McClellan Thomas and McClellan

[Saphroneth]

In my opinion, Lincoln was extremely patient, putting up with McClellan's name-calling and ignoring the Commander-in-Chief.

Out of curiosity, could you give an example of where McClellan publically called Lincoln names?
Separately, would you be able to give an example of where McClellan ignored orders?

(I'm aware of private examples of McClellan insulting Lincoln, but that's private.)

Unfortunately, he apparently thought he was a great general and far above Lincoln both socially and intellectually.

I would however say that McClellan was a broadly competent general, and this is something that Lincoln certainly was not.

The thing is that McClellan's view of Lincoln didn't develop in a vacuum, and it can be argued that some of the things that Lincoln did absolutely should colour the appreciation of him - at least from the commander in question.

Take the event sequence around the fourth and fifth of April, from McClellan's point of view:

A council of Corps commanders (picked by Lincoln) selects the Peninsular route as the approach, and also determines that the garrison of Washington should be about 40,000 counting the covering force.
McClellan leaves about 60,000-70,000 as the combination garrison and covering force.
Lincoln removes a division from McClellan's command (that's Blenker, IIRC) and tells McClellan that that's the last reduction that will take place.
McClellan sets off for the Peninsula, with two corps and planning on moving in 1st Corps (his amphibious unit) for operations depending on what the situation is when he reaches Yorktown.
At more or less the moment he reaches Yorktown, and as he's sending for 1st Corps, he's told that he doesn't have command of them any more - the whole corps has been stripped out from his command.

From McClellan's point of view, the lesson here is clear - you can't trust the solemn assurances of the President.

 

[Saphroneth]

Something that's worth considering in the context of the Lincoln-McClellan relationship is the number of times that Lincoln pre-empted the man who was supposed to be his most important commander in the field and who had been the General-in-Chief at one point (and still was on the org chart, until Henry Halleck swapped with him).

This isn't to excuse McClellan, who must clearly bear some responsibility for the breakdown of the relationship, but Lincoln does too - and McClellan was, at least, doing the thing that a professional soldier is hired to do and meant to do, which is prosecuting the war according to a plan that was within the means of the country and following the orders that Lincoln gave him.

McClellan presents a plan, and Lincoln approves it; is McClellan then to abandon the idea he sees as the better one? Of course not, the plan has been approved. If Lincoln didn't want the plan taken up then he shouldn't have approved it.
McClellan embarks on the plan, and Lincoln then removes troops critical to the plan's success; should McClellan simply proceed as if nothing has happened? He can't - he has to modify his plans to fit. Should he simply remain silent about the problem in his letters to the President? No, because it's his letters to the President which are the only way he can tell the President that the President has made a mistake.

Doubtless McClellan did see himself as an excellent general, possibly beyond the actuality of his ability at the time. But commanding an army is a difficult task, and McClellan operated the Army of the Potomac with competence - certainly the actions he took prior to the battle of South Mountain bespeak a certain skill in articulating a large army, and McClellan went pretty much straight into high command. He's hardly the only general who's been put into high command in the Civil War and decided he's highly competent, and some of them (like General John Pope) promptly stuffed it up royally; McClellan didn't do that, and despite the fact that he went from what we'd call division-command straight up to multi-corps army command his operation of the army is at least competent basically straight off. Maybe he learns and his Loudoun Valley or Maryland Campain articulation is better than his early Peninsular movements, but he doesn't appear to have started poorly.


What this means is that, based on his performance and the situations in which he was in, McClellan was a commander who rarely made what's called an "unforced error". He wasn't someone with fire and dash, but that also meant he didn't throw his armies uselessly at entrenched positions, and when he did decide an attack was worth it he generally got results.

 

[Robin Lesjovitch]

What this all means is that McClellan was a target for the "lost cause" school (who portrayed him as an ineffectual blunderer who Lee fought rings around, and who excused Lee's poor showing at Antietam by giving McClellan a 2:1 numerical advantage) and also for those who considered Lincoln to be tops (who portrayed him in - well - much the same light, to be honest).

I think i would like clarification.
I have no clue what 'lost cause" actually means. I understand Jubal Early is a prime example of a "lost causer". though.
In his Autobiography, Early wrote this:
"General McClellan, it must be confessed, displayed considerable ability in conducting the retreat of his army after it was out-manoeuvred and beaten, notwithstanding the excessive caution he had shown on the Potomac and at Yorktown, and I think there can be no doubt he was the ablest commander the United States had in Virginia during the war, by long odds. During the seven days' operations around Richmond, the two armies were more nearly equal in strength than they ever were afterwards. "
I do not think i understand.

 

[Saphroneth]

I think i would like clarification.
I have no clue what 'lost cause" actually means.

In this context, Lost Cause means minimizing the size of Confederate armies. For example:

During the seven days' operations around Richmond, the two armies were more nearly equal in strength than they ever were afterwards.

Here what Jubal Early is saying is that the Union army was always larger than the Confederate one but that this was the time that it was only a little bit larger. In fact the Confederate army was the larger one, so Jubal Early here is still reducing the size of the Confederate army involved.

When he mentions excessive caution at Yorktown, for example, I woud imagine that he makes a claim about the size of Magruder's force and that of McClellan; I doubt they're both accurate.


To give you another example, though, consider Antietam.
The normal numbers given for strength at Antietam are that McClellan outnumbered Lee more than two to one. This is based on a "Lost Cause" style strength given for Lee's army versus that of McClellan - for example, the Lost Cause count for Confederate strength at Antietam discounts the units that Lee kept in reserve, and it also counts the smallest possible number for Confederate units.

There were 181 Confederate infantry regiments at Antietam, and Lee claimed he only had about 40,000 troops - which would imply an average regimental size of less than 200 men, considering all the artillery and cavalry and so on, and is clearly the number after "straggling" if it means anything at all. But McClellan's army is given as 87,000 men, which is his strength before straggling; it would be equally fair to do this the other way around and estimate McClellan's army at about 50,000 and Lee's at 75,000!


Looking at the numbers in PFD, before straggling:

Seven Days: Confederates 112,000, Union 105,000
Maryland Campaign: Confederates 75,000, Union 87,000

(Union numbers from Wikipedia; Confederate numbers from Harsh and Thorp)

 

[Saphroneth]

uring the seven days' operations around Richmond, the two armies were more nearly equal in strength than they ever were afterwards.

So I found Early's actual numbers. Jubal Early presented Lee's strength during the Seven Days as about 80,000 (using the "Effectives" measure) while it seems he stated that McClellan's force was about 105,000 (which is PFD). Thus he claims that Lee was outnumbered, but not by as much as normal.

Doing it the other way around would mean being able to claim that McClellan (at about 70,000 effectives) was outnumbered more than 3:2 by Lee (at about 112,000 PFD) but this would be just as dishonest. The true figure is that the two forces were roughly equal, with McClellan slightly weaker in numbers and more disadvantaged by his hanging flank than anything.

 

[Robin Lesjovitch]

In this context, Lost Cause means minimizing the size of Confederate armies. For example:


Here what Jubal Early is saying is that the Union army was always larger than the Confederate one but that this was the time that it was only a little bit larger. In fact the Confederate army was the larger one, so Jubal Early here is still reducing the size of the Confederate army involved.

When he mentions excessive caution at Yorktown, for example, I woud imagine that he makes a claim about the size of Magruder's force and that of McClellan; I doubt they're both accurate.


To give you another example, though, consider Antietam.
The normal numbers given for strength at Antietam are that McClellan outnumbered Lee more than two to one. This is based on a "Lost Cause" style strength given for Lee's army versus that of McClellan - for example, the Lost Cause count for Confederate strength at Antietam discounts the units that Lee kept in reserve, and it also counts the smallest possible number for Confederate units.

There were 181 Confederate infantry regiments at Antietam, and Lee claimed he only had about 40,000 troops - which would imply an average regimental size of less than 200 men, considering all the artillery and cavalry and so on, and is clearly the number after "straggling" if it means anything at all. But McClellan's army is given as 87,000 men, which is his strength before straggling; it would be equally fair to do this the other way around and estimate McClellan's army at about 50,000 and Lee's at 75,000!


Looking at the numbers in PFD, before straggling:

Seven Days: Confederates 112,000, Union 105,000
Maryland Campaign: Confederates 75,000, Union 87,000

(Union numbers from Wikipedia; Confederate numbers from Harsh and Thorp)

A good reply.
i would except the Antietam numbers. I seriously doubt that Lee had more than 40,000 men at the start of the battle. And no more than 45,000 total for the day. There had been unusual straggling activities since 2nd Bull Run because of commissary deficiencies. And the less than wise "shoe" policy added to thinning the ranks. Huge numbers of Rebs did not enter Maryland. I do not think Lee understood until later what condition his army was in. I do not think he would have made a stand if he had understood. For me, it was the biggest mistake Lee made in 1862.

 

[Saphroneth]

i would except the Antietam numbers. I seriously doubt that Lee had more than 40,000 men at the start of the battle. And no more than 45,000 total for the day.

That's the problem, though - if you count that way you also have to count McClellan the same way, and people generally don't. Notwithstanding the fact that a lot of the straggling was McClellan's fast marches, which means you can credit him for it anyway, McClellan's own force also straggled badly. The official strength of 1st Corps was nearly 15,000, but Meade states that only about 9,000 of them actually went into battle - that's about a 40% straggle right there. Other corps did better, but you could quite readily make a claim that the troops that could actually fight at Antietam were about 2/3 of McClellan's "official" force or a bit less; I've seen numbers of about 54,000 for the 17th to Lee's 45,000.

Huge numbers of Rebs did not enter Maryland.

The question then is where they went. To make Lee's numbers work there would need to be literal tens of thousands of them in northern Virginia for upwards of two weeks without any organized supply - a few thousand is plausible, certainly, but this massive horde wouldn't have had enough to eat.

There's also other evidence. The number of 75,000 is reached by three methods.

One of them is to take Lee's first post-battle return for his infantry, and add back known Antietam casualties. This produces a number of about 75,000 once cavalry and artillery are added back (which was done by Gene Thorp)
The second one is to take Lee's PFD post-Second Bull Run (an estimate was done by Harsh). This produces a similar number, about 75,000, though not exactly the same.
And the third one is to add up the contemporary strength estimates of moving forces by those in Maryland and Virginia who saw the individual Confederate units moving from the time they left the state capital to the time Harpers Ferry fell; these also add up to around 75,000 (and Thorp has done this too).

All of these suggest the same number for Lee's moving force, which is about 75,000 PFD (which should be compared to McClellan's 87,000 PFD). Doubtless the number of "effectives" on the field at Antietam was smaller, but then we have to estimate McClellan's effectives on the field as well.

 

[wbull1]

Out of curiosity, could you give an example of where McClellan publically called Lincoln names?
Separately, would you be able to give an example of where McClellan ignored orders?

(I'm aware of private examples of McClellan insulting Lincoln, but that's private.)


I would however say that McClellan was a broadly competent general, and this is something that Lincoln certainly was not.

The thing is that McClellan's view of Lincoln didn't develop in a vacuum, and it can be argued that some of the things that Lincoln did absolutely should colour the appreciation of him - at least from the commander in question.

Take the event sequence around the fourth and fifth of April, from McClellan's point of view:

A council of Corps commanders (picked by Lincoln) selects the Peninsular route as the approach, and also determines that the garrison of Washington should be about 40,000 counting the covering force.
McClellan leaves about 60,000-70,000 as the combination garrison and covering force.
Lincoln removes a division from McClellan's command (that's Blenker, IIRC) and tells McClellan that that's the last reduction that will take place.
McClellan sets off for the Peninsula, with two corps and planning on moving in 1st Corps (his amphibious unit) for operations depending on what the situation is when he reaches Yorktown.
At more or less the moment he reaches Yorktown, and as he's sending for 1st Corps, he's told that he doesn't have command of them any more - the whole corps has been stripped out from his command.

From McClellan's point of view, the lesson here is clear - you can't trust the solemn assurances of the President.

Thanks for the questions:

On November 13, 1861 Lincoln, Seward, and presidential secretary John Hay stopped by to see the general. McClellan was out, so the trio waited for his return. After an hour, McClellan came in and was told by a porter that the guests were waiting. McClellan headed for his room without a word, and only after Lincoln waited another half-hour was the group informed of McClellan's retirement to bed. Hay felt that the president should have been greatly offended, but Lincoln replied that it was "better at this time not to be making points of etiquette and personal dignity." Lincoln made no more visits to the general's home.

This is clearly completely disrespectful of the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of State. You say McClellan had some part in the tension between him and the President. Please point out how Lincoln was at fault here.





On Aug. 3, 1862, Gen. George B. McClellan received orders to begin withdrawing the Army of the Potomac from its position in front of Richmond, Va. The new Union general in chief, Henry Halleck, had given McClellan a choice: to renew his offensive against Richmond or ship his army back to Washington. McClellan resented and resisted Halleck's authority, and stubbornly refused to advance, thinking Halleck would eventually recognize the folly of a withdrawal.

This is ignoring a direct order from his superior officer, I believe.

 

[wbull1]

Out of curiosity, could you give an example of where McClellan publically called Lincoln names?
Separately, would you be able to give an example of where McClellan ignored orders?

(I'm aware of private examples of McClellan insulting Lincoln, but that's private.)


I would however say that McClellan was a broadly competent general, and this is something that Lincoln certainly was not.

The thing is that McClellan's view of Lincoln didn't develop in a vacuum, and it can be argued that some of the things that Lincoln did absolutely should colour the appreciation of him - at least from the commander in question.

Take the event sequence around the fourth and fifth of April, from McClellan's point of view:

A council of Corps commanders (picked by Lincoln) selects the Peninsular route as the approach, and also determines that the garrison of Washington should be about 40,000 counting the covering force.
McClellan leaves about 60,000-70,000 as the combination garrison and covering force.
Lincoln removes a division from McClellan's command (that's Blenker, IIRC) and tells McClellan that that's the last reduction that will take place.
McClellan sets off for the Peninsula, with two corps and planning on moving in 1st Corps (his amphibious unit) for operations depending on what the situation is when he reaches Yorktown.
At more or less the moment he reaches Yorktown, and as he's sending for 1st Corps, he's told that he doesn't have command of them any more - the whole corps has been stripped out from his command.

From McClellan's point of view, the lesson here is clear - you can't trust the solemn assurances of the President.

On July 8, 1862



McClellan and Lincoln met on the deck of Lincoln's steamer, where a canvas awning shaded them from the day's insufferable heat. Lincoln asked McClellan when he planned to resume the offensive. Instead of answering, McClellan begged leave to submit a letter detailing his views, which he handed the president. Instead of taking it and leaving, Lincoln read it right there. But if its contents astonished him he gave no sign.

The letter said nothing about the Army's defeat, nor did it propose a plan for renewing the offensive. It was instead a political manifesto, laying out McClellan's grand design for the future civil and military policy of the country. McClellan demanded a "conservative" approach to three basic policies: the legal consequences of secession, the status of slavery and the division of power between civil and military authorities. He denied the basic premise of Lincoln's policy, that secession was an act of rebellion. Instead, he declared that the government had no right to "subjugate" the seceded states. So when their districts were occupied by Union forces, the "political rights" of Southerners must be automatically restored. As McClellan well knew, such a policy would slowly restore the Democratic Party's national majority.

McClellan also warned that "A declaration of radical views, upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present Armies." Coming from the commander of the nation's most powerful army, which was imbued with his cult of personal loyalty, that warning had threatening implications. Finally, McClellan wanted Lincoln to delegate control of all war-related policy to "a Commander in Chief of the Army; one who possesses your confidence, understands your views and who is competent to execute your orders." McClellan was clearly nominating himself for the post.

In effect, McClellan was demanding that Lincoln abandon the responsibilities of his office and the platform of his party, and turn power over to the general who had just lost the war's greatest battle at the time.


I believe this goes far beyond what any officer should do. Lecturing the President about what he should do in national policy while suggesting he should have no one overseeing his actions. I believe is more than sufficient reason to remove him from command. Do you disagree?

By the way, although not a general, Lincoln directly commanded a successful amphibious assault in May of 1862 that captured Norfolk, VA and resulted in the Confederacy scuttling the iron-sided Virginia.

 

[Saphroneth]

On November 13, 1861 Lincoln, Seward, and presidential secretary John Hay stopped by to see the general. McClellan was out, so the trio waited for his return. After an hour, McClellan came in and was told by a porter that the guests were waiting. McClellan headed for his room without a word, and only after Lincoln waited another half-hour was the group informed of McClellan's retirement to bed. Hay felt that the president should have been greatly offended, but Lincoln replied that it was "better at this time not to be making points of etiquette and personal dignity." Lincoln made no more visits to the general's home.

This is clearly completely disrespectful of the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of State. You say McClellan had some part in the tension between him and the President. Please point out how Lincoln was at fault here.

I thought it would be this one, because it's the only one people ever bring up.

I should point out a few things at this point. The first is that Hay is the only person who ever mentioned this, and he did it after everybody else involved (Lincoln, McClellan and Seward) were dead. It's an uncorroborated account.
The second is that by Hays' account it is not actually clear that McClellan heard the porter (he was coming back from a wedding after midnight).
And the third is that according to the etiquette of the time, if one comes to the house of a gentleman and the gentleman is not at home the correct thing to do is to leave a calling card; you can of course be in his parlour because that is a semi-public space, but he is not actually obliged by any means to attend to you when he returns.

Even by Hays' account, this is an unannounced visit in which McClellan didn't meet with Lincoln, possibly because he didn't know Lincoln was there - and, critically, McClellan's letters to his wife don't mention it at all. If this was a deliberate snub, he would have done, because I certainly agree that he was critical of the President in private (and it would corroborate the event).

It's also not "completely disrespectful" because the concept of the Imperial Presidency had not yet really solidified. The President on an unannounced home visit is not on official business and is not far off a private citizen, and here the treatment he gets is not far off the treatment a private citizen gets.

On Aug. 3, 1862, Gen. George B. McClellan received orders to begin withdrawing the Army of the Potomac from its position in front of Richmond, Va. The new Union general in chief, Henry Halleck, had given McClellan a choice: to renew his offensive against Richmond or ship his army back to Washington. McClellan resented and resisted Halleck's authority, and stubbornly refused to advance, thinking Halleck would eventually recognize the folly of a withdrawal.

This is ignoring a direct order from his superior officer, I believe.

Which order do you mean? The order to withdraw or the one to advance?

McClellan in fact did begin advancing, and it's well attested that he reoccupied Malvern Hill and was forming a line of battle when Halleck's order to retreat from the Peninsula took place. McClellan's warning that sending off the wounded would take a long time went unheeded, and it did indeed take a long time, but can you please specifiy the date on which McClellan was not in compliance with his orders?

I believe this goes far beyond what any officer should do. Lecturing the President about what he should do in national policy while suggesting he should have no one overseeing his actions. I believe is more than sufficient reason to remove him from command. Do you disagree?

I absolutely disagree, because McClellan asked permission to send his thoughts on such matters and Lincoln said that that was fine. The exchange of letters about this permission was before the Seven Days so it's often missed, but it's right there in the ORs.

As for "nobody overseeing his actions" - not at all, he's suggesting that the army have a general in chief. Remember that at this point the Union army had been operating without one for at least three months and the result had been chaos; indeed this recommendation was actually adopted in the person of Henry Halleck.

By the way, although not a general, Lincoln directly commanded a successful amphibious assault in May of 1862 that captured Norfolk, VA and resulted in the Confederacy scuttling the iron-sided Virginia.

Directly commanded? Really?
I suppose he was nearby, but at that time orders had already been given to evacuate Norfolk and that was precisely because McClellan had forced the Yorktown line - check the sequence of events.
If you do attribute the outcome of that to Lincoln's command, though, bear in mind it was quite badly botched - I can provide details if you're interested.

 

[Saphroneth]

McClellan and Lincoln met on the deck of Lincoln's steamer, where a canvas awning shaded them from the day's insufferable heat. Lincoln asked McClellan when he planned to resume the offensive.

By the way, if this took place as described, it would actually be something that you could put on the blame side of the ledger for Lincoln. Barely a week previously Lincoln had been praising McClellan for his conduct in the battles of the Seven Days and promising him upwards of 40,000 reinforcements; not a man of them had arrived, and now Lincoln is asking when McClellan can attack again?

If substantiated this would paint a picture of Lincoln as someone who is quite willing to promise something one week and then act like it's irrelevant the next.

 

[wbull1]

By the way, if this took place as described, it would actually be something that you could put on the blame side of the ledger for Lincoln. Barely a week previously Lincoln had been praising McClellan for his conduct in the battles of the Seven Days and promising him upwards of 40,000 reinforcements; not a man of them had arrived, and now Lincoln is asking when McClellan can attack again?

If substantiated this would paint a picture of Lincoln as someone who is quite willing to promise something one week and then act like it's irrelevant the next.

I agree that Hays is the only one who mentioned the event. And he certainly emphasized the positive actions of his boss. On the other hand, it is hard - for me - to believe that the porter just mumbled and was unclear that the President of the United States and the Secretary of State were waiting to see McClellan. The General may have been unimpressed but the porter? Maybe Hays made the whole thing up, but there is no evidence he did. Given information by someone reliable on the scene with no contradiction, I would tend to believe it.

So Lincoln praised McClellan when did well, promised reinforcements that he did not receive and then asked the General to attack. Do you imagine that never happened to any other officer in history? There was a war on. Things were in flux. Lincoln did not always keep his promises. OK. Also, maybe it took longer than a week to raise 40,000 plus troops. Is that possible?

Direct command? Yes, direct command. If you have evidence that the attack Lincoln commanded was botched I would like to see it. Norfolk was taken and the Virginia was abandoned while McClellan was occupied elsewhere. You might read up on the assault.

I do think it was arrogant to offer an opinion on national policies that are in direct opposition of what the administration was doing, when the question was - what are your plans for a military advance? McClellan had supported Stephan A. Douglas and kept in touch with Democratic Party officials throughout the war. He echoed critics of Lincoln. You can read parts of the letter above. It is not written as a series of suggestions but as statements of "facts" or even demands. And it said nothing about the question Lincoln asked.

If you in answer to a request for information from your employee, you got a response that completely ignored the question and instead pointed out everything you must do that you were not doing, I suspect you would find that insubordinate.

 

[Lubliner]

Ok, General Winfield Scott has an opinion in reference to 'George' prior to and on his letter of resignation. August 9, 1861;
"All my military views and opinions had been so presented to him, without eliciting much remark, in our few meetings, which I have in vain sought to multiply." (page 4, vol.11, part 3, series 1).
On page 5, General McClellan states;
"...and, above all, I would abstain from any conduct that could give offense to General Scott or embarrass the President or any department of the Government."
On the contrary to this light, on page 5 again, General Scott has this reply,
"1. The original offense given to me by Major-General McClellan... seems to have been the result of deliberations between him and some of the members of the cabinet, by whom all the greater war questions are to be settled, without resort to or consultation with me, the nominal General-in-Chief of the Army."
And on Page 6 continues, "...while it is believed, and I may add known, that he is in frequent communication with portions of the Cabinet and on matters appertaining to me. This freedom of access and consultation have, very naturally, deluded the junior general into a feeling of indifference toward his senior....With such supports on his part, it would be idle for me as it would be against the dignity of my years, to be filing daily complaints against an ambitious junior, who, independent of the extrinsic advantages alluded to, has unquestionably, very high qualifications for military command."

General Scott has specifically pointed out to the Secretary of War that he has a problem with an insubordinate junior commander, willing to promote criticisms against senior ranks, both nominal and Head. He has specifically brought proof by authority, with few options for making his decision. 1. He could place McClellan under arrest, and have him courts-martialed. 2. Supercede military law and do nothing. 3. Resign.
Lubliner.

 

[Saphroneth]

So Lincoln praised McClellan when did well, promised reinforcements that he did not receive and then asked the General to attack. Do you imagine that never happened to any other officer in history? There was a war on. Things were in flux. Lincoln did not always keep his promises. OK. Also, maybe it took longer than a week to raise 40,000 plus troops. Is that possible?

It's possible, but the troops never turned up. Even a month later, and even when ca. 20,000 of them had collected at Fort Monroe - they were specifically forbidden from joining McClellan until ordered up to join him (and McClellan didn't have the authority to do that).
So Lincoln promised 40,000 troops and delivered none, even when some of those troops had been available doing nothing else for weeks.


Lincoln told McClellan to wait until the new levies had been raised and he could be reinforced, which is what McClellan did - waited for reinforcement - and McClellan did not want to attack because Lee outnumbered him. In this McClellan was entirely correct, because Lee did outnumber him.

Direct command? Yes, direct command. If you have evidence that the attack Lincoln commanded was botched I would like to see it. Norfolk was taken and the Virginia was abandoned while McClellan was occupied elsewhere. You might read up on the assault.

I've read about it, all right.
The attack on Norfolk took place on May 10, 1862. Joseph Johnston had ordered Norfolk abandoned on or about May 2, in connection with the abandonment of the Yorktown line. As such Norfolk was not seriously defended - the brigades of troops who'd been holding it the previous week had left.

As for botched, it took the historical expedition eight hours to travel the seven miles to Norfolk with their opposition being a single Confederate battery; they had generals without assigned troops, regiments without assigned brigades, and cavalry and artillery left in the rear as infantry advanced unsupported; they then got distracted by an elaborate surrender ceremony which gave the Confederates time to burn the Naval Yard.
Most of this can be laid at the feet of Wool, but if one credits Lincoln with the operation one must also blame him.

I do think it was arrogant to offer an opinion on national policies that are in direct opposition of what the administration was doing, when the question was - what are your plans for a military advance? McClellan had supported Stephan A. Douglas and kept in touch with Democratic Party officials throughout the war. He echoed critics of Lincoln. You can read parts of the letter above. It is not written as a series of suggestions but as statements of "facts" or even demands. And it said nothing about the question Lincoln asked.

Saying things as facts like that is rather how letters of the time are put together. It's "This is the true line of operations" and "We should bend our energies to X".

As for the account of the meeting, this is very different from how even Sears (a noted McClellan critic) describes it happening. Sears has it that there were interviews with McClellan and each of the generals, getting estimates of the army's strength and whether the Union army could evacuate Harrisons Landing safely.
Not a silent handing-over of the letter in response to a request for plans to advance, but the letter being handed over personally because it wasn't secure to transmit it (a condition set by Lincoln) along with a discussion of the general military situation.

I agree that Hays is the only one who mentioned the event. And he certainly emphasized the positive actions of his boss. On the other hand, it is hard - for me - to believe that the porter just mumbled and was unclear that the President of the United States and the Secretary of State were waiting to see McClellan. The General may have been unimpressed but the porter? Maybe Hays made the whole thing up, but there is no evidence he did. Given information by someone reliable on the scene with no contradiction, I would tend to believe it.

When you say that there's no evidence Hays made the whole thing up, that's not quite correct. Gene Thorp has noted that the wedding party McClellan was supposed to have been at was on November 2nd according to the Gunston Hall web page (which is the organization that runs the home the wedding took place at). But Hays' diary records it as November 13, by which date Buell had left Washington (and which is the date that the marriage license was filed, in St. Louis).

This doesn't actually appear in the historical record until the 1890s, the date's wrong by over a week, and the one who wrote it said while writing his history:
"I have toiled and labored through ten chapters over him (McC). I think I have left the impression of his mutinous imbecility, and I have done it in a perfectly courteous manner.... It is of the utmost moment that we should seem fair to him, while we are destroying him."

This needs corroboration.

We do however know what happened the next day (the 14th November), which is that McClellan met Lincoln with the assistant secretary of the Navy for a discussion of plans for an amphibious desant. This is a proper liason meeting, while showing up at the private home* of a general unannounced and around midnight is not.

*not the headquarters, which were a different building

 

[Saphroneth]

I do think it was arrogant to offer an opinion on national policies that are in direct opposition of what the administration was doing, when the question was - what are your plans for a military advance?

By the way, I should note here that McClellan's suggestions were not "in direct opposition" to what the administration was doing, because at the time there was not a single coherent administration policy on how to conduct the war. This is why generals kept instituting annexationist measures and then getting them revoked, it's why there's no general-in-chief, and so on.

That being said, a lot of the letter can be summed up as "we should follow the Constitution and do our best not to provoke unnecessary dislike", which is in keeping with Wellington's approach in the south of France in 1814 - he entered enemy territory and paid for what his army seized, and the result was that he didn't suffer from guerilla warfare.

Look at this passage:


Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized. This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves of a particular State, thus working manumission in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time.


This basically means "we could abolish slavery in a state we control by permanently appropriating all slaves in that state, compensating the owners, and then setting them free".

Since it's only about a month later that Lincoln sends the Greeley letter:




I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored the nearer the Union will be "the Union as it was." If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save Slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy Slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy Slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about Slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save this Union, and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause.

Both views are concordant. The important thing is the Union, and the slavery issue is to be approached however it helps with that.

 

[67th Tigers]

I agree that Hays is the only one who mentioned the event. And he certainly emphasized the positive actions of his boss. On the other hand, it is hard - for me - to believe that the porter just mumbled and was unclear that the President of the United States and the Secretary of State were waiting to see McClellan. The General may have been unimpressed but the porter? Maybe Hays made the whole thing up, but there is no evidence he did. Given information by someone reliable on the scene with no contradiction, I would tend to believe it.

The most reliable piece of information that things didn't occur as is often said is the lack of anyone mentioning it.

If McClellan deliberately snubbed Lincoln, then why didn't he write that to his wife? Why didn't Lincoln, or Seward ever mention it? Some maintain that Lincoln stopped visiting McClellan due to this incident, but that is false. He in fact sat in McClellan's parlour the very next evening, if the date is reliable (14th).

Part of the issue here is that neither Lincoln, nor Hay, understood the etiquette of the time. If McClellan behaved exactly as Hay described, which is doubtful*, then it would not be considered insolent by contemporary standards of American gentile society. In allowing Lincoln into his parlour, providing food, drink etc., McClellan's household had carried out all the niceties of a cultured household. Seeing the householder was not a right of any guests, especially in the middle of the night when the householder was sleeping.

* Hay edited his diaries for his Lincoln hagiography. It is unclear whether this event was invented decades later when all the principles were dead or not. The most damning evidence is that the party McClellan was supposidly returning from was on the night of 2nd November, and Frank Wheaton and Emma Twiggs Mason's actual marriage was indeed on the 13th, but in St. Louis. Remember, weddings are supposed to happen in the home church of the bride. If McClellan was indeed returning from the Wheaton wedding then McClellan had 2 hours sleep the night before, and likely collapsed asleep after drinking and dancing at the wedding party, then riding his horse ca. 10 miles from Buell's house to his.

So Lincoln praised McClellan when did well, promised reinforcements that he did not receive and then asked the General to attack. Do you imagine that never happened to any other officer in history? There was a war on. Things were in flux. Lincoln did not always keep his promises. OK. Also, maybe it took longer than a week to raise 40,000 plus troops. Is that possible?

Lincoln ordered McClellan to assume a strict defensive posture.

Direct command? Yes, direct command. If you have evidence that the attack Lincoln commanded was botched I would like to see it. Norfolk was taken and the Virginia was abandoned while McClellan was occupied elsewhere. You might read up on the assault.

What assault? Norfolk was never assaulted. The rebels abandoned it when Yorktown fell, and burnt the docks. The reason the Federals were able to cross is because the rebels had already gone, and the Sewell's Point batteries were abandoned.

I do think it was arrogant to offer an opinion on national policies that are in direct opposition of what the administration was doing, when the question was - what are your plans for a military advance?

McClellan, the commanding general of the US Army with three stars on his shoulders, asked permission of Lincoln to offer an opinion on general military policy. Lincoln accepted, and then deliberately refused to read the letter in front of him.

Lincoln of course wasted an opportunity. He could have read the letter and said "That's great George, but what I think is..." and McClellan would have listened and enacted Lincoln's policies. Lincoln did not. He snubbed McClellan suggestion of emancipating the northern slaves.

 

[Robin Lesjovitch]

That's the problem, though - if you count that way you also have to count McClellan the same way, and people generally don't. Notwithstanding the fact that a lot of the straggling was McClellan's fast marches, which means you can credit him for it anyway, McClellan's own force also straggled badly. The official strength of 1st Corps was nearly 15,000, but Meade states that only about 9,000 of them actually went into battle - that's about a 40% straggle right there. Other corps did better, but you could quite readily make a claim that the troops that could actually fight at Antietam were about 2/3 of McClellan's "official" force or a bit less; I've seen numbers of about 54,000 for the 17th to Lee's 45,000.


The question then is where they went. To make Lee's numbers work there would need to be literal tens of thousands of them in northern Virginia for upwards of two weeks without any organized supply - a few thousand is plausible, certainly, but this massive horde wouldn't have had enough to eat.

There's also other evidence. The number of 75,000 is reached by three methods.

I cannot respond to the methods used to get to 75,000 for the ANV. None of them involve the condition of Lee's army in Maryland.
However, the numbers of 45,000 for Lee and 60,000 for McClellan on the 17th do not seem outrageous to me. The 17th seems to represent the bottom of efficiency and strength for both armies. I would think the strength of both armies increased between sundown on the 17th and 18th. Further, neither army seemed really poised to knock out the other. That would make Lee's stand at Sharpsburg not very useful.
After 2nd Bull Run, Lee's army did not have a tenuous supply situation, it had no supply situation. There was ammunition, but the Quartermaster and Commissary Depts. had not developed to supply an army on the march. These issues were addressed AFTER the Maryland Campaign. For a period there was in fact no organized system of supply. A lot of men took it upon themselves to get what food they could ...something they could not do in the ranks. There were long matches in an army very unprepared to make them.
Taking in the accounts of what Lee's lines looked like at the end of the 17th ,30-32,000 left standing seems reasonable. Add the casualties and 45,000 thousand in ranks for the day is not a stretch.
But McClellan had some of the same issues. I guess he had a numerical avantage of 3-2, but that not not enough to attempt a knockout blow. But, Mac hurt Lee much more than Lee hurt him.

 

[67th Tigers]

On Aug. 3, 1862, Gen. George B. McClellan received orders to begin withdrawing the Army of the Potomac from its position in front of Richmond, Va. The new Union general in chief, Henry Halleck, had given McClellan a choice: to renew his offensive against Richmond or ship his army back to Washington. McClellan resented and resisted Halleck's authority, and stubbornly refused to advance, thinking Halleck would eventually recognize the folly of a withdrawal.

This is ignoring a direct order from his superior officer, I believe.

This isn't exactly what happened.

On the evening of 25th July the steamer Hero arrived with Halleck, Meigs and Burnside aboard. Burnside had arrived in Washington on 22nd July. They had sent no messages ahead. On being told Halleck had arrived, McClellan told all his Corps Commanders to board the Hero and went there himself. On boarding Halleck told him that he didn't want to talk to the CC's. However, soon they started arriving. Heintzelman recorded he had about half an hour of small talk with Halleck et al., and then they all went away, leaving Halleck on the Hero.

At McClellan's HQ on land, the CC's and a few others were told by McClellan that Halleck had forbidden their planned movement across the James, and given them two options: attack Richmond on the left bank of the James with Burnside's reinforcements only, or retreat to Washington. The arguments went back and forth for several hours. With two exceptions it was agreed to wait for Burnside's troops and then attack on the left bank. The two exceptions were Keyes and Franklin. Keyes had been a long standing opponent of the James line, and this was expected. Franklin's opposition was perhaps unexpected. Franklin was not a McClellan loyalist, he was part of McDowell's clique. He was under extreme suspicion since his unordered retreat from the White Oak line which resulted in McClellan separating him from his command. McClellan spent much of the meeting in the tent next door trying to persuade Franklin, but to no avail.

The next morning McClellan, Sumner, Heintzelman and Burnside boarded the Hero and told Halleck of their decision. In the afternoon the Hero departed, carrying not just Halleck, but Burnside, Keyes and Franklin. The Hero returned to Washington on the 27th. Halleck wrote down his report or what had occurred, and on the 28th was in cabinet with Lincoln etc., Burnside and the bureau chiefs. The main topic of conversation was a letter Keyes sent to Meigs on 23rd July.

As an aside, Meigs was feeding Keyes' negative letters directly to Lincoln and Stanton. As CB Grayson's article notes, Meigs had reached the conclusion that McClellan was a more deadly enemy than the rebel army, and his removal was necessary. Hence over the coming months Meigs worked tirelessly to hamstring McClellan. The disappearance of the supplies for McClellan's army in September-October '62 was likely a deliberate act by Meigs to prevent McClellan's success. Meigs was one of the three bureau officers on the War Board who effectively told Lincoln what to do. The other two were Wadsworth and Buckingham (who was brought in to oust the McClellan friendly EA Hitchcock, cementing the complete anti-McClellan bias of the senior staff).

The morning of the 28th, before McClellan had had time to do anything, the cabinet made the decision to withdraw McClellan's Army. Meigs went in with a brief prepared, using Keyes' letter and a dodgy undercount of the enemy army he created against McClellan's returns to suggest McClellan outnumbered Lee 3:2 (158,000 to 105,000) and hence needed no reinforcements. His attempts to get Ingalls, the QM of McClellan's army to agree were rebuffed and his deputy also rebuffed Meigs' assessment, and so their evidence, like all contrary to Meigs' prosecutorial case, was suppressed.

However, the order would have to be issued by Halleck, and it took a lot of pressure to get Halleck to do this. McClellan had agreed to and put in writing the plan to advance when Burnside's 20,000 men (13,000 already at Fort Monroe plus 7 regiments from NC and 4 from SC sent for) arrived, although he noted that if 15-20,000 could be added from the west, things would be more certain. Halleck said that this changed his mind. However, he did not issue an order to McClellan to start running down his army until the 30th July. Why the delay?

Halleck's letter to his wife of 28th July makes it clear that he's washed his hands of McClellan. We can determine from various letters and Burnside's movements that on 28th July Burnside was offered command of the Army of the Potomac, but refused. Halleck's plans to replace McClellan with Burnside were thus thawted.

On the 30th Halleck issues the order to start running down McClellan's army by removing the sick. He issued the orders sending Burnside to Aquia Creek on 1st August, and orders for a general retreat from Virginia on the 3rd August.

McClellan meanwhile has actually mounted a renewed offensive. Forbidden from continuing his movement over the James, McClellan brought much of his force onto Malvern Hill for a Bermuda Hundred movement. Lee reacted by mounting a general concentration against McClellan in the vicinity of the old Glendale battlefield. Then the order from Halleck arrived. McClellan promptly obeyed, and broke off his offensive. He started packing up to withdraw as ordered, but Halleck ignored the fact that it had taken a month to move McClellan's force to the Peninsula, and it would likewise take a month to move it back.

 

[Saphroneth]

That would make Lee's stand at Sharpsburg not very useful.

It can be understood by looking at his trains. Lee's army was moving as a flying column, and intending to forage en route much as it did during the Pennsylvania campaign, but that meant that he had all his wagons pretty much with him.

The stand at Sharpsburg was essentially to save his army from being destroyed. He could have fled over the river on the 16th, but at that time he hadn't got his trains over the river which would have left him without ammunition or the ability to operate as a moving army; he spent the 16th, 17th and 18th moving his wagon trains south of the Potomac, and moved the fighting echelon of the army on the night of the 18th-19th.

As it was, Lee took one hell of a beating - worse than the usual headline numbers suggest, because there are some known casualties that went unreported - and his available strength drops pretty heavily before rising back up again. (It's actually pretty amazing how shattered both armies were after Antietam - one entire Union division was reporting only 300 men with the colours on the afternoon of the 17th, because of heavy casualties and because the formations couldn't sustain combat. The rest of the men came back in but that took time.)

 

[Saphroneth]

Meigs went in with a brief prepared, using Keyes' letter and a dodgy undercount of the enemy army he created against McClellan's returns to suggest McClellan outnumbered Lee 3:2 (158,000 to 105,000) and hence needed no reinforcements.

I like to compare this with Hood's December 10 1864 state.


Hood gives:
Effectives 23,000
PFD 26,850
AP 36,400
AP&A 87,000

Since Megis used the aggregate present and absent of McClellan's entire force (including the troops down at Fort Monroe) this is like using the AP&A of Hood's force (87,000) and saying that Hood (at 87,000) clearly has a much larger army than Hood (only 26,850) so Hood (87,000) doesn't need reinforcements to attack Hood (26,850).

That's not including how Megis was completely wrong in his estimates of Confederate regiment count, which he got out of a Southern newspaper. He estimated 152 regiments in the Seven Days, while the true value was 219 taking part in the Seven Days and more arrived since.