★ ★  Rosecrans, William S.

William Starke "Old Rosy" Rosecrans​

:us34stars:
Rosecrans.jpg


Born: September 6, 1819

Birthplace: Delaware County, Ohio

Father: Crandall Rosecrans 1794 – 1848

Mother: Jemima Hopkins 1794 – 1861

Wife: Ann Eliza Hegeman 1823 – 1883
(Buried: Mount Olivet Cemetery, Washington, D.C.)​
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Married: August 24, 1843 at St. Paul's Church in New York City, New York

Children:

Rev. Adrian Louis Rosecrans 1849 – 1876​
(Buried: Saint Paul the Apostle Church Vault, Manhattan, New York)​
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Sister Mary Louise "Sister St. Charles" Rosecrans 1852 – 1878​
(Buried: Ursuline Cemetery, Saint Martin, Ohio)​
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Lily Elizabeth Rosecrans Toole 1854 – 1939​
(Buried: Resurrection Cemetery, Helena, Montana)​
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Anna Delores "Anita" Rosecrans 1857 – 1903​
(Buried: Old Saint Mary's Catholic Cemetery, Helena, Montana)​
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Carl Frederic Rosecrans 1860 – 1926​
(Buried: Calvary Cemetery, Los Angeles, California)​
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Charlotte Rosecrans 1862 - 1862​

Education:

1842: Graduated from West Point Military Academy – (5th​ in class)​

Occupation before War:

1842 – 1843: Brevet 2nd​ Lt. United States Army, Corps of Engineers​
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1842 – 1843: Assistant Engineer for Hampton Roads Fortifications​
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1843 – 1853: 2nd​ Lt. United States Army, Corps of Engineers​
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1843 – 1844: Assistant Engineering Professor at West Point​
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1844 – 1845: Assistant Philosophy Professor at West Point​
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1845 – 1846: Assistant Engineering Professor at West Point​
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1846 – 1847: Principal Assistant Engineering Professor at West Point​
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1847 – 1853: Superintendent Engineer of Repairs at Fort Adams​
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1852 – 1853: Superintendent Engineer of Surveys of Taunton River​
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1852 – 1853: Superintendent Engineer Repairs on Goat Island​
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1853 – 1854: 1st​ Lt. United States Army, Corps of Engineers​
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1853 – 1854: Superintendent Engineer, Washington Navy Yard​
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1854: Resigned from United States Army on April 1st​​
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1854 – 1855: Civil Engineer, and Architect, in Cincinnati, Ohio​
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1855 – 1857: Superintendent of Coal Company, in Coal River, Virginia​
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1856 – 1857: President of Coal River Navigation Company​
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1857 – 1861: Manufacturer of Kerosene Oil in Cincinnati, Ohio​

Civil War Career:
Rosecrans 1.png


1861: Volunteer Aide to McClellan for Department of the Ohio​
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1861: Colonel, and Chief Engineer in the Union Army​
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1861: Colonel of 23rd​ Ohio Infantry Regiment​
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1861: Commander of Camp Chase, Ohio​
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1861 – 1867: Brigadier General in United States Army​
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1861: Brigade Commander at Battle of Rich Mountain​
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1861: Commander of the Union Army, Department of the Ohio​
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1861 – 1862: Commander of the Army Department of Western Virginia​
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1861: Successful Commander at Battle of Carnifex Ferry​
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1862 – 1866: Major General of Union Army, Volunteers​
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1862: Division Commander at the Siege of Corinth, Mississippi​
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1862: Commander of the Union Army of the Mississippi​
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1862: Successful Commander at Battle of Iuka, Mississippi​
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1862: Union Army Commander of District of Corinth, Mississippi​
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1862: Successful Commander at 2nd​ Battle of Corinth, Mississippi​
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1862 – 1863: Union Army Commander of Army of the Cumberland​
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1862 – 1863: Successful Commander at Battle of Stones River, Tennessee​
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1863: Union Army Commander Occupation of Bridgeport – Stevenson​
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1863: Union Army Commander crossing of Cumberland Mountains​
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1863: Unsuccessful Commander at Battle of Chickamuga, Georgia​
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1863: Commenced fortifying Chattanooga, Tennessee​
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1863 – 1864: Awaiting Orders in Cincinnati, Ohio​
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1864: Union Army Commander of Department of the Missouri​
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1864 – 1865: Awaiting Orders in Cincinnati, Ohio​
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1865: Brevetted Major General, U.S. Army, for Service at Stones River​
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1865 – 1867: On Leave of Absence from the United States Army​
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1866: Mustered out of the Union Army on January 15th​​

Occupation after War:
Rosecrans 2.jpg


1861 – 1867: Brigadier General in United States Army​
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1865 – 1867: On Leave of Absence from the United States Army​
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1867: Resigned from United States Army on March 28th​​
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1868 – 1869: U.S. Minister to the Republic of Mexico​
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1869: Declined Democratic Nomination for Governor of Ohio​
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1869 – 1881: Civil and Mining Engineer, Railroad Enterprises in Mexico​
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1871 – 1881: President of San Jose Mining Company​
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1878 – 1881: President of Safety Powder Company in San Francisco​
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1881 – 1885: United States Congressman from California​
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1883 – 1885: House Chairman of Military Affairs Committee​
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1885 – 1893: Register for U.S. Treasury Department​
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1889: Brigadier General, U.S. Army on the retired list of officers​

Died: March 10, 1898

Place of Death: Bernardo Beach, California

Cause of Death: Pneumonia

Age at time of Death: 78 years old

Original Burial Place: Rosedale Cemetery, Los Angeles, California

Final Burial Place:
Arlington National Cemetery, Arlington, Virginia
 
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Chickamauga was a battle for Chattanooga; the Confederates lost.
Disagree. Chattanooga was already in Union possession, as Crittenden messaged Burnside on Sept 10th : "I am directed by the General commanding the Department of the Cumberland to inform you that I am in full possession of this place, having entered it yesterday at 12 m. without resistance."

Chickamauga was a fight between two armies trying to defeat each other, and the confederates didn't lose.

I think if Rosecrans had realized that Longstreet had reinforced Bragg, the battle would not have taken place where it did. I think Rosecrans would have tried to concentrate in Chattanooga behind defensive works. But Rosecrans dismissed intel about Longstreet.
 
Rosecrans created his own problems.
I don't think this can be emphasized enough. Rosecrans fumbled the ball badly during Iuka, showing up two days late to his own party and fighting a pitched battle just before dusk knowing that Ord was still several miles outside of town. Grant was willing to chalk it up to bad luck, but Rosecrans had his staff smear Grant with blame in the press.

It's just mind-bogglingly inexplicable that Rosecrans would poison that well.
 
Rosecrans dismissed intel on Bragg's numbers before Chickamauga simply because he resented Grant:

"It should be remembered that it was not because of information concerning the approach of Longstreet's corps to reinforce Bragg that Rosecrans desired help from Burnside. When such information was brought to him, he ridiculed it.​

Major General G. M. Dodge, who at the request of General Grant had organized and was in charge of a large secret service force, sent a spy to Richmond in the summer of 1863 for the purpose of watching for any indications of a movement of troops west. This spy, as early as a week or ten days before the battle of Chickamauga, brought to General Dodge information that Longstreet was on his way to join Bragg and crush Rosecrans. This information was at once communicated to General Rosecrans. Colonel George E. Spencer, General Dodge's Chief-of-Staff, says: "We received a reply from Rosecrans that our information was entirely incorrect; and he intimated that if we would attend to our business, he would attend to his."​
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General Dodge says that on receiving from this spy the details of the information he brought, he immediately communicated them to General Grant, "who instructed me," he adds, "to communicate them to General Rosecrans. I was not in his command, but sent them as directed. As Colonel Spencer states, General Rosecrans did not receive the despatch very kindly. You know there was a good deal of feeling between Grant and Rosecrans, and I suppose it was for that reason. I notified General Grant of the despatch I received from General Rosecrans in answer to the news I sent him, and Grant notified me that I need not send any more dispatches to Rosecrans, but to send them to him and he would forward them to him through the War Department."​

"If General Rosecrans had heeded this information, he could have concentrated in front of Chattanooga and prevented the disaster at Chickamauga."​
​
The Mississippi Valley, Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, 1861-1864​
Military Historical Society of Massachusetts​
 
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From the same source as above, another example of Rosecrans dismissing intel on Bragg's reinforcement before Chickamauga:

"General S. D. Atkins, of Wilder's brigade, at a meeting of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, November 3 and 4, 1909, said that, on the first day of the battle of Chickamauga, he captured a prisoner belonging to Longstreet's corps, and took him to Rosecrans, and had him tell Rosecrans what he had said to him. Rosecrans showed great temper, called the prisoner a liar, and said he had received despatches from Washington asserting that no troops had left Lee's army to join Bragg."​

Yet Rosecrans HAD received intel from Grant about Longstreet joining Bragg.
 
I don't think this can be emphasized enough. Rosecrans fumbled the ball badly during Iuka, showing up two days late to his own party and fighting a pitched battle just before dusk knowing that Ord was still several miles outside of town. Grant was willing to chalk it up to bad luck, but Rosecrans had his staff smear Grant with blame in the press.

It's just mind-bogglingly inexplicable that Rosecrans would poison that well.
Rosecrans had elements of Bragg in him: he never seemed to develop good relationships with superiors. Usually he had contentious relationships with superiors, arguing unnecessarily and digging in his heels. He actually urged that sort of approach on his soldiers.

Rosecrans did do better with his corps and division commanders than Bragg, and with the common soldiers in his command. Higher ups and same level commanders, Rosecrans default relationship was usually a quarrel. I am not sure, however, that Rosecrans thought about the consequences of that.
 
Judging by your attribution of Rosecrans successes, I'm curious to know what failures you're attributing to Grant 😃

Neither had really been defeated on the field of battle prior to Chickamauga.
Chickasaw Bayou and Holly Springs were clear cut defeats, both around the same time Rosecrans won. And the reason why he did it was because McClernand was raising troops, and Grant wanted to be the hero, so he launches a premature offensive to take Vicksburg while he still has control. The Vicksburg Campaign before Grant agrees with McClernand to run the guns is a series of screw ups. Given how often generals got removed for their first screwup (read, Rosecrans), it's shocking Great kept his chair during that period.
 
Disagree. Chattanooga was already in Union possession, as Crittenden messaged Burnside on Sept 10th : "I am directed by the General commanding the Department of the Cumberland to inform you that I am in full possession of this place, having entered it yesterday at 12 m. without resistance."

Chickamauga was a fight between two armies trying to defeat each other, and the confederates didn't lose.

I think if Rosecrans had realized that Longstreet had reinforced Bragg, the battle would not have taken place where it did. I think Rosecrans would have tried to concentrate in Chattanooga behind defensive works. But Rosecrans dismissed intel about Longstreet.
It may not be the UNION objective of that campaign, but it certainly was the Confederate's objective. Bragg's plan was to drive Rosecrans into McLemore's Cove, isolate and destroy Rosecrans there, and then take Chattanooga unopposed. The fact command and control on the right flank broke down and Longstreet's command instead breaks the opposite flank, means that the Federal army will be able to retreat to Chattanooga. It is a strategic Confederate defeat, plain and simple. A tactical victory that achieves nothing but allow Bragg to retake a couple miles of North Georgia.
 
Rosecrans dismissed intel on Bragg's numbers before Chickamauga simply because he resented Grant:

"It should be remembered that it was not because of information concerning the approach of Longstreet's corps to reinforce Bragg that Rosecrans desired help from Burnside. When such information was brought to him, he ridiculed it.​

Major General G. M. Dodge, who at the request of General Grant had organized and was in charge of a large secret service force, sent a spy to Richmond in the summer of 1863 for the purpose of watching for any indications of a movement of troops west. This spy, as early as a week or ten days before the battle of Chickamauga, brought to General Dodge information that Longstreet was on his way to join Bragg and crush Rosecrans. This information was at once communicated to General Rosecrans. Colonel George E. Spencer, General Dodge's Chief-of-Staff, says: "We received a reply from Rosecrans that our information was entirely incorrect; and he intimated that if we would attend to our business, he would attend to his."​
​
General Dodge says that on receiving from this spy the details of the information he brought, he immediately communicated them to General Grant, "who instructed me," he adds, "to communicate them to General Rosecrans. I was not in his command, but sent them as directed. As Colonel Spencer states, General Rosecrans did not receive the despatch very kindly. You know there was a good deal of feeling between Grant and Rosecrans, and I suppose it was for that reason. I notified General Grant of the despatch I received from General Rosecrans in answer to the news I sent him, and Grant notified me that I need not send any more dispatches to Rosecrans, but to send them to him and he would forward them to him through the War Department."​

"If General Rosecrans had heeded this information, he could have concentrated in front of Chattanooga and prevented the disaster at Chickamauga."​
​
The Mississippi Valley, Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, 1861-1864​
Military Historical Society of Massachusetts​
Halleck was telling Rosecrans during this period that Bragg was sending troops to Lee. Finally about the 15th of Sept Halleck has confirmation that Longstreet is going to Bragg. Halleck don't tell Rosecrans. But he does order Grant to relieve Rosecrans. Grant has fallen off his horse in a drunken brawl in NO, so it is several days latter when he gets the order. Grant doesn't send Troops to Chattanooga until after he is confirmed as commander in the West. Minty captures a few soldiers from the ANV on Sept 18 at Reeds bridge. Rosecrans interviews 1. Soldier tells Roscrans he is from VA. Rosecrans calls him a lier. On the 19th he will know it is true.

Rosecrans also ask Halleck to have Grant keep Johnson busy so he couldn't send troops to Bragg. Grant was in party mode so that didn't happen. Troops also came from MS.
 
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Chickasaw Bayou and Holly Springs were clear cut defeats, both around the same time Rosecrans won. And the reason why he did it was because McClernand was raising troops, and Grant wanted to be the hero, so he launches a premature offensive to take Vicksburg while he still has control. The Vicksburg Campaign before Grant agrees with McClernand to run the guns is a series of screw ups. Given how often generals got removed for their first screwup (read, Rosecrans), it's shocking Great kept his chair during that period.
That was Halleck's and Lincoln's screwup, not Grant's. I guess Rosecrans could have learned a little something about not calling out your superiors for screwups, real or imagined. 😃

Grant began moving south simply because he was given no strategic direction, and thought being on the offense would be a better call than being on the defense. Clearing the Yazoo and causing the evacuation of Vicksburg were potential effects, not an overall strategic objective.

Head Quarters, Dept. of Ten. Jackson Oct. 26th 1862 Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck Gen. in Chief Washington D. C. Gen.
You have never suggested to me any plan of operations in this Department and as I do not know anything of those of commanders to my right or left. I have none therefore that is not independent of all others forces than those under my immediate command.
As situated now, with no more troops, I can do nothing but defend my positions and I do not feel at liberty to abandon any of them without first consulting you.
I would suggest however the destruction of the railroads to all points of the compass from Corinth by the removal of the rails to this place or Columbus and the opening of the road from Humboldt to Memphis. The Corinth forces I would move to Grand Junction and add to them the Bolivar forces except a small garrison there. With small reinforcements at Memphis I think I would be able to move down the Mississippi Central road and cause the evacuation of Vicksburg and be able to capture or destroy all the boats in the Yazoo river.
I am ready however to do with all my might whatever you may direct, without criticism ...

I am Gen. very respectfully
your obt. svt.
U. S. Grant
Maj. Gen. Com

On November 2nd, as Grant prepared to consolidate his two wings at Grand Junction and begin pushing south overland towards Holly Springs or possibly Grenada, Halleck hints at an imminent riverine campaign involving Banks moving up from New Orleans.

"I approve of your plan of advancing upon the enemy as soon as you are strong enough for that purpose. The Minn & Wisconsin regts should join you very soon & the Governor of 111. has promised ten regts this week. I have directed Genl Curtis to reinforce Helena & if they cannot operate on Little Rock they can cross the river and threaten Grenada. I hope for an active campaign on the Miss, this fall. A large force will ascend the river from New Orleans."

Grant chose to continue south.

On November 9th, Grant got word that men in his department were reporting for duty with vague orders to report to McClernand for a push downriver. On November 10th, Grant wired Halleck to ask him "what the heck?" Halleck demurred, and replied that Grant was free to use the men in his department in any way he saw fit. Rather than reevaluating and planning a move by the river, Grant chose to continue south.

After gradually escalating discouragement towards Grant's plan and hints that the president preferred an attack by river instead, all of which Grant ignored, Halleck finally issued a direct order on December 3rd to end the overland campaign and attack Vicksburg. Halleck set the time frame, the place of attack, and the commander of the expedition. Grant's overland campaign, now almost halfway to Jackson, MS from Grand Junction, TN, was effectively ended.

At this point, Grant's moves were completely dependent on Pemberton's reaction to Sherman. All he could really do, since he had been stripped of the majority of his troops, was create the illusion of activity, which he did by drawing all of his cavalry to the front, stripping any defense in depth he might have had against Van Dorn's raid.

To Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck Oxford Miss Dec 8th 10 P M 1862 Maj Gen H. W. Halleck Gen in Chief. General.

Gen'l Sherman will command the expedition down the Mississippi. He will have a force of about forty thousand (40.000) men—will land above Vicksburg—up the Yazoo if practicable and cut the Mississippi Central R. R. and the Rail Road running East from Vicksburg where they cross Black river. I will cooperate from here. My movements depending on those of the Enemy. With the large Cavalry force now at my command I will be able to have them show themselves at different points on the Tallahatchie & Yallabusha and where an opportunity occurs make a real attack. After cutting the two Rail Roads Gen Shermans movements to secure the end desired will necessarily be left to his judgement. I will occupy this Rail Road to Coffeeville.

U. S. Grant Maj Gen Com'dg
 
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... Given how often generals got removed for their first screwup (read, Rosecrans), it's shocking Great kept his chair during that period.
Rosecrans was not removed for his first screwup. He had tested the patience of Halleck, Stanton and Lincoln for a while and was not removed until a month after Chickamauga.

In the context of actual events, I see nothing shocking about Grant keeping his chair at the time.
 
Sad that a birthday post has been hijacked by the same little group of Grant lovers.
(I wonder if any of them even read the article by the Methodist bishop I posted)
Meanwhile there are people who know and respect William S Rosecrans and what he achieved. His story is getting out. Tullahoma book last year. A new biography next year. It's up to each reader to decide how "brave"
- to quote Albert Castel ( who despite never posting on this site knew a bit about the CW) - he/she wants to be.
http://www.rosecransheadquarters.org/Photos/Monument/Pix.htm
 
Chickasaw Bayou and Holly Springs were clear cut defeats, both around the same time Rosecrans won. And the reason why he did it was because McClernand was raising troops, and Grant wanted to be the hero, so he launches a premature offensive to take Vicksburg while he still has control. The Vicksburg Campaign before Grant agrees with McClernand to run the guns is a series of screw ups. Given how often generals got removed for their first screwup (read, Rosecrans), it's shocking Great kept his chair during that period.
If you think Grant should have been removed for Holly Springs, then Rosecrans should have been gone for Hartsville, one of the most embarrassing union defeats of the war.
 
Chickasaw Bayou and Holly Springs were clear cut defeats, both around the same time Rosecrans won.
You have probably already noticed I do not think much of Sherman's work at Chickasaw Bayou. Things might have gone better if Grant had not been stopped by the success of the twin raids of Van Dorn and Forrest, but sometimes the enemy does good work. OTOH: Holly Springs is really the only place Van Dorn did anything special on that raid, and Colonel Murphy's absolutely horrible performance at Holly Springs is a major part of Van Dorn's success. Grant's orders to Murphy should have gone a long way towards standing off Van Dorn (if Murphy had obeyed them) -- but Sherman had warned Grant he was making a mistake by giving Murphy a second chance at Holly Springs.

Forrest's raid was probably better run and did more damage; in combination with Van Dorn's it crippled Grant's inland advance. Grant had the RR supply line and the Holly Springs depot. If he had only lost one of them, he probably would have been able to keep up the pressure on Pemberton and keep him from sending troops to Vicksburg. The loss of Holly Springs made him utterly dependent on the RR -- and Forrest took out 60 miles of the RR and telegraph, leaving Grant completely isolated and out of communications with Memphis (and thus Sherman downriver). It is the dual Van Dorn-Forrest raids that wreck Grant's advance.

And the reason why he did it was because McClernand was raising troops, and Grant wanted to be the hero, so he launches a premature offensive to take Vicksburg while he still has control.
Hmm. Grant was already engaged in an advance towards Mississippi on the inland route before he heard about McClernand, so premature is probably not the right word. Also, Stanton's actual order gives control of McClernand's troops to Grant when they enter Grant's department (and always subject to Halleck's orders at all times). McClernand only gets to go on his expedition when Grant and Halleck say that Grant does not need McClernand's troops. Either Lincoln and Stanton didn't catch the nuances of the order they actually gave to Halleck, or they never really intended McClernand to be independent of Grant.

Since neither Lincoln nor Stanton had a military background, I would guess they probably did not get how military men thought and did not see the loopholes they had in the order. Halleck had the kind of mind that would find and use the openings they had in the order. Grant (not really a Halleck friend) was not crazy about McClernand running around inside his department, so he went along with Halleck in grabbing the troops to use as part of his already-in-progress advance.

I don't think any of it had to do with Grant wanting to be the hero. I cannot think of any commander who would want anybody running an independent operation inside his department. McClernand, OTOH, was playing personal politics (he and Stanton were both Democrats; McClernand and Lincoln had been co-counsels on Lincoln's last law case before the war) for personal advancement and glory, going over the heads of both Grant and Halleck to do it. Not surprising they yanked the rug out from under him.

After Chickasaw Bayou when McClernand does catch up (January 2, 1863) he -- fit to be tied, no doubt -- wants to do something to make this mess a success. Sherman wants something to offset the failure at Chickasaw Bayou. Porter, an ambitious man, wants a success. On January 3rd, they meet and decide to go after Arkansas Post. McClernand left no account of the meeting; Sherman and Porter contradict each other a bit. No one can say for sure which one of them first proposed the Arkansas Post expedition. They go up and take the place. Then Grant arrives, unhappy that they've taken 30,000 troops up the Arkansas River to take this little post (it took Grant a while to decide it was worthwhile), and brings them back to the Mississippi.

None of the above looks particularly good, and parts of it are clearly bad (repulse at Chickasaw Bayou, the Van Dorn/Forrest raids).
The Vicksburg Campaign before Grant agrees with McClernand to run the guns is a series of screw ups. Given how often generals got removed for their first screwup (read, Rosecrans), it's shocking Great kept his chair during that period.

After the Van Dorn-Forrest raids, Joe Johnston moved Van Dorn up to Tennessee. This was to create a strong threat to any LOC for an overland advance into Mississippi. The Van Dorn-Forrest raids had shown the vulnerability of that route to cavalry from the East.

This (combined with the need for Grant to be physically present to oversee McClernand) is why Grant shifts to a down-the-Mississippi approach going forward. Doing anything on the inland route would have required strong support from Rosecrans, who was fortifying near Murfreesboro after Stones River). Good as Rosecrans could be at some things, he never showed any inclination to go out of his way to help the next commander. Grant could not send him orders, and Rosecrans had Lincoln's grateful support. Halleck and Stanton could not move him against Bragg in the first half of 1863 -- I don't think they could have gotten him to act as a support to a Grant advance towards Jackson.

So what we are really talking here is the period after that, from late January to March of 1863. This is the two canal attempts, the Yazoo Pass expedition, Steele's Bayou expedition and the Lake Providence expedition. None of those works out. OTOH, none of them looks like a disaster. They are just attempts that might have worked, and there really aren't a lot of other things to try until the Spring comes. I would not think screwups would be a good description.

In April, Grant makes his real attempt. The Vicksburg Campaign then becomes a huge success, legendary in American military circles.
 
It is true. He called for Sherman. Sherman got here in November right before the Battle of Missionary Ridge. The Troops from the AOP were sent from the War Department before Grant was given the Command over the West. Grant got here in October.
No, Grant started organizing troops and moving them as soon as he heard about the defeat at Chickamauga, well before he was appointed to command above Rosecrans/Thomas. It took a long time to move them from Mississippi up to Tennessee and across to Chattanooga.
 
It is true. He called for Sherman. Sherman got here in November right before the Battle of Missionary Ridge. The Troops from the AOP were sent from the War Department before Grant was given the Command over the West. Grant got here in October.
Sherman started for Chattanooga from Memphis October 11th. Grant was promoted October 16th.
 
No, Grant started organizing troops and moving them as soon as he heard about the defeat at Chickamauga, well before he was appointed to command above Rosecrans/Thomas. It took a long time to move them from Mississippi up to Tennessee and across to Chattanooga.
Prove it.

Grant had a Division at Memphis. Could of moved it, didn't. Grant accepted command on 10/17. Arrived at Chattanooga 10/23. Grant telegraphed Sherman on 10/23 To move to Bridgeport. Final day of Chickamauga was 9/20.
 
Sherman started for Chattanooga from Memphis October 11th. Grant was promoted October 16th.
It was all decided earlier in Washington. Search for a letter written by JK Herbert to Butler on Elihu Washburne's plans for getting Grant head of Rosecrans' army. You can find it on line in Butlers Papers book on line. It's also in my book
but I think the Grant Group believes I make things up. Please don't dismiss the opinions of those who were there just because you don't like them.
 
Chickasaw Bayou and Holly Springs were clear cut defeats, both around the same time Rosecrans won. And the reason why he did it was because McClernand was raising troops, and Grant wanted to be the hero, so he launches a premature offensive to take Vicksburg while he still has control. The Vicksburg Campaign before Grant agrees with McClernand to run the guns is a series of screw ups. Given how often generals got removed for their first screwup (read, Rosecrans), it's shocking Great kept his chair during that period.
Not to mention that Grant had been surprised at Shiloh, and for that matter, at Donelson when Pillow's breakout attempt caught Grant unawares. Of course, to his credit, Grant remained unflustered in both cases (and as at Chickasaw and Holly Springs), and quickly reformulated his plans to meet the crises. But it is certainly curious that Grant's lack of success or progress at Vicksburg from December 1862 through April 1863 never led to the usually frantic calls that Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck made to threaten other commanders with immediate relief (such as Rosecrans lack of movement until June 1863).
 

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