McClellan Re-evaluating George McClellan

[67th Tigers]

It's kind of a shame. I would have chatted much more about Mac if it wasn't for the radioactive stuff in the ground Belfoured mentioned.

Yes, and it's a shame that we can't just play the ball.

As an aside here, I had the impression at times from reading The Young Napoleon that McClellan used politicians as much as they used him. I came away with the impression he was more interested in salvaging his reputation and his pride at times, and politicians helped him on that for their own reasons.

Indeed, he did engage with politicians in late 1861 a lot, as a means to furthering military operations. The major one is, of course, trying to get staffs authorised for divisions etc., and McClellan expended a lot of political capital trying to get the army formed into divisions. Scott, and many others, considered there was no need for formations above brigades.

One thing that struck me about Mac that I didn't know prior to reading the book was that he was such a hard worker who exhausted himself and was often sick… however he seemed incapable of delegating, didn't trust anyone and micromanaged to such an extent. There's sort of an inference that Sears makes that it was because of his distrust in others.

Schoedingers general, so hard working and yet always absent...

McClellan, in fact, delegated a lot. He spent a huge amount of energy in the early months creating systems, and finding men who could get the job done. Indeed, his complaint about the corps wasn't that he didn't want corps, in fact many divisions were already grouped together under senior division commanders, but that they needed to find the right corps commanders. A poor division commander can be easily managed. A bad corps commander is less easy to manage.

 

[Saphroneth]

It should be pointed out that the US army did not have an existing system whereby a single commander could run a large army. Any structure was more-or-less ad hoc. Even the experience of the Mexican-American War didn't really serve very well, because the engaged formations there are quite small - Scott's army in the Mexico City campaign was on the order of 10,000 men in most of the battles, divided into two divisions.


At that size, what you're actually dealing with is four manoeuvre elements (four brigades). The manoeuvre elements are each of a size where a single person can command them without difficulty, and the two divisions are each binary - fundamentally speaking you do not need many good subordinates who can be trusted with independent action, and you might not really need any of them! The army is small enough that deploying the whole thing into a single two-deep line covers about two miles of front. Any amount of depth reduces that a little, and a commander who rides around a lot can issue commands to all the commanders of the manoeuvre elements during the battle; he can certainly address each of them individually while the force deploys, since the whole thing can fit along a single road. (In a column of fours, the infantry is about a mile and a half long.)


The Army of the Potomac in March 1862 consists of 13 field divisions in what would become 1st-5th Corps (discounting the training camp which got turned into a 4th Corps division), each of which is three brigades, plus Sykes' regulars - thus giving about forty manoeuvre elements, averaging larger than Scott's ones (since they average about 3,500 instead of 2,500, numbers rough but the point is that the AoP brigades are bigger).

If deployed in a single two-deep line, this army would cover about thirty miles of front. It's literally a day's effort to get from one end to the other on a horse, and it would occupy twenty miles of road just from the infantry in a column of fours.

This is well past the point at which an army has to march divided, and operate in multiple columns. It's also well past the point at which subordinate commanders need a quite significant staff.


So - what do you do? Well, what McClellan does is to create permanent divisions, and then (over the winter of 1861-2) whenever he has more than one of those divisions move around as a combined force he does so by specifying that (e.g.) the divisions of Heintzelman and Keyes are to operate under Heintzelman's command.

This is not as effective for the same commanders as a formally established corps structure, but it also avoids committing to commanders before you're sure they'll work out.

 

[1SGDan]

Successful leaders need no excuses but now we have 30+ pages of them. Hmmmm, I think there is something wrong here.

 

[Belfoured]

Successful leaders need no excuses but now we have 30+ pages of them. Hmmmm, I think there is something wrong here.

As always, we have (1) the Cult/Fan Club post about the Man Who Never Made a Single Mistake, promptly followed by (2) the Several Paragraphs of Verbal Methane post. Like clockwork. Every time. NL in Vegas.

 

[67th Tigers]

As always, we have (1) the Cult/Fan Club post about the Man Who Never Made a Single Mistake, promptly followed by (2) the Several Paragraphs of Verbal Methane post. Like clockwork. Every time. NL in Vegas.

Ah, an engaging argument!

Have you ever noticed that these threads are few of you and a few others making nothing posts? In fact, in one recent thread ISTR you were close to the majority of posts, and yet never put forward a real argument!

 

[Belfoured]

Ah, an engaging argument!

Have you ever noticed that these threads are few of you and a few others making nothing posts? In fact, in one recent thread ISTR you were close to the majority of posts, and yet never put forward a real argument!

The reliability of your opinion about "nothing posts" is properly measured by your incessant practice of "misleading posts".

And everything with you is "argument" rather than facts. (They're bad arguments, to boot). Which is why you frequently end up not answering challenges to unsupported claims you've made.

 

[TallTallMan]

As an observer I'm fascinated that this finally reached an impasse. I am honored I was here to witness it.

 

[67th Tigers]

The reliability of your opinion about "nothing posts" is properly measured by your incessant practice of "misleading posts".

By "misleading posts" I think you mean "posts that contradict my beliefs."

And everything with you is "argument" rather than facts. (They're bad arguments, to boot). Which is why you frequently end up not answering challenges to unsupported claims you've made.

Oh really?

How about you actually make real counterarguments rather than declaring your beliefs "facts."

How about you defend your declaration about FJ Porter's movements you've continually refused to, for example?

 

[Belfoured]

By "misleading posts" I think you mean "posts that contradict my beliefs."



Oh really?

How about you actually make real counterarguments rather than declaring your beliefs "facts."

How about you defend your declaration about FJ Porter's movements you've continually refused to, for example?

By "misleading posts" I mean posts that are at a minimum distortions and all too often fabrications. By way of only one example from among an endless stream, we have Hamilton being relieved for "disobeying orders". Bereft, as usual, of actual record evidence and common sense.

You continue to live in the world of "arguments"/"counterarguments", which you erroneously conflate with the world of "facts and record evidence". Thanks for confirming that.

 

[TallTallMan]

How did it come to this?

 

[67th Tigers]

How did it come to this?

View attachment 526566

Yep, which is why I keep trying to insist we "play the ball." It's bizarre to watch the "anti-McClellan cult," to borrow Belfoured turn of phrase, act like the defendant in this KITH sketch:

 

[Saphroneth]

In the spirit of considering the substantive points, an important consideration in specific - Yorktown.


There are two distinct fortifications present in the Yorktown area, as of April 5 - those being the Warwick line in general and Yorktown proper. Of these, Yorktown is the important one as it is what closes the York - most (though not all) Confederate strategic goals are served by the existence of Yorktown by itself, and the Warwick line is an ancillary that prevents Yorktown from being surrounded, physically blocks the Union advance (as opposed to logistically blocking it) and presents an opportunity for the Confederates to inflict a defeat on the Union.


If the Warwick line except for Yorktown still existed, but Yorktown were to be deleted (or replaced with a mere defensive line along Yorktown Creek, to prevent a land movement) then the Confederate defences on the Peninsula would be completely compromised - the Union would be able to move up the York river and land large numbers of troops dozens of miles in the rear of Magruder's army.

Conversely, if the Warwick line except for Yorktown were deleted, then the Confederate defences on the Peninsula would still largely be able to prevent a Union advance on Richmond that used the York for supplies (i.e. all possible advances on Richmond, including overland, so long as the Virginia continues to block the James) and would also be able to physically block the Union (at Williamsburg).
The only way in which it would compromise the actual defence of Yorktown for the Warwick line to not exist is that it would potentially make it easier to site batteries to reduce the town, and in addition make it possible to site batteries to cut off Yorktown's resupply - allowing it to, eventually, be starved out.

And it's only once Yorktown falls that it's possible to move up the York. Any force large enough to take Williamsburg - let alone Richmond - is too large to supply itself by any other means.


What this means is that the strategic priority is to take Yorktown. Breaking through the Warwick line elsewhere is not nothing, it's a victory (victories are good for morale) and a useful adjunct if it can be done, but the main reason for this is that it would streamline the taking of Yorktown. However, trying and failing to break through the Warwick line is a net negative, and the negative gets worse the more resources are committed to it (as it results in casualties and harms morale).


This is something that I think is not sufficiently focused upon. Breaking through the Warwick line on April 5 may have gained some time, but not a month; gaining a month is impossible by land means, because Yorktown needs to be reduced. Breaking through the Warwick line on April 16 may not even have gained more than a day or two.

What this means is that McClellan, in not making a full-court attack on the Warwick line in pursuit of a 'maybe', was acting in accordance with the strategic priority. Fundamentally along the Warwick the fortification with strategic weight is Yorktown; the rest of the defences are lesser in strategic importance, and indeed the greatest long term impact they could have on the campaign is if a failed Federal attack costs the Union thousands of casualties.


Note: my point here is that what matters is Yorktown. That is the priority, that is what blocks the Union offensive movement. The rest of the Warwick line does give the Confederates a benefit, but it's a benefit that requires Yorktown being there and it's not vital to the immediate defence of Yorktown.

Criticism of McClellan's actions with respect to the "Siege of Yorktown" should be focused primarily on how those actions did or did not promote or accelerate the taking of Yorktown.

 

[67th Tigers]

Indeed, "breaking the Warwick line" would be prettymuch a nothing burger. Magruder intended, if this happened, to leave a garrison of about 5,000 men in Yorktown and have them hold to the bitter end. Ultimately, the prediction of James Shields that taking Yorktown would take 6 weeks was probably accurate. Oddly, by not breaking the Warwick line and surrounding Yorktown, operations were actually accelerated. The difference being that if Yorktown had been reduced and the garrison captured, that 5,000 prisoners to boast about, and the cost of 2-3 extra weeks, and allowing the rebels to dig in on the Williamsburg line.

 

[67th Tigers]

As Carter's recent book on the Centreville fortifications notes, it's a myth that McClellan was fooled by the Quaker guns at Centreville, because the Quaker guns, for reasons of security, were only deployed when the rebels withdrew.

In fact, the Artillery Reserve, Washington Artillery and the nine brigade batteries encamped at Centreville were more than sufficient to occupy all the works, with 104 guns to 74 firing positions. Some of these positions were left empty during normal occupation, and the batteries rehersed occupation during a "stand to."

 

[Belfoured]

Yep, which is why I keep trying to insist we "play the ball." It's bizarre to watch the "anti-McClellan cult," to borrow Belfoured turn of phrase, act like the defendant in this KITH sketch:

Thanks for this riveting reply. It explains where you got your incisive knowledge of legal issues and process that you've displayed in posts.

 

[67th Tigers]

By "misleading posts" I mean posts that are at a minimum distortions and all too often fabrications. By way of only one example from among an endless stream, we have Hamilton being relieved for "disobeying orders". Bereft, as usual, of actual record evidence and common sense.

Yep. It all started with him disobeying orders, which was compounded by an increasing refusal to "shut up and soldier."

He'd already shown terrible judgement but his days were numbered when kept failing to send in the complete 0700 report, unlike every other division commander in the army, compaining it was impossible (23rd April), and then failed send out the working parties he was ordered, and then complained about it (24th). He kept complaining about it in a series of letters.

He then disputed Porter's authority over him (27th) and finally his general of the trenches for the 28th (Birney) quit his post without being properly relieved, and was not disciplined. At the same time, he writes to McClellan telling him he is going to go over his head to the highest authorities of the government.

Meanwhile, the Chief-of-Staff of 3rd Corps has told Heintzelman that he would compel him to arrest Hamilton. He has been passing all of Hamilton's bluster to Corps directly to GHQ.

At this point McClellan finally has had enough. He asks for the seniority of Hamilton's brigadiers in preparation of relieving Hamilton.

Obviously, Hamilton's incompetance, captiousness, lack of judgement, continual failure to obey lawful orders and finally his inability to discipline his own officers made him a bad officer. His threat to subvert the chain-of-command and go directly to Lincoln was fatal.

"We learn that Gen. HAMILTON does not attempt to explain away anything. He admits the worst that is said against him. He insists that he has done nothing that a good soldier and gentleman might not honorably do." Damning. He admits to his refusal to obey orders and insubordination, but insists he was right to do so.

There is a lot going on with Hamilton. Ultimately, he simply wasn't a good soldier and needed to be gotten rid of. McClellan probably tolerated him for too long.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Yep. It all started with him disobeying orders, which was compounded by an increasing refusal to "shut up and soldier."

He'd already shown terrible judgement but his days were numbered when kept failing to send in the complete 0700 report, unlike every other division commander in the army, compaining it was impossible (23rd April), and then failed send out the working parties he was ordered, and then complained about it (24th). He kept complaining about it in a series of letters.

He then disputed Porter's authority over him (27th) and finally his general of the trenches for the 28th (Birney) quit his post without being properly relieved, and was not disciplined. At the same time, he writes to McClellan telling him he is going to go over his head to the highest authorities of the government.

Meanwhile, the Chief-of-Staff of 3rd Corps has told Heintzelman that he would compel him to arrest Hamilton. He has been passing all of Hamilton's bluster to Corps directly to GHQ.

At this point McClellan finally has had enough. He asks for the seniority of Hamilton's brigadiers in preparation of relieving Hamilton.

Obviously, Hamilton's incompetance, captiousness, lack of judgement, continual failure to obey lawful orders and finally his inability to discipline his own officers made him a bad officer. His threat to subvert the chain-of-command and go directly to Lincoln was fatal.

"We learn that Gen. HAMILTON does not attempt to explain away anything. He admits the worst that is said against him. He insists that he has done nothing that a good soldier and gentleman might not honorably do." Damning. He admits to his refusal to obey orders and insubordination, but insists he was right to do so.

There is a lot going on with Hamilton. Ultimately, he simply wasn't a good soldier and needed to be gotten rid of. McClellan probably tolerated him for too long.

And still no evidence to back up any of this.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Indeed, "breaking the Warwick line" would be prettymuch a nothing burger. Magruder intended, if this happened, to leave a garrison of about 5,000 men in Yorktown and have them hold to the bitter end. Ultimately, the prediction of James Shields that taking Yorktown would take 6 weeks was probably accurate. Oddly, by not breaking the Warwick line and surrounding Yorktown, operations were actually accelerated. The difference being that if Yorktown had been reduced and the garrison captured, that 5,000 prisoners to boast about, and the cost of 2-3 extra weeks, and allowing the rebels to dig in on the Williamsburg line.

Now it's 5000? The number keeps growing for this convenient excuse for not attacking.

 

[67th Tigers]

And still no evidence to back up any of this.

Except the direct statement of Hamilton, and the letters, many of which are accessable, and the diary of Heintzelman. But yes, no evidence if you ignore all the evidence...

 

[67th Tigers]

Now it's 5000? The number keeps growing for this convenient excuse for not attacking.

?

You were previously denying that Magruder would do this, despite him actually ordering it several times. Because you didn't like the idea, you argued that, despite it being Magruder's stated plan and the orders being on file, he never would. Independent will of the enemy etc.

However, 5,000 would be plenty to hold Yorktown against storm. It would require siege works, which would take 4-6 weeks.