★ ★ Rosecrans, William S.

William Starke "Old Rosy" Rosecrans​

Born: September 6, 1819

Birthplace: Delaware County, Ohio

Father: Crandall Rosecrans 1794 – 1848

Mother: Jemima Hopkins 1794 – 1861

Wife: Ann Eliza Hegeman 1823 – 1883

(Buried: Mount Olivet Cemetery, Washington, D.C.)​

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Married: August 24, 1843 at St. Paul's Church in New York City, New York

Children:

Rev. Adrian Louis Rosecrans 1849 – 1876​

(Buried: Saint Paul the Apostle Church Vault, Manhattan, New York)​

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Sister Mary Louise "Sister St. Charles" Rosecrans 1852 – 1878​

(Buried: Ursuline Cemetery, Saint Martin, Ohio)​

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Lily Elizabeth Rosecrans Toole 1854 – 1939​

(Buried: Resurrection Cemetery, Helena, Montana)​

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Anna Delores "Anita" Rosecrans 1857 – 1903​

(Buried: Old Saint Mary's Catholic Cemetery, Helena, Montana)​

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Carl Frederic Rosecrans 1860 – 1926​

(Buried: Calvary Cemetery, Los Angeles, California)​

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Charlotte Rosecrans 1862 - 1862​

Education:

1842: Graduated from West Point Military Academy – (5th​ in class)​

Occupation before War:

1842 – 1843: Brevet 2nd​ Lt. United States Army, Corps of Engineers​

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1842 – 1843: Assistant Engineer for Hampton Roads Fortifications​

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1843 – 1853: 2nd​ Lt. United States Army, Corps of Engineers​

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1843 – 1844: Assistant Engineering Professor at West Point​

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1844 – 1845: Assistant Philosophy Professor at West Point​

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1845 – 1846: Assistant Engineering Professor at West Point​

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1846 – 1847: Principal Assistant Engineering Professor at West Point​

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1847 – 1853: Superintendent Engineer of Repairs at Fort Adams​

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1852 – 1853: Superintendent Engineer of Surveys of Taunton River​

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1852 – 1853: Superintendent Engineer Repairs on Goat Island​

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1853 – 1854: 1st​ Lt. United States Army, Corps of Engineers​

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1853 – 1854: Superintendent Engineer, Washington Navy Yard​

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1854: Resigned from United States Army on April 1st​​

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1854 – 1855: Civil Engineer, and Architect, in Cincinnati, Ohio​

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1855 – 1857: Superintendent of Coal Company, in Coal River, Virginia​

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1856 – 1857: President of Coal River Navigation Company​

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1857 – 1861: Manufacturer of Kerosene Oil in Cincinnati, Ohio​

Civil War Career:

1861: Volunteer Aide to McClellan for Department of the Ohio​

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1861: Colonel, and Chief Engineer in the Union Army​

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1861: Colonel of 23rd​ Ohio Infantry Regiment​

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1861: Commander of Camp Chase, Ohio​

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1861 – 1867: Brigadier General in United States Army​

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1861: Brigade Commander at Battle of Rich Mountain​

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1861: Commander of the Union Army, Department of the Ohio​

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1861 – 1862: Commander of the Army Department of Western Virginia​

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1861: Successful Commander at Battle of Carnifex Ferry​

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1862 – 1866: Major General of Union Army, Volunteers​

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1862: Division Commander at the Siege of Corinth, Mississippi​

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1862: Commander of the Union Army of the Mississippi​

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1862: Successful Commander at Battle of Iuka, Mississippi​

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1862: Union Army Commander of District of Corinth, Mississippi​

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1862: Successful Commander at 2nd​ Battle of Corinth, Mississippi​

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1862 – 1863: Union Army Commander of Army of the Cumberland​

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1862 – 1863: Successful Commander at Battle of Stones River, Tennessee​

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1863: Union Army Commander Occupation of Bridgeport – Stevenson​

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1863: Union Army Commander crossing of Cumberland Mountains​

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1863: Unsuccessful Commander at Battle of Chickamuga, Georgia​

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1863: Commenced fortifying Chattanooga, Tennessee​

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1863 – 1864: Awaiting Orders in Cincinnati, Ohio​

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1864: Union Army Commander of Department of the Missouri​

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1864 – 1865: Awaiting Orders in Cincinnati, Ohio​

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1865: Brevetted Major General, U.S. Army, for Service at Stones River​

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1865 – 1867: On Leave of Absence from the United States Army​

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1866: Mustered out of the Union Army on January 15th​​

Occupation after War:

1861 – 1867: Brigadier General in United States Army​

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1865 – 1867: On Leave of Absence from the United States Army​

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1867: Resigned from United States Army on March 28th​​

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1868 – 1869: U.S. Minister to the Republic of Mexico​

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1869: Declined Democratic Nomination for Governor of Ohio​

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1869 – 1881: Civil and Mining Engineer, Railroad Enterprises in Mexico​

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1871 – 1881: President of San Jose Mining Company​

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1878 – 1881: President of Safety Powder Company in San Francisco​

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1881 – 1885: United States Congressman from California​

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1883 – 1885: House Chairman of Military Affairs Committee​

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1885 – 1893: Register for U.S. Treasury Department​

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1889: Brigadier General, U.S. Army on the retired list of officers​

Died: March 10, 1898

Place of Death: Bernardo Beach, California

Cause of Death: Pneumonia

Age at time of Death: 78 years old

Original Burial Place: Rosedale Cemetery, Los Angeles, California

Final Burial Place: Arlington National Cemetery, Arlington, Virginia

 

[NedBaldwin]

Your quote is from a book written in 1895 by Ward Lamon. It is not from Lincoln's time much less from his pen. Lincoln apparently knew next to nothing about about Grant judging by this quote: ...

The sourcing for this is second hand from
J Russell Jones - part of the Galen Illinois crowd- and a book written by Ida Tarbell published in the 1920s.

So first you critique him for using a book from 1895 that was not from Lincolns pen, but then you counter it with a book you say was published in the 1920s (I think it first appeared around 1899) which was also not from Lincoln's pen. Why should we "judge" by your quote and not his?

 

[tony_gunter]

So what we are really talking here is the period after that, from late January to March of 1863. This is the two canal attempts, the Yazoo Pass expedition, Steele's Bayou expedition and the Lake Providence expedition. None of those works out. OTOH, none of them looks like a disaster. They are just attempts that might have worked, and there really aren't a lot of other things to try until the Spring comes. I would not think screwups would be a good description.

In April, Grant makes his real attempt. The Vicksburg Campaign then becomes a huge success, legendary in American military circles.

Grant wrote on January 18th that his plan of attack was to get south of the city:

January 18, 1863 231
To Maj. Gen. Henry JV. Halleck
Napolion Arkansas Jany I8th [1863] Maj Gen H W Halleck Genl in Chief
McClernands command is at this place Will move down the River today Should Banks pass Port Hudson this force will be ready to cooperate on Vicksburg at any time What may be necessary to reduce the place I do not yet know but since the late rains think our troops must get below the city to be used effectively.
U S Grant Maj Genl

His orders after landing at Young's Point were in support of that goal: Lake Providence (which was successful by the way, the 250 ton steamer Sam Young sailed into Bayou Macon and back to prove the viability of the route) was pursued to open the interior of Louisiana to forage. Yazoo Pass was envisioned as a raid to break the railroad at Grenada and destroy any Confederate ships in the Yazoo River. Duckport Canal was pursued to move flatboats past the city. Grant's Canal was pursued mostly because Lincoln was fixated on it.

That's not to say he wasn't flexible enough to utilize these for other purposes. He considered sending reinforcements to Banks through Lake Providence. He sent a division of troops through Yazoo Pass after it proved more navigable than expected. When Porter waxed optimistic about Steele Bayou, he pondered the possibility of sending men to the support of Ross to besiege Fort Pemberton.

But Steele Bayou was Porter's baby. Porter was halfway to Rolling Fork before Porter ever told him about it. Grant sent Sherman as a reconnaissance in force to determine the viability of moving troops by land, but Sherman reported back fairly quickly that the land was too covered in water to effectively move troops. Luckily, this recon mission placed Sherman close to Porter because Porter got his butt stuck.

And these operations had unintended benefits. Grant's Canal shifted heavy guns to a less effective position at Warrenton. Lake Providence flooded millions of square miles in Louisiana, effectively screening Grant's move south of the city. Yazoo Pass drew Confederate scouts into the Yazoo swamps where they could not be readily recalled (this one was a killer: when Grant crossed the river, Pemberton resorted to abject amateurs for scouting). It also convinced Pemberton that the boats sailing north with troops on board were moving them east to reinforce Rosecrans, causing Pemberton to release some of his troops in that direction.

The operations against Vicksburg in February and March 1863 were not a series of failures, it was just Grant playing chess while the Confederates played checkers.

 

[tony_gunter]

You're ignoring that Lincoln and Halleck didn't blame Grant for Chickasaw Bayou because Lincoln and Halleck were to blame

That's not Cadwallader Washburn wrote to his brother Elihu. You know the silk purse out of a sow w's War quote. It's in the Grant Papers

Cadwallader Washburn wasn't privy to the fact that Halleck, at the insistence of Lincoln, directly ordered Grant to end his overland campaign and send Sherman downriver to attack Vicksburg.

Washburn was also butthurt that Grant didn't place him in command of the Yazoo Pass expedition.

 

[Lost Cause]

People obsess over Grant being surprised, at Shiloh or wherever. But probably one of the worst and portent surprises was when Rosecrans, on about Sept 12, '63, gradually realized that Bragg was not running away but concentrating for battle.

And Rosecrans realized he had his own forces scattered.

Well, Grant was placed in the role of second fiddle heading southbound toward Corinth. Lincoln had to defend northern criticism of Grant then and again throughout the war, a portion of which is merely regurgitated today based on documented incidents. Fortunately, for Grant, Lincoln had faith that when Grant fell, he would be forward moving. Moreover, Grant had the resources in both theaters of operations to keep moving.

 

[uaskme]

Rosecrans sends Negley down Stevens Gap and into McLemore's cove on 9/14. This is when Rosecrans determined Bragg wasn't retreating. Halleck advised Rosecrans to go South as far as Dalton. Washington intelligence was telling Rosecrans Bragg was sending troops to Lee. So, Negley escapes the AOT's ineptitude and falls back to Lookout Mountain. Halleck wires Grant on the 15th. that Bragg is being enforced and Rosecrans is in trouble. Tells Grant to relieve Rosecrans. Rosecrans has Telegraph service direct to Washington. If Halleck had of informed Rosecrans of this development, he could of fallen back to the west side of Lookout and advanced to Chattanooga. He could of consolidated his forces in Chattanooga instead of at Lee and Gordon's mill and waited for Troops from Burnside and Grant. Would of saved the Federals 1/3 of their Army and 20k plus animals, 40 pieces of artillery and everything else.

Curious everyone else new Bragg was being re-enforced but Rosecrans.

 

[David Moore]

Cadwallader Washburn wasn't privy to the fact that Halleck, at the insistence of Lincoln, directly ordered Grant to end his overland campaign and send Sherman downriver to attack Vicksburg.

Washburn was also butthurt that Grant didn't place him in command of the Yazoo Pass expedition.

I'm guessing you haven't actually read the letters Cadwallader sent to his brother Elihu? Otherwise why not cite from them?

 

[trice]

So IMO

Your quote is from a book written in 1895 by Ward Lamon. It is not from Lincoln's time much less from his pen. Lincoln apparently knew next to nothing about about Grant judging by this quote:
"About all I know of Grant I have got from you," Mr. Lincoln told Congressman Elihu Washburne that winter. "I have never seen him. Who else besides you knows anything about Grant?" Washburne replied: "I know very little about him. He is my townsman but I never saw very much of him. The only man who really knows Grant is [J. Russell] Jones. He has summer and wintered with him."

The sourcing for this is second hand from
J Russell Jones - part of the Galen Illinois crowd- and a book written by Ida Tarbell published in the 1920s.

I have gone through many of the Washburne Papers in the Library of Congress and I have found nothing that indicates Washburne ever lost
faith or interest in Grant. He had invested too much in him. The pertinent question was whether Washburne would push Grant for the nomination in
1864 or wait until 1868.
The Washburne Papers are available on line and I recommend you look at them instead of citing secondary and tertiary sources easily found on the Internet.

None of this has anything to do with my post.

 

[David Moore]

So first you critique him for using a book from 1895 that was not from Lincolns pen, but then you counter it with a book you say was published in the 1920s (I think it first appeared around 1899) which was also not from Lincoln's pen. Why should we "judge" by your quote and not his?

You are making my point: there are many post war recollections about CW personages and events and one has to be careful
and skeptical of their veracity.
The original poster didn't even mention the original source but rather cited an Internet web page about Lincoln and his friends. On the site he referenced is the quote from Jones/Tarbellthat I mentioned. A more thorough discussion of Washburne, Grant and Lincoln would have drawn attention to the Jones quote. However it appears the purpose of the originali post wasn't really to broaden the discussion but to narrow it to a very specific point of view.
I also encouraged the original poster to look at the Washburne Papers which are now available on line. So I am skeptical of most all post CW recollections especially those written after the deaths of most of the participants.
You and I first crossed paths on another site where you reviewed Frank Varney's book.
You may find it interesting that his second book will come out next year.
Also because of your comments about Iuka I revisited the battle - meaning did deep research including visits to research libraries- and discovered very interesting new - to me- information about the battle. Spoiler alert: It is not favorable to Grant. I hope to have a book written - the closure of libraries has set everything back- in a year or so. If I were to dedicate it to the person who spurred me to revisit Iuka it would be you. I accepted the challenge to re-examine my conclusions. Isn't that what scholarship should do? I also document and note when statements were made.

 

[tony_gunter]

I'm guessing you haven't actually read the letters Cadwallader sent to his brother Elihu? Otherwise why not cite from them?

What relevance are you asserting that these letters have to Halleck countermanding Grant's plans and ordering Sherman off on a wild goose chase downriver?

Grant had zero interest in attacking Chickasaw Bayou until Halleck had all but ordered him to do so. In the end, Halleck literally had to order him to do so.

Halleck picked the target, the timeframe, and the commander.

 

[David Moore]

None of this has anything to do with my post.

I don't believe I was referencing anything you wrote rather the person with Hawk in his name.
I may have erred in where I placed my comment.

 

[tony_gunter]

What relevance are you asserting that these letters have to Halleck countermanding Grant's plans and ordering Sherman off on a wild goose chase downriver?

Grant had zero interest in attacking Chickasaw Bayou until Halleck had all but ordered him to do so. In the end, Halleck literally had to order him to do so.

Halleck picked the target, the timeframe, and the commander.

And although I consider Washburn's opinion to be irrelevant with respect to Grant's culpability for Chickasaw Bayou, this is the letter that explains what I was saying about Cadwallader Washburn's butthurt towards Grant in March 1863.

"With great labor Col. Wilson & myself opened the Yazoo Pass, in the face of every possible discouragement, and after it was pronounced an impracticable & foolish undertaking by nearly all prominent Army officers here. Having had the utmost faith in the undertaking from the outset, and believing then as now, that it was the way to take Vicksburgh, I should have been gratified to have had some command in connection with the advance expedition—that however is past, and to the future only that I care to look. The President has seen fit to appoint & the Senate to confirm me as a Maj Genl I need not say that I should like a command on this Expedition such as my rank would properly entitle me to." Cadwallader Washburn to Grant, March 17 1863

Washburn thought he was entitled to command the Yazoo Pass expedition. Instead, Grant appointed Ross, then Quinby, then McPherson as Washburn sat and fumed, a mere commander of cavalry at Helena and Moon Lake.

 

[tony_gunter]

Since this thread is about Rosecrans and we have several Rosecrans experts here ... Halleck hinted to Grant in late March that the first general to score a major victory would receive a promotion to Major General of the Regular Army. Did Halleck send the same prompt to Rosecrans? @NedBaldwin did he send the same prompt to Banks?

 

[DanSBHawk]

The Washburne Papers are available on line and I recommend you look at them instead of citing secondary and tertiary sources easily found on the Internet.

Says the person who posted a photo of a Monocacy park sign. Sometimes the discussion over sources is very selective and predictable.

 

[David Moore]

I posted a sign from the Monocacy Battlefield that said Grant was surprised by Early's movement to Washington. The point is Grant in 1864 was still being surprised.
I think the beef is with the NPS.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Since this thread is about Rosecrans and we have several Rosecrans experts here ... Halleck hinted to Grant in late March that the first general to score a major victory would receive a promotion to Major General of the Regular Army. Did Halleck send the same prompt to Rosecrans? @NedBaldwin did he send the same prompt to Banks?

The message was sent to Hooker, Grant and Rosecrans. I think Rosecrans made some sort of snippy reply. Grant said nothing. Not sure what Hooker did, but it didnt matter for him becuase his next act was a major defeat.

Banks was clearly a Volunteer general whereas the other three were seen as regular army types even though they had all been in civil life when the war started. Also Banks command status by then was not as high as the other three - they each had 3 to 4 times as many men under their command. He was in the second tier of Department commanders like Curtis in Missouri or Hunter/Foster on the Carolina coast.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Curious everyone else new Bragg was being re-enforced but Rosecrans.

As noted previously in the thread, Grenville Dodge tried to warn Rosecrans, but Rosecrans told him to mind his own business.

 

[David Moore]

"I think Rosecrans made some sort of snippy reply."
Wow.
Fellows, the joke's on me. I've been wasting my time.

 

[NedBaldwin]

"I think Rosecrans made some sort of snippy reply."
Wow.
Fellows, the joke's on me. I've been wasting my time.

Did he not? Whats your beef here?

 

[tony_gunter]

The message was sent to Hooker, Grant and Rosecrans. I think Rosecrans made some sort of snippy reply. Grant said nothing. Not sure what Hooker did, but it didnt matter for him becuase his next act was a major defeat.

Banks was clearly a Volunteer general whereas the other three were seen as regular army types even though they had all been in civil life when the war started. Also Banks command status by then was not as high as the other three - they each had 3 to 4 times as many men under their command. He was in the second tier of Department commanders like Curtis in Missouri or Hunter/Foster on the Carolina coast.

IIRC, Grant did reply. Something to the effect "I'll have Vicksburg in a month or die trying." I guess he was off by a couple of weeks

 

[David Moore]

For Mr Baldwin: My beef is the uncertainty and the use of the term snippy and that somehow some people think you're well informed about Rosecrans. Anyone writing about Rosecrans should know about this episode. It's not my job in this space to instruct people about the episode. It's well covered in books.
Ultimately people have to determine what standards of historical research they want to hold themselves to.