McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[Elennsar]

Opn, in fairness to McClellan, in the context of "Okay we're going to have a siege", McClellan conducted that reasonably well.

Sieges take a fair amount of skill to conduct, if not necessarily the kind of skill that would win in the field.

 

[67th Tigers]

So, there's a difference between "isolated", which can be fixed without a complete withdrawal, and "destroyed", which leaves those supplies up in smoke.

A somantic difference, not a practical one. Once the rail line was cut they may have well been on the moon.

Would be even better than nice if McClellan with seventeen brigades did as much as Porter did with the men he had. No one is asking McClellan to ignore what Lee did, only to respond in a way to interfere instead of relying on Porter to hold against whatever forces Lee brings to bear while meanwhile the general commanding has all his attention on the rear.

McClellan in fact commanded from north of the Chickahominy on the 26th, and oversaw the defence, and sighted the new line of defence observing the right flank of the old one was in the air. If you look at his correspondence of the 26th it is marked as "Porter's Headquarters". It's clear he is personally conducting the Beaver Dam Creek from 5th Corps HQ.

See for example:

Expired Image Removed
Of course, the morning of the 27th he's commanding from the central position of AHQ at Camp Lincoln, because he's sorted out the problems on the north side (heavy equipment pulled back over the river, strong position, reserves well in hand) and is expecting action on both sides of the river. He reacts quite promptly to Lee's moves, shifting reserves to meet crises, but Porter's line cracks, and that's usually cited to be due to a freak mishap with Federal cavalry stampeding through their own lines and Hood's brigade charging through the gap.

Yet on the 28th McClellan still hasn't withdrawn the army. He's reformed behind the Chickahominy, and abandoned lines now swept by Confederate artillery, but the army is still there whilst Keyes and 4 brigades is moving south to the James.

On the night of the 28th McClellan calls in his corps commanders except Keyes (already south of the white oak occupying the position at Glendale). He asks all of them if there is a prospect of a successful immediate assault of Richmond. All four say no. He then issues orders to withdraw to the Glendale position, which was his intended destination. Every commander is issued a map of the area and they mark their routes and positions and they're told to hold position tomorrow until night, then march to Glendale.

So it seems McClellan had every intention of remaining as close to Richmond as possible, absorbing Lee's attack, and then continuing with his own.

 

[67th Tigers]

What Yorktown proved was that when push came to shove, little mac always reverted to the defensive, if the enemy shoved back, and it proved that he had no answers, if events did not meet his expectations. Did McClellan try to find a weak spot, before ordering an attack. After Keyes failure? Did he try to find or develop a plan to take advantage of his superior numbers?

How? Massed human wave attacks into the killing areas in front of the fortification?

McClellan dealt with the problem as best he could, and that was pretty well. He tried to get round both flanks but failed due to Misroon's intransigence and a strong defence of Lee's Mill dam (which was dominated by 4 major works). In the end regular approaches is what was left.

Of note is that Magruder was not as weak as he often claims. Before McClellan even reached Yorktown Colston's brigade from Norfolk and Wilcox's brigade from Johnston had arrived and been formed into a 3rd division. GB Anderson's (Featherston's) brigade had been formed from new units and Rodes' and Early's brigades were already en route from Richmond (via steamer down the James, which is how Johnston's forces arrived).

In fact Magruder has more effectives manning the Yorktown lines than Pemberton had manning the Vicksburg fortifications, and they weren't stormed either.

Was McClellan on the peninsula, to take Richmond by not defeating the confederate army defending it, does it really matter if little mjac defeats Lee while defending his supply lines in the open or behind entrenchments at the gates of Richmond?
Defeating Lee in a battle, to secure his supply line, so that he could continue his plan of defeating the confederate forces with his matchless siege guns, would be the validation of the whole point of his presence on the Peninsula in the first place, in 1862.

How? Lee wouldn't be destroyed but pushed back to Richmond.

Please be serious, the ANV or 1862, was not the same army in 1864.

Indeed, it is most likely a better army in 1862 than in 1864. Combat exhaustion hasn't bled off the offensive edge of the army.

 

[Elennsar]

A somantic difference, not a practical one. Once the rail line was cut they may have well been on the moon.

Apparently after moving the largest American army (to date) ever raised to the Peninsula, and conducting a siege, and all the other operations McClellan has conducted up to this point, being expected to repair a railroad would just be too much to ask.

Comparing that to the supplies being on the moon, when McClellan is far from out of contact with friendly territory (thanks to the fact the navy does, at least, function defensively) is just a little too much to believe, even if such repairs would take some time.

McClellan in fact commanded from north of the Chickahominy on the 26th, and oversaw the defence, and sighted the new line of defence observing the right flank of the old one was in the air. If you look at his correspondence of the 26th it is marked as "Porter's Headquarters". It's clear he is personally conducting the Beaver Dam Creek from 5th Corps HQ.

See for example: (snip)

And leaving half his army doing . . . precisely what to interfere with the enemy, again?

Of course, the morning of the 27th he's commanding from the central position of AHQ at Camp Lincoln, because he's sorted out the problems on the north side (heavy equipment pulled back over the river, strong position, reserves well in hand) and is expecting action on both sides of the river. He reacts quite promptly to Lee's moves, shifting reserves to meet crises, but Porter's line cracks, and that's usually cited to be due to a freak mishap with Federal cavalry stampeding through their own lines and Hood's brigade charging through the gap.

Yet on the 28th McClellan still hasn't withdrawn the army. He's reformed behind the Chickahominy, and abandoned lines now swept by Confederate artillery, but the army is still there whilst Keyes and 4 brigades is moving south to the James.

On the night of the 28th McClellan calls in his corps commanders except Keyes (already south of the white oak occupying the position at Glendale). He asks all of them if there is a prospect of a successful immediate assault of Richmond. All four say no. He then issues orders to withdraw to the Glendale position, which was his intended destination. Every commander is issued a map of the area and they mark their routes and positions and they're told to hold position tomorrow until night, then march to Glendale.

So it seems McClellan had every intention of remaining as close to Richmond as possible, absorbing Lee's attack, and then continuing with his own.

It seems more like McClellan was so busy absorbing Lee's attack that any attempt to make one of his own would always be "later" and "after doing what I'm doing now".

 

[67th Tigers]

Apparently after moving the largest American army (to date) ever raised to the Peninsula, and conducting a siege, and all the other operations McClellan has conducted up to this point, being expected to repair a railroad would just be too much to ask.

Comparing that to the supplies being on the moon, when McClellan is far from out of contact with friendly territory (thanks to the fact the navy does, at least, function defensively) is just a little too much to believe, even if such repairs would take some time.

It's simple. The analogy would be a needed key being inside a locked room. To mount an offensive McClellan's army needs supplies, but the supplies can only be gotten by said offensive. Ergo it's not really possible.

The solution is to gain supplies from elsewhere, then go on the offensive.

And leaving half his army doing . . . precisely what to interfere with the enemy, again?

You do understand Lee left 45,000 men south of the Chickahominy, with orders to launch a major attack once McClellan overweakened that side of the river?

McClellan has about 40,000 infantry to oppose them. Do you think they can attack permanent works without artillery cover and at a manpower disadvantage?

It seems more like McClellan was so busy absorbing Lee's attack that any attempt to make one of his own would always be "later" and "after doing what I'm doing now".

Or "when it's realistic to do so".

 

[lakertaker]

Perhaps not a re-evaluation, but how can you not appreciate the sights and sounds of his Peninsular Campaign's 25 mile supply line? Now, there's a 4th of July parade for ya!

 

[Elennsar]

It's simple. The analogy would be a needed key being inside a locked room. To mount an offensive McClellan's army needs supplies, but the supplies can only be gotten by said offensive. Ergo it's not really possible.

The solution is to gain supplies from elsewhere, then go on the offensive.

And again, apparently repairing the railroad is just too much to ask. No, we have to resort to overblown analogies.

You do understand Lee left 45,000 men south of the Chickahominy, with orders to launch a major attack once McClellan overweakened that side of the river?

McClellan has about 40,000 infantry to oppose them. Do you think they can attack permanent works without artillery cover and at a manpower disadvantage?

Whose divisions are you referring to (in Lee's army)?

No attempting to make Lee think that McClellan is in a stronger position to attack? No movements that might involve any element of risk in attempting to make Lee react to McClellan's actions instead of being able to freely hammer on Porter because the other half of the army is no threat to Richmond? Whatever the long term plan, they're not doing anything to make Lee need to worry about balancing defending Richmond with hammering on Porter now.

Or "when it's realistic to do so".

And why is that never "now"? Why can a Lee or a Grant or a Jackson to name three find ways to make offensive action possible throughout their campaigns, but a McClellan can only find ways that it has to be done "later"?

If it was just this specific point in this specific campaign, I wouldn't have much of a problem with it. But McClellan seems to have felt that offensive campaigning could only take place under optimal conditions.

 

[67th Tigers]

And again, apparently repairing the railroad is just too much to ask. No, we have to resort to overblown analogies.

No I understand. You miss the fact that 67,000 Confederates are in the way, with 45,000 Confederates the other. The depot is gone. Nothing can be done. It isn't a few cavalry tearing up some tracks.

Whose divisions are you referring to (in Lee's army)?

Magruder's Corps of 3 divisions and Huger's Division, plus the Richmond Defences. Also once New Bridge was uncovered the forces north of the bank can easily cross via the direct route.

No attempting to make Lee think that McClellan is in a stronger position to attack? No movements that might involve any element of risk in attempting to make Lee react to McClellan's actions instead of being able to freely hammer on Porter because the other half of the army is no threat to Richmond? Whatever the long term plan, they're not doing anything to make Lee need to worry about balancing defending Richmond with hammering on Porter now.

Richmond is well defended. Lee has no worries. When were 45,000 entrenched infantry with permanent works and hundreds of artillery pieces simply run over?

And why is that never "now"? Why can a Lee or a Grant or a Jackson to name three find ways to make offensive action possible throughout their campaigns, but a McClellan can only find ways that it has to be done "later"?

Because a Jackson or Grant always waited until it was time. We just ignore it.

If it was just this specific point in this specific campaign, I wouldn't have much of a problem with it. But McClellan seems to have felt that offensive campaigning could only take place under optimal conditions.

Certainly you need advantages to do so. Which is why Grant flounders about for the first six months of the Vicksburg Campaign, or Grant and Sherman do nothing for six months after Missionary Ridge, or Meade and Grant make no major attacks on Lee for ten months after Gettysburg etc. etc. etc.

 

[Elennsar]

No I understand. You miss the fact that 67,000 Confederates are in the way, with 45,000 Confederates the other. The depot is gone. Nothing can be done. It isn't a few cavalry tearing up some tracks.

http://cdn2.americancivilwar.com/americancivilwar-cdn/civil_war_map/army-peninsula-campaign-map.jpg

So until Gaines's Mill Porter and the other Union forces are in the way of 67,000 Confederates doing anything. Why is McClellan sitting there waiting?

Magruder's Corps of 3 divisions and Huger's Division, plus the Richmond Defences. Also once New Bridge was uncovered the forces north of the bank can easily cross via the direct route.

Per Tenney (rounding to the nearest hundred to stay consistent with the round figure of "45,000" you presented):
Magruder's "corps": 15,800

Huger's Division: 7,300

Richmond Defenses: 6,100 (including 800 men at Drewry's Bluff).

Total: less than 30,000 (29,200).

Where are you getting another sixteen thousand men from?

Obviously 40,000 vs. 29,200 does not favor an assault, but it does not justify tying up 40,000 men hesitant to do anything that might possibly interfere with Lee's plans either. If they can't do anything to assault Magruder, I'm sure Porter would appreciate another ten thousand men.

Because a Jackson or Grant always waited until it was time. We just ignore it.

Grant is more quotable than Jackson (and was more successful, with due respect to Stonewall's feats), so I'm going to quote him:

"The art of war is simple enough. Find out where enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can, and keep moving on."

Or, more apropos:

"[A]nything is better than indecision. We must decide. If I am wrong, we shall soon find it out and can do the other thing. But not to decide wastes both time and money, and may ruin everything."

Certainly you need advantages to do so. Which is why Grant flounders about for the first six months of the Vicksburg Campaign, or Grant and Sherman do nothing for six months after Missionary Ridge, or Meade and Grant make no major attacks on Lee for ten months after Gettysburg etc. etc. etc.

And yet we still see Grant pressing and searching for those advantages in the Vicksburg campaign for the first six months right up to the end and we see Meade pressing and searching for advantages after Gettysburg even when his army is having men taken away (to deal with the New York Draft riots, to reinforce Gilmore down in South Carolina), to look at two relevant examples.

McClellan's philosophy of war seems to be more along the lines of 'I do not favour pitched battles, especially at the beginning of a war, and I am convinced that a skillful general could make war all his life without being forced into one.', in a very different situation than that de Saxe commanded in, and without regard for whether that situation being different (both militarily and politically) meant it was an inappropriate philosophy.

 

[67th Tigers]

http://cdn2.americancivilwar.com/americancivilwar-cdn/civil_war_map/army-peninsula-campaign-map.jpg

So until Gaines's Mill Porter and the other Union forces are in the way of 67,000 Confederates doing anything. Why is McClellan sitting there waiting?

He isn't. As I said both sides were waiting for the ground to dry enough to move. On the 25th McClellan begins his attack, with 3rd Corps pushing the Confederates back one tactical bound (i.e. one geographic feature, a ridgeline in this case). Before news of Jackson's arrival becomes certain 6th Corps is stood ready for an attack in their sector, which was suspended. 6th Corps is controlling the other bank of the Chickahominy and Slocum's division was pulled back to act as a reserve.

Per Tenney (rounding to the nearest hundred to stay consistent with the round figure of "45,000" you presented):
Magruder's "corps": 15,800

Huger's Division: 7,300

Richmond Defenses: 6,100 (including 800 men at Drewry's Bluff).

Total: less than 30,000 (29,200).

Where are you getting another sixteen thousand men from?

Tenny says:

Army of Northern Virginia
Longstreet: 14,291
A.P. Hill: 16,411
D.H. Hill: 12,318
Stuart: 2,109
Total: 45,129

Army of the Valley
Jackson: 9,604
Ewell: 6,353
Whiting: 5,537
Cavalry: 605
Total: 22,099

Confederate defensive forces south of the Chickahominy:
McLaws: 4,915
D.R. Jones: 4,503
Magruder: 5,671
Huger: 6,160
Holmes: 9,018
Reserve artillery: 1,680
Cavalry: 2,000
Richmond defenses: 9,136
Petersburg defenses: 1,909
Total: 44,992

Obviously 40,000 vs. 29,200 does not favor an assault, but it does not justify tying up 40,000 men hesitant to do anything that might possibly interfere with Lee's plans either. If they can't do anything to assault Magruder, I'm sure Porter would appreciate another ten thousand men.

Union Forces are:

Present North of the Chickahominy the morning of the 26th (figures PFDE from OR 11(3), 238 - splitting divisions pro rata as I don't have brigade strengths):

Morell: 12,0011
Sykes: 5,745
McCall: 9,501
Farnsworth's 8th Illinois Cavalry: 671
Cooke's Cavalry Division: 2,087

= 30,015

Sent from South of the Chickahominy on the 27th:

Slocum: 9,246
2 brigades of Richardson: (2/3rds of 8,145) = 5,457
2 brigades of Peck (Casey): (2/3rds of 5,248) = 3,516

Reinforcements sent by McClellan: ca. 18,219

Total committed to the fight north of the Chickahominy: 48,234

Remaining south of the Chickahominy:

Brigade of Richardson's Division: (8,145-5,457) = 2,688
Sedgwick's Division: 8,681
2nd Corps Arty: 355
Averill's Cavalry Regt: 751
3rd Corps Arty: 378
Hooker's Division: 8,976
Kearny's Division: 8,323
Gregg's Cavalry Regt: 643
Couch's Division: 8,314
Brigade of Peck's Division: (5,248-3,516) = 1,732
McReynold's Cavalry Regt: 841
Smith's Division: 9,308
Artillery Reserve: 2,108

Total south of the Chickahominy after sending reinforcements = 53,098

As to Porter, he kept fending off McClellan asking him if he needed reinforcements, and eventually McClellan sent them anyway.

And yet we still see Grant pressing and searching for those advantages in the Vicksburg campaign for the first six months right up to the end and we see Meade pressing and searching for advantages after Gettysburg even when his army is having men taken away (to deal with the New York Draft riots, to reinforce Gilmore down in South Carolina), to look at two relevant examples.

So with Grant and Meade we find reasons for lack of action, but we don't accord the same courtesy to McClellan?

McClellan's philosophy of war seems to be more along the lines of 'I do not favour pitched battles, especially at the beginning of a war, and I am convinced that a skillful general could make war all his life without being forced into one.', in a very different situation than that de Saxe commanded in, and without regard for whether that situation being different (both militarily and politically) meant it was an inappropriate philosophy.

He was not a "doctrinaire" general, no. He was a skillful one.

By far one of the best analysis of McClellan as a military commander is McCoun's MA thesis, which isn't in general circulation, but is often referenced and copies are floating around. Unfortunately my copy isn't OCR'd or I quote chunks.

 

[Elennsar]

He isn't. As I said both sides were waiting for the ground to dry enough to move. On the 25th McClellan begins his attack, with 3rd Corps pushing the Confederates back one tactical bound (i.e. one geographic feature, a ridgeline in this case). Before news of Jackson's arrival becomes certain 6th Corps is stood ready for an attack in their sector, which was suspended. 6th Corps is controlling the other bank of the Chickahominy and Slocum's division was pulled back to act as a reserve.

One must wonder why the attack on the 25th was not pressed. Jackson's arrival or not, keep Lee forced to react to you - best way to keep him off your rail line.

On numbers:

It appears that we have a conflict of sources. Where's Brett Schulte to ask when we need him on this: http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/...al-level-orders-of-battle-the-seven-days-oob/ - his site.

Alternate source (giving around 105,000 total) http://www.icsm.it/secessione/cb02oob.html (Much of the description is only partially translated from Italian, but the OOB research is in English) provided for the sake of comparison. I'm not saying it's the best, just another look to see how much calculations vary.

Comments in () to see if issues there account for any differences.

Italian site
McLaws: 4,588
D.R. Jones: 4,732
Magruder: 5,105
Richmond Defenses: 2,622.
Huger: 6,774
Total: 23,821

Tenney as quoted by you
McLaws: 4,915
D.R. Jones: 4,503
Magruder: 5,671
Huger: 6,160
Richmond Defenses: 9,136
Total: 30,385

Tenney as quoted by Schulte
McLaws: 5,505 (including the 600 strong 53rd Georgia arriving on the 27th)
D.R. Jones: 4,493 (no figures for Dabney's battery)
Magruder: 5,780
Huger: 7,287 (including the 462 men strong 44th Alabama which arrived at Richmond on the 26th of June and joined the brigade its listed with on July 1)
Richmond Defenses: 6,060 (including 791 men at Drewry's bluff)
Total: 29,125.

Note that I am going with what you defined as the source of that 45,000 when I asked you what specific divisions you were referring to in comparing figures:

Magruder's Corps of 3 divisions and Huger's Division, plus the Richmond Defences.

- either we're referring to that specific group of Confederate forces or we're not, but please pick so that we have a common basis to compare head counts.

So with Grant and Meade we find reasons for lack of action, but we don't accord the same courtesy to McClellan?

We find them facing the fact that conditions are not optimal and acting anyway, we find McClellan finding conditions less than optimal and not acting.

So, rather the opposite actually. There are always reasons for taking the cautious, reactive approach - the question is whether a general sought to find victories or excuses.

 

[67th Tigers]

One must wonder why the attack on the 25th was not pressed. Jackson's arrival or not, keep Lee forced to react to you - best way to keep him off your rail line.

That plays straight into Lee's hands. Lee has left ca. 45,000 men in heavy permanent works that magnify their combat power 3-6 times. McClellan simply can't exert much real pressure against them. Indeed McClellan's forces were attacking whilst Lee was pulling west then north to come down against Porter (who had advanced as a demonstration). The fortifications are a superb economy of force measure, and stopped attempts against Richmond in '63 and '64 usually with just a few brigades.

On numbers:

It appears that we have a conflict of sources. Where's Brett Schulte to ask when we need him on this: http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/...al-level-orders-of-battle-the-seven-days-oob/ - his site.

Alternate source (giving around 105,000 total) http://www.icsm.it/secessione/cb02oob.html (Much of the description is only partially translated from Italian, but the OOB research is in English) provided for the sake of comparison. I'm not saying it's the best, just another look to see how much calculations vary.

Comments in () to see if issues there account for any differences.

Italian site
McLaws: 4,588
D.R. Jones: 4,732
Magruder: 5,105
Richmond Defenses: 2,622.
Huger: 6,774
Total: 23,821

Tenney as quoted by you
McLaws: 4,915
D.R. Jones: 4,503
Magruder: 5,671
Huger: 6,160
Richmond Defenses: 9,136
Total: 30,385

Tenney as quoted by Schulte
McLaws: 5,505 (including the 600 strong 53rd Georgia arriving on the 27th)
D.R. Jones: 4,493 (no figures for Dabney's battery)
Magruder: 5,780
Huger: 7,287 (including the 462 men strong 44th Alabama which arrived at Richmond on the 26th of June and joined the brigade its listed with on July 1)
Richmond Defenses: 6,060 (including 791 men at Drewry's bluff)
Total: 29,125.

Note that I am going with what you defined as the source of that 45,000 when I asked you what specific divisions you were referring to in comparing figures:
- either we're referring to that specific group of Confederate forces or we're not, but please pick so that we have a common basis to compare head counts.

I'm using Appendix 2C of Harsh, Confederate Tide Rising.

We find them facing the fact that conditions are not optimal and acting anyway, we find McClellan finding conditions less than optimal and not acting.

So, rather the opposite actually. There are always reasons for taking the cautious, reactive approach - the question is whether a general sought to find victories or excuses.

Yeah, well he was advancing his army, and then got struck by the biggest Confederate attack of the war, except maybe Chickamauga. Once the supply line is gone you can't stay, and McClellan's movements disrupted Lee's planning enough that Lee was reacting to McClellan, and putting in rather bad attacks in acts of desperation.

 

[Elennsar]

That plays straight into Lee's hands. Lee has left ca. 45,000 men in heavy permanent works that magnify their combat power 3-6 times. McClellan simply can't exert much real pressure against them. Indeed McClellan's forces were attacking whilst Lee was pulling west then north to come down against Porter (who had advanced as a demonstration). The fortifications are a superb economy of force measure, and stopped attempts against Richmond in '63 and '64 usually with just a few brigades.

It does not play straight into Lee's hands to make Lee have to respond to your moves instead of making you respond to his. And I would be more than a little skeptical of the idea that the fortifications are the same in '64 as '62.

I'm using Appendix 2C of Harsh, Confederate Tide Rising.

But which specific group of Confederate forces are you intent on talking about? Clearly "Magruder's 'corps', Huger's Division , and the Richmond Defenses" is not 45,000 men.

So are we talking about that, or are we talking about troops from Holmes and Petersburg (among others) as well?

I'm not trying to badger you, but I would appreciate you being clearer here.

Yeah, well he was advancing his army, and then got struck by the biggest Confederate attack of the war, except maybe Chickamauga. Once the supply line is gone you can't stay, and McClellan's movements disrupted Lee's planning enough that Lee was reacting to McClellan, and putting in rather bad attacks in acts of desperation.

If McClellan having his connection to White House Landing cut and proceeding to focus on changing his base because Lee's attack beats Porter is a consequence of Lee fighting on McClellan's terms, McClellan was not the sort of general to achieve any real success here even if he had received the requested for reinforcements post-Malvern Hill.

 

[Elennsar]

On the issue of McClellan's forces:

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar&cc=moawar&idno=waro0014&node=waro0014:3&view=image&seq=240&size=100
Per the above, McClellan has 114,691 present for duty equipped, which not counting Dix (9,246) is 105,445 PFDE total.

Per your most recent figures: Porter has (counting reinforcements) 48,234 and the remainder of the army is 53,098 - 101,332 total.

Per Schulte:

Morell: 10,757
Sykes: 4,943
McCall: 9,581
8th Illinois Cavalry: 627
Cooke: 1,954
Slocum: 8,824
French's brigade: 2,836
Meagher's brigade: 2,240
Peck: 5,031
Total with Porter (counting Peck): 46,793
Army Total: 100,462

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Peck;rgn=full text;idno=waro0013;didno=waro0013;view=image;seq=0217 Peck's refers to having two brigades, but his taking command is a few days after the June 20 return. I would like to look into this more.

Subtracting around 3,000 for the men at White House, the provost guards, and the engineer brigade - McClellan has around 97,000 men to be split between the two areas, with about 50,000 outside those sent to Porter (although it is not clear from either Porter's or Peck's reports that the latter division should be counted as "with Porter" except in not being in the second group).

Subtracting the general headquarters troops, Stoneman, and the Quartermaster's guard from the figures presented in the OR leaves McClellan with (a total of) about 99,628 men.

And as a third party, taking Union strengths from the OR:
http://www.icsm.it/secessione/cb02oob.html

I present the above in the hopes that someone can make heads or tails of how many men were actually available for Lee and McClellan. The possibility that none of the figures presented to date by any party are correct is presently being entertained as a solution to the problem.

But clearly McClellan is both a) facing a considerable number of Confederate soldiers and b) possessed of a not inconsiderable army of his own, close enough in numbers to make numerical superiority to be far more a matter of how many men are present at a given point than is given credit by either Confederate writers or McClellan's concerns.

 

[kevikens]

Not to belabor the point, but when one looks at the casualties of the two sides, McClellan was winning the Seven Days' Campaign. Had he realized how much damage he had inflicted on the Confederates up to and including Malvern Hill and launched a counterattack he, not Lincoln might be on the five dollar bill.

 

[Elennsar]

Not to belabor the point, but when one looks at the casualties of the two sides, McClellan was winning the Seven Days' Campaign. Had he realized how much damage he had inflicted on the Confederates up to and including Malvern Hill and launched a counterattack he, not Lincoln might be on the five dollar bill.

The casualties do not really determine the victor here, at least not when set against the issue of Richmond's fate. But the issue of McClellan not making that counterattack is precisely the problem - not so much that specific decision as that it raises the question of, as someone else put it "What does he fight battles for?" What, indeed, was the purpose of that campaign?

Because if it was to take Richmond, McClellan failed, and similarly if it was to destroy Lee's army - well, Lee's army took no small number of losses, but it wasn't destroyed.

Obviously Lee wasn't completely successful in the Seven Days either, but the Confederates didn't need to be "completely successful" to win the war - the Union had to triumph to prevail, the Confederates simply had to prevent Union triumph.

 

[cash]

Absurd, it simply isn't true.

McClellan objected to the Emancipation Proclamation on military grounds. It would cause friction in the army (and indeed after it was issued he had to clamp down on dissent against Lincoln in his army), and it made the war as existential struggle for the South, meaning a negotiated reentry of the states was impossible.

McClellan also objected to it on political grounds, as the Harrison Landing letter shows. I'm not one to bash Little Mac. I've pointed out that he had Lincoln's prior permission to submit that letter. McClellan wanted to retain slavery intact not because he was necessarily proslavery but because he believed it would facilitate reunion and reconciliation.

 

[cash]

Yet ultimately every single general in the east was a failure to Lincoln, even Grant who Lincoln thought almost most Washington, requiring Lincoln to have a private bollocking session with Grant and threaten to bring McClellan back! Lincoln simply had standards that no mortal could meet.

Sorry, but you've misinterpreted this. In the wake of Jubal Early's raid on Washington, Grant recognized that the situation in the Shenandoah Valley needed to be fixed. There were at least four departments meeting there, with a different commander for each. Grant unified all the commands under one command. The next question was who would command the Department of the Shenandoah? McClellan was one name floated. There was a political implication here, since Mac was the likely Democratic nominee. George Meade's name was also in the mix, but Lincoln nixed that because he had been defending Meade from those who had urged his removal from the AotP, and this would seem as though he was giving in to that pressure. Grant finally settled on Sheridan, and he had to convince Lincoln and Stanton to accept Sheridan because of Sheridan's youth.

Lincoln didn't think Grant was a failure, and he didn't threaten Grant with McClellan. Grant would still be the lieutenant general and McClellan would be his subordinate.

 

[Elennsar]

Cash, do you have any thoughts on the awful tangle of numbers as far as McClellan's and Lee's forces in the Seven Days (or at later dates)?

 

[67th Tigers]

On the issue of McClellan's forces:

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar&cc=moawar&idno=waro0014&node=waro0014:3&view=image&seq=240&size=100
Per the above, McClellan has 114,691 present for duty equipped, which not counting Dix (9,246) is 105,445 PFDE total.

Per your most recent figures: Porter has (counting reinforcements) 48,234 and the remainder of the army is 53,098 - 101,332 total.

Per Schulte:

Morell: 10,757
Sykes: 4,943
McCall: 9,581
8th Illinois Cavalry: 627
Cooke: 1,954
Slocum: 8,824
French's brigade: 2,836
Meagher's brigade: 2,240
Peck: 5,031
Total with Porter (counting Peck): 46,793
Army Total: 100,462

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Peck;rgn=full text;idno=waro0013;didno=waro0013;view=image;seq=0217 Peck's refers to having two brigades, but his taking command is a few days after the June 20 return. I would like to look into this more.

Aye, on paper Brig Gen Casey was assigned to command the WHL defences ISTR on the 23rd, and Peck moved upto the division command, with Howe appointed to command Peck's old brigade. Now looking at Pecks AAR (link) he states that indeed the division was consolidated into two brigades, so thanks, that's something I didn't know.

Subtracting around 3,000 for the men at White House, the provost guards, and the engineer brigade - McClellan has around 97,000 men to be split between the two areas, with about 50,000 outside those sent to Porter (although it is not clear from either Porter's or Peck's reports that the latter division should be counted as "with Porter" except in not being in the second group).

Aye, Peck's men reach the Chickahominy as Porter collapses, and then form line to block an Confederate advance over the river, but aren't involved in the fighting on the north bank.

Interestingly McClellan had asked his four Corps commanders south of the river what they could spare to reinforce Porter. Franklin answered a division, Sumner 2 brigades and Heintzelman and Keyes both answered none. The movement of Peck was ordered anyway. From my readings it seems McClellan considered Keyes to be a very timid commander, and he was the Corps commander McClellan got rid of by leaving at Yorktown when the army was withdrawn. He was also the only CC in favour of abandoning the line of the James.

Subtracting the general headquarters troops, Stoneman, and the Quartermaster's guard from the figures presented in the OR leaves McClellan with (a total of) about 99,628 men.

And as a third party, taking Union strengths from the OR:
http://www.icsm.it/secessione/cb02oob.html

I present the above in the hopes that someone can make heads or tails of how many men were actually available for Lee and McClellan. The possibility that none of the figures presented to date by any party are correct is presently being entertained as a solution to the problem.

Of course none of these figures is combat effectives. Harsh points out that whilst those with pro-Southern sympathies like to strip Lee down to 80,000 combat effectives (excluding the Richmond defences?), to do the same to McClellan would render only 70,000. I'm happy with any consistent measurement.

But clearly McClellan is both a) facing a considerable number of Confederate soldiers and b) possessed of a not inconsiderable army of his own, close enough in numbers to make numerical superiority to be far more a matter of how many men are present at a given point than is given credit by either Confederate writers or McClellan's concerns.

Aye, then the question becomes how best to determine what the enemy is doing and shift reserves - for both sides.