Did Rosecrans get shafted, kind of inclined to think so. He created an impressive force in the army of the Cumberland and his operations from Nashville to Chattanooga are top notch.
Your thoughts.
His army was cut in two and routed at Chickamauga. That kind of debacle usually leads to a transfer to a less demanding post.Did Rosecrans get shafted, kind of inclined to think so. He created an impressive force in the army of the Cumberland and his operations from Nashville to Chattanooga are top notch.
Your thoughts.
Well said. I think Rosecrans was almost always correct on points of fact in his disputes with superiors, especially around the difficulties of operating in TN/GA. But he wasn't politically savvy in presenting them, didn't sufficiently acknowledge others' constraints, and stirred up too much ill feeling in the process.I have a high regard for Rosecrans as a general. Certainly one of the best of the war in terms of battlefield management. But like many other talented generals he was not a team player and was kind of the McClellan of the West. Very talented, but somewhat antagonistic towards the Administration, always asking for more of everything, and not showing sufficient initiative. So he had a troubled relationship with Stanton and Lincoln. As long as he was winning a general like this can be tolerated. But after the disaster of Chickamauga, I think it was inevitable that he had to be replaced.
The US needed its generals to be good team players and one of Grant's great strengths was putting together a team of generals who all sang from the same page. So Grant, for the sake of harmony, would promote less talented generals who had the right attitude, like Howard, over more talented ones like Hooker who lacked the right attitude. (I know this change was pushed by Sherman, but Grant approved it and Sherman was following the Grant model). Grant and Sherman (and Lincoln and Stanton) wanted "can do" generals who made do with what they had, followed orders, and were responsive to and respected the command structure. This was not Rosecrans.
Actually, Garfield could have went public with the details of Rosecrans at Chickamauga. He didn't. He maintained his silence for his entire life, out of some sense of honor or loyalty to Rosecrans. Garfield did discuss it privately with a few people. Cox, for example.Dana was an absolute snake, and I don't have much respect for Garfield, on how he did Rosecrans.
Part of the problem was that Rosecrans expected Hurlbut's command to be sent with him on the "pursuit." But Hurbut's men were hurting after Hatchee bridge, and had to return to Bolivar.I think his judgment was completely correct during the pursuit after Corinth, and Grant's later scheme of maneuver in the Vicksburg campaign (living off the land for extended periods) was a tacit admission of such; but it's also hard to fault Grant for reining him in when R.
Garfield actually went behind Rosecrans back before Tullahoma to Salmon Chase. Dana implied that Rosecrans planned to retreat from Chattanooga, which he never intended, he only intended to point out that he couldn't supply his army over Walden Ridge indefinitely, and that unless the situation was rectified at some point he would be forced to give way. Dana then spun this very disengenously toward Stanton. Dana purposely ingratiated himself to Rosecrans and then used that personal relationship to spin things against Rosecrans. I don't see how one can argue against that.Actually, Garfield could have went public with the details of Rosecrans at Chickamauga. He didn't. He maintained his silence for his entire life, out of some sense of honor or loyalty to Rosecrans. Garfield did discuss it privately with a few people. Cox, for example.
Dana was supportive of Rosecrans immediately after the defeat. That changed as he discussed things with Rosecrans and also with the officers under Rosecrans.
My point stands on Garfield. He could have went public. He didn't.Garfield actually went behind Rosecrans back before Tullahoma to Salmon Chase. Dana implied that Rosecrans planned to retreat from Chattanooga, which he never intended, he only intended to point out that he couldn't supply his army over Walden Ridge indefinitely, and that unless the situation was rectified at some point he would be forced to give way. Dana then spun this very disengenously toward Stanton. Dana purposely ingratiated himself to Rosecrans and then used that personal relationship to spin things against Rosecrans. I don't see how one can argue against that.
As Dave Powell notes:
"Dana played on Stanton's worst fears by stressing the theme of retreat. At midday on October 16, reported Dana, "nothing can prevent the retreat of the army from this place within a fortnight … except the opening of the river." That same day, in a wire sent at 4:00 p.m., Dana summarized a "full conversation" with the army commander, which sounded even more alarming. The river must be reopened, claimed Rosecrans, but only Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker (with the reinforcements from the Potomac army) could do that, and Hooker had to wait for his trains to get up. Worse, "as soon as the weather would allow the enemy will cross … in force … and then it will be necessary to fight a battle … or retreat from here." Given the parlous state of the army's logistics, fighting a battle seemed unlikely, leaving withdrawal as the only option. Worst of all, Dana charged that Rosecrans seemed oblivious to his peril, "insensible to the impending danger, and dawdl[ing] with trifles."
"Dana was sending pure, if vitriolic, nonsense. Rosecrans was neither inactive nor feeble. Meigs's reports show Rosecrans in firm control, working day and night to address his various logistical, organizational, and morale problems. By mid-October Rosecrans had already worked out a complete plan for opening the river and returning the troops to full rations. Implementation only waited on the completion of several riverboats, then under construction at Bridgeport, and the production of at least 50 pontoon boats in Chattanooga, which would do double-duty as assault boats. All the while Dana secretly urged that Rosecrans be immediately replaced by George Thomas—even though Thomas had already quietly refused the notion, not wanting to be seen as undermining a commander he still greatly respected—and pitched Grant as the only man who could come and save a deteriorating situation. With that last, Stanton heartily agreed."
It's one thing for Garfield to express displeasure at Rosecrans not moving fast enough before Tullahoma, it's another to send off letters of a negative bent to one of Lincoln's Cabinent Members. I stand by what I said about Garfield. I will grant that 90% of Rosecrans issues stem from Dana though. I just don't have much respect for Garfield who supposedly considered Rosecrans a friend and still wrote that letter. If he was that upset he should of resigned his post over it, not sent a letter behind his back.My point stands on Garfield. He could have went public. He didn't.
Halleck and Stanton didn't particularly care for Rosecrans. There was no reason to send Dana to Rosecrans, other than that Stanton was looking for things. Regardless of when he grew disillusioned, the point is his wirings and letters were twisted truths and fabricated lies. Not much to respect for someone who does that.Dana started out in support of Rosecrans. He grew disillusioned, partly from talking with Rosecrans' subordinates.
Chase was an advocate for Rosecrans. I doubt that it did Rosecrans any harm.It's one thing for Garfield to express displeasure at Rosecrans not moving fast enough before Tullahoma, it's another to send off letters of a negative bent to one of Lincoln's Cabinent Members. I stand by what I said about Garfield. I will grant that 90% of Rosecrans issues stem from Dana though. I just don't have much respect for Garfield who supposedly considered Rosecrans a friend and still wrote that letter. If he was that upset he should of resigned his post over it, not sent a letter behind his back.
Halleck and Stanton didn't particularly care for Rosecrans. There was no reason to send Dana to Rosecrans, other than that Stanton was looking for things. Regardless of when he grew disillusioned, the point is his wirings and letters were twisted truths and fabricated lies. Not much to respect for someone who does that.
Dana called Chickamauga another Bull Run. That was Washington's first perception. Dana had a couple of communications before Rosecrans got back to Chattanooga. Dana wet his pants on the Battlefield. Had a front row seat for Longstreet's Breakthrough. Crossed himself.Chase was an advocate for Rosecrans. I doubt that it did Rosecrans any harm.
Lincoln didn't get the impression of Rosecrans being a duck struck on the head from Dana. Rosecrans' own communications with Washington created doubts about his fitness.
Edited to add: Halleck's opinion of Rosecrans wasn't always negative. It became more negative in '63.
No he didn't, he just requested that Hurlbut not return to Bolivar - he wanted him to remain in place and/or secure his rear around Corinth.Part of the problem was that Rosecrans expected Hurlbut's command to be sent with him on the "pursuit." But Hurbut's men were hurting after Hatchee bridge, and had to return to Bolivar
Sure he did. Hamilton had received supplies and was consolidating on his left, holding open his own supply lines with Corinth. He also knew that Van Dorn's army was not very far ahead, having just drawn up in anticipation of a battle, and was in much worse shape than his own.Rosecrans had no supplies, no plan, and men tired after a two-day battle. I doubt he could have made it far.