McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[Saphroneth]

@Saphroneth

Did you have any other particular views which you were thinking of expressing regarding the reorganization?

Assuming that you mean the May reorganization of the Army of the Potomac, it's probably the best that could be done at the time and within the constraints then active. McClellan's primary concern is that he has three corps commanders, all of whom he has a low opinion of; he has nine divisions in total, and he has two division commanders (Porter and Franklin) who he thinks relatively highly of.

Lincoln perhaps sees this as playing favourites, but it's perhaps not unexpected that McClellan would tend to trust the advice of the men who he considers to be more competent. The alternative, after all, is that he tends to trust the advice of men who he doesn't consider to be more competent, which is obviously silly.

In any case. He can't remove any of the three corps commanders because none of them have disobeyed orders, they've just been rather poor at their jobs (again, in his evaluation).

What McClellan thus does is to create two new corps, each of them with two divisions. He does this partly by turning Sykes' brigade of regular infantry into a division, giving him ten to work with instead of nine.

Porter's division obviously follows him into the new Porter's corps, and Franklin's division becomes the nucleus of the new Franklin's corps. Since Porter came from 3rd Corps (a corps which had three divisions) that leaves 3rd Corps with two, 2nd Corps already has just two, 4th Corps still has three, and he has Sykes to distribute plus Porter and Franklin's corps have one division each.

Since Keyes is the one who McClellan seems to consider the weakest of his three existing corps commanders (as the one he didn't want in the first place), and is also the most junior IIRC, McClellan can by removing a division from 4th Corps balance the corps out and also make it so that either Sumner or Heintzelman can exercise command over a combination of 3rd/4th or 2nd/4th and only have four divisions to deal with - which isn't drastically outside the realm of possibility.


The only remaining questions are then about which division to take from Keyes and how to combine those elements. I'm not certain of the precise reasoning behind it, but if I had to guess it would be -
McClellan is more confident in Porter, of the two of them, so Porter gets the new (smaller) Regular division in addition to his own. Porter is handling two people new to division command (Morell and Sykes).
McClellan is less confident in Franklin, of the two of them, so Franklin gets WF Smith's division in addition to his own. Smith is a division commander who McClellan thinks relatively highly of so Franklin isn't overwhelmed with two new-to-division-command people and his ex-4th-Corps division is solid and can take care of itself.


It's not on the same level as the reshuffle of the army in September, let alone Wellington's masterpiece of army reorg before the Waterloo campaign, but McClellan has much less freedom to shuffle units around in May.


In June, when McClellan gets a new division he chooses to bulk out 5th Corps, which had been smaller than the others beforehand but is now the largest single corps.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Lest we forget, Corinth was a great victory, which repulsed a concentrated Confederate attack upon a strategically vital position.

Being that it was proven to an above user in another thread that the Iuka plan was to trap Price at Iuka from the ability to pull back either to the south, to the east via Bear Creek, or due north towards the Tennessee River, which wasn't even known by them until it was demonstrated to them, one would think that they would be careful in passing judgements too quickly from there. These are complex topics, which have to be studied intimately, lest obvious mistakes like that will be made. You show respect to the record and the historical actors involved in judging their actions and often things come out much differently than one may think if not intimately studied.

@tony_gunter

If you haven't studied Hamilton's command in the east, it is very interesting.

It is very easy to see what the subsequent statements will be. Not pursuing on the night of the 4th will be a catastrophic blunder and not destroying the Confederate Army along the Hatchie River will be due to Rosecrans' blundering and so on and so forth, on each point which can be formulated. I am sure that we will be hearing such next. It is just very difficult with people who have minimal knowledge, but a massive axe to grind and have already come to pre-set conclusions.

 

[TallTallMan]

 

[67th Tigers]

Just duck the issue when you have no good response. McClellan's May 22 response is significant because Lincoln had given McClellan the chance to do what he he hadn't done in his April 30 order - specify the detailed grounds for relieving Hamilton from division command. He chose the broad statement that Hamilton was not "fit" for division command. As I pointed out, he had that authority if in fact there was "cause". We don't know what the specific "cause" was because he never provided any details and because a court of inquiry was neither requested nor convened. The same is true, by the way, of his April 30 message to Franklin informing him that Kearney was being assigned to command the 3rd division of III Corps and that Hamilton was "relieved".

McClellan had two requests sent to Heintzelman on April 29 and April 30 requesting the dates of commission of Birney, Berry, and Grover but no reference to his intentions regarding Hamilton. Meanwhile, on April 29 and 30 he had two messages sent to Hamilton, the first directing the responsibility of the "division officer of the day" for "guarding the trenches" and the second asking "what were the dates of your applications for cavalry in your letter of 26th inst."

McClellan, on the day he was busy establishing a bridgehead across the Chickahominy, stated he had given no reason essentially not to embarrass Hamilton. Until then, Hamilton had simply been reassigned. McClellan stated that Hamilton was not fit to command a division. Yes, there are no details, but again this is so not as to embarrass Hamilton or those who appointed him to be a general.

What you've failed to do is quote Hamilton's communications. By the summary in the NYT etc., which Hamilton did not dispute, Hamilton started refusing to provide the work details requested by Porter, and disputed Porters right to command his section of the trenches.* The work on his section (Batteries 7 and 8 and Redoubt C) fell behind the rest. With Heintzelman sick, McKeever sent these to GHQ and McClellan got involved. Eventually Hamilton told McClellan he was well connected in Washington, and he'd go over McClellan's head to Lincoln. This prompted McClellan to relieve him for insubordination, which it clearly was.

Hamilton was, of course, politically well connected and was able to get Lincoln to ask for him to be restored to command. The problem that restoring him to a division would create is obvious - it confirms that he is not bound to follow orders. It would completely undermine the discipline of the army.

There were a few politicians a bit like this, including Baker who was killed at Ball's Bluff. One might point to Sickles, or McClernand, or Cox as examples of generals who thought their political connections made them special.

* Porter was detailed to command the trenches and ranked 5th in the Army of the Potomac, after McClellan (3 stars), Sumner (regular 1 star), Heintzelman, Keyes and Andrew Porter. He was the most senior division commander in the army. Hamilton ranked 9th and was the most junior division commander in 3rd Corps. He was ranked by Kearny, who didn't have a division after refusing one.

 

[67th Tigers]

The only remaining questions are then about which division to take from Keyes and how to combine those elements. I'm not certain of the precise reasoning behind it, but if I had to guess it would be -
McClellan is more confident in Porter, of the two of them, so Porter gets the new (smaller) Regular division in addition to his own. Porter is handling two people new to division command (Morell and Sykes).
McClellan is less confident in Franklin, of the two of them, so Franklin gets WF Smith's division in addition to his own. Smith is a division commander who McClellan thinks relatively highly of so Franklin isn't overwhelmed with two new-to-division-command people and his ex-4th-Corps division is solid and can take care of itself.

Let me note that Stanton offered to replaced Keyes with Franklin as commander of 4th Corps...

 

[Saphroneth]

Let me note that Stanton offered to replaced Keyes with Franklin as commander of 4th Corps...

That would have been an interesting one. I wonder how that would have worked out?

Could you have a 2nd Corps (Sumner) of Richardson/Sedgwick, a 3rd Corps (Heintzelman) of Hooker/Kearny, a 4th Corps (Franklin) of Smith/Casey/(Couch or Keyes), and a 5th Provisional Corps (Porter) of Morell/Sykes/Slocum?

 

[Nathan Towne]

Assuming that you mean the May reorganization of the Army of the Potomac, it's probably the best that could be done at the time and within the constraints then active. McClellan's primary concern is that he has three corps commanders, all of whom he has a low opinion of; he has nine divisions in total, and he has two division commanders (Porter and Franklin) who he thinks relatively highly of.

Lincoln perhaps sees this as playing favourites, but it's perhaps not unexpected that McClellan would tend to trust the advice of the men who he considers to be more competent. The alternative, after all, is that he tends to trust the advice of men who he doesn't consider to be more competent, which is obviously silly.

In any case. He can't remove any of the three corps commanders because none of them have disobeyed orders, they've just been rather poor at their jobs (again, in his evaluation).

What McClellan thus does is to create two new corps, each of them with two divisions. He does this partly by turning Sykes' brigade of regular infantry into a division, giving him ten to work with instead of nine.

Porter's division obviously follows him into the new Porter's corps, and Franklin's division becomes the nucleus of the new Franklin's corps. Since Porter came from 3rd Corps (a corps which had three divisions) that leaves 3rd Corps with two, 2nd Corps already has just two, 4th Corps still has three, and he has Sykes to distribute plus Porter and Franklin's corps have one division each.

Since Keyes is the one who McClellan seems to consider the weakest of his three existing corps commanders (as the one he didn't want in the first place), and is also the most junior IIRC, McClellan can by removing a division from 4th Corps balance the corps out and also make it so that either Sumner or Heintzelman can exercise command over a combination of 3rd/4th or 2nd/4th and only have four divisions to deal with - which isn't drastically outside the realm of possibility.


The only remaining questions are then about which division to take from Keyes and how to combine those elements. I'm not certain of the precise reasoning behind it, but if I had to guess it would be -
McClellan is more confident in Porter, of the two of them, so Porter gets the new (smaller) Regular division in addition to his own. Porter is handling two people new to division command (Morell and Sykes).
McClellan is less confident in Franklin, of the two of them, so Franklin gets WF Smith's division in addition to his own. Smith is a division commander who McClellan thinks relatively highly of so Franklin isn't overwhelmed with two new-to-division-command people and his ex-4th-Corps division is solid and can take care of itself.


It's not on the same level as the reshuffle of the army in September, let alone Wellington's masterpiece of army reorg before the Waterloo campaign, but McClellan has much less freedom to shuffle units around in May.


In June, when McClellan gets a new division he chooses to bulk out 5th Corps, which had been smaller than the others beforehand but is now the largest single corps.

Yeah, I just hadn't heard any of your take before.

 

[Saphroneth]

Yeah, I just hadn't heard any of your take before.

I will point out that on a functional level having Franklin replace Keyes might have been better, but IIRC McClellan might actually have accepted that offer and it just didn't happen.





So a bit of a discussion on the role and purpose of a subordinate commander, and in particular the senior subordinates in a large army.


The fundamental constraint on command of a large army is that it is too big for a single commander to be everywhere at once. The role of, in particular, corps and division commanders is in large part to be able to act for themselves according to the directions of the high commander - this being particularly relevant in the period from the Napoleonic revolution in army sizes up to WW1, becaue the 19th century sees a large army being composed of subordinate commands (corps), each of which is itself tractable to human control with the tactical decisions being made such that the commander of the corps can in principle know all the commanders of the basic battlefield building blocks (brigades, regiments) by name. This stopped being the case in WW1 owing to the tactical decision making devolving down to platoon and company level, while in WW2 the advent of radio meant that a commander could at least in principle be in direct contact with the sharp end without actually going over there physically.

But in the Civil War and temporally related wars, an army commander's operational subunits (corps) can be miles apart - such that it is not practical to be available within even (say) an hour if a decision needs to be made. Under some circumstances signals corps can allow for rapid communication of simple messages, but this is by no means guaranteed - especially not on the advance, or in a fluid situation - and managing tactical commitments by semaphore based on the information coming down a semaphore link is potentially disastrous.


Thus, a commander's senior subordinates matter because they are the senior authority in a given area. They are the ones who are making the decisions, and the CIC is in many cases simply unable to overrule them in a timely fashion, indeed the decision loop can be multiple hours long from wherever the CIC is to the corps commander.

With this in mind, the choice of corps commanders, and the ability of the commanding general to be reasonably sure what they will do given certain circumstances, is quite important.

To take an example - let's go with, say, General Kaltin Gruder. He is commander of the Left Wing, which will be operating some miles away from the rest of the army.

If the CIC were accompanying the Left Wing, and acting as the commander of the Left Wing, then the CIC could be fairly confident that the actions of the Left Wing would be as he would prefer them. But that isn't an option for the whole army - we can't clone the CIC and have him everywhere at once.

Instead, the CIC's orders to Gruder must reflect what the CIC wants to happen and must be filtered through the CIC's understanding of how Gruder will interpret the orders. If Gruder is a hard-charging and aggressive general who will attack unless he has a positive reason not to, then the orders will probably specify under what circumstances an attack should not take place; if Gruder is prone to overestimating the difficulty of the task before him, the orders will instead be different, and endeavour to emphasize the importance of attacking.

And if Gruder is erratic, or a poor commander in general, then the CIC must simply accept that the results may not be all that the CIC wishes. The CIC can accompany whichever of his forces has a task that will be most difficult to accomplish given the available information and what he knows about the commander, but he can only pick one.



To make matters worse, of course, in the US Army as of early 1862 there is not a deep base of experience - at least, not at the corps command level. Many of the men who were corps commanders as of April 1862 hadn't even commanded a division on active campaign - McDowell had commanded an army which was of the scale of a large corps in size (which... hadn't gone great) while Heintzelman had run a division in that same campaign. Keyes had run a brigade.


So that's the problem McClellan has. His corps commanders are people where he cannot really reliably trust them to act appropriately, in some cases even with explicit instructions about what to do. There is nothing inherently heretical about a corps commander going against orders, their job is more than robotically following orders (it's about independent thought and discretion, more than any other position) but they should be doing it when it's a good idea.
Heintzelman alerts the enemy despite orders not to. Sumner refuses to pull back during the Seven Days when he has orders to do so, and then when he does pull back he goes too far. All three CCs put together don't reinforce Hancock during Williamsburg.

This is the organizational problem. The realities of the nature of armies at the time mean that McClellan has to have tactical and operational deputies able to use their own judgement, and the CCs keep making misjudgements.

A lot of this is really based on how they had little to no experience or testing at the rank. Keyes is a corps commander in April and FJ Porter is not because of the relative ordering of their appointments to colonels of new infantry regiments on May 14, 1861 (literally which is higher on the list), which feeds into their relative placement on the list of BGs of volunteers on May 17, 1861.

Notably McClellan didn't make Keyes a division commander in lineal order of seniority. He only got his slot because Buell was sent west to become an army commander, and at that point there were several generals junior to Keyes who had divisions while Keyes did not.

 

[tony_gunter]

It is very easy to see what the subsequent statements will be. Not pursuing on the night of the 4th will be a catastrophic blunder and not destroying the Confederate Army along the Hatchie River will be due to Rosecrans' blundering and so on and so forth, on each point which can be formulated. I am sure that we will be hearing such next. It is just very difficult with people who have minimal knowledge, but a massive axe to grind and have already come to pre-set conclusions.

Wait, are you saying that Rosecrans didn't fumble the pursuit?

When McPherson arrived at the end of the battle, Rosecrans gave him an order to "have your men formed on the road by first light and ready to pursue." The men formed and stood in the road for hours. When Rosecrans stumbled upon them mid-morning and asked why they had not begun the pursuit, McPherson simply pulled out the order and read it back to him.

 

[Saphroneth]

Wait, are you saying that Rosecrans didn't fumble the pursuit?

When McPherson arrived at the end of the battle, Rosecrans gave him an order to "have your men formed on the road by first light and ready to pursue." The men formed and stood in the road for hours. When Rosecrans stumbled upon them mid-morning and asked why they had not begun the pursuit, McPherson simply pulled out the order and read it back to him.

If substantiated (as it feels like a "funny story", not saying it's not true, just that it feels like it) this would be an excellent example of the discretion that a subordinate commander is meant to employ. McPherson is functionally a corps commander (commanding a detachment of two divisions under his overall control, and not as the senior division commander); he has discretion for independent command and should not simply stand there like a lemon for hours waiting for explicit instructions. He perhaps should not pursue without instructions, but he should certainly send a message asking whether he should begin the pursuit!

This is the kind of thing a corps commander is meant to do. They are supposed to act with discretion and are granted wide (though not unlimited) latitude to achieve those goals.

 

[Nathan Towne]

If substantiated (as it feels like a "funny story", not saying it's not true, just that it feels like it) this would be an excellent example of the discretion that a subordinate commander is meant to employ. McPherson is functionally a corps commander (commanding a detachment of two divisions under his overall control, and not as the senior division commander); he has discretion for independent command and should not simply stand there like a lemon for hours waiting for explicit instructions. He perhaps should not pursue without instructions, but he should certainly send a message asking whether he should begin the pursuit!

This is the kind of thing a corps commander is meant to do. They are supposed to act with discretion and are granted wide (though not unlimited) latitude to achieve those goals.

@tony_gunter

This isn't really worth responding to. It is simply inaccurate. I put forth the relevant question to you in the other thread regarding the Iuka operation, by the way.

 

[DanSBHawk]

What you've failed to do is quote Hamilton's communications. By the summary in the NYT etc., which Hamilton did not dispute, Hamilton started refusing to provide the work details requested by Porter, and disputed Porters right to command his section of the trenches.* The work on his section (Batteries 7 and 8 and Redoubt C) fell behind the rest. With Heintzelman sick, McKeever sent these to GHQ and McClellan got involved. Eventually Hamilton told McClellan he was well connected in Washington, and he'd go over McClellan's head to Lincoln. This prompted McClellan to relieve him for insubordination, which it clearly was.

Hamilton was, of course, politically well connected and was able to get Lincoln to ask for him to be restored to command. The problem that restoring him to a division would create is obvious - it confirms that he is not bound to follow orders. It would completely undermine the discipline of the army.

There were a few politicians a bit like this, including Baker who was killed at Ball's Bluff. One might point to Sickles, or McClernand, or Cox as examples of generals who thought their political connections made them special.

* Porter was detailed to command the trenches and ranked 5th in the Army of the Potomac, after McClellan (3 stars), Sumner (regular 1 star), Heintzelman, Keyes and Andrew Porter. He was the most senior division commander in the army. Hamilton ranked 9th and was the most junior division commander in 3rd Corps. He was ranked by Kearny, who didn't have a division after refusing one.

This seems suspiciously detailed. I've seen before how some people fill in a story without any actual evidence. Can you provide any links?

 

[Belfoured]

McClellan, on the day he was busy establishing a bridgehead across the Chickahominy, stated he had given no reason essentially not to embarrass Hamilton. Until then, Hamilton had simply been reassigned. McClellan stated that Hamilton was not fit to command a division. Yes, there are no details, but again this is so not as to embarrass Hamilton or those who appointed him to be a general.

What you've failed to do is quote Hamilton's communications. By the summary in the NYT etc., which Hamilton did not dispute, Hamilton started refusing to provide the work details requested by Porter, and disputed Porters right to command his section of the trenches.* The work on his section (Batteries 7 and 8 and Redoubt C) fell behind the rest. With Heintzelman sick, McKeever sent these to GHQ and McClellan got involved. Eventually Hamilton told McClellan he was well connected in Washington, and he'd go over McClellan's head to Lincoln. This prompted McClellan to relieve him for insubordination, which it clearly was.

Hamilton was, of course, politically well connected and was able to get Lincoln to ask for him to be restored to command. The problem that restoring him to a division would create is obvious - it confirms that he is not bound to follow orders. It would completely undermine the discipline of the army.

There were a few politicians a bit like this, including Baker who was killed at Ball's Bluff. One might point to Sickles, or McClernand, or Cox as examples of generals who thought their political connections made them special.

* Porter was detailed to command the trenches and ranked 5th in the Army of the Potomac, after McClellan (3 stars), Sumner (regular 1 star), Heintzelman, Keyes and Andrew Porter. He was the most senior division commander in the army. Hamilton ranked 9th and was the most junior division commander in 3rd Corps. He was ranked by Kearny, who didn't have a division after refusing one.

Your incessant veneration of McClellan's infallible character is itself embarrassing. This is another example. The assertion that McClellan concealed his grounds for relieving Hamilton because he had no desire to "embarrass" Hamilton is absurd. That, of course, is the implication by McClellan in his May 22 response but that is swallowed only by those who believe literally everything McClellan said. The removal of an officer from command with no explanation - as happened on April 30 - is not only "embarrassing" for that officer but leaves open to speculation that the officer must have done something egregious to earn removal. McClellan was acting within his authority to relieve Hamilton for cause but we have nothing from McClellan indicating the grounds other than the very general - and very disparaging - not "fit" for command. Regarding the NYT, as you well know, that newspaper referred to a story in the Chicago Daily Tribune. The Tribune published stories that put a different slant on the incident than you have. Hamilton would have had no reason to challenge the version of events presented by the Tribune.

 

[Belfoured]

This seems suspiciously detailed. I've seen before how some people fill in a story without any actual evidence. Can you provide any links?

Other than the New Testament and McClellan's Sermon on the Mount. The Chicago Tribune published a couple of stories about the Hamilton incident which put a different slant on what happened - unsurprisingly, of course.

 

[tony_gunter]

If substantiated (as it feels like a "funny story", not saying it's not true, just that it feels like it) this would be an excellent example of the discretion that a subordinate commander is meant to employ. McPherson is functionally a corps commander (commanding a detachment of two divisions under his overall control, and not as the senior division commander); he has discretion for independent command and should not simply stand there like a lemon for hours waiting for explicit instructions. He perhaps should not pursue without instructions, but he should certainly send a message asking whether he should begin the pursuit!

This is the kind of thing a corps commander is meant to do. They are supposed to act with discretion and are granted wide (though not unlimited) latitude to achieve those goals.

McPherson was the engineer in charge of railroads, acting provisionally as brigade commander.

 

[tony_gunter]

@tony_gunter

This isn't really worth responding to. I put forth the relevant question to you in the other thread regarding the Iuka operation, by the way.

This isn't really worth responding to.

 

[Saphroneth]

McPherson was the engineer in charge of railroads, acting provisionally as brigade commander.

It was my understanding that McPherson was commanding the detachment of the Army of the Tennessee present at Second Corinth. If not, however, then presumably someone was commanding the detachment - if he's a directly reporting subordinate of Rosecrans then the same basic principle applies (i.e. not just standing around) and if he's under whoever was commanding the detachment then they're the one who should be exercising that principle.

I note that McPherson's report says that he bivouacked in the town according to orders, and moved in pursuit "shortly after daylight Sunday morning".

 

[67th Tigers]

Other than the New Testament and McClellan's Sermon on the Mount. The Chicago Tribune published a couple of stories about the Hamilton incident which put a different slant on what happened - unsurprisingly, of course.

Of course, it was Hamilton leaking and putting it as all about his poor soldiers, going sick because they were being asked to do too much work. In the same articles, you will note, Hamilton freely admits to threatening to go over McClellan's head to Lincoln. That was certainly insubordination.

McClellan, of course, initially said nothing. It was the done thing not to throw people under the bus, and officers who intrigued against others, like Hamilton did, were often found out.

Marvel characterises Hamilton as a "well-connected, calculating backbiter"(1) and a "querulous man." (2) He has letters wherein Hamilton is smearing other officers to get ahead of them. He notes that Hamilton's division shed huge numbers of stragglers, who because marauders, and Porter gave orders to his pickets to shoot them if they were outside of their lines. Marvel notes a stream of notes from Hamilton complaining that his division was being asked to do an equal share of the work, which is the root cause of the issue.

Hamilton certain wasn't a team-player, perhaps even more so than Hooker or Kearny, since I've never seen anything from those two that suggests they didn't perform their duty, whereas Hamilton was certainly lax. Hamilton apparently believed his political connections made him immune to the normal discipline of the army, but they didn't.

Of the division commanders, two were clearly imcompetent to command a division - Hamilton and Casey. The others at least had the basics, even if they weren't very good at commanding in battle.



(1) Marvel, William. Radical Sacrifice: The Rise and Ruin of Fitz John Porter (Civil War America) (p. 109). The University of North Carolina Press. Kindle Edition.

(2) ibid, 117

 

[DanSBHawk]

So perhaps Hamilton ran afoul of McClellan by clashing with Fitz John Porter, who was McClellan's pet.

 

[Nathan Towne]

So perhaps Hamilton ran afoul of McClellan by clashing with Fitz John Porter, who was McClellan's pet.

^"McClellan's pet."