McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[67th Tigers]

McClellan also objected to it on political grounds, as the Harrison Landing letter shows.

If I may quote:

"Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master; except for repressing disorder as in other cases. Slaves contraband under the Act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor should be asserted and the right of the owner to compensation therefore should be recognized. This principle might be extended upon grounds of military necessity and security to all the slaves within a particular state; thus working manumission in such [a] state -- and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also and possibly even in Maryland the expediency of such a military measure is only a question of time. A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty. Unless the principles governing the further conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present Armies."

So McClellan is objecting on military, not political grounds. He believes it will damage the northern armies, and indeed there was a large spike in desertions after the EP was announced, and McClellan intervened to point out to the soldiers of his army that they were the servants of the government.

He was personally a moderate abolishonist, hating the un-Christian institution of slavery, and agrees with Lincoln that the government has a right to appropriate slaves. He is also here proposing working compensated emancipation in the loyalist slave states, which he believes will quash a lot of opposition to abolishon in the south.

 

[Elennsar]

Aye, on paper Brig Gen Casey was assigned to command the WHL defences ISTR on the 23rd, and Peck moved upto the division command, with Howe appointed to command Peck's old brigade. Now looking at Pecks AAR (link) he states that indeed the division was consolidated into two brigades, so thanks, that's something I didn't know.

I suspect its a matter of when things were organized as far as the brigade issue - I wouldn't be terribly surprised if the change to two brigades occurred after the 20th but before Peck took command.

Interestingly McClellan had asked his four Corps commanders south of the river what they could spare to reinforce Porter. Franklin answered a division, Sumner 2 brigades and Heintzelman and Keyes both answered none. The movement of Peck was ordered anyway. From my readings it seems McClellan considered Keyes to be a very timid commander, and he was the Corps commander McClellan got rid of by leaving at Yorktown when the army was withdrawn. He was also the only CC in favour of abandoning the line of the James.

Judging by his performance in 1863, Keyes was not corps command material. I wonder what Heintzelman's problem was - not in regards to sending reinforcements, just that his career is uninspiring. No noteworthy blunders, but something that works out as a copper medal - although I'm not sure any of McClellan's commanders get the gold. Porter as a possible exception.

But neither Franklin or Sumner look very good.

Of course none of these figures is combat effectives. Harsh points out that whilst those with pro-Southern sympathies like to strip Lee down to 80,000 combat effectives (excluding the Richmond defences?), to do the same to McClellan would render only 70,000. I'm happy with any consistent measurement.

Alright, so from available sources - Schulte, Harsh, and whatever we call the Italian guy - McClellan has ~100,000 men and Lee has somewhere around 100-110,000 (give or take), and both figures assuming everyone potentially up is actually up (as in, discounting stragglers that would alter how many of say, French's brigade actually show up at Gaines's Mill as opposed to how many men were potentially present - for combat or other duties - as of June 20).

And of that 100-110,000 for Lee, around 15,000 of that is either Holmes (coming up from North Carolina, I think, though he may be up by the 26th) or the Richmond defenses.

Aye, then the question becomes how best to determine what the enemy is doing and shift reserves - for both sides.

Yeah. To McClellan's credit, I would have to say that he seems to have split his forces reasonably well under the assumption that he had to defend both places and that offensive operations were impractical at this particular point (speaking around June 26).

Whether that was a good assumption is in question, but I think we can agree on how he deployed his troops with that in mind.

On the Confederate side of things, for fairness's sake:
Similarly, Lee seems to have kept a surprisingly large part of his forces back at Richmond - even if Holmes doesn't count as completely up yet (June 26) that's still thirty thousand men not counting those who wouldn't be moved like the heavy artillery, which suggests he intended to either launch an attack with this force either as a diversion or otherwise, OR that he felt less confident in Richmond's defenses (the fortifications, not the heavy artillery etc.) than the notion of them making each man count for three or more suggests.


Its not very surprising that this wound up as bloody and with neither side accomplishing what they wanted.

 

[67th Tigers]

I suspect its a matter of when things were organized as far as the brigade issue - I wouldn't be terribly surprised if the change to two brigades occurred after the 20th but before Peck took command.

If memory serves that division was absolutely battered at Fair Oaks. Actually looking at it Casey's division was already weak by Fair Oaks, he reports only 4,380 in line (inc. arty) and suffered 1,433 casualties (OR 11(1), 917). So there's a mystery to be investigated.

Judging by his performance in 1863, Keyes was not corps command material. I wonder what Heintzelman's problem was - not in regards to sending reinforcements, just that his career is uninspiring. No noteworthy blunders, but something that works out as a copper medal - although I'm not sure any of McClellan's commanders get the gold. Porter as a possible exception.

But neither Franklin or Sumner look very good.

Keyes had already been flagged as the weakest of the corps commanders, and sometime in April (I'd have to check Beattie) McClellan organised 2nd and 4th Corps into a wing and largely bypassed Keyes. That said he was very efficient at the movement to the James.

Of Sumner, Heintzelman and Franklin, all committed at least one major blunder in the seven days.

Sumner after Savage's Station refused to leave the "victorious field" despite the fact he was the army rearguard and was about to become isolated. McClellan wrote out an order for his arrest, sealed it, and had gave it to (ISTR) his inspector general who was told to reiterate the order and then arrest Sumner if he refused to obey.

Heintzelman quit his position without orders on the 29th, isolating Sumner and Franklin around Savage's Station, leading to a crisis there.

Franklin quit his position along White Oak Creek without orders on the night of the 30th, leading to the collapse of the position around Glendale, and the mad scramble to get the army onto Malvern Hill.

I'd argue Porter made some bad decisions on the 27th. The fight of the 26th was commanded in person by McClellan, but on the 27th McClellan had returned to GHQ believing he'd left Porter in a strong position. Porter kept rebuffing McClellan's offers of reinforcements, and eventually McClellan sent Slocum, French (-) and Peck northwards anyway because his information was Porter wasn't doing as well as Porter thought.

Alright, so from available sources - Schulte, Harsh, and whatever we call the Italian guy - McClellan has ~100,000 men and Lee has somewhere around 100-110,000 (give or take), and both figures assuming everyone potentially up is actually up (as in, discounting stragglers that would alter how many of say, French's brigade actually show up at Gaines's Mill as opposed to how many men were potentially present - for combat or other duties - as of June 20).

And of that 100-110,000 for Lee, around 15,000 of that is either Holmes (coming up from North Carolina, I think, though he may be up by the 26th) or the Richmond defenses.

Holmes was at Petersburg ISTR, and his troops were misreported as Beauregards.

There were another 3 brigades en route from NC - Samuel Gibbs French's Brigade, Junius Daniel's Brigade and James Green Martin's Brigade, but none would fight in the Seven Days. In the aftermath Daniel's brigade garrisoned Petersburg, and French and Martin were at opposite the river from Harrisons to harass the Federals and oppose any movement over the river.

Yeah. To McClellan's credit, I would have to say that he seems to have split his forces reasonably well under the assumption that he had to defend both places and that offensive operations were impractical at this particular point (speaking around June 26).

Whether that was a good assumption is in question, but I think we can agree on how he deployed his troops with that in mind.

One must remember they'd made a very significant advance on the 25th, with 3rd Corps moving half a mile forward, but of course bereft of entrenchments. Hence McClellan not ordering any reinforcements from 3rd Corps, and telling Heintzelman to pull back to his old entrenchments and fight from there is pushed strongly.

On the Confederate side of things, for fairness's sake:
Similarly, Lee seems to have kept a surprisingly large part of his forces back at Richmond - even if Holmes doesn't count as completely up yet (June 26) that's still thirty thousand men not counting those who wouldn't be moved like the heavy artillery, which suggests he intended to either launch an attack with this force either as a diversion or otherwise, OR that he felt less confident in Richmond's defenses (the fortifications, not the heavy artillery etc.) than the notion of them making each man count for three or more suggests.

Magruder (as senior officer left south of the river) was under orders to mount demonstrations, and then launch into an full scale attack if the Federals left their entrenchments. This of course he did on the 29th, resulting in the Battle of Savage's Station.

The order is serial II in Lee's battle orders:

Expired Image Removed

Its not very surprising that this wound up as bloody and with neither side accomplishing what they wanted.

Oh, absolute agreement. Neither side was truly successful. However, the moral victory was with the south, and it was Lincoln's will to continue along the line of the James that was ultimately defeated.

 

[cash]

If I may quote:

"Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master; except for repressing disorder as in other cases. Slaves contraband under the Act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor should be asserted and the right of the owner to compensation therefore should be recognized. This principle might be extended upon grounds of military necessity and security to all the slaves within a particular state; thus working manumission in such [a] state -- and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also and possibly even in Maryland the expediency of such a military measure is only a question of time. A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty. Unless the principles governing the further conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present Armies."

So McClellan is objecting on military, not political grounds.

No. "The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor should be asserted and the right of the owner to compensation therefore should be recognized." That is political.

"This principle might be extended upon grounds of military necessity and security to all the slaves within a particular state; thus working manumission in such [a] state -- and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also and possibly even in Maryland the expediency of such a military measure is only a question of time." This is a justification for emancipating slaves through military necessity.

"A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty." This is 100% political.

"Unless the principles governing the further conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present Armies." This is actually political. He's talking about men deserting because of their opposition to emancipation, and he's talking about not being able to recruit new soldiers due to opposition to emancipation.

He believes it will damage the northern armies, and indeed there was a large spike in desertions after the EP was announced, and McClellan intervened to point out to the soldiers of his army that they were the servants of the government.

It's been shown that claims of a large amount of desertions due to the EP were based on a misreading of the evidence.

He was personally a moderate abolishonist, hating the un-Christian institution of slavery, and agrees with Lincoln that the government has a right to appropriate slaves. He is also here proposing working compensated emancipation in the loyalist slave states, which he believes will quash a lot of opposition to abolishon in the south.

One can't be a moderate abolitionist. One either is or isn't an abolitionist. Mac may have been moderately antislavery, but that's different from being an abolitionist.

 

[67th Tigers]

No. "The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor should be asserted and the right of the owner to compensation therefore should be recognized." That is political.

In asmuch as it asserts the right of the US government to govern the whole of the USA, yes.

The compensation has a military reason though. It cuts through objections that a large number of southern planters have to the government of the US, and reduces the will of the southerners to remain outside of the US.

"This principle might be extended upon grounds of military necessity and security to all the slaves within a particular state; thus working manumission in such [a] state -- and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also and possibly even in Maryland the expediency of such a military measure is only a question of time." This is a justification for emancipating slaves through military necessity.

It is an extension of the above. Afterall, there is no necessity in forcing emancipation in the loyal slave states is there? It would drive them into the Confederate camp, where arguably they'd be if not for Union military action anyway. The Democrats had long memories, and there was a lot of objections to McClellan as their Presidential runner in '64 because of his rough handling of the Maryland legislature in '61, arresting them before they could secede.

"A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty." This is 100% political.

Actually religious. McClellan was a very strong Christian, and is also a Calvinist.

"Unless the principles governing the further conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present Armies." This is actually political. He's talking about men deserting because of their opposition to emancipation, and he's talking about not being able to recruit new soldiers due to opposition to emancipation.

Well both, but it's the effect *on the army* that concerns him, hence it's a military one.

It's been shown that claims of a large amount of desertions due to the EP were based on a misreading of the evidence.

Where has this been shown? I note you comments on a thread last year, but they were not convincing and mostly formulated from the opinion of McPherson rather than primary evidence. Whole regiments deserted or were disbanded because of it, the most famous examples being the 107th and 128th Illinois, both in Grant's command.

One can't be a moderate abolitionist. One either is or isn't an abolitionist. Mac may have been moderately antislavery, but that's different from being an abolitionist.

Yes you can. Abolition takes many forms. McClellan came out in favour of gradual compensated emancipation, which is how it was conducted in most of the northern states. It's a different kettle of fish to sudden immediate emancipation, or emancipation followed by deportation, or a number of other options.

 

[cash]

In asmuch as it asserts the right of the US government to govern the whole of the USA, yes.

The compensation has a military reason though. It cuts through objections that a large number of southern planters have to the government of the US, and reduces the will of the southerners to remain outside of the US.

That's a supposition you claim. Where does McClellan make that claim?

It is an extension of the above. Afterall, there is no necessity in forcing emancipation in the loyal slave states is there? It would drive them into the Confederate camp, where arguably they'd be if not for Union military action anyway. The Democrats had long memories, and there was a lot of objections to McClellan as their Presidential runner in '64 because of his rough handling of the Maryland legislature in '61, arresting them before they could secede.

Not an extension since we don't yet have McClellan making the claim you typed. There is no military necessity and also no political reason to force emancipation in loyal states at that time. There would be military necessity later. But it's also political.

You're right about the objections to McClellan from Maryland. One MD Democrat said he would never support McClellan.

Actually religious. McClellan was a very strong Christian, and is also a Calvinist.

No, it's political. The nation is governed politically, not religiously; however, McClellan wrote of political actions influenced by religious teachings, which was and still is common. He's talking about "the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations," which is completely political.

Well both, but it's the effect *on the army* that concerns him, hence it's a military one.

It's the effect based on their political beliefs, hence it's a political concern.

Where has this been shown? I note you comments on a thread last year, but they were not convincing and mostly formulated from the opinion of McPherson rather than primary evidence.

McPherson is an eminent historian who has studied the evidence and provides the results of his study. I note that you've only made a claim with no evidence at all.

A number of people have claimed spikes in desertion due to the EP, forgetting that desertions also followed Burnside's failed assaults at Fredericksburg and his winter camp where there were shortages of provisions and other supplies. It's significant that when Hooker took command a number of the deserters came back to the army, yet the EP was still in effect.

Whole regiments deserted or were disbanded because of it, the most famous examples being the 107th and 128th Illinois, both in Grant's command.

Really? Dyer's Compendium Part I lists this for the 107th:
107th REGIMENT INFANTRY.—Org. at Camp Butler, Ill., Sept. 4, 1862. Oct., 1862, R. R. Guard Louisville and Nashville R. R., Dept. Ohio. Nov., 1862, Dist. West. Ky., Dept. Ohio. June, 1863, 1 Brig., 3 Div., 23 Corps, Dept. Ohio. Aug., 1863, 2 Brig., 2 Div., 23 Corps. Feby., 1865, 2 Brig., 2 Div., 23 Corps, Army Ohio, to Feby., 1865, and Dept. North Carolina to June, 1865. Mustered out June 21, 1865.

Part III lists this record for the 107th Illinois:

107th REGIMENT INFANTRY.
Organized at Camp Butler, Ill., and mustered in September 4, 1862. Moved to Jeffersonville, Ind., September 30-October 1, 1862, and to Louisville, Ky., October 12. Attached to railroad guard Louisville & Nashville R. R., Dept. of the Ohio, to November, 1862. District of West Kentucky, Dept. of the Ohio, to June, 1863. 1st Brigade, 3rd Division, 23rd Army Corps, Army of the Ohio, to August, 1863. 2nd Brigade, 2nd Division, 23rd Army Corps, Army of the Ohio, to February, 1865; and Dept. of North Carolina to June, 1865.
SERVICE.--Moved to Elizabethtown, Ky., October 18, 1862, and duty there till December, 1862. Moved to Mumfordsville, Ky., December 3, and duty there till March, 1863. Moved to Glasgow, Ky., and duty there till June 18. Pursuit of Morgan June 18-July 26. Return to Lebanon, Ky. Burnaide's Campaign in East Tennessee August 16-October 17. Knoxville Campaign November 4-December 23. Huff's Ferry November 14. Near Loudon November 15. Campbell's Station November 16. Siege of Knoxville November 17-December 5. Pursuit of Longstreet December 5-22. At Knoxville till April, 1864. Expedition to Flat Creek February 1. March to Calhoun, Tenn., April 27-30. Atlanta (Ga.) Campaign May 1-September 8. Demonstration on Dalton May 8-13. Rocky Faced Ridge May 8-11. Battle of Resaca May 14-15. Operations on line of Pumpkin Vine Creek and battles about Dallas, New Hope Church and Allatoona Hills May 25.June 5. Operations about Marietta and against Kenesaw Mountain June 10-July 5. Lost Mountain June 15-17. Muddy Creek June 17. Noyes' Creek June 19. Kolb's Farm June 22. Assault on Kenesaw June 27. On line of the Nickajack Creek July 2-5. On line of the Chattahoochie July 5-17. Siege of Atlanta July 22-August 25. Utoy Creek August 5-7. Flank movement on Jonesboro August 25-30. LoveJoy Station September 2-6. Operations in North Georgia and North Alabama against Hood September 29-November 3. Nashville, Tenn., Campaign November-December. Columbia, Duck River, November 24-27. Battle of Franklin November 30. Battle of Nashville December 15-16. Pursuit of Hood to the Tennessee River December 17-20. At Clifton, Tenn., till January 26, 1865. Moved to Washington, D.C., January 26-February 2, thence to Fort Fisher, N. C., February 11-15. Occupation of Wilmington. N. C., February 22. Campaign of the Carolinas March 1-April 26. Advance on Goldsboro, N. C., March 6-21. Occupation of Goldsboro March 21. Advance on Raleigh April 10-14. Occupation of Raleigh April 14. Bennett's House April 26. Surrender of Johnson and his army. Duty at Saulsbury, N. C., till June 21. Mustered out June 21, 1865.
Regiment lost during service 3 Officers and 27 Enlisted men killed and mortally wounded and 122 Enlisted men by disease. Total 152.

That's pretty impressive for a unit that deserted.

Now, you're on stronger ground with the 128th Illinois. Dyer's Compendium Part III shows:

128th REGIMENT INFANTRY.
Organized at Camp Butler, Ill., and mustered in November 4, 1862. Attached to District of Columbus, Ky., 16th Army Corps, Dept. of the Tennessee. Disbanded April 1, 1863, by order of Gen. Grant, having lost in 5 months over 700 men, principally by desertion, and the Officers having proved themselves utterly incompetent, were mustered out of service. The few remaining men were consolidated into a Detachment and consolidated with 9th Illinois Infantry April 1, 1863.
Regiment lost during service by disease 1 Officer and 34 men. Total 35

That they were mustered into service AFTER the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation indicates that the EP may not have been the driving factor for most of the desertions, though.

Yes you can. Abolition takes many forms. McClellan came out in favour of gradual compensated emancipation, which is how it was conducted in most of the northern states. It's a different kettle of fish to sudden immediate emancipation, or emancipation followed by deportation, or a number of other options.

You're confusing abolitionism with antislaveryism. The two are not the same. McClellan was no abolitionist, but I accept he may have been antislavery.

 

[67th Tigers]

That's a supposition you claim. Where does McClellan make that claim?

Not an extension since we don't yet have McClellan making the claim you typed. There is no military necessity and also no political reason to force emancipation in loyal states at that time. There would be military necessity later. But it's also political.

No, it's political. The nation is governed politically, not religiously; however, McClellan wrote of political actions influenced by religious teachings, which was and still is common. He's talking about "the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations," which is completely political.

It's the effect based on their political beliefs, hence it's a political concern.

Whilst you continue to assert these were politically motivated, all the evidence to the contrary. Now these were indeed attempts to further military plans with a private letter to his boss, but the letter was not for public consumption.

Now, Lincoln took it quite another way to be sure. The letter ultimately is what caused him to abandon McClellan.

McPherson is an eminent historian who has studied the evidence and provides the results of his study. I note that you've only made a claim with no evidence at all.

I merely note that McPherson presents no real evidence either.

A number of people have claimed spikes in desertion due to the EP, forgetting that desertions also followed Burnside's failed assaults at Fredericksburg and his winter camp where there were shortages of provisions and other supplies. It's significant that when Hooker took command a number of the deserters came back to the army, yet the EP was still in effect.

Might have something to do with them very publically shooting deserters.....

 

[cash]

Whilst you continue to assert these were politically motivated, all the evidence to the contrary.

You've given no evidence to the contrary. I've pointed out the political views.

Now these were indeed attempts to further military plans with a private letter to his boss, but the letter was not for public consumption.

Now, Lincoln took it quite another way to be sure. The letter ultimately is what caused him to abandon McClellan.

Wrong. The letter, which Lincoln gave McClellan permission to present to him, had little to no effect on Lincoln's relationship to McClellan.

I merely note that McPherson presents no real evidence either.

He does. You should read the book. He has several quotations from soldiers, and he based it on his study of what the soldiers wrote.

Might have something to do with them very publically shooting deserters.....

No. It had to do with better food, better supply, more esprit, better management, and confidence in Hooker as a fighting general.

 

[67th Tigers]

You've given no evidence to the contrary. I've pointed out the political views.

and I've pointed out they were entirely concerned with how then current political developments (the Confiscation Bill) effected the military aspect

Wrong. The letter, which Lincoln gave McClellan permission to present to him, had little to no effect on Lincoln's relationship to McClellan.

That's not what Montgomery Blair thought. You should perhaps read McClellan's Last Service to the Republic, which is online: https://archive.org/stream/mcclellanslastse00curt#page/n0/mode/2up

The Harrison's Landing letter poisoned the Lincoln-McClellan relationship, which had been at least functional upto that point. Lincoln took the letter differently to the way it was intended and saw a potential political rival. He stopped defending McClellan against Stanton and the Radicals and decided that McClellan would not be reinforced, lest he be successful.

Of course, this poisoning of the relationship meant that for the public good McClellan should have been removed immediately, and Burnside put in his place, on the James. Lincoln did not do this, adopting a much more fraught course for the nation that ultimately probably added two years to the war.

He does. You should read the book. He has several quotations from soldiers, and he based it on his study of what the soldiers wrote.

Yet we can selectively quote from soldiers who did desert for precisely that reason. It's figures that matter, with statistical tests.

No. It had to do with better food, better supply, more esprit, better management, and confidence in Hooker as a fighting general.

Confidence in Hooker? Seriously?

Consider the absence rates:

McClellan's Army
31/3/62: 12% absent
20/6/62: 19% absent
10/7/62: 25% absent
10/8/62: 24% absent

Pope's Army
31/7/62: 21% absent

McClellan's, Burnside's and Hooker's Army
20/9/62: 43% absent
30/9/62: 39% absent
10/10/62: 35% absent
20/10/62: 31% absent
10/11/62: 33% absent
10/12/62: 29% absent
31/1/63: 31% absent
31/3/63: 24% absent
30/4/63: 24% absent
10/5/63: 29% absent
30/5/63: 30% absent

Later timepoints
30/6/63: 31% absent
31/12/63: 19% absent
30/6/64: 27% absent
31/12/64: 24% absent
30/4/65: 36% absent

The most conspicuous sustained increase in absentee rates is in the aftermath of Antietam and the EP, and nothing nearly as large after the Seven Days, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg or the Overland Campaign. Why is this?

 

[Elennsar]

If memory serves that division was absolutely battered at Fair Oaks. Actually looking at it Casey's division was already weak by Fair Oaks, he reports only 4,380 in line (inc. arty) and suffered 1,433 casualties (OR 11(1), 917). So there's a mystery to be investigated.

Per Schulte in lieu of other information (if anyone has it I'd be delighted to see it):

I'd argue Porter made some bad decisions on the 27th. The fight of the 26th was commanded in person by McClellan, but on the 27th McClellan had returned to GHQ believing he'd left Porter in a strong position. Porter kept rebuffing McClellan's offers of reinforcements, and eventually McClellan sent Slocum, French (-) and Peck northwards anyway because his information was Porter wasn't doing as well as Porter thought.

Where is the rebuffing reported? Porter refers to

Holmes was at Petersburg ISTR, and his troops were misreported as Beauregards.

There were another 3 brigades en route from NC - Samuel Gibbs French's Brigade, Junius Daniel's Brigade and James Green Martin's Brigade, but none would fight in the Seven Days. In the aftermath Daniel's brigade garrisoned Petersburg, and French and Martin were at opposite the river from Harrisons to harass the Federals and oppose any movement over the river.

Which raises the question of to what extent we count the troops at Petersburg as relevant to what McClellan had to fight at Richmond.

Certainly troops could be moved from Petersburg to Richmond relatively quickly by rail (I say relatively because moving large numbers of troops is never a smooth process), but if talking about the number of men at Richmond behind the defenses of whatever quality, Petersburg is not Richmond.

One must remember they'd made a very significant advance on the 25th, with 3rd Corps moving half a mile forward, but of course bereft of entrenchments. Hence McClellan not ordering any reinforcements from 3rd Corps, and telling Heintzelman to pull back to his old entrenchments and fight from there is pushed strongly.

The only context half a mile forward is a significant offense is either trench warfare or tactical. Neither lead to McClellan being in a position to - or at least not choosing to - besiege Richmond (in the sense that he set up his siege artillery to "besiege Yorktown"), so I am dubious of its significance at this point.

Oh, absolute agreement. Neither side was truly successful. However, the moral victory was with the south, and it was Lincoln's will to continue along the line of the James that was ultimately defeated.

McClellan's lack of willingness to fight there might have had something to do with Lincoln's confidence in that position. McClellan had not done anything to bring to life the idea that it was a better place to fight Lee than northern Virginia.



And on the desertion issue, I must ask:

McClellan's, Burnside's and Hooker's Army
20/9/62: 43% absent
30/9/62: 39% absent
10/10/62: 35% absent
20/10/62: 31% absent
10/11/62: 33% absent
10/12/62: 29% absent
31/1/63: 31% absent
31/3/63: 24% absent
30/4/63: 24% absent
10/5/63: 29% absent
30/5/63: 30% absent

Average absence rate between Antietam and McClellan's removal from command (bolded dates): 37%
Average absence rate during Burnside's time in command (underlined dates): 31%, even counting the January 31 numbers as his responsibility.
Average for Joseph Hooker: 27.6% (or 26.75% if we consider the January 31 numbers to be from Burnside's time).

January 31 is also after the Mud March, which certainly ruined enthusiasm for Burnside in the army, so even if you consider that 2% increase to be related to the EP, it's not the only element and may not be even the primary element.

 

[Elennsar]

If memory serves that division was absolutely battered at Fair Oaks. Actually looking at it Casey's division was already weak by Fair Oaks, he reports only 4,380 in line (inc. arty) and suffered 1,433 casualties (OR 11(1), 917). So there's a mystery to be investigated.

Per Schulte in lieu of other information (if anyone has it I'd be delighted to see it):

Seven Pines/Fair Oaks:

Naglee (11th ME, 56th NY, 100th NY, 52nd PA, 104th PA): ~2,200 with 1753 in action.
Wessels (96th NY, 85th PA, 101st PA, 103rd PA): 2061 with ~1500 in action.
Palmer (81st NY, 85th NY, 92nd NY, 98th NY): ~2200

That should mean a total of ~6,461 for just the infantry.

No precise numbers for the divisional cavalry (one company) or artillery (four batteries)

Seven Days (using him again, in lieu of assignment on information on regiments elsewhere):
Naglee (11th ME, 56th NY, 100th NY, 52nd PA, 104th PA): 2083
Wessels (81st NY, 85th NY, 92nd NY, 96th NY, 98th NY, 85th PA, 10st PA, 103rd PA): 2853
Plus one battery (1st NY, Battery H -also present at Seven Pines: 95 men)

I'd argue Porter made some bad decisions on the 27th. The fight of the 26th was commanded in person by McClellan, but on the 27th McClellan had returned to GHQ believing he'd left Porter in a strong position. Porter kept rebuffing McClellan's offers of reinforcements, and eventually McClellan sent Slocum, French (-) and Peck northwards anyway because his information was Porter wasn't doing as well as Porter thought.

Where is the rebuffing reported? Trying to compare McClellan's and Porter's reports here.

And please, a link to the page would be preferred to a screen capture, if it's all the same to you.

Holmes was at Petersburg ISTR, and his troops were misreported as Beauregards.

There were another 3 brigades en route from NC - Samuel Gibbs French's Brigade, Junius Daniel's Brigade and James Green Martin's Brigade, but none would fight in the Seven Days. In the aftermath Daniel's brigade garrisoned Petersburg, and French and Martin were at opposite the river from Harrisons to harass the Federals and oppose any movement over the river.

Which raises the question of to what extent we count the troops at Petersburg as relevant to what McClellan had to fight at Richmond.

Certainly troops could be moved from Petersburg to Richmond relatively quickly by rail (I say relatively because moving large numbers of troops is never a smooth process), but if talking about the number of men at Richmond behind the defenses of whatever quality, Petersburg is not Richmond.

One must remember they'd made a very significant advance on the 25th, with 3rd Corps moving half a mile forward, but of course bereft of entrenchments. Hence McClellan not ordering any reinforcements from 3rd Corps, and telling Heintzelman to pull back to his old entrenchments and fight from there is pushed strongly.

The only context half a mile forward is a significant offense is either trench warfare or tactical. Neither lead to McClellan being in a position to - or at least not choosing to - besiege Richmond (in the sense that he set up his siege artillery to "besiege Yorktown"), so I am dubious of its significance at this point.

Oh, absolute agreement. Neither side was truly successful. However, the moral victory was with the south, and it was Lincoln's will to continue along the line of the James that was ultimately defeated.

McClellan's lack of willingness to fight there might have had something to do with Lincoln's confidence in that position. McClellan had not done anything to bring to life the idea that it was a better place to fight Lee than northern Virginia, which is not a position Lincoln seems to have held much faith in earlier either - perhaps if this area had delivered anything worthwhile, it would be another story.

But at the end of the Seven Days, McClellan is insisting he needs reinforcements to counterattack after being forced to fall back. That hardly recommends sticking around here.

And on the desertion issue, I must ask:

McClellan's, Burnside's and Hooker's Army
20/9/62: 43% absent
30/9/62: 39% absent
10/10/62: 35% absent
20/10/62: 31% absent
10/11/62: 33% absent
10/12/62: 29% absent
31/1/63: 31% absent
31/3/63: 24% absent
30/4/63: 24% absent
10/5/63: 29% absent
30/5/63: 30% absent

Average absence rate between Antietam and McClellan's removal from command (bolded dates): 37%
Average absence rate during Burnside's time in command (underlined dates): 31%, even counting the January 31 numbers as his responsibility.
Average for Joseph Hooker: 27.6% (or 26.75% if we consider the January 31 numbers to be from Burnside's time).

January 31 is also after the Mud March, which certainly ruined enthusiasm for Burnside in the army, so even if you consider that 2% increase to be related to the EP, it's not the only element and may not be even the primary element.

But the question, regardless of any influence by the EP, is why the Young Napoleon's army sees higher absence rates than Hooker's, if your argument is against the idea that they were confident in Hooker?

 

[cash]

and I've pointed out they were entirely concerned with how then current political developments (the Confiscation Bill) effected the military aspect

Though what you've claimed is strained in some areas.

I think it's instructive to look at the letter in its entirety to give it a context beyond the part you quoted regarding the EP:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Camp near Harrison's Landing, Va., July 7, 1862.
Mr. PRESIDENT: You have been fully informed that the rebel army is in our front with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our positions or reducing us by blocking our river communications. I cannot but regard our condition as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies, to lay before Your Excellency for your private consideration my general views concerning the existing state of the rebellion, although they do not strictly relate to the situation of this army or strictly come within the scope of my official duties. These views amount to convictions, and are deeply impressed upon my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, and blood. If secession is successful, other dissolution's are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State.
The time has come when the Government must determine upon a civil and military policy covering the whole ground of our national trouble. The responsibility of determining, declaring, and supporting such civil and military policy, and of directing the whole course of national affairs in regard to the rebellion, must now be assumed and exercised by you, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power sufficient even for the present terrible exigency.
This rebellion has assumed the character of a war. As such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment.
In prosecuting the war all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations; all private property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes, all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military toward citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist, and oaths not required by enactment's constitutionally made should be neither demanded nor received. Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political rights. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized. This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves of a particular State, thus working manumission in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time. A system of policy thus constitutional, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty.
Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. The policy of the Government must be supported by concentrations of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist.
In carrying out any system of policy which you may form you will require a Commander-in-Chief of the Army-one who possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior.
I may be on the brink of eternity, and as I hope forgiveness from my Maker I have written this letter with sincerity toward you and from love for my country.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.
His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
President.

That's a political letter. Please understand I'm not criticizing McClellan, unlike Stephen Sears. Mac had Lincoln's permission to give him the letter outlining his views, and as the commanding general of the Army of the Potomac, making his views known on political aspects of the war was, in my opinion, appropriate.

That's not what Montgomery Blair thought. You should perhaps read McClellan's Last Service to the Republic, which is online: https://archive.org/stream/mcclellanslastse00curt#page/n0/mode/2up

Should I read past page 31, which says, "we are not at all disposed to adopt the theory that the Harrison's Landing letter gave Mr. Lincoln any personal offence?" It seems to me Mac's constant call for reinforcements and his failure to move after Antietam is what did it.

The Harrison's Landing letter poisoned the Lincoln-McClellan relationship, which had been at least functional upto that point. Lincoln took the letter differently to the way it was intended and saw a potential political rival. He stopped defending McClellan against Stanton and the Radicals and decided that McClellan would not be reinforced, lest he be successful.

On the contrary. What poisoned the relationship was Mac's failure to move the army after Antietam and claiming he needed more troops. Lincoln didn't decide Mac wouldn't be reinforced to prevent him from being successful. The manpower pool was tapped out at that point.

Yet we can selectively quote from soldiers who did desert for precisely that reason. It's figures that matter, with statistical tests.

I'm not aware of any credible accusations that McPherson selectively quoted anyone.

Confidence in Hooker? Seriously?

Prior to May, absolutely. Perhaps you should look into his battle record prior to May 1863.

Consider the absence rates:

McClellan's Army
31/3/62: 12% absent
20/6/62: 19% absent
10/7/62: 25% absent
10/8/62: 24% absent

Pope's Army
31/7/62: 21% absent

McClellan's, Burnside's and Hooker's Army
20/9/62: 43% absent
30/9/62: 39% absent
10/10/62: 35% absent
20/10/62: 31% absent
10/11/62: 33% absent
10/12/62: 29% absent
31/1/63: 31% absent
31/3/63: 24% absent
30/4/63: 24% absent
10/5/63: 29% absent
30/5/63: 30% absent

Later timepoints
30/6/63: 31% absent
31/12/63: 19% absent
30/6/64: 27% absent
31/12/64: 24% absent
30/4/65: 36% absent

The most conspicuous sustained increase in absentee rates is in the aftermath of Antietam and the EP, and nothing nearly as large after the Seven Days, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg or the Overland Campaign. Why is this?

What's your source for these percentages? I don't doubt them, but I'd like to see the source.

It does appear as though you've committed the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy by ignoring what else was going on.

"As late as October, 1862, General Meade was unable to secure shoes, blankets, or overcoats for his men and received marching orders although he had declared that he could not move without those necessities. Even in December, 1863, the quartermaster's department was not yet able to meet the demands for clothing, as the report of a medical director from Tennessee attests: 'Having just returned from a personal inspection of the men in this command, I have the honor to report that I find them exceedingly destitute of clothing. The entire outfit of many soldiers consists of a blouse, worn as a shirt, a pair of pants, well worn, a pair of shoes, and in some instances not even those, an oil or woolen blanket, and a hat or cap.' Some complaints of barefoot men occur as late as December, 1864." [Ella Lonn, Desertion During the Civil War, p. 129]

"In August of the first year of the war one regiment had no blankets, save private property, and only the clothing in which they had enlisted. Rosecrans's troops were without tents or shelter for thirty-eight days in 1862; with their clothing worn out, their shoes gone, and without pay for four months, he held it small wonder that they stole and marauded. Exposure to a violent storm without tents filled the hospitals, and hospital tents there were none." [Ibid.]

"The effect of hardships, when combined with defeat, was about to destroy the Army of the Potomac by 1863. The continued fighting at a disadvantage without success, in addition to frequent night marches, had exhausted and disheartened them. These hardships were recognized by [Carl] Schurz as a fundamental cause of the growing desertion." [Ibid., p. 132]

"War weariness and discouragement was another potent cause of desertion, which is made vivid by the Comte de Paris: 'The old soldiers who had made the campaign of the peninsula could not ponder without bitterness over the fact that, after having seen the spires of Richmond six months before, they were further than ever from attaining the object of their efforts. The newcomers had learned to know the war in its most tragic aspect, and the enthusiasm which had called them to arms had considerably cooled off.' " [Ibid., p. 137]

"The large and numerous bounties given to volunteers proved undoubtedly an inducement to desert for the purpose of reenlisting, or to enlist when the recruit knew that he had no intention of remaining in the field. ... By July, 1862, payment of one fourth of the bounty in advance at the time of mustering and a premium of $2 or $3 was authorized by act of Congress under insistent urging of civilians and officers." [Ibid., pp. 139-140]

"Last, but by no means least, in the catalogue of causes, comes the cowardly or traitorous encouragement of desertion by civilians, from which the Union, as the Confederacy, suffered." [Ibid., p. 142]

"When Hooker took command of the Army of the Potomac on January 26, 1863, the situation seemed almost hopeless; desertions were occurring at the rate of several hundred a day; his carefully compiled returns showed about 25 per cent of the army absent. The number of missing and of deserters--it is impossible here, because of the method of keeping the records, to discriminate between those taken prisoner by the enemy and those deliberately taking advantage of the confusion to slip away--in the eastern army was more than double the number of those in the volunteer forces in the West. ... Hooker immediately went to work to improve the situation with regard to desertion, as well as to bring up the morale of the army. He issued stricter rules concerning leaves of absence, whereby they were restricted to fifteen days, and arrested deserters with such energy that by February he reported desertions in his army almost at an end." [Ibid., p. 145]

 

[67th Tigers]

Per Schulte in lieu of other information (if anyone has it I'd be delighted to see it):

Seven Pines/Fair Oaks:

Naglee (11th ME, 56th NY, 100th NY, 52nd PA, 104th PA): ~2,200 with 1753 in action.
Wessels (96th NY, 85th PA, 101st PA, 103rd PA): 2061 with ~1500 in action.
Palmer (81st NY, 85th NY, 92nd NY, 98th NY): ~2200

That should mean a total of ~6,461 for just the infantry.

No precise numbers for the divisional cavalry (one company) or artillery (four batteries)

Yet 4,380 in line inc. arty. This would be 68%, which is an overestimate.

If you've read Carman's short discussion on how many of the PFD were ever in line of battle he says between 60% and 80% of PFD could be formed into line of battle, depending largely on the discipline of the unit. This is clearly in that range.

That's one of the ways the post-war lost cause movement was able to claim Confederate meagerness - they counted muskets, but the Union counted all men present. As Grant wrote in his article on Shiloh sent to the Century Magazine (reprinted as Battles and Leaders):

"According to the custom of enumeration in the South, this number probably excluded every man enlisted as musician, or detailed as guard or nurse, and all commissioned officers -- everybody who did not carry a musket or serve a cannon. With us everybody in the field receiving pay from the Government is counted."

For the Seven Days we have good data on the number of combat effectives for the Confederates, and PFD for the Union, and it was the custom (and often still is) to compare the two. Harsh (via his student Tenney) has done us a huge favour by getting Confederate PFD data from the unit records, and so we have two directly comparable figures.

Where is the rebuffing reported? Trying to compare McClellan's and Porter's reports here.

Allow me to recant. Checking Burton it seems I'd confused no answer on the question (from Porter) with an actual rebuff.

And please, a link to the page would be preferred to a screen capture, if it's all the same to you.

Roger that.

Which raises the question of to what extent we count the troops at Petersburg as relevant to what McClellan had to fight at Richmond.

Certainly troops could be moved from Petersburg to Richmond relatively quickly by rail (I say relatively because moving large numbers of troops is never a smooth process), but if talking about the number of men at Richmond behind the defenses of whatever quality, Petersburg is not Richmond.

True. May I recommend the Windham maps of the Seven Days, the first of the sequence here: http://www.loc.gov/resource/g3884rm.gcw0652000/#seq-1

They show the positions of the troops and we can discuss things on that basis?

The only context half a mile forward is a significant offense is either trench warfare or tactical. Neither lead to McClellan being in a position to - or at least not choosing to - besiege Richmond (in the sense that he set up his siege artillery to "besiege Yorktown"), so I am dubious of its significance at this point.

Yorktown was never a siege, despite the name. It did however involve regular approaches to some extremely strong fortifications.

The Richmond defences had some very large works that simply could not be stormed. See the map here: http://www.loc.gov/resource/g3884r.cw0628000/

Any attack directly via Fair Oaks would be conducted by Smith's division (9,308 PFD) and one brigade of Richardson's division (ca. 2,688 PFD) who have to fight through Magruder (15,089) then contend with four major forts, including Fort Jackson.

An attack from the new position would be Sedgwick (8,681), Kearny (8,323) and Hooker (8,976) (25,980 total) against Huger and two of Holmes' brigades (11,487 according to Schulte's rendering of Tenney) towards redoubts 14 and 15.

The second of these two is far more dangerous to the Confederates, because a much greater local superiority can be achieved, partially because this was McClellan planned route in anyway. The Federal can stack up about 2:1 manpower advantage. However, quite a bit of that would be negated by the lack of artillery support and the Confederate entrenchments.

McClellan's lack of willingness to fight there might have had something to do with Lincoln's confidence in that position. McClellan had not done anything to bring to life the idea that it was a better place to fight Lee than northern Virginia, which is not a position Lincoln seems to have held much faith in earlier either - perhaps if this area had delivered anything worthwhile, it would be another story.

But at the end of the Seven Days, McClellan is insisting he needs reinforcements to counterattack after being forced to fall back. That hardly recommends sticking around here.

Of course McClellan did fight. However here he is indeed conducting a flank movement towards the James. This is largely to do with remaining able to continue to fight. Once the line of supply is gone the army can't make an attack, and no army in the civil war made a successful attack when unsupplied (noting that Grant indeed did keep a LoC after crossing the Mississippi at Vicksburg).

And on the desertion issue, I must ask:

Average absence rate between Antietam and McClellan's removal from command (bolded dates): 37%
Average absence rate during Burnside's time in command (underlined dates): 31%, even counting the January 31 numbers as his responsibility.
Average for Joseph Hooker: 27.6% (or 26.75% if we consider the January 31 numbers to be from Burnside's time).

January 31 is also after the Mud March, which certainly ruined enthusiasm for Burnside in the army, so even if you consider that 2% increase to be related to the EP, it's not the only element and may not be even the primary element.

But the question, regardless of any influence by the EP, is why the Young Napoleon's army sees higher absence rates than Hooker's, if your argument is against the idea that they were confident in Hooker?

On the Peninsula they were within the norm (ca. 25%), and under Hooker they were about the norm, and even after the bloodletting of the Overland Campaign weren't that inflated. However there is a period of increased absenteeism lasting from September '62 into early '63. Why?

 

[67th Tigers]

Though what you've claimed is strained in some areas.

I think it's instructive to look at the letter in its entirety to give it a context beyond the part you quoted regarding the EP:

That's a political letter. Please understand I'm not criticizing McClellan, unlike Stephen Sears. Mac had Lincoln's permission to give him the letter outlining his views, and as the commanding general of the Army of the Potomac, making his views known on political aspects of the war was, in my opinion, appropriate.

It certainly comments on the political arena, especially as it relates to military operations, but it was a private letter and not meant for public consumption. As per Curtis etc. it was not seen by anyone except by the staff officer detailed to write it, Lincoln, and a few members of the cabinet (Stanton and maybe a few others) Lincoln showed it too.

I think we're talking across purposes. I am not denying it is commenting on political matters, but there is no indication for political motivation. All the evidence suggests a military motivation.

Should I read past page 31, which says, "we are not at all disposed to adopt the theory that the Harrison's Landing letter gave Mr. Lincoln any personal offence?" It seems to me Mac's constant call for reinforcements and his failure to move after Antietam is what did it.

Indeed it did not give personal offense to Lincoln. However it did make McClellan look like a potential political rival.

Indeed, McClellan was calling for reinforcement. One would note this is sensible in the situation and he only had to repeat the request because it was not being met. If everyone of Grant's 1864 orders to strip another army to feed the forces operating against Lee was stacked up against McClellans no doubt it is Grant who'd look greedier. The difference is Grant never had to ask, he could just take.

Hence before 7th July Lincoln is ordering large reinforcements to McClellan, although Halleck would successfully argue against parting with 25,000 men because his 215,094 men apparently weren't enough to defend against Bragg's 61,561, and Smith's 16,303.

From 28th June - 7th July, the President had ordered the following sent to McClellan:

25,000 from Halleck (Halleck rebuffed this and on 4th July the President asked if he could spare 10,000)
10,000 from Hunter ("all you can spare")
10,000 from Burnside (ditto)
11,000 from Washington

McClellan requests for resources (in this case ferry boats) are being met promptly upto the 10th July. On the 11th Lincoln appoints Halleck Commanding General and suspends the reinforcements movements to McClellan. Why does Lincoln and the government suddenly shift position around this time?

On the contrary. What poisoned the relationship was Mac's failure to move the army after Antietam and claiming he needed more troops. Lincoln didn't decide Mac wouldn't be reinforced to prevent him from being successful. The manpower pool was tapped out at that point.

Yet McClellan did move his army after Antietam, and had successfully separated Longstreet and Jackson and was moving to strike Longstreet around Orange Court House when relieved. For all the allegations of slowness, McClellan stops after parrying Lee's movements after Antietam when permission to build bridges at Harper's Ferry and cross the Potomac to strike Lee is denied by Halleck, but then moves rapidly when the Potomac rises to prevent Lee recrossing and is on the verge of a major battle.

Prior to May, absolutely. Perhaps you should look into his battle record prior to May 1863.

In command of an army it is nil. In command of a wing at Fredericksburg it's pathetic. In command of a corps at Antietam it is below par. In command of a division on the Peninsula it is average.

What's your source for these percentages? I don't doubt them, but I'd like to see the source.

The returns in the OR.

It does appear as though you've committed the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy by ignoring what else was going on.

I'm aware of the terrible supply situation. Yet when the same situation is applied to McClellan not moving for a month after Antietam it seems to be ignored.

 

[Elennsar]

Yet 4,380 in line inc. arty. This would be 68%, which is an overestimate.

If you've read Carman's short discussion on how many of the PFD were ever in line of battle he says between 60% and 80% of PFD could be formed into line of battle, depending largely on the discipline of the unit. This is clearly in that range.

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Casey;rgn=full text;idno=waro0012;didno=waro0012;view=image;seq=935;page=root;size=100

This report, I presume.
But what is the most recent return of Casey's strength before the battle of Seven Pines? Judging his PFD for that based on the numbers of June seems like it would be grossly misleading, whatever the value of PFD as a figure for counting combat strength (see below).

That's one of the ways the post-war lost cause movement was able to claim Confederate meagerness - they counted muskets, but the Union counted all men present. As Grant wrote in his article on Shiloh sent to the Century Magazine (reprinted as Battles and Leaders):

"According to the custom of enumeration in the South, this number probably excluded every man enlisted as musician, or detailed as guard or nurse, and all commissioned officers -- everybody who did not carry a musket or serve a cannon. With us everybody in the field receiving pay from the Government is counted."

For the Seven Days we have good data on the number of combat effectives for the Confederates, and PFD for the Union, and it was the custom (and often still is) to compare the two. Harsh (via his student Tenney) has done us a huge favour by getting Confederate PFD data from the unit records, and so we have two directly comparable figures.

Grant refers to "the effective strength of the Union force on the morning of the 6th" - he does say whether that was his force's "aggregate present" or "present for duty" or anything illuminating how that relates to effectives in the sense of musket-carrying men.

For what it's worth: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Grant;rgn=full text;idno=waro0010;didno=waro0010;view=image;seq=130;page=root;size=100

but Confederate figures are either: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=no. 135;rgn=full text;idno=waro0010;didno=waro0010;view=image;seq=414;page=root;size=100

or
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=no. 135;rgn=full text;idno=waro0010;didno=waro0010;view=image;seq=416;page=root;size=100

which gives officers and men present for duty, officers and men present for extra duty, officers and men sick, and officers men under arrest.

Looking at the First Corps (I can run the numbers for if the other units listed also have the figures add up if you want to check them), the aggregate total works out as the sum of all of those.

Sadly Grant's figures are simply "present for duty" with no mention of extra duty/sick/under arrest, and several Confederate reports also just list the total number officers and men present without regard for whether sick, on extra duty, or under arrest.

But this
http://freepages.military.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~pa91/cc3926m.html suggests that present for duty is not - at least it is not supposed to be recorded as, though I'm sure some officers were more conscientious than others about it "all the men of a unit who were within the camps of the army or detachment in question".

And I've never heard anything suggesting that the 91st Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry's morning reports were anything unusual.

Allow me to recant. Checking Burton it seems I'd confused no answer on the question (from Porter) with an actual rebuff.

Makes sense. Although while talking what Porter said: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=no. 93;rgn=full text;idno=waro0013;didno=waro0013;view=image;seq=223;page=root;size=100 - for those who haven't read his report, which I presume doesn't include you but which may include others on this site.

I don't know what exactly Porter is referring to in regards to "Jackson with 50,000 men", but even the highest figures for Lee's army don't give Jackson that many men - even counting men under his de-facto "corps" and not just the Valley Army.

True. May I recommend the Windham maps of the Seven Days, the first of the sequence here: http://www.loc.gov/resource/g3884rm.gcw0652000/#seq-1

They show the positions of the troops and we can discuss things on that basis?

In lieu of clearer maps, sure (reading white on black is not my preference, but I don't have an alternative depiction to suggest).

Yorktown was never a siege, despite the name. It did however involve regular approaches to some extremely strong fortifications.

Extremely strong maybe, but also extremely undermanned until after McClellan has decided to rely on his siege guns rather than taking advantage of Magruder's thin lines. I don't have an exact date on when Johnston started arriving, but his forces are not up until after McClellan has begun to call up his heavy artillery.

So it was certainly not a pitched battle. "The preliminary to siege operations"?

I'm not using "siege" as a slur here. Sometimes, the big guns are an effective military solution.

The Richmond defences had some very large works that simply could not be stormed. See the map here: http://www.loc.gov/resource/g3884r.cw0628000/

Any attack directly via Fair Oaks would be conducted by Smith's division (9,308 PFD) and one brigade of Richardson's division (ca. 2,688 PFD) who have to fight through Magruder (15,089) then contend with four major forts, including Fort Jackson.

An attack from the new position would be Sedgwick (8,681), Kearny (8,323) and Hooker (8,976) (25,980 total) against Huger and two of Holmes' brigades (11,487 according to Schulte's rendering of Tenney) towards redoubts 14 and 15.

The second of these two is far more dangerous to the Confederates, because a much greater local superiority can be achieved, partially because this was McClellan planned route in anyway. The Federal can stack up about 2:1 manpower advantage. However, quite a bit of that would be negated by the lack of artillery support and the Confederate entrenchments.

Why a lack of artillery support? Why so little of the army's infantry?

Of course McClellan did fight. However here he is indeed conducting a flank movement towards the James. This is largely to do with remaining able to continue to fight. Once the line of supply is gone the army can't make an attack, and no army in the civil war made a successful attack when unsupplied (noting that Grant indeed did keep a LoC after crossing the Mississippi at Vicksburg).

He did not fight in the sense of taking the fight to the enemy, even before Porter's position was breached we still see him going on the defensive - with around half his army not even facing the Richmond works. Even allowing for waiting for things to dry up enough to make major changes, that is a cautious deployment rather than an aggressive one.

On the Peninsula they were within the norm (ca. 25%), and under Hooker they were about the norm, and even after the bloodletting of the Overland Campaign weren't that inflated. However there is a period of increased absenteeism lasting from September '62 into early '63. Why?

Since this is under the tenure of McClellan followed by Burnside, I would venture to say that it wasn't based on the esteem felt by the army for any particular general - otherwise we'd see a dramatic change around the time leaders change, but the amount it falls per period seems generally steady.

The preliminary EP is issued two days after the first figure and eight before the second, so I'm missing the "spike" in desertions supposedly caused by it.

 

[cash]

Cash, do you have any thoughts on the awful tangle of numbers as far as McClellan's and Lee's forces in the Seven Days (or at later dates)?

I think McClellan grossly overestimated Lee's forces.

 

[Elennsar]

I think McClellan grossly overestimated Lee's forces.

Do you think he underestimated his own?

 

[cash]

Do you think he underestimated his own?

No, I don't. I think he would know how many men he had.

 

[Elennsar]

Without wishing to drop the discussion on the Seven Days, I wanted to take a look at the numbers McClellan faced at Antietam (where the situation was far more favorable for the Union than against Richmond's fortifications)

Looking at Antietam, where the situation was far more ripe for exploitation by offensive moves the Richmond fortifications, the following is my best attempt at understanding Lee's PFD.

Per John Owen Allen's thesis, Lee had about 75,000 men PFD on September 2. Subtracting the reserve artillery and the cavalry (to compare to the field return for September 22, which lacks figures for those) gives us 68,724 officers and men present for duty.

The field return for September 22
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=September 22;rgn=full text;idno=waro0028;didno=waro0028;view=image;seq=0623

A mere 2,732 officers and 33,686 men present for duty (41,529 aggregate present).

The field return for September 30 - described as "incorrect", but I do not know of what the corrected figures were, http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=field return;rgn=full text;idno=waro0028;didno=waro0028;view=image;seq=0641

3,857 officers and 48,933 men present for duty (62,713 aggreage present) - still not including information for the cavalry, but the reserve artillery contributes 55 officers and 716 men present for duty and 849 aggregate present - leaving 3,802 officers and 48,217 men present for duty in comparison to the September 22 figures.

October 10, which does include the cavalry (423 officers and 5338 men present for duty, 6,378 aggregate present)

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=field return;rgn=full text;idno=waro0028;didno=waro0028;view=image;seq=0662

But for comparison to the earlier returns let's subtract it from the total and note that there are 4,117 officers and 54,395 men present for duty, and 71,826 aggregate present.

Finally, here is October 20 with the cavalry and artillery reserve both reported: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=field return;rgn=full text;idno=waro0028;didno=waro0028;view=image;seq=0676

A total of 68,033 officers and men present for duty, with 79,595 aggregate present.

Lee suffered 10,320* casualties at Antietam. 36,418+10,320 would give us 46,638 plus the cavalry and reserve artillery units present, minus detached units such as Thomas's brigade.

Livermore, for comparison, gives us the following:
http://books.google.com/books?id=jthCAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA91&lpg=PA91&dq=Livermore Numbers and losses at Antietam&source=bl&ots=G1YUYenr8V&sig=wl5qPF2n_sQvQgBtkI9JIn3xRZk&hl=en&sa=X&ei=VvW8U5X8FpCBogTHtoKgCg&ved=0CEQQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=Livermore Numbers and losses at Antietam&f=false
55,211 PFD.

Should we adopt Livermore's figures for losses instead of the NPS's, Lee would have 50,142 not counting those units of the reserve artillery and cavalry present and prior to detachments.

Adding Livermore's calculation of the cavalry and reserve artillery present and subtracting his figures for detachments would give 57,497 men PFD on September 17, including of course Powell Hill's late arriving division.

Carman gives "an aggregate of approximately 37,351 men" engaged, which if a figure of effectives (I regrettably do not own a copy of his work yet, so I'm relying on checking google books) would mean - calculating the horse artillery as part of the cavalry for this conversion, which overrates its numbers slightly - that Lee had approximately 42,199 PFD in those units engaged.

If I have made an error in my calculations at any point I trust that my fellow students can correct me.

For a quick comparison - more detailed calculations to come if desired:
McClellan's forces engaged per Carman were 55,956 and 87,164 present for duty (said to be ignoring Morrell's division) per Livermore, of which "about 23,000 in 6th Corps and Sykes's division here did not open fire in the line of battle" which would give 64,164 men PFD of those actually involved in the fighting.

* http://www.nps.gov/anti/historyculture/casualties.htm To this the reported casualties of the Reserve Artillery and cavalry should be subtracted for greater accuracy, but compared to the rest of the army their losses were relatively inconsequential.

 

[67th Tigers]

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Casey;rgn=full text;idno=waro0012;didno=waro0012;view=image;seq=935;page=root;size=100

This report, I presume.
But what is the most recent return of Casey's strength before the battle of Seven Pines? Judging his PFD for that based on the numbers of June seems like it would be grossly misleading, whatever the value of PFD as a figure for counting combat strength (see below).

Yes, that one. The PFD I had was closer, but darned if I can find it.

What I did find is Keyes calling attention to the massive drop in strength in Casey's Division on the 22nd May: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=casey;rgn=full text;idno=waro0014;didno=waro0014;view=image;seq=188;page=root;size=100

and Casey put forward a defence: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=casey;rgn=full text;idno=waro0014;didno=waro0014;view=image;seq=199;page=root;size=100

Grant refers to "the effective strength of the Union force on the morning of the 6th" - he does say whether that was his force's "aggregate present" or "present for duty" or anything illuminating how that relates to effectives in the sense of musket-carrying men.

For what it's worth: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Grant;rgn=full text;idno=waro0010;didno=waro0010;view=image;seq=130;page=root;size=100

but Confederate figures are either: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=no. 135;rgn=full text;idno=waro0010;didno=waro0010;view=image;seq=414;page=root;size=100

or
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=no. 135;rgn=full text;idno=waro0010;didno=waro0010;view=image;seq=416;page=root;size=100

which gives officers and men present for duty, officers and men present for extra duty, officers and men sick, and officers men under arrest.

Looking at the First Corps (I can run the numbers for if the other units listed also have the figures add up if you want to check them), the aggregate total works out as the sum of all of those.

Sadly Grant's figures are simply "present for duty" with no mention of extra duty/sick/under arrest, and several Confederate reports also just list the total number officers and men present without regard for whether sick, on extra duty, or under arrest.

The PFD you mention gives 37,331 excluding 3rd division.

According to "The Battle of Shiloh and the Organizations Engaged":

1st Div: 6,941 PFD, 286 on extra duty, 1,030 sick, 13 under arrest. Reported "engaged" by commander= 7,280
2nd Div: 8,408 PFD, 616 on extra duty, 1,257 sick, no report of under arrest etc.
4th Div: 7,825 PFD, 302 on extra duty, 1,315 sick, no report of under arrest etc.
5th Div: 8,580 PFD, 453 on extra duty, 1,524 sick, no report of under arrest etc.
6th Div: 7,545 PFD, 269 on extra duty, 1,279 sick (the "tens" digit is missing, assume 0), no report of under arrest etc.
Unassigned: 2,031 PFD, 148 sick

Summary (exc/ 3rd division and unassigned inf not on the field) = 39,830 PFD, 1,926 extra duty, 6,453 sick and 13 under arrest (only 1st div).

According to Grant this yielded 33,000 effectives, and so many ran away that only 25,000 fought. Sherman says the force was 32,000 effectives. This would put the army at around 75-80% of PFD/ED (which many commanders did not separate out) as combat effectives, in the range given by Carman.

But this
http://freepages.military.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~pa91/cc3926m.html suggests that present for duty is not - at least it is not supposed to be recorded as, though I'm sure some officers were more conscientious than others about it "all the men of a unit who were within the camps of the army or detachment in question".

And I've never heard anything suggesting that the 91st Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry's morning reports were anything unusual.

Absolutely. Which is why "aggregate present"is usually the best statistic to judge relative army strengths.

Makes sense. Although while talking what Porter said: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=no. 93;rgn=full text;idno=waro0013;didno=waro0013;view=image;seq=223;page=root;size=100 - for those who haven't read his report, which I presume doesn't include you but which may include others on this site.

I don't know what exactly Porter is referring to in regards to "Jackson with 50,000 men", but even the highest figures for Lee's army don't give Jackson that many men - even counting men under his de-facto "corps" and not just the Valley Army.

Some very exaggerated reports on Jackson's strength were circulating. Pinkerton settled on 30,000 coming down, which is essentially the maths behind the "200,000" figure.

McClellan's intelligence was estimating 150,000 men at Richmond, and it seems to be an estimate of the "aggregate present" figure (as all these estimates were, the methodology was to get the roster strength of units and knock off an estimate of sick at 1/6th, however the computer Pinkerton employed used 6% instead of the reported 1/6th leading to about 10% inflation). At the time, there were roughly 100-110,000 Present, excluding detachments from NC and the Valley.

Jackson was estimated to have brung down 30,000 (present) which is actually pretty close, and "Beauregard" about 20,000 (present) up from NC, which is pretty close.

The overestimate seems to be in the Richmond garrison, which held 133 inf regts, plus cavalry, artillery and the Richmond defences (usually ignored), excluding the North Carolina dept (16 inf regts and arty etc.) and Jackson and Ewell (36 inf regts, plus arty etc.). When I looked at this a while back it seemed that the usual "Pinkerton had the units right" was quite wrong, and he'd included a large number of regiments that were elsewhere, and when that was factored in the maths worked, especially if you assume double counting of the NC troops (Pinkerton did). Pinkerton's records estimate 208 infantry regiments, including Holmes and Jackson, a quite large overestimate.

His estimates of regiments are here, and I've long intended to analyse them: https://archive.org/stream/spyofrebellionbe00inpink#page/588/mode/2up

In lieu of clearer maps, sure (reading white on black is not my preference, but I don't have an alternative depiction to suggest).

It's the only one I've seen with brigade positions.

Extremely strong maybe, but also extremely undermanned until after McClellan has decided to rely on his siege guns rather than taking advantage of Magruder's thin lines. I don't have an exact date on when Johnston started arriving, but his forces are not up until after McClellan has begun to call up his heavy artillery.

Wilcox's brigade from Johnston, and Colston's brigade from Huger arrived before McClellan reached Yorktown, and Featherston's and Pryor's brigades were formed there from spare regiments sent and there already, giving Magruder 8 brigades manning the line, rather than the 4 he claims.

The "effective strength" of the forces present on the 6th April, taken from the 30th April estimate were:

1st Division (Yorktown)
Rains: 1,830
Featherston: 2,224 (the wikipedia article says this was from Johnston, but the OR shows Featherston was assigned to a new brigade created on the Peninsula initially under Col GB Anderson)
(Gloucester Point garrison: 1,119)
Yorktown garrison: 1,151

2nd Division (Lee's Mill)
McLaws: 2,084
Cobb: 3,796
10th Ga (unbrigaded): 582

3rd Division (Wynn's Mill)
Wilcox: 2,616
Colston: 1,750
Pryor: 2,301
Ward's demi-brigade: 890

= 19,224, excluding Gloucester Point. Newton suggests increasing the numbers by 10% to account for sickness = 21,146, and this excludes a small cavalry force (no numbers available).

On the day McClellan reach Yorktown the first two brigades of Johnston's army were boarding steamers in Richmond to travel to King's Mill Wharf at Williamsburg. Thus Rodes (3,040 + 10% = 3,344) and Early (2,380 + 10% = 2,618) arrive during the 7th or so bringing the defenders upto 27,108. Another 7 brigades reach Yorktown over the next week, and 5 more remain at Williamsburg (there is literally no space in the line to put them).

So it was certainly not a pitched battle. "The preliminary to siege operations"?

I'm not using "siege" as a slur here. Sometimes, the big guns are an effective military solution.

I see a difference between a formal siege, of which there were few (Vicksburg being the most obvious) and "regular approaches".

Why a lack of artillery support? Why so little of the army's infantry?

The artillery was back in the old position. That's essentially ALL the available infantry after other tasks are covered, and I'm impressed a local 2:1 advantage in that sector was possible.

He did not fight in the sense of taking the fight to the enemy, even before Porter's position was breached we still see him going on the defensive - with around half his army not even facing the Richmond works. Even allowing for waiting for things to dry up enough to make major changes, that is a cautious deployment rather than an aggressive one.

My reading is he intended to hold his position and move his supply base to the James, using the Chickahominy as a curtain of maneouver. He doesn't make the decision to cross the White Oak with the whole army until the evening of the 28th, after a council of war with his corps commanders (sans Keyes) nixes the idea of making an attack against Richmond.