Doctrine for Dummies

[JohnG0609]

For sometime I've been using the Siege of Vicksburg forum as a bit of a lab for my experiment; to create a methodology for interpreting ACW operations using the analytic tools from modern doctrine documents and various root cause analysis methodologies.

I've been blessed to receive a first rate professional military education. Which means nothing really, I'm just a guy with a bit of knowledge, enthusiasm for the ACW, and some opinions. And far from a professional planner or strategist or even a practitioner in a meaningful way of the profession of arms (I'm medical). But my education and experience does allow me to frame things differently than an academic or historian.

Over on the Vicksburg forum we've been having a discussion under the heading "Raymond" and "Raymond and Walker's brigade" which led me to create a post today that I think really gets to the essence of what I'm attempting to do, make military doctrine simple and relatable to the academic, historian, or lay person.

So I'm beta testing my post with a larger audience here and I ask for any and all feedback, good, bad, or indifferent of what I've written. I'd be most interested in knowing if it's easily understood and that you don't have to be a War College graduate to grasp modern doctrine concepts. TIA!
__________________________________________________________________________________________

My post on Siege of copied and pasted here:

Your comment started me looking at the artillery available for operations around 05.11-05.13 time frame.

Hoskin's battery, Brookhaven Light artillery, was attached to Gregg's brigade and is present on the April 30 return at PH. It went with the brigade on its move to Jackson. Pemberton, responds to a 05.08 dispatch from Gregg at Brookhaven, "Yes, bring batteries...", obviously implying more than one battery (Hoskins and Bledsoe). But Gregg fought the Battle of Raymond with just one battery (Bledsoe). So where was Hoskins?

I speculate that the purpose of Gregg's dispatch that Pemberton responded to was possibly for some sort of official sanction to allow Hoskin's battery some time at home, considering they were from Brookhaven. Transportation thru-put after Grierson was still slow and I speculate that Gregg may have allowed Hoskins to ship last and granted Hoskins' men a short, unofficial leave to see their families. I speculate that Gregg may have allowed them to proceed by road to Jackson. So now Hoskins' battery would be running 24-36 hours behind the rest of the brigade.

After Gregg had begun his movement to Raymond, J. Adams, on 05.11 stated that there was, "no field battery," present then in Jackson. But by the afternoon of 05.12 two batteries are now accounted for, Hoskins' and Martin's (Walker's battery). Adams sent forward with Walker one battery while, "one battery to arrive in morning." By 05.13 that battery arrived and Adams was, "sending forward one battery- all that is here." Adams confirmed in a second 05.13.63 dispatch that he had, "sent forward from here this morning one battery and a battalion."

Now which of the two batteries, Hoskins' or Matin's, arrived first and went forward first to Gregg's support isn't specified. I speculate that Hoskins' arrived first to Jackson based solely on the seemingly surprise battery that suddenly appeared solo for Adams to order forward with Walker. Martin's battery arriving the next morning (05.13) by railroad with an additional infantry contingent.

Why does any of this matter?

Pemberton had ordered a mission and that mission is expressed doctrinally as Commander's Intent. Commander's Intent is a clear and concise statement of the purpose, desired end state, and key tasks of an operation. For the mission Pemberton had designed his Commander's Intent would be expressed as a statement something similar to:

"Position troops at Raymond of sufficient capability to defend the approaches to Jackson and Southern Railroad and if ordered, attack in rear or flank enemy forces attacking friendly forces at Edwards Depot and Big Black River Bridge."

Then it becomes fair to ask, "How well did the leaders of TF Gregg do in executing this mission?"

In two words, not well.

Obviously, it isn't fair to judge them based on doctrine that didn't exist in 1863, but it is fair to use modern doctrine to explain how things went wrong.

The mnemonic METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time, and Civil Considerations) is a good tool for analyzing the Raymond operation. Focusing just on the Troops, establishing what friendly forces were available to execute this mission. In other words, the Combatant Commander (Pemberton) presents forces to the Task Force Commander (Gregg) to execute the assigned mission.

That would have looked something like this:
Gregg's brigade 2700
Walker's element 1000
Adams' Cavalry 300
Thompson's MI 200(?)

Bledsoe's Battery 3 guns
Hoskins' Battery 4 guns
Adams' howitzers 2 guns
Total: 4200 men and 9 guns

But as we know, Gregg was only able to get his brigade and one 3 gun battery into action. So this is where all these seemingly minor deviations from orders begin to come into play.

If W Adams orders had not been confused by competing command authorities
If Walker had obeyed his orders to move immediately
If Gregg had not allowed Hoskins to move independently (I speculate)
If Gregg had properly provisioned his troops for sustained operations

Then maybe the Battle of Raymond would have turned out differently, at the very least delaying Grant another day, allowing the Confederate reinforcements one more day to get into place at Jackson, thus making the Battle of Jackson a bit more of a contest for Grant.

Using James Reasons "Swiss Cheese Model" of error causation in complex systems, it's easy to see how the holes in the cheese all lined up to create Confederate defeat at Raymond.

This is far from a complete analysis of the operation concluding with the Battle of Raymond. But is a fair representation I think of how things could have been different.

Interested to know what you guys think, feel free to be critical of my analysis or correct any mistakes I may have made.

 

[JohnG0609]

I would like to thank all who participated in the discussion. My mental health thanks you. Been laid up with a slow healing ortho issue and I've learned you can, in fact, get tired of watching Andy Griffith reruns.

After some more sitting with my leg up I'd be interested in some of y'all's thoughts on my notions. My dogs are good listeners but they don't give very much feedback.

 

[Belfoured]

I would like to thank all who participated in the discussion. My mental health thanks you. Been laid up with a slow healing ortho issue and I've learned you can, in fact, get tired of watching Andy Griffith reruns.

I just noticed this thread. In a very simplistic sense I've always found FM 100-5 and then FM 3-0 challenging to correlate to 19th century concepts of tactics/grand tactics/operations. Adding artillery to the mix for the ACW era really complicates things given what was in some expanded sense still the archaic "battalion guns" concept. That was what drove guys like Henry Hunt to push hard for more centralization of field artillery under the control of somebody who actually knew the necessary basics of artillery tactics, etc. As for anything beyond that, such as command and control, communications, etc., "what everybody else said". This has to be better than watching Deputy Fife on a daily basis ...

 

[JohnG0609]

In a very simplistic sense I've always found FM 100-5 and then FM 3-0 challenging to correlate to 19th century concepts of tactics/grand tactics/operations

Yes! It seems intuitive to go to the 3 series operations to analyze operations. But in my answer to James I discovered the same thing. It's very difficult to tease out relative portions of Doctrine for multi domain warfare when analyzing a two domain war. I could never take JP 3-0 and its army derivatives ADP 3-0 and FM 3-0 and apply them to this particular ACW campaign. Admittedly, the Vicksburg campaign is the only one I've attempted this with so that may not hold true with a more traditional ACW campaign like Gettysburg or Chancellorsville. If i can ever get warm and fuzzy about my analysis of Vicksburg I intend to give a more traditional campaign a try. Maybe 3 series operations doctrine will find a home for me there.

The disaggregated and distributed nature of the Vicksburg campaign doesn't fit the operations series model very well.

 

[Belfoured]

Yes! It seems intuitive to go to the 3 series operations to analyze operations. But in my answer to James I discovered the same thing. It's very difficult to tease out relative portions of Doctrine for multi domain warfare when analyzing a two domain war. I could never take JP 3-0 and its army derivatives ADP 3-0 and FM 3-0 and apply them to this particular ACW campaign. Admittedly, the Vicksburg campaign is the only one I've attempted this with so that may not hold true with a more traditional ACW campaign like Gettysburg or Chancellorsville. If i can ever get warm and fuzzy about my analysis of Vicksburg I intend to give a more traditional campaign a try. Maybe 3 series operations doctrine will find a home for me there.

The disaggregated and distributed nature of the Vicksburg campaign doesn't fit the operations series model very well.

Not nearly enough historians do this. One who did was the late Eric Wittenberg. In his excellent study of Buford's decisions and tactics at Gettysburg on July 1 - Devil's to Pay - Eric in Appendix C analyzes those tactics by applying FM 3-90 and FM 34-35 (1990) regarding defense in depth and a covering action. Granted, it's a narrower issue he was assessing but the concept is there.

 

[JohnG0609]

FM 3-90 and FM 34-35 (1990) regarding defense in depth and a covering action. Granted, it's a narrower issue he was assessing but the concept is there.

Thank you for this! Im old and wise enough to know I'm not such a genius that someone else hasn't already thought about it. I'd be curious if you could use a more contemporary version. 1990 was still analog warfare, well the end of analog warfare. GPS and guided munitions being first used. 2025 is digital warfare, the more sensors the better. My point being not only do you need to find the right doctrine, you have to make sure it comports to the era in which you are applying it for research.

 

[Belfoured]

Thank you for this! Im old and wise enough to know I'm not such a genius that someone else hasn't already thought about it. I'd be curious if you could use a more contemporary version. 1990 was still analog warfare, well the end of analog warfare. GPS and guided munitions being first used. 2025 is digital warfare, the more sensors the better. My point being not only do you need to find the right doctrine, you have to make sure it comports to the era in which you are applying it for research.

I agree. I'm only pointing out the rare example of a Civil War historian using modern doctrine to assess Civil War actions. While, for example, FM 34-35 is now obsolete, its "state of the art" date was well over a century after the war ended. Translating 2025 to 1865 is going to be more challenging the more you get beyond very basic principles.

 

[JohnG0609]

I'm only pointing out the rare example of a Civil War historian using modern doctrine to assess Civil War actions.

Oh I got it! That's what I had meant to convey, that I'm not that original, someone had thought of it.

 

[Belfoured]

Oh I got it! That's what I had meant to convey, that I'm not that original, someone had thought of it.

Not many have, however. I'm not sure why, since staff rides, etc are still used. It's a real gap in the books IMHO.

 

[JohnG0609]

It's a real gap

Because it's hard to do! It's my opinion that most of the ACW products that come from CGSC or USAWC students thesis driven. The point is to prove your thesis, not investigate things that might tend to disprove. Academic papers are inherently biased…. The author wants to prove his point.

Then also not many military professionals understand the importance of root cause analysis. I don't know about the other branches but in the USAF, RCA is a core competency. Aircraft accident investigations for sure but also in every USAF mission set. Wouldn't want to skip a step with enough power to destroy the world with a push of a button.

 

[James Brenner]

One thing to remember about staff rides is that they are not intended to refight old battles with modern technology. Instead, they look at the constants of warfare. Some of those constants are fairly obvious: weather, terrain, offense/defense, etc. Leadership is one of those constants.

Are you familiar with Arthur Lykke's strategy model of ends, ways, means and risk? He uses a three legged stool to illustrate the model. It's very insightful. I wonder if leadership and risk management are worthwhile rabbit holes to go down.

 

[tony_gunter]

It is, but the analytic tools available in it are super helpful. As I said in my reply to James, I discovered the product of planning is the plan. No matter if its generated by a staff of hundreds or between John Pemberton's two ears the result is the same, a plan. To illustrate, as it regards to Pemberton specifically and the infamous council of war, that lines up as COA decision brief from JP 5-0, so it is possible to sort of reverse engineer Pemberton's "plan" using the joint planning process and the analytic tools therein.

I am not the guy to ask about tactics. My view so far is that the battles themselves are well described and well understood. Without appearing too morbid, the battle is the plane crash, that is obvious. Now its time for the investigation. It's the things that occurred, or didn't occur, the orders given, how they were understood, and how they were executed that have been my primary focus.

If you read the original post, I thought that for the first time I was able to make sense of what I was trying to get at. Why did Gregg deviate from his orders to take three days rations? Why did Walker take nearly 24 hours and still couldn't get within 4 miles of Raymond? Why was Hoskins' battery not present with its brigade? How did Adams get conflicting orders crossed up?

I've discovered where things go wrong is generally related to technical competence, the blocking and tackling fundamentals that are not well learned or not well obeyed.

Thanks for the great question and keep them coming. I couldn't ask for a better outcome for my post. Challenging questions create sharper knowledge.

You think Raymond is well described and well understood? Oh you sweet summer child.

Raymond was all chaos, and it's very thinly documented so it's difficult to comprehend. Bearss threw his hands up and proclaimed that McPherson threw his troops in piecemeal as they arrived. Grabau knew that explanation didn't fit, but he couldn't understand it either and invented an atmospheric inversion that didn't exist: it was chaotic because nobody could see.

 

[tony_gunter]

Not nearly enough historians do this. One who did was the late Eric Wittenberg. In his excellent study of Buford's decisions and tactics at Gettysburg on July 1 - Devil's to Pay - Eric in Appendix C analyzes those tactics by applying FM 3-90 and FM 34-35 (1990) regarding defense in depth and a covering action. Granted, it's a narrower issue he was assessing but the concept is there.

An FM 3-90 analysis of Raymond would be interesting. Seems like infiltration would be the best fit to describe the encounter: McPherson attempts an infiltration of the Confederate left, the Confederates simultaneously attempt an infiltration on the same side. Hilarity ensues.

 

[Belfoured]

One thing to remember about staff rides is that they are not intended to refight old battles with modern technology. Instead, they look at the constants of warfare. Some of those constants are fairly obvious: weather, terrain, offense/defense, etc. Leadership is one of those constants.

Are you familiar with Arthur Lykke's strategy model of ends, ways, means and risk? He uses a three legged stool to illustrate the model. It's very insightful. I wonder if leadership and risk management are worthwhile rabbit holes to go down.

I agree. The purpose is to use the ride to illustrate core principles that can be translated into modern doctrine. Analyzing historical battles using modern doctrine is a closely related but different purpose. The first is a training exercise. The second is a historical exercise. Some rides drill down to more detail than others.

 

[JohnG0609]

You think Raymond is well described and well understood? Oh you sweet summer child.

ok, ok I surrender. What I had meant to imply was that the "Battle of Raymond," from 1000-1900 May 12 is well described, 23rd Indiana, 7th Texas, 3rd Teen. The tactical component. But hey..... if I'm wrong in thinking that you will surely hear from me when I get to the tactical battle.

What I am most interested in is the operations and operational design, how and why Raymond occurred in the way it did. As you know, there is strategy and there are tactics. Operations are what lives between them both, "the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state."

Raymond was all chaos, and it's very thinly documented so it's difficult to comprehend. Bearss threw his hands up and proclaimed that McPherson threw his troops in piecemeal as they arrived. Grabau knew that explanation didn't fit, but he couldn't understand it either and invented an atmospheric inversion that didn't exist: it was chaotic because nobody could see.

Well if I can ever get through the Confederate operations we will see what we can find!

 

[JohnG0609]

Are you familiar with Arthur Lykke's strategy model of ends, ways, means and risk?

Actually, I am not, or perhaps I just don't recall. Obviously, I understand ends, ways, and means, and risk, just not sure from where I learned it. But I will certainly look at it. Thanks for the pro tip!

Related to ends, ways, and means, I'm always a bit leery about discussing them outside of a military environment because it inevitably leads into military constraints and restraints, which as you know have vastly different meanings for the military than the common definition. I've always had to pay super close attention when examining military constraints and restraints, so easy to confuse.

EDIT: I can say that's my first view of Lykke. Obviously we learned ends, ways, and means but I suppose the 14 year difference in our graduation dates it may have been taken out of the curriculum. But I will certainly read up on it!

 

[JohnG0609]

I agree. The purpose is to use the ride to illustrate core principles that can be translated into modern doctrine. Analyzing historical battles using modern doctrine is a closely related but different purpose. The first is a training exercise. The second is a historical exercise. Some rides drill down to more detail than others.

I agree as well. Again, I'm not a strategist, or planner, heck I'm not even combat arms, so staff rides to me personally, is being able to see, touch and feel what it must have been like and the challenges they faced bringing sufficient combat power to the right place at the right time.

 

[James Brenner]

I am not well versed on the Vicksburg campaign, so I am not sure if this will be helpful; particularly since I am drawing on memory which means that I can recall things that never happened.

Anyway, if there was any doctrine worthy of the name in the pre-war army, it was on defensive considerations; either on the seacoast or in forts to protect the westward movement. Mahan's, Out-Post was extremely influential at West Point with its emphasis on fortifications. For those officers who were with Scott in Mexico, they learned from him that a turning movement was much better than a frontal attack. Not only would it save lives, it would avoid the enemy's strength, and possibly could lead to the annihilation of an army, much like what Napoleon did at Austerlitz.

Grant, before Vicksburg, tried a series of Scott-like turning movements at Raymond, Port Gibson and elsewhere that avoided frontal assaults. They were successful as he minimized his casualties and ultimately trapped Pemberton at Vicksburg.

I mentioned leadership in a previous post as a possible theme to help make sense of the operation. Maybe followership would be more helpful.

 

[wausaubob]

Absolutely correct. Which leads into another question-

Has the military culture changed?

We seem to see a lot of instances of commanders "suggesting" orders. "If practicable"….."upon your judgement", etc.

Pretty certain this type of ambiguity is strongly discouraged when training today's leaders.

Maybe for a different thread….. But was the sometime absence of direct, concise orders a byproduct of a 19th century gentleman's code? Or perhaps due to the understanding that communication is slow- and a subordinate may need a free hand to react to the situation as it is presented? Maybe a bit of both?

I think the last suggestion should be given the most weight, given the communications of that time.

 

[wausaubob]

Fascinating, if a bit heavy on the jargon. What did you conclude about the federal side at Raymond?

 

[JohnG0609]

if there was any doctrine worthy of the name in the pre-war army,

paraphrasing Grant after reading two chapters of Hardee's tactics and putting it down, "its common sense."