Rosecrans removal

atlantis

2nd Lieutenant
Joined
Nov 12, 2016
Did Rosecrans get shafted, kind of inclined to think so. He created an impressive force in the army of the Cumberland and his operations from Nashville to Chattanooga are top notch.
Your thoughts.
 
With his orders to proceed to Chattanooga in late 1863 General Grant was given latitude to retain Rosy in command of the Army of the Cumberland, or not, as he saw fit, and he saw fit to have him replaced by Gen. Thomas...

"Up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted after I left Vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of Halleck's dispatches that I had better go to Nashville and superintend the operation of troops sent to relieve Rosecrans. Soon after we started the Secretary handed me two orders, saying that I might take my choice of them. The two were identical in all but one particular. Both created the "Military Division of Mississippi," (giving me the command) composed of the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and all the territory from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi River north of Banks's command in the south-west. One order left the department commanders as they were, while the other relieved Rosecrans and assigned Thomas to his place. I accepted the latter."

Grant says he was not impressed by Gen. Rosecrans' operations, or lack thereof, during the Vicksburg siege. Then the defeat at Chickamauga. But after Grant accepted his orders assuming overall command, Rosy's removal was shortly expedited by some excitement by notices to Secretary of War Stanton, etc., that he was considering abandoning Chattanooga. Grant immediately sent notices to Chattanooga of the change of command, and instructions to Gen. Thomas to hold the city at all hazards.

Shortly, Gen. Grant says he met Rosy on his way northward;

"On the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reaching Stevenson Alabama, after dark. Rosecrans was there on his way north. He came into my car and we held a brief interview, in which he described very clearly the situation at Chattanooga, and made some excellent suggestions as to what should be done. My only wonder was that he had not carried them out."
 
I have a high regard for Rosecrans as a general. Certainly one of the best of the war in terms of battlefield management. But like many other talented generals he was not a team player and was kind of the McClellan of the West. Very talented, but somewhat antagonistic towards the Administration, always asking for more of everything, and not showing sufficient initiative. So he had a troubled relationship with Stanton and Lincoln. As long as he was winning a general like this can be tolerated. But after the disaster of Chickamauga, I think it was inevitable that he had to be replaced.

The US needed its generals to be good team players and one of Grant's great strengths was putting together a team of generals who all sang from the same page. So Grant, for the sake of harmony, would promote less talented generals who had the right attitude, like Howard, over more talented ones like Hooker who lacked the right attitude. (I know this change was pushed by Sherman, but Grant approved it and Sherman was following the Grant model). Grant and Sherman (and Lincoln and Stanton) wanted "can do" generals who made do with what they had, followed orders, and were responsive to and respected the command structure. This was not Rosecrans.
 
I have gone back and forth on whether the decision was the correct one, or not. My friend, the great Dave Powell, doesn't agree with the decision. We also have evidence, both from Rosecrans and others, to the effect that Thomas was initially going to protest the order, but was dissuaded from doing so by Rosecrans. My central concern really is with how effectively Rosecrans was going to be able to work with Grant and vice versa. If that relationship would have hindered the war effort then it was probably the right decision, but I think that it was a difficult call.

For those interested, in Volume III of Dave Powell's Chickamauga trilogy there is a great appendix (appendix two) on this which is very much worth reading.
 
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My own opinion is that the removal of Rosecrans was the correct decision. He had not been getting along with the Lincoln administration, had just suffered a major defeat and his relationship with Grant was now toxic. The two men had come to despise one another. For the sake of the war effort, one of them had to go and the candidate to go was obviously Rosecrans. Grant had objectively correct reasons to rid himself of Rosecrans even if his decision was contaminated by personal animosity. Expecting these two generals to work together harmoniously going forward was not going to happen.
 
I have a high regard for Rosecrans as a general. Certainly one of the best of the war in terms of battlefield management. But like many other talented generals he was not a team player and was kind of the McClellan of the West. Very talented, but somewhat antagonistic towards the Administration, always asking for more of everything, and not showing sufficient initiative. So he had a troubled relationship with Stanton and Lincoln. As long as he was winning a general like this can be tolerated. But after the disaster of Chickamauga, I think it was inevitable that he had to be replaced.

The US needed its generals to be good team players and one of Grant's great strengths was putting together a team of generals who all sang from the same page. So Grant, for the sake of harmony, would promote less talented generals who had the right attitude, like Howard, over more talented ones like Hooker who lacked the right attitude. (I know this change was pushed by Sherman, but Grant approved it and Sherman was following the Grant model). Grant and Sherman (and Lincoln and Stanton) wanted "can do" generals who made do with what they had, followed orders, and were responsive to and respected the command structure. This was not Rosecrans.
Well said. I think Rosecrans was almost always correct on points of fact in his disputes with superiors, especially around the difficulties of operating in TN/GA. But he wasn't politically savvy in presenting them, didn't sufficiently acknowledge others' constraints, and stirred up too much ill feeling in the process.

So too in his relations with Grant. I think his judgment was completely correct during the pursuit after Corinth, and Grant's later scheme of maneuver in the Vicksburg campaign (living off the land for extended periods) was a tacit admission of such; but it's also hard to fault Grant for reining him in when R. hadn't demonstrated that he could act as a trusted subordinate. Perhaps Grant should have gone to Chattanooga in person before deciding his fate, and his memoirs come across as somewhat uncharitable, but I can certainly understand his reasoning.

That said, I'm undecided on whether his removal was the right decision. In terms of morale, political constraints, and team harmony, it was justified, but in terms of generalship alone, I don't think it was. The tactical defeat was overshadowed by the enormous accomplishment of getting to Chattanooga in extremely adverse circumstances, and the defeat remained purely tactical - as many others have pointed out, the campaign remained an operational and strategic success.
 
The Cumberland army would have been better off if Thomas had been in command all along and Rosecrans' talents were utilized as an executive officer.
As a Virginian, Thomas could not make any mistakes, and he lived up to that standard. At Keenesaw Mountain it was Sherman's mistake in ordering the attack that led to the failure. Sherman never repeated the error.
Rosecrans was a talented individual but he had difficulty subordinating his ego to any higher authority.
 
Dana was an absolute snake, and I don't have much respect for Garfield, on how he did Rosecrans.
Actually, Garfield could have went public with the details of Rosecrans at Chickamauga. He didn't. He maintained his silence for his entire life, out of some sense of honor or loyalty to Rosecrans. Garfield did discuss it privately with a few people. Cox, for example.

Dana was supportive of Rosecrans immediately after the defeat. That changed as he discussed things with Rosecrans and also with the officers under Rosecrans.
 
I think his judgment was completely correct during the pursuit after Corinth, and Grant's later scheme of maneuver in the Vicksburg campaign (living off the land for extended periods) was a tacit admission of such; but it's also hard to fault Grant for reining him in when R.
Part of the problem was that Rosecrans expected Hurlbut's command to be sent with him on the "pursuit." But Hurbut's men were hurting after Hatchee bridge, and had to return to Bolivar.

Rosecrans had no supplies, no plan, and men tired after a two-day battle. I doubt he could have made it far.
 
Actually, Garfield could have went public with the details of Rosecrans at Chickamauga. He didn't. He maintained his silence for his entire life, out of some sense of honor or loyalty to Rosecrans. Garfield did discuss it privately with a few people. Cox, for example.

Dana was supportive of Rosecrans immediately after the defeat. That changed as he discussed things with Rosecrans and also with the officers under Rosecrans.
Garfield actually went behind Rosecrans back before Tullahoma to Salmon Chase. Dana implied that Rosecrans planned to retreat from Chattanooga, which he never intended, he only intended to point out that he couldn't supply his army over Walden Ridge indefinitely, and that unless the situation was rectified at some point he would be forced to give way. Dana then spun this very disengenously toward Stanton. Dana purposely ingratiated himself to Rosecrans and then used that personal relationship to spin things against Rosecrans. I don't see how one can argue against that.

As Dave Powell notes:
"Dana played on Stanton's worst fears by stressing the theme of retreat. At midday on October 16, reported Dana, "nothing can prevent the retreat of the army from this place within a fortnight … except the opening of the river." That same day, in a wire sent at 4:00 p.m., Dana summarized a "full conversation" with the army commander, which sounded even more alarming. The river must be reopened, claimed Rosecrans, but only Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker (with the reinforcements from the Potomac army) could do that, and Hooker had to wait for his trains to get up. Worse, "as soon as the weather would allow the enemy will cross … in force … and then it will be necessary to fight a battle … or retreat from here." Given the parlous state of the army's logistics, fighting a battle seemed unlikely, leaving withdrawal as the only option. Worst of all, Dana charged that Rosecrans seemed oblivious to his peril, "insensible to the impending danger, and dawdl[ing] with trifles."

"Dana was sending pure, if vitriolic, nonsense. Rosecrans was neither inactive nor feeble. Meigs's reports show Rosecrans in firm control, working day and night to address his various logistical, organizational, and morale problems. By mid-October Rosecrans had already worked out a complete plan for opening the river and returning the troops to full rations. Implementation only waited on the completion of several riverboats, then under construction at Bridgeport, and the production of at least 50 pontoon boats in Chattanooga, which would do double-duty as assault boats. All the while Dana secretly urged that Rosecrans be immediately replaced by George Thomas—even though Thomas had already quietly refused the notion, not wanting to be seen as undermining a commander he still greatly respected—and pitched Grant as the only man who could come and save a deteriorating situation. With that last, Stanton heartily agreed."
 
Garfield actually went behind Rosecrans back before Tullahoma to Salmon Chase. Dana implied that Rosecrans planned to retreat from Chattanooga, which he never intended, he only intended to point out that he couldn't supply his army over Walden Ridge indefinitely, and that unless the situation was rectified at some point he would be forced to give way. Dana then spun this very disengenously toward Stanton. Dana purposely ingratiated himself to Rosecrans and then used that personal relationship to spin things against Rosecrans. I don't see how one can argue against that.

As Dave Powell notes:
"Dana played on Stanton's worst fears by stressing the theme of retreat. At midday on October 16, reported Dana, "nothing can prevent the retreat of the army from this place within a fortnight … except the opening of the river." That same day, in a wire sent at 4:00 p.m., Dana summarized a "full conversation" with the army commander, which sounded even more alarming. The river must be reopened, claimed Rosecrans, but only Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker (with the reinforcements from the Potomac army) could do that, and Hooker had to wait for his trains to get up. Worse, "as soon as the weather would allow the enemy will cross … in force … and then it will be necessary to fight a battle … or retreat from here." Given the parlous state of the army's logistics, fighting a battle seemed unlikely, leaving withdrawal as the only option. Worst of all, Dana charged that Rosecrans seemed oblivious to his peril, "insensible to the impending danger, and dawdl[ing] with trifles."

"Dana was sending pure, if vitriolic, nonsense. Rosecrans was neither inactive nor feeble. Meigs's reports show Rosecrans in firm control, working day and night to address his various logistical, organizational, and morale problems. By mid-October Rosecrans had already worked out a complete plan for opening the river and returning the troops to full rations. Implementation only waited on the completion of several riverboats, then under construction at Bridgeport, and the production of at least 50 pontoon boats in Chattanooga, which would do double-duty as assault boats. All the while Dana secretly urged that Rosecrans be immediately replaced by George Thomas—even though Thomas had already quietly refused the notion, not wanting to be seen as undermining a commander he still greatly respected—and pitched Grant as the only man who could come and save a deteriorating situation. With that last, Stanton heartily agreed."
My point stands on Garfield. He could have went public. He didn't.

Dana started out in support of Rosecrans. He grew disillusioned, partly from talking with Rosecrans' subordinates.
 
My point stands on Garfield. He could have went public. He didn't.
It's one thing for Garfield to express displeasure at Rosecrans not moving fast enough before Tullahoma, it's another to send off letters of a negative bent to one of Lincoln's Cabinent Members. I stand by what I said about Garfield. I will grant that 90% of Rosecrans issues stem from Dana though. I just don't have much respect for Garfield who supposedly considered Rosecrans a friend and still wrote that letter. If he was that upset he should of resigned his post over it, not sent a letter behind his back.
Dana started out in support of Rosecrans. He grew disillusioned, partly from talking with Rosecrans' subordinates.
Halleck and Stanton didn't particularly care for Rosecrans. There was no reason to send Dana to Rosecrans, other than that Stanton was looking for things. Regardless of when he grew disillusioned, the point is his wirings and letters were twisted truths and fabricated lies. Not much to respect for someone who does that.
 
It's one thing for Garfield to express displeasure at Rosecrans not moving fast enough before Tullahoma, it's another to send off letters of a negative bent to one of Lincoln's Cabinent Members. I stand by what I said about Garfield. I will grant that 90% of Rosecrans issues stem from Dana though. I just don't have much respect for Garfield who supposedly considered Rosecrans a friend and still wrote that letter. If he was that upset he should of resigned his post over it, not sent a letter behind his back.

Halleck and Stanton didn't particularly care for Rosecrans. There was no reason to send Dana to Rosecrans, other than that Stanton was looking for things. Regardless of when he grew disillusioned, the point is his wirings and letters were twisted truths and fabricated lies. Not much to respect for someone who does that.
Chase was an advocate for Rosecrans. I doubt that it did Rosecrans any harm.

Lincoln didn't get the impression of Rosecrans being a duck struck on the head from Dana. Rosecrans' own communications with Washington created doubts about his fitness.

Edited to add: Halleck's opinion of Rosecrans wasn't always negative. It became more negative in '63.
 
Chase was an advocate for Rosecrans. I doubt that it did Rosecrans any harm.

Lincoln didn't get the impression of Rosecrans being a duck struck on the head from Dana. Rosecrans' own communications with Washington created doubts about his fitness.

Edited to add: Halleck's opinion of Rosecrans wasn't always negative. It became more negative in '63.
Dana called Chickamauga another Bull Run. That was Washington's first perception. Dana had a couple of communications before Rosecrans got back to Chattanooga. Dana wet his pants on the Battlefield. Had a front row seat for Longstreet's Breakthrough. Crossed himself.

Dana got a Cotton trading permit from Grant while he was in MS.

They didn't replace Rosy until after the fall elections in OH. Didn't want to give the Democrats another reason to vote. Yes politicos saved him and he was sent to MO.
 
Part of the problem was that Rosecrans expected Hurlbut's command to be sent with him on the "pursuit." But Hurbut's men were hurting after Hatchee bridge, and had to return to Bolivar
No he didn't, he just requested that Hurlbut not return to Bolivar - he wanted him to remain in place and/or secure his rear around Corinth.
Rosecrans had no supplies, no plan, and men tired after a two-day battle. I doubt he could have made it far.
Sure he did. Hamilton had received supplies and was consolidating on his left, holding open his own supply lines with Corinth. He also knew that Van Dorn's army was not very far ahead, having just drawn up in anticipation of a battle, and was in much worse shape than his own.
 

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