McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[DanSBHawk]

The bottom line is that Hamilton wanted to attack, and was refused. He disagreed with the "timid policy" of McClellan.

Additionally, Hamilton protested the unfair workload imposed on his troops.

For these two minor reasons, McClellan apparently decided that Hamilton was unfit to command a division. This is why I tend to think that it was more an issue of thin skin on the part of McClellan.

 

[Belfoured]

The bottom line is that Hamilton wanted to attack, and was refused. He disagreed with the "timid policy" of McClellan.

Additionally, Hamilton protested the unfair workload imposed on his troops.

For these two minor reasons, McClellan apparently decided that Hamilton was unfit to command a division. This is why I tend to think that it was more an issue of thin skin on the part of McClellan.

Well, as I've pointed out, the glass is half full - it's been awhile since we saw that canard about "disobeying orders". The "thin skin" was probably derived in part from the fact that Hamilton appears to have made a complaint that was somehow related to "Old Fitz". Bad choice. One wonders about the "over/under" if Hamilton's complaint related instead to Keyes, Sumner, or Heintzelman - even though none of that group had the Fredonian Army title "Director of the Siege".

 

[67th Tigers]

The bottom line is that Hamilton wanted to attack, and was refused. He disagreed with the "timid policy" of McClellan.

Additionally, Hamilton protested the unfair workload imposed on his troops.

For these two minor reasons, McClellan apparently decided that Hamilton was unfit to command a division. This is why I tend to think that it was more an issue of thin skin on the part of McClellan.

The "minor issue" he was sacked for was disobeying orders and threatening to go over his commanders head to his political backers directly. There is a difference between:

"I follow your orders under protest."

and

"I refuse to follow your orders. I am friends with many politicians and I will appeal to them to overrule you."

He absolutely should have been sacked for this, and there was no reasonable way of keeping him on after this. It would dissolve the command structure of the army if well-connected officers didn't have to follow orders.

As to the tactical issue - he was simply wrong. No amount of "he wanted to attack" changes his faulty judgement.

You know who else wanted to attack? George McClellan. The difference is that McClellan wanted his attack to succeed. Hamilton's claims that the position was abandoned, if true, would have had McClellan order him to seize it, just like the false report that Dam No. 1 was abandoned about a week later. However, it was not true, and Hamilton was deluded. Any attempt to seize the "unoccupied" works with a brigade would have led to a slaughter.

 

[Saphroneth]

I think it deserves remembering that there is the kind of situation where an attack is obviously a good chance to succeed (enemy has actually mostly abandoned the position, for example), and the kind of situation where an attack is a risk, and the kind of situation where an attack is obviously a poor chance.

The attack Hamilton is suggesting is an attack on a position which the Confederates had not actually abandoned. At most, they had been driven to take cover (i.e. moved out of direct line of sight). But the mere fact that the enemy has taken cover is not enough to make an attack an obvious good chance, unless you can cause this to happen right up to the moment of contact.

But that's basically late WW1 attack theory, the lifting barrage. It's not standard in the 1860s!

 

[67th Tigers]

Indeed, because of the direct fire nature of artillery, sustaining the barrage is generally not possible. You'd be firing through your own attacking troops and doing the enemy's work for them.

What is needed is to minimise the time between the barrage lifting, and the assaulting troops getting on the position. This means, practically, sapping forward. If your troops can get to within 200 yards before the barrage lifts, there's a chance. 100 yds would be more preferable.

The obvious example to point to is Pickett's Charge. The barrage was completely successful at neutralising the enemy artillery on the position and suppressing the infantry to a point they could not defend it. However, the barrage had to lift, and the attacking infantry had to cross 600 to 800 yards of ground. In that time, artillery was brought up from the reserve, and the infantry were able to re-man the position.

To keep suppression, the fire support needs to be about 90 degrees to the assaulting axis:

I think it's fairly obvious why when an attack was considered against Wynn's Mill (which had already occurred) the question is whether artillery could set up a firing position to enfilade the enemy and allow suppression to continue until the last bound. No way of doing this could be found, and a simple map study should show why:

 

[Saphroneth]

What makes this worse, of course (for the attacker) is that the Wynn's Mill works are heavy works - their trace is still very visible today, comparable to the atillery works around Dam #1 which effectively resisted the concentrated fire of a full division's artillery batteries and kept casualties down to zero or nearly zero.

The fact of these heavy works means that the Confederate defenders actually could re-occupy their works while still under fire (and expect to take minimal casualties) - they just don't have a reason to do so unless the enemy is attacking, because minimal casualties are still casualties.

Taking cover in the woods from an artillery barrage (no casualties) is better than occupying the works under fire (minimal casualties). But occupying the works under fire (minimal casualties) is better than taking cover in the woods while a Union attack is coming in (loss of the position, significant subsequent casualties).

 

[67th Tigers]

Indeed, and the bombardment at Dam No. 1 caused no human casualties. There is no evidence, apart from Hamilton's claims, of any casualties at Wynn's Mill on the 16th or a gun being dismounted. It would be good to find any evidence to corroborate Hamilton's claims.

 

[Saphroneth]

Hamilton's claims of the enemy largely abandoning their works are something that I'd take at face value because the burden of proof is not high. The enemy declined to remain in view while actively under fire at a point when it served no purpose; that's reasonable enough.

Going from having observed that to the idea that the position could easily be taken, however, would mean more than that.

 

[DanSBHawk]

The "minor issue" he was sacked for was disobeying orders and threatening to go over his commanders head to his political backers directly. There is a difference between:

"I follow your orders under protest."

and

"I refuse to follow your orders. I am friends with many politicians and I will appeal to them to overrule you."

He absolutely should have been sacked for this, and there was no reasonable way of keeping him on after this. It would dissolve the command structure of the army if well-connected officers didn't have to follow orders.

As to the tactical issue - he was simply wrong. No amount of "he wanted to attack" changes his faulty judgement.

You know who else wanted to attack? George McClellan. The difference is that McClellan wanted his attack to succeed. Hamilton's claims that the position was abandoned, if true, would have had McClellan order him to seize it, just like the false report that Dam No. 1 was abandoned about a week later. However, it was not true, and Hamilton was deluded. Any attempt to seize the "unoccupied" works with a brigade would have led to a slaughter.

You've presented zero evidence that Hamilton refused to obey orders.

So far in this thread, the only evidence that has been presented of the reasons behind Hamilton's relief, has been the short description in his "narrative" letter.

"You know who else wanted to attack? George McClellan." That's funny. There were sure a lot of people at the time that wondered why he didn't.

 

[Belfoured]

You've presented zero evidence that Hamilton refused to obey orders.

So far in this thread, the only evidence that has been presented of the reasons behind Hamilton's relief, has been the short description in his "narrative" letter.

"You know who else wanted to attack? George McClellan." That's funny. There were sure a lot of people at the time that wondered why he didn't.

And - silly me - I thought that half-baked fiction had died a merciful death. If Hamilton had "disobeyed" orders McClellan would have said so - and was obligated to say so. Especially after Lincoln pressed him on it. That, of course, was a court martial charge. We have yet to see any documentary confirmation of that. The sole "explanation" is the cult-like claim here that McClellan was the best example of New Testament values in the history of warfare. Of course, we then have to deal with his apparent "slip ups" in what he bluntly said about Sumner on multiple occasions to his wife and in his letter sent to one of Sumner's bosses, Stanton, on May 8 [OR XI Part 3 at 153-54]. If the real reason was "disobedience" of orders, McClellan deliberately orchestrated things to make it difficult for Hamilton to clear his name. Real New Testament stuff, that. Of course, the simple fact is that McClellan did not relieve Hamilton for "disobeying" orders. That's why nobody - including McClellan - said he did.

 

[SSVilla]

No, read what Hamilton wrote. That's the relevant dispatch. And it's obvious that you are trying to ignore it.

I have one question because I am not versed in these details, is this the same fort that was found to have a lot of Quaker (fake/log) guns?

Maybe I am opening another can of worms here?..

Since we've been given a reference to what Marvel said regarding the Hamilton incident in Radical Sacrifice, let's look at everything Marvel said about that. (Perhaps the Kindle version isn't as "complete" as the hard copy book).

According to Marvel at p. 117, Hamilton wasn't the only officer complaining about Porter's actions as "Director of the Siege". At p. 118 Marvel states that the "grumbling" about Porter involved three generals in III Corps; that one suggested the only way he could gain recognition "would be to change his name to Porter"; and that this "probably" was Hamilton, whom McClellan "sent home the next day."

While we're using Marvel and Radical Sacrifice as an authoritative source, it bears mention that at p. 172 he describes McClellan's mental state during the Seven Days as "hobbled" and dependent on Porter. This is not inconsistent with Andrew Humphreys' July 1862 assessment of McClellan's mental condition during the Seven Days nor with Rafuse's modern assessment.

hobbled? I am very interested in this, Maybe psychologically he wasn't cut out for it. He must have known it (had doubts and insecurities at least) when he repeated to himself that God worked through weak instruments at times, and things of that nature.
———

Interestingly, I looked up a lecture someone posted much earlier in this thread (very old, over 10 years old. This thread started in 2014!) from Rafuse and so far nothing on McC. It started and mostly covered the war in Missouri, Lyon, Blair and etc. and hasn't gotten to McC, so that I am left wondering why it was posted.

———

Thinking about McC the best I could say to someone in the position of the OP, is you can still tip your hat if you want to the old general. He wasn't perfect but no one is. He tried to save the Union his way, but his way wasn't going to be enough.

Frankly even if he had captured Richmond, he would have then found out that it wouldn't have been the end of the war. That's what other successful generals found in the West. Even a major battle won, a huge victory, the capture of cities, forts, and armies even, the occupation of territory wasn't going to be enough to subdue the confederacy. It hobbled the confederacy sure, and weakened them. Every victory and battle won made it more likely that it would be the last, but so long as the confederacy could field dangerous armies and have a sitting government somewhere they wouldn't have given up. Now that's the realm of speculation and we don't need to go there, but total war and the abolition of slavery was the only thing that could guarantee a lasting peace. Lord Lyons of Britain thought the U.S. would win but then be faced with everlasting internal warring among themselves.

I once read a study by a military professional about how civil wars tend to recur, particularly when what gave rise to them isn't solved. Sometimes foreign intervention on one side or another doesn't guarantee a lasting peace. It was a blessing for the future in that sense that no foreign power intervened and the U.S. was allowed to fight their war out until they were all fought out and ready to move on. Possibly one of the reasons (aside from the very real terrorism based on race that persisted for decades and generations unfortunately) that the war did not recur was that it was so complete, and that it resolved the real cause behind it. In that sense, we ought to always be grateful to the generation who settled that issue for us, as Bruce Catton wrote. And they knew, if they knew nothing else, that at least that they had done — they settled that issue forever. That's I think what gave them peace of mind and allowed them to live with themselves afterwards. It was best that we had the war when we did, would write Grant. If it had to happen it was best that it happened when it did and took with it it's root cause.

Then McC had his own role to play. Maybe anyone who would have been plunged in that situation at the beginning was in a minefield that he couldn't have conquered or passed through unscathed. That seems to be the view Grant took of McC, when he spoke with mercy about the cruel and vast responsibility thrown on him at the outset of the war.

So, tip your hat to McC. He played his part in the beginning and then showed Lincoln that the limited war way wasn't going to be successful and that taking the kid gloves off was necessary and now slavery would have to go too. It's interesting that McC would come up with the Harrison Landing letter when Lincoln was already looking at the emancipation proclamation.

 

[SSVilla]

Here is what Hamilton proposed on April 16th. He clearly wants to attack.
View attachment 520937
View attachment 520938

Wow. Thanks for sharing this. McC then sent an engineer to survey the terrain that gets killed, per others here. But even if that surveyor hadn't unfortunately been killed, he wouldn't have been able to report what Hamilton is stating here. Essentially he had tested the defenses and there was lower resistance than expected. That's not the same as saying there's no one out there. Basically McC settled into a siege without testing things first.

But the "larger mosaic" includes the tenor of several of his letters during that week, etc. Humphreys, as noted, was in a very good position to notice that something significant had changed that was obvious. The observations in his letter can't be simply dismissed as amateur psychoanalysis. In fact, anybody who's familiar with Humphreys would laugh at the suggestion.

i am curious about this, where can I find it?

 

[TallTallMan]

Wow. Thanks for sharing this. McC then sent an engineer to survey the terrain that gets killed, per others here. But even if that surveyor hadn't unfortunately been killed, he wouldn't have been able to report what Hamilton is stating here. Essentially he had tested the defenses and there was lower resistance than expected. That's not the same as saying there's no one out there. Basically McC settled into a siege without testing things first.

i am curious about this, where can I find it?

Dang it bro I wish you wouldn't revive a Mac thread! CWT taboo!

 

[SSVilla]

Dang it bro I wish you wouldn't revive a Mac thread! CWT taboo!

This thread was going well without me even looking at it until mid Sept this year…lol

Someone else revived it. @Nathan Towne maybe? There's a super lengthy (and frankly too much for me) discussion for about 14 pages purely about troop numbers during the Peninsula campaign.

For me, I started reading today Sears finally, the Young Napoleon… and I recently started reading Bruce Catton Mr. Lincoln's Army… Why do this to myself ? Two books at a time? But I can go wrong with neither. Catton is a classic and I dont see what other people object to with Sears … I only just started reading him though, and enthralled. It reads like gossip. lol

This discussion about Hamilton just a month ago was interesting. I missed it in real time I guess.

I was never that much interested in McClellan to be fair and I am not a fan, but he is an interesting character in how perplexing he is.

 

[67th Tigers]

For me, I started reading today Sears finally, the Young Napoleon… and I recently started reading Bruce Catton Mr. Lincoln's Army… Why do this to myself ? Two books at a time? But I can go wrong with neither. Catton is a classic and I dont see what other people object to with Sears … I only just started reading him though, and enthralled. It reads like gossip. lol

"It reads like gossip" is part of the issue. Sears is a journalist who learned his trade at American Heritage, which itself descends from Catton, also a journalist rather than a historian.* As journalists they have (had) an editorial bias. However, they are incredibly readable.

Sears has annoyed many people because it's been shown he has suppressed information which goes against editorial line. The big editorial line at American Heritage was "Pro-Grant, Anti-McClellan."


* Catton improved a bit, but the Army of the Potomac trilogy starting with Mr. Lincoln's Army is very much in the style of a tabloid journalist repacking KP Powers work, complete with Powers' editorial line. His later 1960's trilogy is less biased and sensationalised.

 

[Belfoured]

Dang it bro I wish you wouldn't revive a Mac thread! CWT taboo!

It's called "stove touching" - with ample reason. We know to a 98% degree of certainty what is likely to follow ...

 

[67th Tigers]

I have one question because I am not versed in these details, is this the same fort that was found to have a lot of Quaker (fake/log) guns?

No, and no fort had "a lot" of quaker guns.

There are two incidents concerning quaker guns with McClellan.

1. Munson's Hill.

The battery situated on Munson's Hill near Washington had dug six gun positions, but only had 4 guns. They placed quaker guns in the other two positions, and left them behind when McClellan moved against the hill. It is wrongly purported there were no guns on the hill at all, because they left the two fakes behind, and took the 4 real guns with them.

2. Centreville and Fort Johnston.

The original fortification the rebels built was a strong star fort redoubt called "Artillery Hill." They then expanded to 13 redoubts and lunettes, mostly connected by full infantry parapits. From right to left, the works contained, in November '61:

Eastern line

1. Cocke's Battery (1 rifle and 3 smaller smoothbores, probably 6 pdrs) - Arty Res
2. "some brigade battery to occupy" (Roger's battery)
3. Latham's Battery (not stated, probably 4) - Cocke's bde, Longstreet's Division
4. (Square work between the Fairfax Turnpike and Braddock Road) Stribling's Bty (2x 12 pdrs and 2x 24 pdr howitzers) - DR Jones' brigade, Longstreet's Division
5. (Fort Johnston) Hamilton's Bty (4 rifles) - Arty Res
6. Elm. Walton's command (2x 12 pdrs, 2x 24 pdr howitzers and 2x rifles)
7. Elm. Walton's command (2 rifles and 2x 12 pdr howitzers)

Reserve works behind Eastern line

1. (Artillery Hill) - Elm. Walton's command (4 rifles)
2. Dance's Battery (4x smoothbores) - Arty Res

Northern Line

1. Brockenborough's Battery (2 rifles and 2 smoothbores) - Elzey's bde, EK Smith's division
2. Cutt's Battery (2 rifles and 4 smoothbores) - Arty Res
3. Coleman's Battery (1 rifle, 2 howitzers and 1 smoothbore) - Arty Res
4. Kirkpatrick's Battery (4 guns) - Arty Res

= 58 guns

The troops occupying the works were Longstreet's and EK Smith's divisions. Van Dorn's division was in reserve. Collectively this force was "1st Corps, Army of the Potomac." The 2nd Corps of two divisions was stationed to the south around Dumfries etc.

Longstreet's Division proper (sans Griffith's bde) had 3x btys, and Rogers' battery was supposed to occupy the work without a battery listed. The Army at Centreville had 9 infantry brigades, each with their own batteries, plus the artillery reserve (9 batteries) and Walton's command (3 batteries, two of the Washington Arty btys were attached to brigades at the time) = 21 batteries, excluding the horse artillery.

Not in the works are:

Arty Res - 3 btys (Woolfolk's, Holman's and Lane's Btys)
All of Van Dorn's divisional arty - 3 btys
Part of EK Smith's divisional arty - 2 btys (Bowyer's and Courtney's Btys)
= 8 additional batteries ready to move into the works = 32? guns

Every single work there was artillery, and there were 8 additional batteries (ca. 32 guns) ready to move into the positions if threatened, and the works were designed to let the reserve guns to rapidly move into them.

The guns weren't enough to fully man all works, and especially those with all-round defence facing to the rear weren't provided with those guns. More guns arrived, delayed by the Potomac Blockade taking guns away.

In December, Beauregard reported that he the "wooden guns" were stockpiled to replace real ones, and he would only employ them if needed. The idea seems to be that if the guns were to be taken away, they'd be replaced with the quaker guns. For example, if an attack occurred necessitating concentrating the artillery on one side of the position.

The only Quaker guns there are pictures of are those in the rear of Fort Johnston (i.e. facing away from the enemy). Other shots show that the positions facing McClellan were simply empty. It appears they placed the quaker guns in the positions to the rear that weren't in use, and had real guns facing the enemy.

 

[67th Tigers]

Wow. Thanks for sharing this. McC then sent an engineer to survey the terrain that gets killed, per others here. But even if that surveyor hadn't unfortunately been killed, he wouldn't have been able to report what Hamilton is stating here. Essentially he had tested the defenses and there was lower resistance than expected. That's not the same as saying there's no one out there. Basically McC settled into a siege without testing things first.

i am curious about this, where can I find it?

In the OR and various papers. It's not a big thing. McClellan had Hamilton fire on Wynn's Mill to prevent troops moving to Dam No. 1 on the 16th. On the 17th Hamilton wrote that the enemy had essentially abandoned Wynn's Mill and he could occupy it with a single brigade. He was wrong, and the recce showed him to be wrong.

However, because it sounds good to some, Hamilton is assumed to be right...

 

[Saphroneth]

Something that's worth remembering is that breaking through the Warwick line =/= taking Yorktown. In the event that the Warwick line is broken through or abandoned except for Yorktown, the Confederates actually have a good reason to hold Yorktown as long as they can.

This is because holding Yorktown means (1) that the Union can't pass troops up to Eltham's Landing to cut off a Confederate retreat, and (2) that the Confederates can hold the Williamsburg line long-term.


Taking Yorktown (specifically) either by siege (starvation), or by artillery bombardment, or by naval bombardment is necessary.


What this means, in turn, is that the premium to be placed on an early attack on the Warwick line (exclusive of Yorktown) by McClellan's forces is LOW. Opening up the Warwick line at the cost of, say, 500 more Union casualties than Confederate is a net loss for the Union relative to the historical outcome, because it does not accelerate the Union campaign against Richmond and it costs Union troops in a campaign where it has been made clear to McClellan that he's doing it on a strict manpower budget.

This might be different if the line could be forced very early on, on the 5th or 6th, because of the possibility that Yorktown could be starved out in a month and/or the possibility that better positions for siege guns to operate against Yorktown specifically could have been found with the "Gap" to work with for artillery positions. But by the middle of April the marginal benefit of forcing the Warwick line without taking Yorktown is very minor, so the casualties to be risked in an attempt are consequently minor (cost-benefit analysis).


Had the Confederates abandoned the Warwick line on the 16th, and only held Yorktown, the only way in which that makes the job of advancing on Richmond easier is that the batteries in the Redoubts can't shell the Union siege batteries as they're being emplaced.

 

[DanSBHawk]

In the OR and various papers. It's not a big thing. McClellan had Hamilton fire on Wynn's Mill to prevent troops moving to Dam No. 1 on the 16th. On the 17th Hamilton wrote that the enemy had essentially abandoned Wynn's Mill and he could occupy it with a single brigade. He was wrong, and the recce showed him to be wrong.

However, because it sounds good to some, Hamilton is assumed to be right...

No the recce did not show Hamilton to be wrong. Hamilton did not claim that the position was abandoned entirely. Just that it was drastically weakened.

The flip side is that some assume Hamilton to be wrong simply because they feel it doesn't reflect well on McClellan.