McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[NedBaldwin]

Then there is Gen Walker's post war article in which he claims that while at Frederick, Lee told him he thought there were 8,000 - 10,000 stragglers between Frederick and the Rapidan.

 

[Elennsar]

I think this bears looking at as far as men returning the ranks (which would have to be either recovered wounded/sick, or stragglers, if no new recruits have joined the army.)

September 22nd:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=September 22;rgn=full text;idno=waro0028;didno=waro0028;view=image;seq=0623

36,418 men not counting the cavalry or reserve artillery.

September 30:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=September 30;rgn=full text;idno=waro0028;didno=waro0028;view=image;seq=0641

52,019 men not counting the cavalry or reserve artillery (+15,601 in eight days)

October 10:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=October 10;rgn=full text;idno=waro0028;didno=waro0028;view=image;seq=0662

57,600 men not counting the cavalry or reserve artillery. (+21,182 in eighteen days)

If Lee's army has received few if any new recruits (claimed by Thorp here: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/artsandliving/civilwar/mcclellan-graphic/?tab=1 ) , and the number of wounded returned to the ranks is no more than the difference between his revised count and the count used in the "add back" (3,512 men), then how are his ranks expanding so much? That's not a mere trickle of stragglers, especially if he had around (at most) 50,000 men at Antietam and lost over ten thousand.

@ 67th Tigers: None of these returns list a "total present", only the same present for duty (officers and men counted separately), aggregate present, and aggregate present and absent columns that we see on a Union report such as this:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=October 10;rgn=full text;idno=waro0028;didno=waro0028;view=image;seq=0412

So why should we believe that "present for duty" does not include men who would be listed as "present for duty" in a Union report? What is the basis for that being stated as a fact?

 

[NedBaldwin]

I think this bears looking at as far as men returning the ranks (which would have to be either recovered wounded/sick, or stragglers, if no new recruits have joined the army.)
... That's not a mere trickle of stragglers ...

The questions that we seem to struggle with are
1) when did the bulk of this straggling occur? Before the 2nd? before crossing into Maryland? in Maryland? during the move from Harper Ferry to the battle?
and
2) based on the above, how were they enumerated in previous force calculations? Where they part of PFD Sept 1 or where they already among those not considered PFD?

 

[Gene Thorp]

Congratulations Ned, you have done an incredible job proving that there were stragglers in Lee's army, a fact that no one, especially me, ever denied. The real question has always been how many, when and where?

The commonly held belief is that half of Lee's army, 35,000 men or more, did not cross the Potomac. They supposedly wandered the countryside until the battle of Antietam, not playing any roll in the siege of Harper's Ferry, or showing up in any organized groups. Suddenly, only five days after Antietam, 10,000 supposedly reappeared in time for the Sept. 22 return, and the the remaining 23,000 were supposedly back a little over two weeks later on Oct. 10. Nonsense!

Who fed so many unorganized men? Most were from far off places and had never been to Northern Virginia. How did they even know where to go to meet up with Lee's army if they were individuals or small groups hiding in the woods? Why would they rejoin Lee if they had already abandoned him during arguably the most important campaign of the war?

Ned, any Confederate stragglers captured or paroled by the Union troops you list are irrelevant in this argument because they could not have rejoined Lee by Oct. 10.

Elennsar, judging by Union medical reports, the wounded returning to the ranks would only have been a blip on Lee's returns for this period of time. Union Medical Director Jonathan Letterman, referring to a number of camps under his control, recorded that on Sept. 30 they had a total of 5,353 chiefly wounded patients. By Oct. 31, a full month later, only 403 had returned to the ranks, or a measly 7.5% of the total. (ORv27p.110-111). Confederate hospitals were nowhere near as good as those of the Union, and the sample above is for a longer time period than we are discussing, so it would be very generous if we apply that percentage to the number of Confederate wounded from the Antietam Campaign, right? So, 9,451 (which is an undercount) x 7.5% = 708, the most liberal number of wounded returning to Lee's ranks by Oct.10.

No significant number of casualties from the Antietam Campaign made it back to Lee in time for the Oct. 10 report. By October 10, Lee reported 64,273 men present for duty. At that same time, 2,500 rebels captured from the Antietam Campaign were in the process of being exchanged on the James River while another 2,500 were still in Union hospitals. At least 6,000 wounded Confederates were reported at Winchester on Sept. 20 (before many even arrived from the battle), and another 1,000 at Shepherdstown in early October. Diary after diary reports 3,000 rebels were left unburied on the battlefield and those accounts are backed up by Chief Medical Director Jonathan Letterman's official report—quoted by McClellan—and further verified by the number of dead actually buried at the four Confederate cemeteries listed in my article. This adds up to a total of no less than 15,000 outstanding Antietam campaign casualties at the same time Lee's returns were filed on Oct. 10.

As I stated before, Lee's army was not swelled by new units. Just compare the Antietam Order of Battle to the Fredericksburg Order of Battle. The only regiments I can find that were added in those three months were the 54th N.C. and the 57th N.C., neither of which were sent to Lee from Richmond until mid-November. The 1st N.C. cavalry also joined Lee, but not until Oct. 16. I recall another regiment joining Lee, but have yet to locate it. From what I recall it was cavalry and also arrived after Oct. 10. The units you wrote about earlier including Thomas' brigade and the 61st Va. were already included in ANV PFD totals. No other units joined Lee that I can find. (BTW, Elennsar, you wrote that I bring nothing new to the table. Where have you ever seen the compiled stats above?)

What about new recruits and returning convalescents? As previously noted recruits would be almost non-existent, as the February draft law had already pulled just about every eligible man into the army by early summer.

Lee wrote on Sept. 8:
"Many convalescents, anxious to rejoin their commands, are scattered between this and Culpeper Court-House, subject to capture by passing scouts of Federal cavalry. General Lee requests that all recruits, convalescents, &c., destined for this army, may be retained in Richmond, employed as guards or at the school of instruction, until in sufficient force to be sent forward as an organized detachment, under command of officers, to Culpeper Court-House, and thence, after drawing rations sufficient for the march, to Winchester, by the way of Luray and Front Royal. Under the present system they are scattered from Rapidan, unprovided for and uncontrolled, straggling on the road and depredating upon the community, and in some instances have been captured by the enemy." (OR28_p601)

Lee wrote on Sept. 24 to Smith:
"I hear of no conscripts coming on from the South to fill up our skeleton regiments, nor do I understand that you have been able to increase your force in front of Richmond." (OR28_p625)

Davis wrote to Lee on Sept. 28:
"I have steadily urged the prompt enrollment of conscripts to fill up the thinned ranks of your regiments, and directed special attention to the counties of Western Virginia, in which but little had been done, because of the presence of the enemy. The report to me has been for the past week about 500 men, convalescents included, sent forward from this place."(OR28_p634)

I can document that some 6,000 stragglers were collected and were returned to Lee by Sept. 30. Brig. Gen. J.R. Jones wrote on Sept. 27:
"I am operating now in the country in every direction. In a scout upon the Pughtown road yesterday I brought in' 150 stragglers, found loafing at the various farm-houses. To-day sent to Clarke County, to Pughtown, toward Romney, toward Front Royal, and expect to make a sweep, as the country is full of stragglers. I have sent back already 5,000 or 6,000. The provost guard was of no assistance, and little was doing. The labor has been constant, but I hope it has been repaid by a gratifying increase in the army. The number of officers back here was most astonishing. After due notice, I ordered the cavalry to arrest and bring to the rendezvous all officers, as well as men, found in the rear without proper leave. It created quite a stampede in the direction of the army. I hope to clear the rear sufficiently by Monday to enable me to return to my command. There are about 1,200 barefooted men here. I am satisfied that a large number throw away their shoes in order to remain." (OR28_p630)

Just about every quantifiable account points to the fact that Lee's army was 70,000+ in Frederick on Sept. 10, and the severe straggling that shows up on the returns to Sept. 22 (which are imperfect) was done primarily by the six divisions that were involved in the capture of Harper's Ferry. These stragglers were located near Lee's army between Winchester and the Potomac, and were generally either trying to return to their units or were hustled up by the small number of cavalry assigned to the task of gathering them in time to be recorded on the Oct. 10 report.

It would appear to me that since Lee wrote on Sept. 21 that up to that time straggling had, "increased instead of diminished," the incomplete report of 41,000 Rebels accounted for in the report the following day (Sept. 22), reflect those who mostly were at the battle of Antietam (Sept. 17-18), minus an additional 5 days of straggling. If we add back in the casualties from Sept. 14 to Sept. 20, which I calculated and published in my article as about 16,929, it puts Lee back to 57,000 PFD on Sept. 14. Add back in the 23,000 men who apparently straggled and returned by Oct. 10, you come to the number of 80,000 PFD for Sept. 10. As Steiner's account and the other eye-witness accounts do not support a PFD that high for Frederick, and we know that Lee wrote "a great many men" did not cross into Maryland, it would seem that up to 5,000, the equivalent of a Confederate division, never crossed the Potomac.

In conclusion, it would certainly seem that McClellan was dealing with some 75,000 or so Confederates present for duty for the campaign up to South Mountain, and 55,000 or so for the battle.

I have so much more to write on this, but that's my two cents for now. This was written again in haste, so I may have to adjust and clarify in spots.

It has been fun, but, regrettably, I am going to have to sign off for awhile as this has been very disruptive to my personal life and I still need to finish up my final detailed response to Sears over the Trophies telegram controversy. The U.S. involvement in Syria is not helping me with time management either. I certainly encourage constructive criticism, but all I ask is to please be respectful and source your counterpoints as you have now been doing. I'll check back in as time allows. Thanks,

Gene Thorp

 

[Gene Thorp]

The questions that we seem to struggle with are
1) when did the bulk of this straggling occur? Before the 2nd? before crossing into Maryland? in Maryland? during the move from Harper Ferry to the battle?
and
2) based on the above, how were they enumerated in previous force calculations? Where they part of PFD Sept 1 or where they already among those not considered PFD?

My take on question one I just posted.
Stragglers were put in the category of "Absent", which also included captured, missing, wounded. Dead were struck from the rolls, thus reducing the Aggregate total.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Congratulations Ned, you have done an incredible job proving that there were stragglers in Lee's army, a fact that no one, especially me, ever denied.

You certainly seem determined to deny that significant straggling occurred early in the campaign. You wrote "Are you not trying to back up your argument with names like Carman, Hartwig and Harsh, that a large number of Confederates remained south of the Potomac as stragglers at the beginning of the Antietam Campaign? I am saying that I do not recall them supporting that notion, and thus, I am asking you to point me to text that they wrote which supports your apparent point of view."

The commonly held belief is that half of Lee's army, 35,000 men or more, did not cross the Potomac.

Is that commonly held? Becuase I feel whenever I have this discussion, the commonly held view is what you seem to be arguing -- that stragglers on the south of the Potomac were few.

EDIT: Note, I have never claimed that the number was that high.

Who fed so many unorganized men? Most were from far off places and had never been to Northern Virginia. How did they even know where to go to meet up with Lee's army if they were individuals or small groups hiding in the woods? Why would they rejoin Lee if they had already abandoned him during arguably the most important campaign of the war?

I have seen these questions all answered in post war writings.

 

[BillO]

I'm not sure that's entirely fair, or even at all fair.

I don't like McClellan, but I'm leery of casting aspersions on anyone's physical courage. McClellan's failures would not have been turned into successes by him eating some lead.

FYI finding pleasure and relief in not being killed is not cowardice.

 

[NedBaldwin]

My take on question one I just posted.
Stragglers were put in the category of "Absent", which also included captured, missing, wounded. Dead were struck from the rolls, thus reducing the Aggregate total.

I wasnt clear enough with my second question.
We all seem to agree that at some point in the campaign there was a bunch of straggling. My question #2 was meant to think about to what extent these men were a net subtraction from the calculated pfd of the start of the campaign. As i undertsand it, the Sept 2 PFD is a calculation by John Allen in his thesis where he used earlier returns and extraploated forward-- there is no historic complete Comfederate force return for that day. DH Hill (as an example) wrote of a lot of straggling happening on the way from Richmond to Centreville. So when Allen determined Hill's PFD can we assume he had deducted for these pre-sept 2 stragglers? So was some of the straggling that commanders commented on already baked into the number we use for PFD at the start of the campaign?

 

[Elennsar]

As I stated before, Lee's army was not swelled by new units. Just compare the Antietam Order of Battle to the Fredericksburg Order of Battle. The only regiments I can find that were added in those three months were the 54th N.C. and the 57th N.C., neither of which were sent to Lee from Richmond until mid-November. The 1st N.C. cavalry also joined Lee, but not until Oct. 16. I recall another regiment joining Lee, but have yet to locate it. From what I recall it was cavalry and also arrived after Oct. 10. The units you wrote about earlier including Thomas' brigade and the 61st Va. were already included in ANV PFD totals. No other units joined Lee that I can find. (BTW, Elennsar, you wrote that I bring nothing new to the table. Where have you ever seen the compiled stats above?)

I pointed out in an earlier post that I haven't studied Lee's causalities in depth, so whether or not you're the first to write what you wrote in that article would naturally escape me. My issue with you not bringing anything new is over the force they were taken from.

It would appear to me that since Lee wrote on Sept. 21 that up to that time straggling had, "increased instead of diminished," the incomplete report of 41,000 Rebels accounted for in the report the following day (Sept. 22), reflect those who mostly were at the battle of Antietam (Sept. 17-18), minus an additional 5 days of straggling. If we add back in the casualties from Sept. 14 to Sept. 20, which I calculated and published in my article as about 16,929, it puts Lee back to 57,000 PFD on Sept. 14.

If we add back in the casualties from Sept. 14 to Sept. 20, which I calculated and published in my article as about 16,929, it puts Lee back to 57,000 PFD on Sept. 14. Add back in the 23,000 men who apparently straggled and returned by Oct. 10, you come to the number of 80,000 PFD for Sept. 10. As Steiner's account and the other eye-witness accounts do not support a PFD that high for Frederick, and we know that Lee wrote "a great many men" did not cross into Maryland, it would seem that up to 5,000, the equivalent of a Confederate division, never crossed the Potomac.

In conclusion, it would certainly seem that McClellan was dealing with some 75,000 or so Confederates present for duty for the campaign up to South Mountain, and 55,000 or so for the battle.

Steiner for the army minus the cavalry and Walker's division, but including the reserve artillery: No more than 69,000 aggregate present (not counting his figure for blacks).

October 10 aggregate present not counting the cavalry or Walker: 66,940 men.

Lee's present for duty without counting the cavalry or Walker on October 10?

54,518 men.

So using the October 10 relationship between "aggregate present" and "present for duty" to apply to Steiner: at most 56,196 (rounded up to the nearest man) present for duty before counting the two division in question.

By the September 22 figure (recalculated to check my math):

Lee had (not counting Walker and Stuart, and using the September 30 figures for the reserve artillery)

33,671 present for duty (36,418 - 3428 + 771) and 38,498 aggregate present (41,520- 3871 + 849 ).

Applied to Steiner: 60,348 present for duty at most per Steiner before adding Walker and Stuart.

And for September 30 (not counting Walker and Stuart), for completeness's sake:

48900 present for duty, 58187 aggregate present.

At most 57,987 present for duty in what Steiner counts.


So per Steiner's high end estimate, which is close to the highest figure we have for Frederick, Lee had between 56000+Walker and Stuart and 60,000+before adding Walker and Stuart.

This is a very shaky basis for a definitive "Lee had X men" even if we use Steiner's high end (we have figures between 60-75,000 when counting other sources) as our figure to work with - good enough for a rough sense of Lee's numbers, but too rough to compare to any actual solid information on present for duty on McClellan when determining the odds even if we use take the estimates for aggregate present as entirely accurate.





Ned: When do we consider "the start of the campaign" in the context of anything talked about as happening "since the start of the campaign"?

I tend to use the September 2nd figure as "before the campaign has begun" (it's before anyone has entered Maryland, and thus before anyone who has refused to enter Maryland but kept up with the army so far would be dropping out), and it would include any stragglers from the men coming up on their own two feet from Richmond. But it would not be counted as part of the stragglers referred to

 

[NedBaldwin]

I tend to use the September 2nd figure as "before the campaign has begun" (it's before anyone has entered Maryland, and thus before anyone who has refused to enter Maryland but kept up with the army so far would be dropping out), and it would include any stragglers from the men coming up on their own two feet from Richmond. But it would not be counted as part of the stragglers referred to

I use September 2 as Day_0 of the campaign. So in addition to the debate about whether dramatic straggling occurred earlier or later in the campaign, I feel that there is also a question of whether the large quantity of stragglers talked about as being in northern Virginia were from before or after September 2. If we assume that a lot of them were prior stragglers catching up, they would not have eaten into Lee's combat strength on Sept 2 as they were already in the absent category by then. Only if they straggled during the move from Centerville to the river [Sept3-6] would they have reduced Lee's starting strength. But I dont know how Allen reached the numbers that have become the basis for the PFD count on Sept 2.

 

[BillO]

For what it's worth I believe Lee considered the start of the campaign as when Jackson left the vicinity of Richmond to go deal with Pope.

 

[ole]

For what it's worth I believe Lee considered the start of the campaign as when Jackson left the vicinity of Richmond to go deal with Pope.

Could buy this. I have my stuff on 2nd Manassas filed under The First Maryland Campaign.

 

[ole]

We've wandered considerably from "re-evaluating McClellan." Somehow we've wandered into "just how many men did Lee have at Antietam/Sharpsburg." How does one search for that kind of information on this board? Oh. You have to search for re-evaluating McClellan.

Seems we have buried an awesome discussion.

 

[Elennsar]

I use September 2 as Day_0 of the campaign. So in addition to the debate about whether dramatic straggling occurred earlier or later in the campaign, I feel that there is also a question of whether the large quantity of stragglers talked about as being in northern Virginia were from before or after September 2. If we assume that a lot of them were prior stragglers catching up, they would not have eaten into Lee's combat strength on Sept 2 as they were already in the absent category by then. Only if they straggled during the move from Centerville to the river [Sept3-6] would they have reduced Lee's starting strength. But I dont know how Allen reached the numbers that have become the basis for the PFD count on Sept 2.

Yeah. I know where its used, but I doubt that's anything more than you do.

I think the stragglers that rejoined between September 22nd and October 10 would still be a sizable number - the idea of ten thousand between the Rapidan and Frederick seems pretty solid to me in the current state of information. A large number, but not half the army.

Thirty thousand seems like it would be too great for what figures we have for present for duty by Antietam (between 40 and 50,000), but five thousand between September 2 and September 6 seems low.


Ole: Well, speaking for myself, the odds McClellan actually faced as opposed to those he believed he faced is part of evaluating him, but I wouldn't object to splitting the fussing over numbers on the 10th into a new thread.

 

[67th Tigers]

Ole: Well, speaking for myself, the odds McClellan actually faced as opposed to those he believed he faced is part of evaluating him, but I wouldn't object to splitting the fussing over numbers on the 10th into a new thread.

but then of course one needs to determine what those estimates are estimates of. Are they PFD, aggregate, present and absent, or some other measure? Was the division left at Richmond included?

The real problem is that if we take the estimates as accurate values for Lee's invading army, does McClellan have any indication that maybe he should assume half Lee's army won't turn up on the field (assuming that few did, we have fragmentary evidence that a considerable number rejoined their commands sometime after morning rollcall).

McClellan's intelligence gave this as the marching state (i.e. aggregate present) of Lee's army:


General T J Jackson's corps 24,778
General James Longstreet's corps 23,342
General D H Hill's two divisions 15,525
General J E B Stuart, cavalry 6,400
Generals Ransom's and Jenkins' brigade 3,000
Forty-six regiments not included in above 18,400
Artillery, estimated at 400 guns 6,000
Total 97,445

Using the 2nd September reconstructed states:

Jackson had 20,603 "PFD" - given the differences in methodology McClellan has a good estimate

Longstreet had 24,743, assuming it includes Anderson, and is a good estimate.

DH Hill's division had 9,764 and came up with McLaws and Walker. Since what appears to be Walker's division is listed separately it would appear the other division is McLaws with 7,652 totalling 17,418 and is a good estimate.

The Brigades of Ransom and Jenkins one assumes is Walkers Division (Walkers and Ransom's brigades) and the estimate of 3,000 is far short of the 5,159 actually PFD.

So far this is 66,645 infantry, and the numbers for gunners (6,000) and cavalry (6,400) put the army on 79,045 - very close to the real figure.

Then we come to "forty-six regiments not included above", which is a problem. Like the 36 infantry regiments identified but not placed in the estimate around the Seven Days this is our problem. The calculation is obvious, and intelligence is rating the average regiment down at 400. One suspects this is the 36 extras from the Seven Days, plus an extra 10. That said two of the regiments that were extras in the Seven Days have actually joined Lee in the field:

61st Virginia has joined Mahone's bde
51st Georgia has joined Drayton's new bde

and some more are with GW Smith's division holding Richmond. The nearest report of Smith's strength is:

Expired Image Removed

In summary, apart from that one line it is a very good estimate. I contend that that line, regiments believed to be with the army from interviews etc., was always the source of any overestimate.

 

[Elennsar]

McClellan's report:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...o=waro0027;didno=waro0027;view=image;seq=0083

"These estimates give the actual number present and fit for duty."

Banks's report:

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...aro0028;view=image;seq=454;page=root;size=100

The numbers given - 24778 for Jackson, 23342 for Longstreet, 15255 for Hill, 6400 for Stuart, 3000 for Ransom and Jenkins, 18400 in forty-six regiments at 400 each, and 6000 artillerymen - are added up to reach the "total for duty", and the main body of his message refers to "the total strength of the rebel army for duty on this basis is nearly 100,000."

So where is the idea of this being the estimated "marching strength (i.e. aggregate present)" taken from?

I think I am missing something.

 

[NedBaldwin]

but then of course one needs to determine what those estimates are estimates of. Are they PFD, aggregate, present and absent, or some other measure? Was the division left at Richmond included?

The real problem is that if we take the estimates as accurate values for Lee's invading army, does McClellan have any indication that maybe he should assume half Lee's army won't turn up on the field (assuming that few did, we have fragmentary evidence that a considerable number rejoined their commands sometime after morning rollcall).

McClellan's intelligence gave this as the marching state (i.e. aggregate present) of Lee's army:


General T J Jackson's corps 24,778
General James Longstreet's corps 23,342
General D H Hill's two divisions 15,525
General J E B Stuart, cavalry 6,400
Generals Ransom's and Jenkins' brigade 3,000
Forty-six regiments not included in above 18,400
Artillery, estimated at 400 guns 6,000
Total 97,445

The problem is that this information was only provided to McClellan in late October.
So it was not the estimate he had in September as he was reacting to Lee's invasion of Maryland.
In September he was reporting to Halleck that Lee had 120,000 men or more in Maryland.

 

[Nathan Towne]

It does miss the defences. However what is really important is that these numbers are estimates of the number of combatants taken into the field. That is a good number, but not PFD.

To get the equivalent Federal figure you need to deduct the Federal forces not present, taking the 105,000 down to about 96,000. Then you have to multiply that by 80% (approx) to derive the equivalent figure of about 77,000.

In fact a few Federal brigades ISTR gave their musket strength during the Seven Days, and most were much less than their official PFD. It would make an interesting project.

Nothing could be further from the case.

Remember, he was beginning the final "grand offensive" when the Seven Days broke. Simply by getting to Richmond he is in a club of two generals, and the club for those that rapidly broke the Richmond defences has no members.

The change of base is actually vital, because an army must be able to sustain itself. McClellan's position was dictated by the fact that his supply base had been dictated to him by Stanton, and he was not free to base on the James, which was always his preferred base, and indeed was Grant's preferred base. Once the base on the York was gone there is no option but to open a new supply base, and because his forces can't cover the whole of the ground from the James to the Chickahominy he has to move the army.

In fact Harrison's Bar was much further back than McClellan intended to move. He was intending to stop around Glendale, but the naval commander claimed he couldn't supply McClellan beyond the mouth of the Chickahominy. Harrison's landing was the furthest west the navy would supply McClellan until they held both banks of the James. The army however scrambled back from Glendale after Franklin quit his position along the White Oak, leading to McClellan having another night without sleep.

From Harrison's Bar McClellan's intent was to land troops on the NC bank, occupy City Point and advance up the river. He'd slated Burnside to land on the NC side, and lead that wing of the army. Hence the month of July is consumed awaiting Burnside and a pontoon bridge he'd sent Marcy to Washington to acquire (and when the army finally got it they'd give good service at Fredericksburg and ultimately Grant's crossing of the James). When it's clear Burnside isn't coming he lands a force (Pennsylvania Reserves) at City Point and goes forward without any reinforcement at all, only to be recalled.

This is an important discussion. Do you believe that McClellan had already determined on the change of his supply base by June 25th, as he later stated?

 

[67th Tigers]

Nothing could be further from the case.

This is an important discussion. Do you believe that McClellan had already determined on the change of his supply base by June 25th, as he later stated?

This a reply to a ten year old thread (!). However:

(1) That is true - the combat effectives for every unit are less than their PFD. To quote Carman:

"That these figures correctly state the number reported as "present for duty" is not questioned; that they correctly give the number "in action" is an error. Every old soldier who served in the war of 1861-1865 knows the difference between the number of those who answered the roll-call in camp, or were accounted for as present, and the number of those who went onto the fighting line, a difference of from 20 to 40 per cent, depending upon the discipline of the organization, some of the very best in the Union army considering themselves themselves very fortunate in getting four-fifths of their men in action.2 We propose to test these figures and endeavor to arrive at a reasonably correct conclusion as to the number of men in action at Antietam, and shall depend upon the official reports of the division, brigade and regimental commanders, regimental histories, and other authentic sources of information."

Carman, Ezra A.. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862: Volume II - Antietam (p. 905). Savas Beatie. Kindle Edition.

f/n 2: Carman used his first-hand knowledge of soldiering to provide a short lesson in the arcane business of reporting numbers during the Civil War. Addressing this topic more scientifically were Thomas Livermore, Numbers and Losses of the Civil War in America (Boston, MA: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1900), and Frederick Phisterer, Statistical Record of the Armies of the United States (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883). Livermore estimated the difference of "present for duty" and "effectives" as 89-93 percent for infantry and 83-86 percent for cavalry, p. 68. He emphasized that there were averages. Phisterer, whose numbers are more aligned with Carman's, put the difference higher, somewhere around 30-35 percent, pp. 62-63. Given the hard campaigning and serious straggling prevalent to both armies, the percentages of those supposedly present, but not in the ranks, was probably closer to Phisterer, and maybe higher.

Carman, Ezra A.. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862: Volume II - Antietam (pp. 934-935). Savas Beatie. Kindle Edition. (Note that Philisterer was measuring something else).

In this case, many rebels gave estimates of their engaged enlisted men during the Seven Days, and they are less than their PFD. As Burton notes:

"Alexander Lawton, D. H. Hill, John Magruder, four of James Longstreet's brigadiers, all of Benjamin Huger's brigadiers, A. P. Hill, and Theophilus Holmes all give strength figures in their reports, and most estimates use those numbers as their basis. Lawton does not include either artillery or officers. D. H. Hill does not seem to include either, although it is unclear. Magruder is unclear. Of Longstreet's brigadiers, James Kemper does not include either officers or artillery. Colonel J. B. Strange (reporting George Pickett's strength) includes officers but not artillery. Cadmus Wilcox does not seem to include either (he reports casualties among officers and men separately, but explicitly states only men with his strength figure). Roger Pryor also seems to include neither artillery nor officers. Of Huger's brigadiers, Robert Ransom seems not to include either (he refers to effective force). William Mahone includes officers but not artillery. Ambrose Wright seems to include only men in the ranks.

Lew Armistead includes officers except for those of one regiment. A. P. Hill almost certainly includes artillery in his figure. Holmes is the most explicit, and he does not include artillery or officers in his report. All the estimates, including the ones used in this book, are given in the following table."

Burton, Brian K.. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles . Indiana University Press. Kindle Edition.

Burton then make an estimate of ca. 90,000 officers and men engaged for the rebels, based on battle reports of the actual strength carried into action. However, he's used Livermore's corrections for the Federals, which overstates Federal effective strength as it was calibrated against returns that have already excluded the logistics. He finds. ca. 96,000 PFD(E) in combat units and thus the effective force is:

Livermore: upto ca. 89,000 (but miscalibrated, includes extra-duty etc.)
Carman: 58,000 to 77,000
McClellan's technique: upto 80,000 (PFDE minus 1/6th)

Harsh estimates about 70,000 "effectives" for McClellan in the Seven Days, which would be reasonable. McClellan himself, in the immediate aftermath, thought he had around 50,000 effectives remaining on reaching Harrison's Landing.

In discussing Gettysburg, Busey & Martin note that, by corps, only 83.5% (2nd Corps) to 92.4% (1st Corps) of the nominal effective strength was actually carried into battle by units that reported it. At Antietam, we have data from three corps on their carried into battle and can compare to PFD to show only about 63% of the PFD (which was calculated to include logistics etc., unlike at Gettysburg) were actually combatants.

The rebels have largely given their actual engaged strength which, after accounting for removing the Richmond garrison, is around 90% of their effective strength, consistent with the Federals at Gettysburg.

The actual force ratio was probably about 90,000 rebels *actually available to the battleline* attacking 75,000 Federals actually available to defend their line. Completely different numbers to PFD etc., and I don't mind which category you use, as long as you don't mix and match.

 

[Nathan Towne]

This a reply to a ten year old thread (!). However:

(1) That is true - the combat effectives for every unit are less than their PFD. To quote Carman:

"That these figures correctly state the number reported as "present for duty" is not questioned; that they correctly give the number "in action" is an error. Every old soldier who served in the war of 1861-1865 knows the difference between the number of those who answered the roll-call in camp, or were accounted for as present, and the number of those who went onto the fighting line, a difference of from 20 to 40 per cent, depending upon the discipline of the organization, some of the very best in the Union army considering themselves themselves very fortunate in getting four-fifths of their men in action.2 We propose to test these figures and endeavor to arrive at a reasonably correct conclusion as to the number of men in action at Antietam, and shall depend upon the official reports of the division, brigade and regimental commanders, regimental histories, and other authentic sources of information."

Carman, Ezra A.. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862: Volume II - Antietam (p. 905). Savas Beatie. Kindle Edition.

f/n 2: Carman used his first-hand knowledge of soldiering to provide a short lesson in the arcane business of reporting numbers during the Civil War. Addressing this topic more scientifically were Thomas Livermore, Numbers and Losses of the Civil War in America (Boston, MA: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1900), and Frederick Phisterer, Statistical Record of the Armies of the United States (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883). Livermore estimated the difference of "present for duty" and "effectives" as 89-93 percent for infantry and 83-86 percent for cavalry, p. 68. He emphasized that there were averages. Phisterer, whose numbers are more aligned with Carman's, put the difference higher, somewhere around 30-35 percent, pp. 62-63. Given the hard campaigning and serious straggling prevalent to both armies, the percentages of those supposedly present, but not in the ranks, was probably closer to Phisterer, and maybe higher.

Carman, Ezra A.. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862: Volume II - Antietam (pp. 934-935). Savas Beatie. Kindle Edition. (Note that Philisterer was measuring something else).

In this case, many rebels gave estimates of their engaged enlisted men during the Seven Days, and they are less than their PFD. As Burton notes:

"Alexander Lawton, D. H. Hill, John Magruder, four of James Longstreet's brigadiers, all of Benjamin Huger's brigadiers, A. P. Hill, and Theophilus Holmes all give strength figures in their reports, and most estimates use those numbers as their basis. Lawton does not include either artillery or officers. D. H. Hill does not seem to include either, although it is unclear. Magruder is unclear. Of Longstreet's brigadiers, James Kemper does not include either officers or artillery. Colonel J. B. Strange (reporting George Pickett's strength) includes officers but not artillery. Cadmus Wilcox does not seem to include either (he reports casualties among officers and men separately, but explicitly states only men with his strength figure). Roger Pryor also seems to include neither artillery nor officers. Of Huger's brigadiers, Robert Ransom seems not to include either (he refers to effective force). William Mahone includes officers but not artillery. Ambrose Wright seems to include only men in the ranks.

Lew Armistead includes officers except for those of one regiment. A. P. Hill almost certainly includes artillery in his figure. Holmes is the most explicit, and he does not include artillery or officers in his report. All the estimates, including the ones used in this book, are given in the following table."

Burton, Brian K.. Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles . Indiana University Press. Kindle Edition.

Burton then make an estimate of ca. 90,000 officers and men engaged for the rebels, based on battle reports of the actual strength carried into action. However, he's used Livermore's corrections for the Federals, which overstates Federal effective strength as it was calibrated against returns that have already excluded the logistics. He finds. ca. 96,000 PFD(E) in combat units and thus the effective force is:

Livermore: upto ca. 89,000 (but miscalibrated, includes extra-duty etc.)
Carman: 58,000 to 77,000
McClellan's technique: upto 80,000 (PFDE minus 1/6th)

Harsh estimates about 70,000 "effectives" for McClellan in the Seven Days, which would be reasonable. McClellan himself, in the immediate aftermath, thought he had around 50,000 effectives remaining on reaching Harrison's Landing.

In discussing Gettysburg, Busey & Martin note that, by corps, only 83.5% (2nd Corps) to 92.4% (1st Corps) of the nominal effective strength was actually carried into battle by units that reported it. At Antietam, we have data from three corps on their carried into battle and can compare to PFD to show only about 63% of the PFD (which was calculated to include logistics etc., unlike at Gettysburg) were actually combatants.

The rebels have largely given their actual engaged strength which, after accounting for removing the Richmond garrison, is around 90% of their effective strength, consistent with the Federals at Gettysburg.

The actual force ratio was probably about 90,000 rebels *actually available to the battleline* attacking 75,000 Federals actually available to defend their line. Completely different numbers to PFD etc., and I don't mind which category you use, as long as you don't mix and match.

That is true and would apply for the Confederate Army, as well.

I agree with you that the Army of Northern Virginia was larger during the Seven Days than was once believed and the figures which have been presented by Tenney, as you know, line up pretty well with much of what else is known.

I wrote a long, detailed response to you in another thread walking through this as far as the claim that the Army of the Potomac changed policy shortly after McClellan being replaced by Burnside is concerned.

I was just asking regarding your above comment, are you of the opinion that McClellan had definitively made the decision to shift to the James River by June 25th (or on June 25th)?