★ ★ Rosecrans, William S.

William Starke "Old Rosy" Rosecrans​

Born: September 6, 1819

Birthplace: Delaware County, Ohio

Father: Crandall Rosecrans 1794 – 1848

Mother: Jemima Hopkins 1794 – 1861

Wife: Ann Eliza Hegeman 1823 – 1883

(Buried: Mount Olivet Cemetery, Washington, D.C.)​

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Married: August 24, 1843 at St. Paul's Church in New York City, New York

Children:

Rev. Adrian Louis Rosecrans 1849 – 1876​

(Buried: Saint Paul the Apostle Church Vault, Manhattan, New York)​

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Sister Mary Louise "Sister St. Charles" Rosecrans 1852 – 1878​

(Buried: Ursuline Cemetery, Saint Martin, Ohio)​

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Lily Elizabeth Rosecrans Toole 1854 – 1939​

(Buried: Resurrection Cemetery, Helena, Montana)​

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Anna Delores "Anita" Rosecrans 1857 – 1903​

(Buried: Old Saint Mary's Catholic Cemetery, Helena, Montana)​

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Carl Frederic Rosecrans 1860 – 1926​

(Buried: Calvary Cemetery, Los Angeles, California)​

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Charlotte Rosecrans 1862 - 1862​

Education:

1842: Graduated from West Point Military Academy – (5th​ in class)​

Occupation before War:

1842 – 1843: Brevet 2nd​ Lt. United States Army, Corps of Engineers​

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1842 – 1843: Assistant Engineer for Hampton Roads Fortifications​

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1843 – 1853: 2nd​ Lt. United States Army, Corps of Engineers​

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1843 – 1844: Assistant Engineering Professor at West Point​

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1844 – 1845: Assistant Philosophy Professor at West Point​

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1845 – 1846: Assistant Engineering Professor at West Point​

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1846 – 1847: Principal Assistant Engineering Professor at West Point​

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1847 – 1853: Superintendent Engineer of Repairs at Fort Adams​

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1852 – 1853: Superintendent Engineer of Surveys of Taunton River​

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1852 – 1853: Superintendent Engineer Repairs on Goat Island​

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1853 – 1854: 1st​ Lt. United States Army, Corps of Engineers​

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1853 – 1854: Superintendent Engineer, Washington Navy Yard​

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1854: Resigned from United States Army on April 1st​​

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1854 – 1855: Civil Engineer, and Architect, in Cincinnati, Ohio​

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1855 – 1857: Superintendent of Coal Company, in Coal River, Virginia​

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1856 – 1857: President of Coal River Navigation Company​

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1857 – 1861: Manufacturer of Kerosene Oil in Cincinnati, Ohio​

Civil War Career:

1861: Volunteer Aide to McClellan for Department of the Ohio​

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1861: Colonel, and Chief Engineer in the Union Army​

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1861: Colonel of 23rd​ Ohio Infantry Regiment​

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1861: Commander of Camp Chase, Ohio​

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1861 – 1867: Brigadier General in United States Army​

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1861: Brigade Commander at Battle of Rich Mountain​

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1861: Commander of the Union Army, Department of the Ohio​

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1861 – 1862: Commander of the Army Department of Western Virginia​

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1861: Successful Commander at Battle of Carnifex Ferry​

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1862 – 1866: Major General of Union Army, Volunteers​

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1862: Division Commander at the Siege of Corinth, Mississippi​

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1862: Commander of the Union Army of the Mississippi​

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1862: Successful Commander at Battle of Iuka, Mississippi​

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1862: Union Army Commander of District of Corinth, Mississippi​

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1862: Successful Commander at 2nd​ Battle of Corinth, Mississippi​

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1862 – 1863: Union Army Commander of Army of the Cumberland​

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1862 – 1863: Successful Commander at Battle of Stones River, Tennessee​

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1863: Union Army Commander Occupation of Bridgeport – Stevenson​

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1863: Union Army Commander crossing of Cumberland Mountains​

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1863: Unsuccessful Commander at Battle of Chickamuga, Georgia​

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1863: Commenced fortifying Chattanooga, Tennessee​

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1863 – 1864: Awaiting Orders in Cincinnati, Ohio​

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1864: Union Army Commander of Department of the Missouri​

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1864 – 1865: Awaiting Orders in Cincinnati, Ohio​

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1865: Brevetted Major General, U.S. Army, for Service at Stones River​

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1865 – 1867: On Leave of Absence from the United States Army​

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1866: Mustered out of the Union Army on January 15th​​

Occupation after War:

1861 – 1867: Brigadier General in United States Army​

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1865 – 1867: On Leave of Absence from the United States Army​

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1867: Resigned from United States Army on March 28th​​

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1868 – 1869: U.S. Minister to the Republic of Mexico​

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1869: Declined Democratic Nomination for Governor of Ohio​

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1869 – 1881: Civil and Mining Engineer, Railroad Enterprises in Mexico​

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1871 – 1881: President of San Jose Mining Company​

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1878 – 1881: President of Safety Powder Company in San Francisco​

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1881 – 1885: United States Congressman from California​

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1883 – 1885: House Chairman of Military Affairs Committee​

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1885 – 1893: Register for U.S. Treasury Department​

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1889: Brigadier General, U.S. Army on the retired list of officers​

Died: March 10, 1898

Place of Death: Bernardo Beach, California

Cause of Death: Pneumonia

Age at time of Death: 78 years old

Original Burial Place: Rosedale Cemetery, Los Angeles, California

Final Burial Place: Arlington National Cemetery, Arlington, Virginia

 

[NedBaldwin]

For Mr Baldwin: My beef is the uncertainty and the use of the term snippy and that somehow some people think you're well informed about Rosecrans. Anyone writing about Rosecrans should know about this episode. It's not my job in this space to instruct people about the episode. It's well covered in books.
Ultimately people have to determine what standards of historical research they want to hold themselves to.

The episode is well covered. I described it accurately.

We know you dont believe in holding authors to high standards

 

[David Moore]

Mr Baldwin ironically I'm indebted to you for reigniting my curiosity about Iuka. I discovered things that didn't make it into my Rosecrans book.

I probably should dedicate my second book to you and the idea that historical investigation should never end and all conventional wisdom
can and should be questioned.
I think we can pause our discussions for a while.
I'll be sure to let you, Mr Hawk and everyone else know when my Iuka book is out. Hopefully next year. Meanwhile there's a new Rosecrans bio and a new Frank Varney book coming out next year.
Happy belated Rosecrans Birthday.

 

[jackt62]

Grant only took over the downriver movement at the end of January 1863.
He created the appearance of activity in February (Lake Providence, Yazoo Pass, etc)
But then there was clear lack of success in March.
This did lead to anxiety in DC, including discussion whether someone else should take over.

Grant's political connection with Washburne and the fact that he demonstrated a gritty determination were attributes which allowed him much slack or leeway. The administration was not necessarily as forgiving to other commanders who lacked those attributes.

 

[jackt62]

You're ignoring that Lincoln and Halleck didn't blame Grant for Chickasaw Bayou because Lincoln and Halleck were to blame

How so? Is this referring to McClernand's attempt to obtain independent command from Lincoln and thereby beating Grant to Vicksburg?

 

[David Moore]

This is from a letter written in October 13 1862 that I saw on Dan Masters Civil War
Chronicles website. It is about the Battle of Corinth.
On and on they came up, and over the fallen trees and our line on the right gave back, back until the foes again trod the streets of Corinth. The times were desperate and something had to be done or the day and our all was lost. Leaping forward, General Rosecrans threw himself among his flying legions and, as if by magic, his presence and unequalled bravery restored order out of chaos and shouting, wild and long, they again faced the fore and dealt him blows thick and fast and in turn the enemy was forced back, and all that he had gained was lost."

How can I not want to learn more and talk about General Rosecrans?


https://dan-masters-civil-war.blogspot.com/?m=1







https://dan-masters-civil-war.blogspot.com/?m=1

 

[jackt62]

Grant actually was active in that period, which runs from roughly the 17th of January (when Grant comes downriver to Napoleon to take command) to late March. During that period, there are five separate attempts to advance on Vicksburg. How many attempts to advance on Bragg did Rosecrans make in the same period? Any

Grant did make those attempts but even Lincoln never put much stock in them panning out. The issue to me is that Lincoln gave Grant a lot of slack because he had faith in Grant's ability to eventually succeed. It also helped that Grant played his political hand in a canny way, unlike Rosecrans whose outspokenness often got him into hot water.

 

[tony_gunter]

How so? Is this referring to McClernand's attempt to obtain independent command from Lincoln and thereby beating Grant to Vicksburg?

Because Chickasaw Bayou was never part of Grants plan until Grant was told to make it part of his plan.

Lincoln wanted an attack on Vicksburg in the fall. Halleck obliged by picking the target, the timeframe, and the commander.

 

[NedBaldwin]

...The administration was not necessarily as forgiving to other commanders who lacked those attributes.

.... The issue to me is that Lincoln gave Grant a lot of slack because he had faith in Grant's ability to eventually succeed.

A lot of slack compared to what? Not as forgiving to whom? Who are these other commanders not given slack?

Certainly not Rosecrans who was given a lot a lot of slack

 

[trice]

Grant did make those attempts but even Lincoln never put much stock in them panning out. The issue to me is that Lincoln gave Grant a lot of slack because he had faith in Grant's ability to eventually succeed. It also helped that Grant played his political hand in a canny way, unlike Rosecrans whose outspokenness often got him into hot water.

I think you are missing the point. It isn't about those attempts having a high chance of success. It is about actually doing things to make the situation go forward.

Lincoln had experienced many problems with generals telling him what they could not do, digging in their heels, arguing about all the things they needed, refusing to move. Rosecrans was one of those, but at least he actually did go to seek out the enemy and fight when he thought he had everything ready -- some seemed to Lincoln like they would never move at all.

Grant kept trying things, doing this and pushing that. He had ideas of how to go forward, not sit and wait for a build-up. Halleck left him without direction for a large part of 1862 -- and Grant wanted activity, so he started moving. Grant's thoughts were about getting at the enemy and working with what he could get, not waiting for perfection.

This translates into greater trust from above. Grant isn't a guy you have to poke and prod into motion. Rosecrans sure looks like it to Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck. For most of the first half of 1863, Rosecrans fought taking steps against Bragg, digging in, demanding more from Washington. Grant was being active. There is an obvious contrast between the two of them, and it is a difference that explains part of why Grant was allowed to stay in command and why Rosecrans made enemies willing to see him go.

 

[tony_gunter]

A lot of slack compared to what? Not as forgiving to whom? Who are these other commanders not given slack?

Certainly not Rosecrans who was given a lot a lot of slack

Yeah, Lincoln's faith in Grant is grossly overstated. Lincoln sends McClernand into Grant's department to carry out his vision of how Vicksburg should be taken. Halleck obviates that by ordering Sherman to conduct the attack before McClernand could arrive. Grant spends the next month repositioning his troops to the river. Grant lands at Young's Point January 28th and begins issuing orders to execute his vision. Just over two months later Lincoln has spies inside Grant's department trying to figure out if Grant should be relieved of command.

 

[jackt62]

A lot of slack compared to what? Not as forgiving to whom? Who are these other commanders not given slack?

Certainly not Rosecrans who was given a lot a lot of slack

Lincoln's faith in Grant is grossly overstated.

Which rounds out a more subtle picture of Grant. Lincoln may not have necessarily had the greatest and fullest trust or faith in Grant during the first 2 years of the war, but he was willing to let Grant pursue his own methods because 1) in comparison to other Union commanders, Grant showed a gritty aggressiveness, and 2) Lincoln had few alternatives after going through a succession of commanders from McDowell and Pope to Buell and Hooker, not to mention hesitancy on the part of a Thomas or Burnside in gaining higher command.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I'll be sure to let you, Mr Hawk and everyone else know when my Iuka book is out. Hopefully next year. Meanwhile there's a new Rosecrans bio and a new Frank Varney book coming out next year.

And I'm sure the books will be fairly evaluated by historians and readers of history, and judged for accuracy, and bias, and misrepresentations, and so on.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Here's the journalist Henry Villards impression of Rosecrans during early '63:

It was not difficult for me to get on a confidential footing with Rosecrans. In fact, he freely offered his confidence to me of his own accord, and thus enabled me promptly to take a correct measure of the man. He showed at once that his disagreements with the Washington authorities were the uppermost thoughts in his mind, and that it gratified him greatly to express his ill-humor towards them. Indeed, he criticised General Halleck and Secretary Stanton with such freedom - with such a total disregard of official propriety - not once, but repeatedly, that it really embarrassed me to listen to him, although, fortunately, he was content to do the talking without expecting sympathetic echoes from me.​

​

He dwelt upon the disregard of some of his wishes by those superiors as a public wrong, and denounced as criminal their efforts to force him into the offensive before he was completely ready. Nor did he hesitate to expatiate upon his plans for future operations, and this with scarcely concealed self-appreciation. He evidently believed that he was destined to play the most prominent part and reach the greatest distinction among all the Union generals.​

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He unfolded to me his conception of the grand strategy by which the triumph of the North could be assured, coupling it with a broad intimation that Halleck and Stanton would have to be got out of the way, leaving me to infer that, after this was done, the next necessary step was to put him in the former's place.​

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Talk of this kind was so regularly repeated by him that I could not help concluding that he was anxious to impress me with his greatness and to have that impression reflected in the Tribune. There was a correspondent attached to his headquarters, W. D. Bickham, who did that sort of work for him very willingly in the columns of the Cincinnati Commercial.​

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But the more "Old Rosey," as the puffer in question had nicknamed him, tried to make me help in pointing him out as the great and only hope of the country, the less I was inclined to gratify him, and the smaller grew my faith in his fitness to command a large army and lead it to victory.​

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Notwithstanding his transparent vanity and love of approbation, he tried to make me -and, for that matter, everybody else, including his superiors- believe that he disliked publicity and shrank especially from newspaper notoriety.​

 

[Irishtom29]

Here's the journalist Henry Villards impression of Rosecrans during early '63:...

Well, Santa Anna might have been the Napoleon of the West but it seems Rosecrans was the McClellan of the West.

 

[David Moore]

Mr Hawk quoted - not for the first time I think - from Villard's book which was published around 1904. It's not that what Villard wrote was entirely wrong - or right fior fhar matter- but that it's so far removed from the events and personages that it's become unimportant.Villard - a newspaperman, businessman and power in the Republican Party was neither a historian nor impartial. He is an interesting person
Garfield offers a much better and closer in time insight into Rosecrans' mindset in the summer of 1863. Some of the letters Garfield wrote may be available on line and when the research libraries reopen Mr Hawk and others might want to go to a good university library and look at the several books that have transcripts of Garfield's letters. I cite some in my book - but I know that's an automatic turnoff to some.

 

[David Moore]

Well, Santa Anna might have been the Napoleon of the West but it seems Rosecrans was the McClellan of the West.

Well they were both Democrats not a good thing fior a general to be in Republican dominated Washington. You think the eye witnesses that praise Rosecrans that I have cited - I've got plenty more- were delusional, lying maybe bribed by Rosecrans?
Just kidding. They were honest, simple men telling the truth as they saw it. We should honor, respect snd believe them.

 

[tony_gunter]

Here's the journalist Henry Villards impression of Rosecrans during early '63:

It was not difficult for me to get on a confidential footing with Rosecrans. In fact, he freely offered his confidence to me of his own accord, and thus enabled me promptly to take a correct measure of the man. He showed at once that his disagreements with the Washington authorities were the uppermost thoughts in his mind, and that it gratified him greatly to express his ill-humor towards them. Indeed, he criticised General Halleck and Secretary Stanton with such freedom -​

To be fair, Halleck really was that bad.

Or was Halleck simply the fall guy, and Lincoln was calling the shots and using Halleck to shield him from blame?

 

[wausaubob]

I think you are missing the point. It isn't about those attempts having a high chance of success. It is about actually doing things to make the situation go forward.

Lincoln had experienced many problems with generals telling him what they could not do, digging in their heels, arguing about all the things they needed, refusing to move. Rosecrans was one of those, but at least he actually did go to seek out the enemy and fight when he thought he had everything ready -- some seemed to Lincoln like they would never move at all.

Grant kept trying things, doing this and pushing that. He had ideas of how to go forward, not sit and wait for a build-up. Halleck left him without direction for a large part of 1862 -- and Grant wanted activity, so he started moving. Grant's thoughts were about getting at the enemy and working with what he could get, not waiting for perfection.

This translates into greater trust from above. Grant isn't a guy you have to poke and prod into motion. Rosecrans sure looks like it to Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck. For most of the first half of 1863, Rosecrans fought taking steps against Bragg, digging in, demanding more from Washington. Grant was being active. There is an obvious contrast between the two of them, and it is a difference that explains part of why Grant was allowed to stay in command and why Rosecrans made enemies willing to see him go.

Rosecrans' main problem was with Edwin Stanton. But Lincoln and Seward may have been the additional reason Rosecrans never got a significant second command. When Sherman and Thomas had to replace McPherson, Thomas made no effort to get Rosecrans back into Georgia. So poor Bill Rosecrans had a few more problems than disagreements with General Grant.

 

[DanSBHawk]

To be fair, Halleck really was that bad.

Or was Halleck simply the fall guy, and Lincoln was calling the shots and using Halleck to shield him from blame?

I don't have a strong opinion of Halleck. He was very competent in some ways.

Once he got to Washington, I think he just tried to avoid any actual responsibility.

 

[wausaubob]

Here's the journalist Henry Villards impression of Rosecrans during early '63:

It was not difficult for me to get on a confidential footing with Rosecrans. In fact, he freely offered his confidence to me of his own accord, and thus enabled me promptly to take a correct measure of the man. He showed at once that his disagreements with the Washington authorities were the uppermost thoughts in his mind, and that it gratified him greatly to express his ill-humor towards them. Indeed, he criticised General Halleck and Secretary Stanton with such freedom - with such a total disregard of official propriety - not once, but repeatedly, that it really embarrassed me to listen to him, although, fortunately, he was content to do the talking without expecting sympathetic echoes from me.​

​

He dwelt upon the disregard of some of his wishes by those superiors as a public wrong, and denounced as criminal their efforts to force him into the offensive before he was completely ready. Nor did he hesitate to expatiate upon his plans for future operations, and this with scarcely concealed self-appreciation. He evidently believed that he was destined to play the most prominent part and reach the greatest distinction among all the Union generals.​

​

He unfolded to me his conception of the grand strategy by which the triumph of the North could be assured, coupling it with a broad intimation that Halleck and Stanton would have to be got out of the way, leaving me to infer that, after this was done, the next necessary step was to put him in the former's place.​

​

Talk of this kind was so regularly repeated by him that I could not help concluding that he was anxious to impress me with his greatness and to have that impression reflected in the Tribune. There was a correspondent attached to his headquarters, W. D. Bickham, who did that sort of work for him very willingly in the columns of the Cincinnati Commercial.​

​

But the more "Old Rosey," as the puffer in question had nicknamed him, tried to make me help in pointing him out as the great and only hope of the country, the less I was inclined to gratify him, and the smaller grew my faith in his fitness to command a large army and lead it to victory.​

​

Notwithstanding his transparent vanity and love of approbation, he tried to make me -and, for that matter, everybody else, including his superiors- believe that he disliked publicity and shrank especially from newspaper notoriety.​

Villard got around. He was not a good guy to have saying negative things about a person.