★ ★  Rosecrans, William S.

William Starke “Old Rosy” Rosecrans

:us34stars:
Rosecrans.jpg


Born: September 6, 1819

Birthplace: Delaware County, Ohio

Father: Crandall Rosecrans 1794 – 1848

Mother: Jemima Hopkins 1794 – 1861

Wife: Ann Eliza Hegeman 1823 – 1883
(Buried: Mount Olivet Cemetery, Washington, D.C.)​
Married: August 24, 1843 at St. Paul’s Church in New York City, New York

Children:

Rev. Adrian Louis Rosecrans 1849 – 1876​
(Buried: Saint Paul the Apostle Church Vault, Manhattan, New York)​
Sister Mary Louise “Sister St. Charles” Rosecrans 1852 – 1878​
(Buried: Ursuline Cemetery, Saint Martin, Ohio)​
Lily Elizabeth Rosecrans Toole 1854 – 1939​
(Buried: Resurrection Cemetery, Helena, Montana)​
Anna Delores “Anita” Rosecrans 1857 – 1903​
(Buried: Old Saint Mary’s Catholic Cemetery, Helena, Montana)​
Carl Frederic Rosecrans 1860 – 1926​
(Buried: Calvary Cemetery, Los Angeles, California)​
Charlotte Rosecrans 1862 - 1862​

Education:

1842: Graduated from West Point Military Academy – (5th in class)​

Occupation before War:

1842 – 1843: Brevet 2nd Lt. United States Army, Corps of Engineers​
1842 – 1843: Assistant Engineer for Hampton Roads Fortifications​
1843 – 1853: 2nd Lt. United States Army, Corps of Engineers​
1843 – 1844: Assistant Engineering Professor at West Point​
1844 – 1845: Assistant Philosophy Professor at West Point​
1845 – 1846: Assistant Engineering Professor at West Point​
1846 – 1847: Principal Assistant Engineering Professor at West Point​
1847 – 1853: Superintendent Engineer of Repairs at Fort Adams​
1852 – 1853: Superintendent Engineer of Surveys of Taunton River​
1852 – 1853: Superintendent Engineer Repairs on Goat Island​
1853 – 1854: 1st Lt. United States Army, Corps of Engineers​
1853 – 1854: Superintendent Engineer, Washington Navy Yard​
1854: Resigned from United States Army on April 1st
1854 – 1855: Civil Engineer, and Architect, in Cincinnati, Ohio​
1855 – 1857: Superintendent of Coal Company, in Coal River, Virginia​
1856 – 1857: President of Coal River Navigation Company​
1857 – 1861: Manufacturer of Kerosene Oil in Cincinnati, Ohio​

Civil War Career:
Rosecrans 1.png


1861: Volunteer Aide to McClellan for Department of the Ohio​
1861: Colonel, and Chief Engineer in the Union Army​
1861: Colonel of 23rd Ohio Infantry Regiment​
1861: Commander of Camp Chase, Ohio​
1861 – 1867: Brigadier General in United States Army​
1861: Brigade Commander at Battle of Rich Mountain​
1861: Commander of the Union Army, Department of the Ohio​
1861 – 1862: Commander of the Army Department of Western Virginia​
1861: Successful Commander at Battle of Carnifex Ferry​
1862 – 1866: Major General of Union Army, Volunteers​
1862: Division Commander at the Siege of Corinth, Mississippi​
1862: Commander of the Union Army of the Mississippi​
1862: Successful Commander at Battle of Iuka, Mississippi​
1862: Union Army Commander of District of Corinth, Mississippi​
1862: Successful Commander at 2nd Battle of Corinth, Mississippi​
1862 – 1863: Union Army Commander of Army of the Cumberland​
1862 – 1863: Successful Commander at Battle of Stones River, Tennessee​
1863: Union Army Commander Occupation of Bridgeport – Stevenson​
1863: Union Army Commander crossing of Cumberland Mountains​
1863: Unsuccessful Commander at Battle of Chickamuga, Georgia​
1863: Commenced fortifying Chattanooga, Tennessee​
1863 – 1864: Awaiting Orders in Cincinnati, Ohio​
1864: Union Army Commander of Department of the Missouri​
1864 – 1865: Awaiting Orders in Cincinnati, Ohio​
1865: Brevetted Major General, U.S. Army, for Service at Stones River​
1865 – 1867: On Leave of Absence from the United States Army​
1866: Mustered out of the Union Army on January 15th

Occupation after War:
Rosecrans 2.jpg


1861 – 1867: Brigadier General in United States Army​
1865 – 1867: On Leave of Absence from the United States Army​
1867: Resigned from United States Army on March 28th
1868 – 1869: U.S. Minister to the Republic of Mexico​
1869: Declined Democratic Nomination for Governor of Ohio​
1869 – 1881: Civil and Mining Engineer, Railroad Enterprises in Mexico​
1871 – 1881: President of San Jose Mining Company​
1878 – 1881: President of Safety Powder Company in San Francisco​
1881 – 1885: United States Congressman from California​
1883 – 1885: House Chairman of Military Affairs Committee​
1885 – 1893: Register for U.S. Treasury Department​
1889: Brigadier General, U.S. Army on the retired list of officers​

Died: March 10, 1898

Place of Death: Bernardo Beach, California

Cause of Death: Pneumonia

Age at time of Death: 78 years old

Original Burial Place: Rosedale Cemetery, Los Angeles, California

Final Burial Place:
Arlington National Cemetery, Arlington, Virginia
 
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Not to mention that Grant had been surprised at Shiloh, and for that matter, at Donelson when Pillow's breakout attempt caught Grant unawares. Of course, to his credit, Grant remained unflustered in both cases (and as at Chickasaw and Holly Springs), and quickly reformulated his plans to meet the crises. But it is certainly curious that Grant's lack of success or progress at Vicksburg from December 1862 through April 1863 never led to the usually frantic calls that Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck made to threaten other commanders with immediate relief (such as Rosecrans lack of movement until June 1863).
Washburne explains everything.
 
Prove it.

Grant had a Division at Memphis. Could of moved it, didn’t. Grant accepted command on 10/17. Arrived at Chattanooga 10/23. Grant telegraphed Sherman on 10/23 To move to Bridgeport. Final day of Chickamauga was 9/20.
Grant began issuing orders to reinforce Rosecrans on 9/22, after receiving dispatches from Halleck. When Halleck realized Bragg was being reinforced from Virginia, he sent orders for reinforcements for Rosecrans. Grant had been planning to send reinforcements to Banks, but those plans changed and Grant wrote Banks on 9/22 that "We must make no disposition of troops that will endanger the success of Rosecrans." Here is Grant's message on 9/22 to Halleck informing him that he is sending 4 divisions to Rosecrans:

Vicksburg Miss Via Memphis​
Sept 22nd 10:30 Am​
Maj Gen H W Halleck Genl in Chief​
Your dispatch to Maj Gen Hurlbut of the Fifteenth (15th) instant directing reinforcements to be sent Maj Gen Rosecrans is just received. I have ordered two (2) Divisions from here, one from each the Fifteenth (15th) and Seventeenth (17) Army Corps The one from the Seventeenth (17th) Army Corps is already on Steamboats between Vicksburg and Helena, having been previously ordered to Steele. Hurlbut should be able to send one full Division, if not two besides the troops that may return from the Expedition against Little Rock and I have so directed. Genl Banks has asked for another Division. This of course I cannot send him in view of what you require for Rosecrans. Should more troops be required from here for Rosecrans there is sufficient time for orders to reach before transportation can be had—An Army Corps Commander will be sent in command of all troops from here—​
U. S. Grant​
Maj Genl Comdg​

So Grant started issuing orders to send troops as soon as asked. Long before anyone knew that Rosecrans was going to get relieved.
 
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Washburne explains everything.
Nope. Lincoln explains everything.

In the spring of 1863, Senator Benjamin Wade came to see the President and insisted that the American people demanded that he dismiss Grant because the campaign to take Vicksburg had bogged down. Mr. Lincoln later said: “To show to what extent this sentiment prevails, even [Congressman Elihu] Washburne, who has always claimed Grant as his by right of discovery, has deserted him, and demands his removal; and I really believe I am the only friend Grant has left. Grant advises me... that he will take Vicksburg by the Fourth of July, and I believe he will do it; and he shall have the chance.”1​

http://www.mrlincolnandfriends.org/the-officers/ulysses-grant/
 
Grant began issuing orders to reinforce Rosecrans on 9/22, after receiving dispatches from Halleck. When Halleck realized Bragg was being reinforced from Virginia, he sent orders for reinforcements for Rosecrans. Grant had been planning to send reinforcements to Banks, but those plans changed and Grant wrote Banks on 9/22 that "We must make no disposition of troops that will endanger the success of Rosecrans." Here is Grant's message on 9/22 to Halleck informing him that he is sending 4 divisions to Rosecrans:

Vicksburg Miss Via Memphis​
Sept 22nd 10:30 Am​
Maj Gen H W Halleck Genl in Chief​
Your dispatch to Maj Gen Hurlbut of the Fifteenth (15th) instant directing reinforcements to be sent Maj Gen Rosecrans is just received. I have ordered two (2) Divisions from here, one from each the Fifteenth (15th) and Seventeenth (17) Army Corps The one from the Seventeenth (17th) Army Corps is already on Steamboats between Vicksburg and Helena, having been previously ordered to Steele. Hurlbut should be able to send one full Division, if not two besides the troops that may return from the Expedition against Little Rock and I have so directed. Genl Banks has asked for another Division. This of course I cannot send him in view of what you require for Rosecrans. Should more troops be required from here for Rosecrans there is sufficient time for orders to reach before transportation can be had—An Army Corps Commander will be sent in command of all troops from here—​
U. S. Grant​
Maj Genl Comdg​

So Grant started sending troops as soon as asked. Long before anyone knew that Rosecrans was going to get relieved.
He didn’t send them. On 10/24 he orders Sherman to advance to Bridgeport.
 
Prove it.

Grant had a Division at Memphis. Could of moved it, didn’t. Grant accepted command on 10/17. Arrived at Chattanooga 10/23. Grant telegraphed Sherman on 10/23 To move to Bridgeport. Final day of Chickamauga was 9/20.
OK, if you insist. I don't know why people take that attitude. I always have backup available for the things I say in one form or another.

Longstreet's attack routed Rosecrans' right wing at Chickamauga on September 20, 1863.

From O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXI/2 [S# 55]
No. 189.--Report of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Tennessee, including operations since September 22, and march to the relief of Knoxville, with field dispatches November 18-29, and thanks of Congress.

On the 22d day of September, I received a telegraphic dispatch from General Grant, then at Vicksburg, commanding the Department of the Tennessee, requiring me to detach one of my divisions to march to Vicksburg, there to embark for Memphis, where it was to form part of an army to be sent to Chattanooga to re-enforce Genera[ Rosecrans. I designated the First Division, and at 4 p.m. the same day it marched for Vicksburg and embarked the next day.

On the 23d of September, I was summoned to Vicksburg by the general commanding, who showed me several dispatches from the General-in-Chief, which led him to suppose he would have to send me and my whole corps to Memphis and eastward, and I was instructed to prepare for such orders.
It was explained to me that in consequence of the low stage of water in the Mississippi, boats had arrived irregularly and had brought dispatches that seemed to conflict in meaning, and that John E. Smith's division, of McPherson's corps, had been ordered up to Memphis, and that I should take that division and leave one of my own in its stead to hold the line of the Big Black. I detailed my Third Division, General Tuttle, to remain and report to Major-General McPherson, commanding the Seventeenth Corps, at Vicksburg, and that of General John E. Smith, already started for Memphis, was styled the Third Division, though it still belongs to the Seventeenth Army Corps.
This division is also composed of three brigades, commanded by General Matthies, Col. G. B. Raum, of the Fifty-sixth Illinois, and Col. J. I. Alexander, of the Fifty-ninth Indiana.
The Second and Fourth Divisions were started for Vicksburg the moment I was notified that boats were in readiness, and on the 27th of September I embarked in person in the steamer Atlantic for Memphis, followed by a fleet of boats conveying these two divisions. Our progress was slow on account of the unprecedentedly low water in the Mississippi and the scarcity of coal and wood. We were compelled at places to gather fence rails and to land wagons and haul wood from the interior to the boats, but I reached Memphis during the night of the 2d of October, and the other boats came in on the 3d and 4th.
On arrival at Memphis, I saw General Hurlbut and read all the dispatches and letters of instruction of General Halleck, and therein derived my instructions, which I construed to be as follows: To conduct the Fifteenth Army Corps, and all other troops which could be spared from the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, to Athens, Ala., and thence report by letter for orders to General Rosecrans, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, at Chattanooga; to follow substantially the railroad eastward, repairing it as I moved; to look to my own line for supplies, and in no event to depend on General Rosecrans for supplies, as the roads to his rear were already overtaxed to supply his present army.

So there you have absolute proof that Grant down in Vicksburg was already sending a corps of reinforcements to Rosecrans relief by September 23rd and had started sending troops on September 22nd.

Please acknowledge that you have read this and understand that Grant had done so.
 
OK, if you insist. I don't know why people take that attitude. I always have backup available for the things I say in one form or another.

Longstreet's attack routed Rosecrans' right wing at Chickamauga on September 20, 1863.

From O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXI/2 [S# 55]
No. 189.--Report of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Tennessee, including operations since September 22, and march to the relief of Knoxville, with field dispatches November 18-29, and thanks of Congress.

On the 22d day of September, I received a telegraphic dispatch from General Grant, then at Vicksburg, commanding the Department of the Tennessee, requiring me to detach one of my divisions to march to Vicksburg, there to embark for Memphis, where it was to form part of an army to be sent to Chattanooga to re-enforce Genera[ Rosecrans. I designated the First Division, and at 4 p.m. the same day it marched for Vicksburg and embarked the next day.

On the 23d of September, I was summoned to Vicksburg by the general commanding, who showed me several dispatches from the General-in-Chief, which led him to suppose he would have to send me and my whole corps to Memphis and eastward, and I was instructed to prepare for such orders.
It was explained to me that in consequence of the low stage of water in the Mississippi, boats had arrived irregularly and had brought dispatches that seemed to conflict in meaning, and that John E. Smith's division, of McPherson's corps, had been ordered up to Memphis, and that I should take that division and leave one of my own in its stead to hold the line of the Big Black. I detailed my Third Division, General Tuttle, to remain and report to Major-General McPherson, commanding the Seventeenth Corps, at Vicksburg, and that of General John E. Smith, already started for Memphis, was styled the Third Division, though it still belongs to the Seventeenth Army Corps.
This division is also composed of three brigades, commanded by General Matthies, Col. G. B. Raum, of the Fifty-sixth Illinois, and Col. J. I. Alexander, of the Fifty-ninth Indiana.
The Second and Fourth Divisions were started for Vicksburg the moment I was notified that boats were in readiness, and on the 27th of September I embarked in person in the steamer Atlantic for Memphis, followed by a fleet of boats conveying these two divisions. Our progress was slow on account of the unprecedentedly low water in the Mississippi and the scarcity of coal and wood. We were compelled at places to gather fence rails and to land wagons and haul wood from the interior to the boats, but I reached Memphis during the night of the 2d of October, and the other boats came in on the 3d and 4th.
On arrival at Memphis, I saw General Hurlbut and read all the dispatches and letters of instruction of General Halleck, and therein derived my instructions, which I construed to be as follows: To conduct the Fifteenth Army Corps, and all other troops which could be spared from the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, to Athens, Ala., and thence report by letter for orders to General Rosecrans, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, at Chattanooga; to follow substantially the railroad eastward, repairing it as I moved; to look to my own line for supplies, and in no event to depend on General Rosecrans for supplies, as the roads to his rear were already overtaxed to supply his present army.

So there you have absolute proof that Grant down in Vicksburg was already sending a corps of reinforcements to Rosecrans relief by September 23rd and had started sending troops on September 22nd.

Please acknowledge that you have read this and understand that Grant had done so.
On Oct 24, Sherman received Grant’s order to “drop everything east of Bear Creek [Mississippi] and move with you entire force toward Stevenson until you receive further orders.” OR 30(1):713

He brings 4 divisions. Osterhaus’s First Division, Morgan L. Smith’s Second Division, Hugh Ewing’s Fourth Division and John E Smith’s Second Division.

Grant originally thought about attacking Mobile, then repairing the Memphis to Chattanooga RR. But on 10/24 he ordered Sherman to Stevenson.
pp65 Impulse of Victory by Powell
 
Prove it.

Grant had a Division at Memphis. Could of moved it, didn’t. Grant accepted command on 10/17. Arrived at Chattanooga 10/23. Grant telegraphed Sherman on 10/23 To move to Bridgeport. Final day of Chickamauga was 9/20.
Just read the actual records. In late September Grant directed Sherman to leave the Vicksburg area and take 4 divisions to Rosecrans. Halleck instructed that Sherman do so overland from Memphis, so he did. Sherman got to Memphis at the start of October, by which time one of his 4 divisions was already to Corinth, another was just setting out and the other two were just arriving by boats from Vicksburg. This movement began before Grant was promoted. The day Grant accepted the command, Sherman was at Corinth heading east.
 
On Oct 24, Sherman received Grant’s order to “drop everything east of Bear Creek [Mississippi] and move with you entire force toward Stevenson until you receive further orders.” OR 30(1):713
The reason Sherman was "east of Bear Creek" was that he had been ordered to reinforce Rosecrans a month before but Halleck had ordered him to move from Memphis along the rail line repairing it as he went. Sherman had been moving toward Chattanooga for weeks
 
... But it is certainly curious that Grant's lack of success or progress at Vicksburg from December 1862 through April 1863 never led to the usually frantic calls that Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck made to threaten other commanders with immediate relief (such as Rosecrans lack of movement until June 1863).
Grant only took over the downriver movement at the end of January 1863.
He created the appearance of activity in February (Lake Providence, Yazoo Pass, etc)
But then there was clear lack of success in March
This did lead to anxiety in DC, including discussion whether someone else should take over.
The result was that people like Dana and Congressman Washburn went to check on Grant.
They arrived to find progress being made in April and success in May.
So nothing really curious about it to me
 
"But it is certainly curious that Grant's lack of success or progress at Vicksburg from December 1862 through April 1863 never led to the usually frantic calls that Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck made to threaten other commanders with immediate relief (such as Rosecrans lack of movement until June 1863)."

You’re ignoring that Lincoln and Halleck didn’t blame Grant for Chickasaw Bayou because Lincoln and Halleck were to blame 😂
 
Not to mention that Grant had been surprised at Shiloh, and for that matter, at Donelson when Pillow's breakout attempt caught Grant unawares. Of course, to his credit, Grant remained unflustered in both cases (and as at Chickasaw and Holly Springs), and quickly reformulated his plans to meet the crises. But it is certainly curious that Grant's lack of success or progress at Vicksburg from December 1862 through April 1863 never led to the usually frantic calls that Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck made to threaten other commanders with immediate relief (such as Rosecrans lack of movement until June 1863).
Hmm. Grant actually was active in that period, which runs from roughly the 17th of January (when Grant comes downriver to Napoleon to take command) to late March. During that period, there are five separate attempts to advance on Vicksburg. How many attempts to advance on Bragg did Rosecrans make in the same period? Any?

Grant had a reputation as a general who would fight and always sought to get at the enemy. He had good relations with higher command (he did not constantly argue with them) and generally tried to carry out his orders. Rosecrans carried on long disputes with the same people, dug in his heels and insisted on moving only when he was ready. Rosecrans demanded things from the high command; Grant asked for things from the high command. Rosecrans was a fighter, but a general pain to anyone trying to give him orders.

Men like Rosecrans often do not understand the damage they are inflicting on themselves when they act like that. There's an old New York saying for it: "What goes around, comes around". The Bible says "As you sow, so shall you reap". He made an enemy of Stanton, which was probably more of a reason for his relief than anything else. Grant, given carte blanche by Stanton and urged to dump Rosecrans, was happy to go with the flow.
 
OK, if you insist. I don't know why people take that attitude. I always have backup available for the things I say in one form or another.

Longstreet's attack routed Rosecrans' right wing at Chickamauga on September 20, 1863.

From O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXI/2 [S# 55]
No. 189.--Report of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Tennessee, including operations since September 22, and march to the relief of Knoxville, with field dispatches November 18-29, and thanks of Congress.

On the 22d day of September, I received a telegraphic dispatch from General Grant, then at Vicksburg, commanding the Department of the Tennessee, requiring me to detach one of my divisions to march to Vicksburg, there to embark for Memphis, where it was to form part of an army to be sent to Chattanooga to re-enforce Genera[ Rosecrans. I designated the First Division, and at 4 p.m. the same day it marched for Vicksburg and embarked the next day.

On the 23d of September, I was summoned to Vicksburg by the general commanding, who showed me several dispatches from the General-in-Chief, which led him to suppose he would have to send me and my whole corps to Memphis and eastward, and I was instructed to prepare for such orders.
It was explained to me that in consequence of the low stage of water in the Mississippi, boats had arrived irregularly and had brought dispatches that seemed to conflict in meaning, and that John E. Smith's division, of McPherson's corps, had been ordered up to Memphis, and that I should take that division and leave one of my own in its stead to hold the line of the Big Black. I detailed my Third Division, General Tuttle, to remain and report to Major-General McPherson, commanding the Seventeenth Corps, at Vicksburg, and that of General John E. Smith, already started for Memphis, was styled the Third Division, though it still belongs to the Seventeenth Army Corps.
This division is also composed of three brigades, commanded by General Matthies, Col. G. B. Raum, of the Fifty-sixth Illinois, and Col. J. I. Alexander, of the Fifty-ninth Indiana.
The Second and Fourth Divisions were started for Vicksburg the moment I was notified that boats were in readiness, and on the 27th of September I embarked in person in the steamer Atlantic for Memphis, followed by a fleet of boats conveying these two divisions. Our progress was slow on account of the unprecedentedly low water in the Mississippi and the scarcity of coal and wood. We were compelled at places to gather fence rails and to land wagons and haul wood from the interior to the boats, but I reached Memphis during the night of the 2d of October, and the other boats came in on the 3d and 4th.
On arrival at Memphis, I saw General Hurlbut and read all the dispatches and letters of instruction of General Halleck, and therein derived my instructions, which I construed to be as follows: To conduct the Fifteenth Army Corps, and all other troops which could be spared from the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, to Athens, Ala., and thence report by letter for orders to General Rosecrans, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, at Chattanooga; to follow substantially the railroad eastward, repairing it as I moved; to look to my own line for supplies, and in no event to depend on General Rosecrans for supplies, as the roads to his rear were already overtaxed to supply his present army.

So there you have absolute proof that Grant down in Vicksburg was already sending a corps of reinforcements to Rosecrans relief by September 23rd and had started sending troops on September 22nd.

Please acknowledge that you have read this and understand that Grant had done so.
Of course Washington - where the real blame lies- could have - and should have - read in the front page of the NY Herald reírte that Lee was sending troops south. Rosecrans was never I firmed of this until much later. All in my book but I’m guessing you consider it untrustworthy.
(I’d happily send you the original page etc but I’ve learned it makes no difference in getting people to reconsider their opinions.
OK, if you insist. I don't know why people take that attitude. I always have backup available for the things I say in one form or another.

Longstreet's attack routed Rosecrans' right wing at Chickamauga on September 20, 1863.

From O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXI/2 [S# 55]
No. 189.--Report of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Tennessee, including operations since September 22, and march to the relief of Knoxville, with field dispatches November 18-29, and thanks of Congress.

On the 22d day of September, I received a telegraphic dispatch from General Grant, then at Vicksburg, commanding the Department of the Tennessee, requiring me to detach one of my divisions to march to Vicksburg, there to embark for Memphis, where it was to form part of an army to be sent to Chattanooga to re-enforce Genera[ Rosecrans. I designated the First Division, and at 4 p.m. the same day it marched for Vicksburg and embarked the next day.

On the 23d of September, I was summoned to Vicksburg by the general commanding, who showed me several dispatches from the General-in-Chief, which led him to suppose he would have to send me and my whole corps to Memphis and eastward, and I was instructed to prepare for such orders.
It was explained to me that in consequence of the low stage of water in the Mississippi, boats had arrived irregularly and had brought dispatches that seemed to conflict in meaning, and that John E. Smith's division, of McPherson's corps, had been ordered up to Memphis, and that I should take that division and leave one of my own in its stead to hold the line of the Big Black. I detailed my Third Division, General Tuttle, to remain and report to Major-General McPherson, commanding the Seventeenth Corps, at Vicksburg, and that of General John E. Smith, already started for Memphis, was styled the Third Division, though it still belongs to the Seventeenth Army Corps.
This division is also composed of three brigades, commanded by General Matthies, Col. G. B. Raum, of the Fifty-sixth Illinois, and Col. J. I. Alexander, of the Fifty-ninth Indiana.
The Second and Fourth Divisions were started for Vicksburg the moment I was notified that boats were in readiness, and on the 27th of September I embarked in person in the steamer Atlantic for Memphis, followed by a fleet of boats conveying these two divisions. Our progress was slow on account of the unprecedentedly low water in the Mississippi and the scarcity of coal and wood. We were compelled at places to gather fence rails and to land wagons and haul wood from the interior to the boats, but I reached Memphis during the night of the 2d of October, and the other boats came in on the 3d and 4th.
On arrival at Memphis, I saw General Hurlbut and read all the dispatches and letters of instruction of General Halleck, and therein derived my instructions, which I construed to be as follows: To conduct the Fifteenth Army Corps, and all other troops which could be spared from the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, to Athens, Ala., and thence report by letter for orders to General Rosecrans, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, at Chattanooga; to follow substantially the railroad eastward, repairing it as I moved; to look to my own line for supplies, and in no event to depend on General Rosecrans for supplies, as the roads to his rear were already overtaxed to supply his present army.

So there you have absolute proof that Grant down in Vicksburg was already sending a corps of reinforcements to Rosecrans relief by September 23rd and had started sending troops on September 22nd.

Please acknowledge that you have read this and understand that Grant had done so.
"But it is certainly curious that Grant's lack of success or progress at Vicksburg from December 1862 through April 1863 never led to the usually frantic calls that Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck made to threaten other commanders with immediate relief (such as Rosecrans lack of movement until June 1863)."

You’re ignoring that Lincoln and Halleck didn’t blame Grant for Chickasaw Bayou because Lincoln and Halleck were to blame 😂
That’s not Cadwallader Washburn wrote to his brother Elihu. You know the silk purse out of a sow w’s War quote. It’s in the Grant Papers
 
You’re ignoring that Lincoln and Halleck didn’t blame Grant for Chickasaw Bayou because Lincoln and Halleck were to blame 😂
Nope. There is absolutely nothing to back that interpretation.

However, if you step back and look at it, Stones River looks a lot like Shiloh. Rosecrans comes close to being driven into the river on December 31st, his right thrown back in near rout by a surprise assault. Hard fighting and determined leadership by Rosecrans, Thomas and Mendenhall saved the Union about as much as hard fighting and Grant/Sherman/Prentiss did. Good luck helped at both battles. Disjointed Confederate leadership, sometimes bad Confederate leadership, and cumbersome Confederate armies helped at both battles. Grant and Rosecrans both survive.

Lincoln wanted fighters. Lincoln supported both because of it.
 
Hmm. Grant actually was active in that period, which runs from roughly the 17th of January (when Grant comes downriver to Napoleon to take command) to late March. During that period, there are five separate attempts to advance on Vicksburg. How many attempts to advance on Bragg did Rosecrans make in the same period? Any?

Grant had a reputation as a general who would fight and always sought to get at the enemy. He had good relations with higher command (he did not constantly argue with them) and generally tried to carry out his orders. Rosecrans carried on long disputes with the same people, dug in his heels and insisted on moving only when he was ready. Rosecrans demanded things from the high command; Grant asked for things from the high command. Rosecrans was a fighter, but a general pain to anyone trying to give him orders.

Men like Rosecrans often do not understand the damage they are inflicting on themselves when they act like that. There's an old New York saying for it: "What goes around, comes around". The Bible says "As you sow, so shall you reap". He made an enemy of Stanton, which was probably more of a reason for his relief than anything else. Grant, given carte blanche by Stanton and urged to dump Rosecrans, was happy to go with the flow.
Rosecrans probably saved Grant’s career in Mississippi in 1862.
He set up Grant for ultimate victory in Chattanooga in 1863. Grant in turn later got so drunk that it shocked John Rawlins. Of course you might believe John Rawlins was lying. Letter is in Grant Papers.
 
Nope. There is absolutely nothing to back that interpretation.

However, if you step back and look at it, Stones River looks a lot like Shiloh. Rosecrans comes close to being driven into the river on December 31st, his right thrown back in near rout by a surprise assault. Hard fighting and determined leadership by Rosecrans, Thomas and Mendenhall saved the Union about as much as hard fighting and Grant/Sherman/Prentiss did. Good luck helped at both battles. Disjointed Confederate leadership, sometimes bad Confederate leadership, and cumbersome Confederate armies helped at both battles. Grant and Rosecrans both survive.

Lincoln wanted fighters. Lincoln supported both because of it.
Of course a Buell equivalent didn’t show up
at Stones River. Stones River in turn happens after Grant’s and Sherman’s less than stellar performance in Mississippi in late 1862.
 
On Oct 24, Sherman received Grant’s order to “drop everything east of Bear Creek [Mississippi] and move with you entire force toward Stevenson until you receive further orders.” OR 30(1):713

He brings 4 divisions. Osterhaus’s First Division, Morgan L. Smith’s Second Division, Hugh Ewing’s Fourth Division and John E Smith’s Second Division.

Grant originally thought about attacking Mobile, then repairing the Memphis to Chattanooga RR. But on 10/24 he ordered Sherman to Stevenson.
pp65 Impulse of Victory by Powell
Please note again that Grant had ordered Sherman to move up to Memphis in response to the news from Chickamauga on September 22nd and 23rd -- more than one month before the incidents you are talking about here. That is the only reason Sherman has a corps anywhere near Chattanooga.

Your post does not look very much like page 65 of Powell's book. The chapter that starts on page 65 details Sherman's movement from the time he left Memphis (to Corinth and Collierville, where he was attacked by Chalmers). Sherman was following the route of the Memphis & Charleston RR, trying to repair it as he went (growing increasingly doubtful that he could protect it as Chalmers kept raiding him). The order on October 24 you are referring to is Grant's acknowledgement that the effort to repair the RR should be abandoned, that Sherman should gather his troops and move faster to the relief of Chattanooga.

Powell also doesn't say that Grant was talking about attacking Powell here. He attributes that thought to Sherman on page 65, the first paragraph of the chapter:

1631154282963.png
 
Please note again that Grant had ordered Sherman to move up to Memphis in response to the news from Chickamauga on September 22nd and 23rd -- more than one month before the incidents you are talking about here. That is the only reason Sherman has a corps anywhere near Chattanooga.

Your post does not look very much like page 65 of Powell's book. The chapter that starts on page 65 details Sherman's movement from the time he left Memphis (to Corinth and Collierville, where he was attacked by Chalmers). Sherman was following the route of the Memphis & Charleston RR, trying to repair it as he went (growing increasingly doubtful that he could protect it as Chalmers kept raiding him). The order on October 24 you are referring to is Grant's acknowledgement that the effort to repair the RR should be abandoned, that Sherman should gather his troops and move faster to the relief of Chattanooga.

Powell also doesn't say that Grant was talking about attacking Powell here. He attributes that thought to Sherman on page 65, the first paragraph of the chapter:

View attachment 413488

So IMO
Nope. Lincoln explains everything.

In the spring of 1863, Senator Benjamin Wade came to see the President and insisted that the American people demanded that he dismiss Grant because the campaign to take Vicksburg had bogged down. Mr. Lincoln later said: “To show to what extent this sentiment prevails, even [Congressman Elihu] Washburne, who has always claimed Grant as his by right of discovery, has deserted him, and demands his removal; and I really believe I am the only friend Grant has left. Grant advises me... that he will take Vicksburg by the Fourth of July, and I believe he will do it; and he shall have the chance.”1​

http://www.mrlincolnandfriends.org/the-officers/ulysses-grant/
Your quote is from a book written in 1895 by Ward Lamon. It is not from Lincoln’s time much less from his pen. Lincoln apparently knew next to nothing about about Grant judging by this quote:
“About all I know of Grant I have got from you,” Mr. Lincoln told Congressman Elihu Washburne that winter. “I have never seen him. Who else besides you knows anything about Grant?” Washburne replied: “I know very little about him. He is my townsman but I never saw very much of him. The only man who really knows Grant is [J. Russell] Jones. He has summer and wintered with him.”

The sourcing for this is second hand from
J Russell Jones - part of the Galen Illinois crowd- and a book written by Ida Tarbell published in the 1920s.

I have gone through many of the Washburne Papers in the Library of Congress and I have found nothing that indicates Washburne ever lost
faith or interest in Grant. He had invested too much in him. The pertinent question was whether Washburne would push Grant for the nomination in
1864 or wait until 1868.
The Washburne Papers are available on line and I recommend you look at them instead of citing secondary and tertiary sources easily found on the Internet.
 
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