Well dear friend, as to the operations around Raymond we have said enough. 50 years from now some ACW goober like us will put in just the right keywords and the algorithm will line up just right, and this discussion will populate his search. He can figure it out for himself.
But I do want to thank you for challenging me as I know from experience that's how I improve. Furthermore, I am always mindful that you've shown an interest in what I am trying to do. Unfortunately, I haven't really been able to say because I wasn't sure myself. In any War College you will inevitably be tasked with a paper analyzing a campaign from the past using modern doctrine. I remember thinking while analyzing Operation HUSKY, the invasion of Sicily, that this method could be done for ACW campaigns. So in my retirement I decided to give it a try. Suffice it to say, it is more easily said than done. So I'm figuring it out as I go. After about a year I finally found the entrance to King Tuts tomb but I still didn't have a map to the riches. That's why I'm grateful to you and
@tony_gunter for being so willing to share your knowledge and challenge me, as it has been a tremendous help in finding the right approach. So while still very imperfect, I'll try to give you some context. You've inquired about understanding the framework from which I approach my research so I will make an attempt at it now:
The product of planning is just that, the plan. It matters not whether it is done by Gen Grant, locked in a stateroom, wreathed in cigar smoke, poring over maps and dispatches or a modern staff of hundreds. The product of planning is the plan. Unfortunately, John Pemberton wasn't very good at that... planning. So that adds an additional layer of difficulty in analyzing his operations. After May 3, Pemberton had exactly two plans, (1) get into position behind the BBR on a line from Warrenton to Hall's Ferry(?) and invite attack. And (2) on May 13, get into line south and east of Edwards Depot and await attack. Everything else he did, in my opinion, was a reaction, not a plan. I've found two descriptions of Pemberton that I feel are accurate:
Dougherty:
View attachment 558421
Basso:
View attachment 558423
BLUF: Pemberton could only do one thing at a time and then only half way.
So that does complicate the understanding of Confederate operations. I solved that by reverse engineering the "plan," such as it was, for Raymond. It is simple enough to understand that a plan begins with initiation and ends with execution. Modern doctrine has a methodology for planning from initiation to execution (expressed as the orders).
View attachment 558428
Obviously, Pemberton did not have access to this knowledge but we can establish that he got to Step 7 and issued orders. From those orders it is possible to scroll back to Step 2, Mission Analysis. One of the primary outputs of Step 2, Mission Analysis, is the commander's intent statement, which I interpret as:
"Position troops at Raymond of sufficient capability to defend the approaches to Jackson and Southern Railroad and if ordered, attack in rear or flank enemy forces attacking friendly forces at Edwards Depot and Big Black River Bridge."
Once it is established what his intent was and the orders he issued in furtherance of that intent, then it becomes fair to examine how well they did at executing that intent. That examination reveals to me that, (1) Gregg deviated from his orders, (2) Gregg permitted the separation of Hoskins' battery from his movement, (3) Adams received conflicting orders which kept him from accomplishing Pemberton's intent, (4) Walker deviated from his orders to move immediately. All of which are contributors to the root causes of Confederate defeat at Raymond. Instead of 4200 men and 9 guns, the Confederates were only able to put into action 2700 men and 3 guns, certainly a big enough delta to influence the outcome.
That's an overview of the approach I'm taking. As I go along I expect I'll be able to add more context but for now that's about the best I can accomplish. I claim no special prescience in my interpretations, I just think using the tools of modern doctrine can add additional fidelity to the study of the campaign, more than the Principles of War can provide.
I do think that Raymond represents a unique chapter in the Inland Campaign for Vicksburg mostly based on how its treated in historiography. As I see it, most authors do well enough examining the entire complex system of the campaign but when it comes to Raymond it just seems to be a hard break in the narrative and then a chapter describing the Battle of Raymond. Almost as a stand alone event, without putting it in its proper place and proper context in the examination of the entire campaign. I think that hard stop in the narrative just to cover the Battle of Raymond prevents us from putting into context the pre and post impacts of Raymond beyond just the change in Grant's thinking. I'm curious if y'all see it that way as well.
Bringing the