McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[Dan2022]

Every so often I read a book or two where McClellan comes up and it sets me to wondering how to evaluate that man. He appears to have thought a great deal of himself, which is certainly off putting, but if one can set aside his petty and quirky annoyances I wonder if he may have been more instrumental in the North winning the Civil War than he is usually credited with.

I must admit to being somewhat willing to cut him some slack . He had, I believe enormous talent to organize and inspire an army and I think he had considerable strategic sense. I wonder how many Union commanders in 1861 could have done as good a job of creating a competent fighting force, properly equipped and suitably inspired as he did in picking up the pieces after Bull Run. And despite his failure to take Richmond in the spring of 1862 I think the Peninsular Campaign was sound strategy.

Of course what McClellan is most remembered for is his lack of tactical skill. Though he could create a formidable army he was oddly incapable, or unwilling, to hurl it at an enemy. If winning is to be the measure of success as a general, McClellan falls far short of many other commanders. But if creating that formidable army and getting it near its enemy is the mark of a capable commander he should be recognized for that achievement. I am reminded of the remark made by Lee after the war that, while he feared no Union commander, he thought McClellan was the one general whose army he would never be able to utterly destroy.

Anyway I am certain that this topic has been debated before but I wonder if there are others who think that the man was not a total failure as a commander and deserves more respect that the books usually give him. I must confess to something that I bring to this discussion. I live close to the cemetery in Trenton, NJ where he is buried ( you'll have no trouble finding it as it towers over every other grave monument). When I visit, I always approach respectfully, salute the deceased general and mentally say "thank you" for your services as I believe what he accomplished with the Army of the Potomac was as essential to winning that war as what Meade or Grant did later. The tool they used effectively was forged by his skill and by his hand and I thank him for doing that.

Putting aside his ego, I believe his organization skills and how he formed The Army Of The Potomac were essential to the union cause later in the war. That he lacked initiative to use that army remains to be suspect, I believe his personal thoughts of granduer held himself back as much as his fighting tactics or lack of aggression that was constantly facing him by Gen Lee. He never seemed to quite able to acertain the killer instinct needed to obtain the goals he believed himslf to rule like a Napolean? Again his skills of forming an army were second to none I believe, and cannot be ignored to the unions victory..

 

[67th Tigers]

That is true and would apply for the Confederate Army, as well.

I agree with you that the Army of Northern Virginia was larger during the Seven Days than was once believed and the figures which have been presented by Tenney, as you know, line up pretty well with much of what else is known.

I wrote a long, detailed response to you in another thread walking through this as far as the claim that the Army of the Potomac changed policy shortly after McClellan being replaced by Burnside is concerned.

I was just asking regarding your above comment, are you of the opinion that McClellan had definitively made the decision to shift to the James River by June 25th (or on June 25th)?

Yes, except the Confederates already largely reported "taken in battle" numbers, which are probably the best numbers when assessing combat outcomes. These are even more stripped down than "combat effectives." The latter includes men that nominally could be available for the battle line, but were not present on account of straggling or being detailed.

There are few such numbers in Federal reports of the time. In later times, some would include it, and Carman spent a lot of effort trying to get the "carried into battle" for the Federals at Antietam. No-one has done this for the Seven Days. What we have is a field return for the 20th June, which gives us the number of PFD(E), noting that PFDE is 99.6% of the PFD, and so obviously hasn't removed extra-duty men etc.* However, Morell's division has many more PFDE than PFD, and this is likely a typo distorting matters, and the PFDE for Morell is likely 11,011 rather than 12,011 (making PFDE at 98.8% of PFD).

Thus, we need to make adjustments. We have a strength, but one reported in a higher category, and including teamsters, nurses, etc. who are not available for combat.

Interesingly, I find 75,000 Federals vs 80-90,000 rebels, mentioned on a U.S. Army Staff ride...

* Note that the aggregate present is almost exactly the Army of the Potomac's strength (inc. Ft Monroe) on the 30th April 1864 report. We'd thus expect essentially the same number of effectives if Ft Monroe was included.

To the second point - no. It was a contingency that had been prepared for, but it was not a movement intended unless necessary.

 

[Saphroneth]

The thing that has to be remembered about the shift south to the James is that it is a move that removes operational danger, but it compromises what siege prep operations had been conducted by that point.

We know as of 25 June that McClellan was in a state to begin offensive operations south of the Chickahominy. After weeks of work and waiting for the weather to clear, he had rail supply to within a few miles of Richmond and a fortified line to use as a base from which to push closer to Richmond.

Giving up this progress is annoying. It's something that is only justified by clear and present danger to the army, and if 1st Corps turns up or if Jackson doesn't turn up then that danger doesn't exist (and McClellan can conduct regular approaches in security)

 

[Nathan Towne]

Yes, except the Confederates already largely reported "taken in battle" numbers, which are probably the best numbers when assessing combat outcomes. These are even more stripped down than "combat effectives." The latter includes men that nominally could be available for the battle line, but were not present on account of straggling or being detailed.

There are few such numbers in Federal reports of the time. In later times, some would include it, and Carman spent a lot of effort trying to get the "carried into battle" for the Federals at Antietam. No-one has done this for the Seven Days. What we have is a field return for the 20th June, which gives us the number of PFD(E), noting that PFDE is 99.6% of the PFD, and so obviously hasn't removed extra-duty men etc.* However, Morell's division has many more PFDE than PFD, and this is likely a typo distorting matters, and the PFDE for Morell is likely 11,011 rather than 12,011 (making PFDE at 98.8% of PFD).

Thus, we need to make adjustments. We have a strength, but one reported in a higher category, and including teamsters, nurses, etc. who are not available for combat.

Interesingly, I find 75,000 Federals vs 80-90,000 rebels, mentioned on a U.S. Army Staff ride...

* Note that the aggregate present is almost exactly the Army of the Potomac's strength (inc. Ft Monroe) on the 30th April 1864 report. We'd thus expect essentially the same number of effectives if Ft Monroe was included.

To the second point - no. It was a contingency that had been prepared for, but it was not a movement intended unless necessary.

Regarding the change of base from White House to the James river, yes, I would agree with you that it was something which he was at least seriously considering as a contingency. The reason I asked though is because, as you know, McClellan would recall after the war that he had made the decision to shift base on June 25th, which is a statement which you have made in another thread before.

As far as the stuff above, Carman was operating in PFD and formulated U.S. and Confederate figures as such. I am glad that you agree that we have U.S. returns while McClellan commanded the Army in PFD and PFDE. No, we should not be arbitrarily removing 20% of the PFD strength of the U.S. field armies. That is simply absurd. I walked throug( this in another thread for you, in depth.

 

[67th Tigers]

As far as the stuff above, Carman was operating in PFD and formulated U.S. and Confederate figures as such. I am glad that you agree that we have U.S. returns while McClellan commanded the Army in PFD and PFDE. No, we should not be arbitrarily removing 20% of the PFD strength of the U.S. field armies. That is simply absurd. I walked throug( this in another thread for you, in depth.

Yes, we should in this case because it is not arbitary.

Consider that the 30th April 1864 monthly report. There was an argument between Humphrey and the Secretary of War as to the strength, and Drum dug the following out of the files:

Per regulation, the PFD is the sum of first two lines, which the SECWAR quoted. It gives 121,964 Present for Duty, including all officers and men on duty whether they be assigned to special, extra or daily duty or not. However, the OR lists only the first value.

The PFDE, after excluding logistics etc. is 97,273. That is approximately 80% of the PFD, or almost exactly what McClellan said should be removed to account for logistics and all minor details that were extra duty etc. (deduct 1/6th for extra duty etc, and 1/5th for all-up). This represents the maximum possible combat strength, assuming no casualties, no details, no straggling etc. You will note that the PFDE of 1864 has already removed these. In comparison, those of 1862 had not done this, and the PFD and PFDE figures are thus calculated differently and represent two different things.

The PFDE of 1864 is basically calculated the same was as PFD on rebel ANV returns, and are directly comparable. Those of 1862 are not, and 1/5th or 1/6th needs to be removed to account for extra-duty etc. This gives a figure comparable to 1864 figures, and rebel figures.

The actual number brought into battle will be a figure lower than this. How much lower depends on the situation. Armies on the move, and especially those making forced marches will have a much lower figure, whilst those defending a static position will have much better retention.

For the most part, the rebels gave us their "carried into battle" figures for the Seven Days - about 90,000 with officers and arty.

We don't have the same value for the Federals. If we make reaonable estimates, then the numbers would be around 70-75,000 in the same category.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Yes, we should in this case because it is not arbitary.

Consider that the 30th April 1864 monthly report. There was an argument between Humphrey and the Secretary of War as to the strength, and Drum dug the following out of the files:

View attachment 520441

Per regulation, the PFD is the sum of first two lines, which the SECWAR quoted. It gives 121,964 Present for Duty, including all officers and men on duty whether they be assigned to special, extra or daily duty or not. However, the OR lists only the first value.

The PFDE, after excluding logistics etc. is 97,273. That is approximately 80% of the PFD, or almost exactly what McClellan said should be removed to account for logistics and all minor details that were extra duty etc. (deduct 1/6th for extra duty etc, and 1/5th for all-up). This represents the maximum possible combat strength, assuming no casualties, no details, no straggling etc. You will note that the PFDE of 1864 has already removed these. In comparison, those of 1862 had not done this, and the PFD and PFDE figures are thus calculated differently and represent two different things.

The PFDE of 1864 is basically calculated the same was as PFD on rebel ANV returns, and are directly comparable. Those of 1862 are not, and 1/5th or 1/6th needs to be removed to account for extra-duty etc. This gives a figure comparable to 1864 figures, and rebel figures.

The actual number brought into battle will be a figure lower than this. How much lower depends on the situation. Armies on the move, and especially those making forced marches will have a much lower figure, whilst those defending a static position will have much better retention.

For the most part, the rebels gave us their "carried into battle" figures for the Seven Days - about 90,000 with officers and arty.

We don't have the same value for the Federals. If we make reaonable estimates, then the numbers would be around 70-75,000 in the same category.

Regarding the June 25th issue, I will merely note that you did say at one point that such was the case, but I would have to go find the thread again.

Everything else which you wrote is wholly incorrect and not even consistent @67th Tigers. You stated that the PFD of the Army of the Potomac was in excess of 120,000 men on April 30th, but that the PFDE strength was around 97,000 men, which demonstrates your case that these extra-duty men had been removed.

The PFD strength of the Army including Ninth Corps, which was not tabulated directly with the Army was slightly in excess of 120,000 men PFD. The PFD strength of the Army on the April 30th returns, in which Ninth Corps was not recorded and was recorded separately as they technically were not part of the Army was 102,869 men PFD, as compared to a PFDE strength of 97,273 men.

That can be seen at 36 OR 1: 198.

The PFD strength of Ninth Corps was recorded separately and was recorded at 19,250 men PFD.

That can be found at 36 OR 1: 915

When added to to the remainder of the Army, you get 122,116 men PFD total.

The 97,273 men PFDE figure corresponds to the Army return for only the Army itself, not including Ninth Corps and comprised 94.56% of the Army's PFD strength at the time.

You then reverse on that tell us again that nevermind, it actually had been changed by 1864, effectively admitting the point, after claiming the opposite immediately above it. So, using the April of '64 returns is pointless in making the case if you then turn around and admit that it actually wasn't the case by that time because it had been changed already, which I have pushed you on before and you claimed that such occurred in November of 1862, in which I quickly demonstrated to you was not the case and 20,000 men were not suddenly moved out into Aggregate Present, which is what you were claiming at the time, which would have to be the case if the PFD numbers didn't include them later on.

 

[67th Tigers]

Everything else which you wrote is wholly incorrect and not even consistent @67th Tigers. You stated that the PFD of the Army of the Potomac was in excess of 120,000 men on April 30th, but that the PFDE strength was around 97,000 men, which demonstrates your case that these extra-duty men had been removed.

The 9th Corps was a separate formation, and not included on Army of the Potomac returns. The returns exist and have no line for the 9th Corps on them. Indeed, the 9th Corps apparently still gave regulation PFD, as it only has a small fraction of the AP not included in the PFD column.

The whole force had a regulation PFD of 142,744. Converting into PFDE for the combatants would give around 114-115,000.

 

[Nathan Towne]

The 9th Corps was a separate formation, and not included on Army of the Potomac returns. The returns exist and have no line for the 9th Corps on them. Indeed, the 9th Corps apparently still gave regulation PFD, as it only has a small fraction of the AP not included in the PFD column.

The whole force had a regulation PFD of 142,744. Converting into PFDE for the combatants would give around 114-115,000.

The returns for the Army of the Potomac can be found at 36 OR 1: 198 and for Ninth Corps at 36 OR 1: 915. They may be operational returns, but regardless the figures can be see there and were quoted above.

 

[tony_gunter]

McClellan had one really bad division commander, Hamilton, and got rid of him, only to have the President try and pressure him into returning him to the army as he had powerful friends. McClellan protested and Lincoln backed down, but never forgot it.

Was Hamilton bad tho?

After he went west, he performed well, but it was his politicking that got him on the wrong side of Grant.

He was one of the only generals from Wisconsin, so shelving him was a major political risk. It speaks to Grant's skill that he figured out a way to get him to resign instead of dismissing him.

What so incensed McClellan that he just had to be rid of him?

 

[Nathan Towne]

Was Hamilton bad tho?

After he went west, he performed well, but it was his politicking that got him on the wrong side of Grant.

He was one of the only generals from Wisconsin, so shelving him was a major political risk. It speaks to Grant's skill that he figured out a way to get him to resign instead of dismissing him.

What so incensed McClellan that he just had to be rid of him?

Hamilton was relieved by McClellan without official explanation. He departed from the Peninsula on May 3rd if I recall correctly. His was the Division which would be assigned to the command of Phillip Kearney.

 

[67th Tigers]

Hamilton was behind on building Batteries 7 and 8, and started refusing to send the working parties he was ordered to send. This refusal to obey orders doomed him.

 

[67th Tigers]

The returns for the Army of the Potomac can be found at 36 OR 1: 198 and for Ninth Corps at 36 OR 1: 915. They may be operational returns, but regardless the figures can be see there and were quoted above.

Yes, but the PFD for both isn't figured the same way. The returns held by the office of the Adjutant-General show the "PFD" Humphreys gave (in the OR) excluded extra, special and daily duty personnel. This was not how returns were supposed to be made, and Burnside's returns appear to include them under PFD, as is correct. The sum of the two values, with the extra regiment the 9th Corps received, is 142,744.

The issue is that the definitions used between formations, and over time, are inconsistent. The monthly return would columns for all the categories, and they would often sum them. There is a PFD column, but the total PFD column was supposed to be the sum of the PFD, PFED, PFDD and PFSD columns. In 1864 this was not the case, and they excluded these men from PFD. We know this because Humphreys objected to the SECWAR's report giving the full PFD, and Drum, then Adjutant-General, explained the contents of the returns that were on file were as I said.

This means you can't just read off a figure and compare to other formations or at other times. How the return is made out may be different.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Yes, but the PFD for both isn't figured the same way. The returns held by the office of the Adjutant-General show the "PFD" Humphreys gave (in the OR) excluded extra, special and daily duty personnel. This was not how returns were supposed to be made, and Burnside's returns appear to include them under PFD, as is correct. The sum of the two values, with the extra regiment the 9th Corps received, is 142,744.

The issue is that the definitions used between formations, and over time, are inconsistent. The monthly return would columns for all the categories, and they would often sum them. There is a PFD column, but the total PFD column was supposed to be the sum of the PFD, PFED, PFDD and PFSD columns. In 1864 this was not the case, and they excluded these men from PFD. We know this because Humphreys objected to the SECWAR's report giving the full PFD, and Drum, then Adjutant-General, explained the contents of the returns that were on file were as I said.

This means you can't just read off a figure and compare to other formations or at other times. How the return is made out may be different.

I responded to this issue regarding to the Army while Burnside was in command here:

Devise a Way McClellan Could Have Successfully Assaulted the Warwick Line on the 5th or 6th April. | Eastern Theater

To just cite the statements, or testimony, of a number of people who were there and their opinion on something when they were operating with impartial information, e.t.c. Is kind of silly, frankly. You can make any argument you want anywhere in the war doing that. I mean, James Biddle was there...

civilwartalk.com

 

[DanSBHawk]

Was Hamilton bad tho?

After he went west, he performed well, but it was his politicking that got him on the wrong side of Grant.

He was one of the only generals from Wisconsin, so shelving him was a major political risk. It speaks to Grant's skill that he figured out a way to get him to resign instead of dismissing him.

What so incensed McClellan that he just had to be rid of him?

I know that in the middle of April, 1862, Hamilton pushed for a more aggressive strategy to break through the Warwick Line. That may have angered McClellan.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I know that in the middle of April, 1862, Hamilton pushed for a more aggressive strategy to break through the Warwick Line. That may have angered McClellan.

If you have any evidence on that, I am sure that we would all be willing to see it. It is an interesting topic.

 

[Sbc]

Contemporary opinion

 

[Belfoured]

I know that in the middle of April, 1862, Hamilton pushed for a more aggressive strategy to break through the Warwick Line. That may have angered McClellan.

There's been a claim that Hamilton disobeyed orders. That's a serious charge that would result in a court martial/court of inquiry. No such charge was made in the April 30 order relieving Hamilton or in McClellan's May 22 response to Lincoln. Instead, he was relieved for cause. That was within McClellan's authority if cause existed. We don't know because McClellan never specified any. There was a disagreement between Heintzelman's AAJ and Hamilton on April 13 regarding whether information had been forwarded in a timely manner. Hamilton closed his response by objecting to the "tone" of the communication to him.

 

[67th Tigers]

There's been a claim that Hamilton disobeyed orders. That's a serious charge that would result in a court martial/court of inquiry. No such charge was made in the April 30 order relieving Hamilton or in McClellan's May 22 response to Lincoln. Instead, he was relieved for cause. That was within McClellan's authority if cause existed. We don't know because McClellan never specified any. There was a disagreement between Heintzelman's AAJ and Hamilton on April 13 regarding whether information had been forwarded in a timely manner. Hamilton closed his response by objecting to the "tone" of the communication to him.

"Relief for cause" is a mid-20th century invention that did not exist in 1862, as we have discussed many times.

Per Heintzelman's diary, McKeever had told Heintzelman that Hamilton's captious behaviour would force him to arrest Hamilton. Whilst Heintzelman was ill, McKeever forwarded Hamilton's letters to Heintzelman on to McClellan's HQ. This prompted McClellan to have him removed.

 

[DanSBHawk]

There's been a claim that Hamilton disobeyed orders. That's a serious charge that would result in a court martial/court of inquiry. No such charge was made in the April 30 order relieving Hamilton or in McClellan's May 22 response to Lincoln. Instead, he was relieved for cause. That was within McClellan's authority if cause existed. We don't know because McClellan never specified any. There was a disagreement between Heintzelman's AAJ and Hamilton on April 13 regarding whether information had been forwarded in a timely manner. Hamilton closed his response by objecting to the "tone" of the communication to him.

So other than the AAJ letter, there's no evidence of what might have happened?

 

[67th Tigers]

If you have any evidence on that, I am sure that we would all be willing to see it. It is an interesting topic.

Ah, I know what Dan is referring to, since it has come up before, and it's a bit mangled.

On the 17th, Hamilton reported that he believed Wynn's Mill was abandoned, and he could occupy the enemy position with one brigade. Heintzelman sent this report up to GHQ, who sent and engineer officer to conduct a recce. Lt Wagner was sent, but one of the "withdrawn" guns fired and killed him. Hamilton was simply wrong.