships at Richmond on the 16th, and are in line by the 17th or 18th.

It seems likely then that his army arrived at Yorktown sometime around April 18. That said, I dont know when McClellan started to bring up his seige guns.

McClellan gave the order to embark them on the 5th, but he didn't order them up into position until the 16th.

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...waro0014;view=image;seq=73;page=root;size=100

The guns were delayed in coming up, and the ground was only broken the batteries on the 18th: https://archive.org/stream/reportengineera00barrgoog#page/n124/mode/2up

 

[Kenneth Almquist]

I also think he went out of his way to slow reinforcements going to Pope leading up to Second Manassas, and took a measure of satisfaction from Pope's defeat.

I don't know if he went out of his way or not, but

"Oh, wait, Sumner can't move his artillery. Guess we'll have to wait for more logistical support to come up, can't send the infantry now and the artillery later, nope. Gotta send it all together." style effort feels like he wasn't trying very hard. Even if the logistical problems were real, his response was not to do the most he could with what he had.

"Better something now than everything but too late." was not McClellan's style at all.

Compare the performance of McClellen to Longstreet: McClellen received his orders on August 3, whereas Longstreet wasn't ordered to march until August 13. Never the less, Longstreet's troops got to where they were needed, whereas most of McClellen's troops did not. I lack the understanding of military operations that many people here have, but it seems to me that having a ten day head start gave McClellen a huge advantage over Longstreet. Whether McClellen was shell-shocked from his battles with Lee, or simply lacked motivation, that advantage proved insufficient. Longstreet outperformed him.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Compare the performance of McClellen to Longstreet: McClellen received his orders on August 3, whereas Longstreet wasn't ordered to march until August 13. Never the less, Longstreet's troops got to where they were needed, whereas most of McClellen's troops did not. I lack the understanding of military operations that many people here have, but it seems to me that having a ten day head start gave McClellen a huge advantage over Longstreet. Whether McClellen was shell-shocked from his battles with Lee, or simply lacked motivation, that advantage proved insufficient. Longstreet outperformed him.

Differences in transportation logistics matter. One of the problems with Harrison Landing, where McClellan ended up huddling, was that the landing wasnt big enough for large troop transports. So in order to leave, the army had to march back down the Peninsula.

 

[NedBaldwin]

... In the second he emphasised his own opinion that the loss of the Shenandoah Valley would be the greatest disaster to befall the confederacy despite Johnston having been told less than a month earlier by Davis that the loss of Norfolk would be that greatest disaster. ...

I am interested in the order. Can you give me a reference?

 

[Nytram01]

I am interested in the order. Can you give me a reference?

I may have paraphrazed what is found in Steven Newton's book but as for referances, I can only give you what Newton refers to. Somewhat confusingly to me the page notes merely say OR, 11 (part 3): 408, and Ibid., 409 for the specific part quoted. I'll give you the relevant passage from Newton's book anyway.

Lee's second letter only deepened Johnston's confusion. In it, Lee suggested that the greatest disaster that could happen would be the loss of the upper Shenandoan Valley, which he believed would follow if Johnston were forced off his present line. The decision as to whether to detach 10,000 or march with 25,000 was still to be Johnston's, but Lee had added an entirely new constraint: protecting the rail line between Richmond and Staunton. "As a mode of expressing to you the limit which it is intended to affic I will cite the remark of the President, that the loss of the Central road and communication with the valley at Staunton would be more injurious than the withdrawal from the Peninsula and the evacuation of Norfolk."

Joseph E. Johnston and the Defence of Richmond - Steven H. Newton, Page 81​

 

[Elennsar]

He's hardly alone in overestimating. Grant was estimating at least 200,000 Confederates in the west in April '62 and reported repulsing 100,000 at Shiloh.

Have a look at the Grant papers, which are online: http://digital.library.msstate.edu/cdm/landingpage/collection/USG_volume and find the correspondence around Shiloh. In fact download them all, they're fascinating reading.

http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=011/0095 This? Different site, I know, just making sure that's the message before digging through volume 5.

However, it must be noted in connection to this the lack of any mention of a desire to retreat or other messages implying that he's overwhelmed and can't do anything against the Rebel Hordes.

OTOH He assumed the rebel government would be more sensible than his own, which to a point it was.

In what regard?

Certainly there is skepticism in his message about a possible 200,000, because it's based on a (false) report Beauregard had come east. Of course the man himself was in Richmond, but Federal int hadn't detected that he'd been fired. The Federals had also lost track of Bragg's forces which were last seen boarding trains heading east, in fact towards Chattanooga, but it opened the possibility at least.

The inflation otherwise is in the force already at Richmond, and 36 extra regiments would account for it....

http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=012/0051

36 extra regiments and grossly overcounting those already there (considering 700 men the average size of a regiment at this point).

http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?page=269&dir=012

Pinkerton's intelligence gathering incompetence astounds me. And that McClellan presents it as he does doesn't leave me feeling that better about his assessment of the situation.

 

[Elennsar]

I may have paraphrazed what is found in Steven Newton's book but as for referances, I can only give you what Newton refers to. Somewhat confusingly to me the page notes merely say OR, 11 (part 3): 408, and Ibid., 409 for the specific part quoted. I'll give you the relevant passage from Newton's book anyway.

Lee's second letter only deepened Johnston's confusion. In it, Lee suggested that the greatest disaster that could happen would be the loss of the upper Shenandoan Valley, which he believed would follow if Johnston were forced off his present line. The decision as to whether to detach 10,000 or march with 25,000 was still to be Johnston's, but Lee had added an entirely new constraint: protecting the rail line between Richmond and Staunton. "As a mode of expressing to you the limit which it is intended to affic I will cite the remark of the President, that the loss of the Central road and communication with the valley at Staunton would be more injurious than the withdrawal from the Peninsula and the evacuation of Norfolk."

Joseph E. Johnston and the Defence of Richmond - Steven H. Newton, Page 81​

http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?page=408&dir=014 Does this look like it? I haven't read Newton's book yet, so I'm just digging up OR references.

 

[NedBaldwin]

I may have paraphrazed what is found in Steven Newton's book but as for referances, I can only give you what Newton refers to. Somewhat confusingly to me the page notes merely say OR, 11 (part 3): 408, and Ibid., 409 for the specific part quoted. I'll give you the relevant passage from Newton's book anyway.

Lee's second letter only deepened Johnston's confusion. In it, Lee suggested that the greatest disaster that could happen would be the loss of the upper Shenandoan Valley, which he believed would follow if Johnston were forced off his present line. The decision as to whether to detach 10,000 or march with 25,000 was still to be Johnston's, but Lee had added an entirely new constraint: protecting the rail line between Richmond and Staunton. "As a mode of expressing to you the limit which it is intended to affic I will cite the remark of the President, that the loss of the Central road and communication with the valley at Staunton would be more injurious than the withdrawal from the Peninsula and the evacuation of Norfolk."

Joseph E. Johnston and the Defence of Richmond - Steven H. Newton, Page 81​

Thanks.

 

[Nytram01]

http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?page=408&dir=014 Does this look like it? I haven't read Newton's book yet, so I'm just digging up OR references.

That does match up to the quotes Newton provides for both letters.

 

[67th Tigers]

http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=011/0095 This? Different site, I know, just making sure that's the message before digging through volume 5.

However, it must be noted in connection to this the lack of any mention of a desire to retreat or other messages implying that he's overwhelmed and can't do anything against the Rebel Hordes.

That's one of at least three messages claiming 100,000 attacking him, the others being to Halleck and Julia Grant.

Grant of course did not advance on the rebels, and didn't really pursue. Halleck ultimately assembled a force of 125,000 (aggregate present) against Beauregard's 74,000 (same measure) and didn't think that was enough to permit an assault.

BTW At Ft Donelson Grant had estimated the rebels at 40,000 strong, and hence had decided to adopt a prolonged regular siege. The rebels had also overestimated Grant (at 40,000) and decided they couldn't hold out against those numbers.

http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=012/0051

36 extra regiments and grossly overcounting those already there (considering 700 men the average size of a regiment at this point).

http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?page=269&dir=012

Pinkerton's intelligence gathering incompetence astounds me. And that McClellan presents it as he does doesn't leave me feeling that better about his assessment of the situation.

Yet it is not bad by the standards of the time. Remember Meade overestimated Lee at Gettysburg by more than 33% and the numbers would indicate Meade was outnumbered, and Pinkerton is long gone.

 

[godofredus]

To put it metaphorically, McClellan was paid the big bucks to be a swordsman, and his skills as a swordsmith need to be compared to the generals who were both able to make armies and use them.

Yes, he was an excellent organizer (except in regards to cavalry), and his troops loved him - but he never truly tested what his army could do the way Meade and Grant would.

And judging by the performance of the Army of the Tennessee, among other Federal forces, I am not sure that McClellan's skill as a swordsmith was best at producing a sharp blade.

The merits of the Peninsula campaign strategically need to be set against the slowness of his moves and his reluctance to heed Lincoln's wishes on the deployment of troops around Washington.

Excellent summary IMHO

 

[godofredus]

From the Wiki article on McC:

"While McClellan's reputation has suffered over time, especially over the last 75 years, there is a small but intense cadre of American Civil War historians who believe that the general has been poorly served on at least four levels. First, McClellan proponents say that because the general was a conservative Democrat with great personal charisma, radical Republicans fearing his political potential deliberately undermined his field operations.[95] Second, that as the radical Republicans were the true winners coming out of the American Civil War, they were able to write its history, placing their principal political rival of the time, McClellan, in the worst possible light.[96] Third, that historians eager to jump on the bandwagon of Lincoln as America's greatest political icon worked to outdo one another in shifting blame for early military failures from Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton to McClellan.[97] And fourth, that Lincoln and Stanton deliberately undermined McClellan because of his conciliatory stance towards the South, which might have resulted in a less destructive end to the war had Richmond fallen as a result of the Peninsula Campaign.[98] Proponents of this school claim that McClellan is criticized more for his admittedly abrasive personality than for his actual field performance."

Interesting summary. Note that regarding point one translates as his opposition to emancipation. Fremont and Butler suffered from the same problem in reverse. Regarding point two it is not hard to find ammunition in McC's own words.
I'll ignore three and four...at the moment

McC 's behavior did, in effect, made every general since then very careful in dealing with the President. Can anyone on this board think of a general in WW I who treated Wilson the way McC treated Lincoln? I understand Stilwell reffered to FDR as "that **** cripple" but never made his opposition public.