JohnG0609
Corporal
- Joined
- Jan 27, 2025
- Location
- Mississippi
For sometime I've been using the Siege of Vicksburg forum as a bit of a lab for my experiment; to create a methodology for interpreting ACW operations using the analytic tools from modern doctrine documents and various root cause analysis methodologies.
I've been blessed to receive a first rate professional military education. Which means nothing really, I'm just a guy with a bit of knowledge, enthusiasm for the ACW, and some opinions. And far from a professional planner or strategist or even a practitioner in a meaningful way of the profession of arms (I'm medical). But my education and experience does allow me to frame things differently than an academic or historian.
Over on the Vicksburg forum we've been having a discussion under the heading "Raymond" and "Raymond and Walker's brigade" which led me to create a post today that I think really gets to the essence of what I'm attempting to do, make military doctrine simple and relatable to the academic, historian, or lay person.
So I'm beta testing my post with a larger audience here and I ask for any and all feedback, good, bad, or indifferent of what I've written. I'd be most interested in knowing if it's easily understood and that you don't have to be a War College graduate to grasp modern doctrine concepts. TIA!
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My post on Siege of copied and pasted here:
Your comment started me looking at the artillery available for operations around 05.11-05.13 time frame.
Hoskin's battery, Brookhaven Light artillery, was attached to Gregg's brigade and is present on the April 30 return at PH. It went with the brigade on its move to Jackson. Pemberton, responds to a 05.08 dispatch from Gregg at Brookhaven, "Yes, bring batteries...", obviously implying more than one battery (Hoskins and Bledsoe). But Gregg fought the Battle of Raymond with just one battery (Bledsoe). So where was Hoskins?
I speculate that the purpose of Gregg's dispatch that Pemberton responded to was possibly for some sort of official sanction to allow Hoskin's battery some time at home, considering they were from Brookhaven. Transportation thru-put after Grierson was still slow and I speculate that Gregg may have allowed Hoskins to ship last and granted Hoskins' men a short, unofficial leave to see their families. I speculate that Gregg may have allowed them to proceed by road to Jackson. So now Hoskins' battery would be running 24-36 hours behind the rest of the brigade.
After Gregg had begun his movement to Raymond, J. Adams, on 05.11 stated that there was, "no field battery," present then in Jackson. But by the afternoon of 05.12 two batteries are now accounted for, Hoskins' and Martin's (Walker's battery). Adams sent forward with Walker one battery while, "one battery to arrive in morning." By 05.13 that battery arrived and Adams was, "sending forward one battery- all that is here." Adams confirmed in a second 05.13.63 dispatch that he had, "sent forward from here this morning one battery and a battalion."
Now which of the two batteries, Hoskins' or Matin's, arrived first and went forward first to Gregg's support isn't specified. I speculate that Hoskins' arrived first to Jackson based solely on the seemingly surprise battery that suddenly appeared solo for Adams to order forward with Walker. Martin's battery arriving the next morning (05.13) by railroad with an additional infantry contingent.
Why does any of this matter?
Pemberton had ordered a mission and that mission is expressed doctrinally as Commander's Intent. Commander's Intent is a clear and concise statement of the purpose, desired end state, and key tasks of an operation. For the mission Pemberton had designed his Commander's Intent would be expressed as a statement something similar to:
"Position troops at Raymond of sufficient capability to defend the approaches to Jackson and Southern Railroad and if ordered, attack in rear or flank enemy forces attacking friendly forces at Edwards Depot and Big Black River Bridge."
Then it becomes fair to ask, "How well did the leaders of TF Gregg do in executing this mission?"
In two words, not well.
Obviously, it isn't fair to judge them based on doctrine that didn't exist in 1863, but it is fair to use modern doctrine to explain how things went wrong.
The mnemonic METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time, and Civil Considerations) is a good tool for analyzing the Raymond operation. Focusing just on the Troops, establishing what friendly forces were available to execute this mission. In other words, the Combatant Commander (Pemberton) presents forces to the Task Force Commander (Gregg) to execute the assigned mission.
That would have looked something like this:
Gregg's brigade 2700
Walker's element 1000
Adams' Cavalry 300
Thompson's MI 200(?)
Bledsoe's Battery 3 guns
Hoskins' Battery 4 guns
Adams' howitzers 2 guns
Total: 4200 men and 9 guns
But as we know, Gregg was only able to get his brigade and one 3 gun battery into action. So this is where all these seemingly minor deviations from orders begin to come into play.
If W Adams orders had not been confused by competing command authorities
If Walker had obeyed his orders to move immediately
If Gregg had not allowed Hoskins to move independently (I speculate)
If Gregg had properly provisioned his troops for sustained operations
Then maybe the Battle of Raymond would have turned out differently, at the very least delaying Grant another day, allowing the Confederate reinforcements one more day to get into place at Jackson, thus making the Battle of Jackson a bit more of a contest for Grant.
Using James Reasons "Swiss Cheese Model" of error causation in complex systems, it's easy to see how the holes in the cheese all lined up to create Confederate defeat at Raymond.
This is far from a complete analysis of the operation concluding with the Battle of Raymond. But is a fair representation I think of how things could have been different.
Interested to know what you guys think, feel free to be critical of my analysis or correct any mistakes I may have made.
I've been blessed to receive a first rate professional military education. Which means nothing really, I'm just a guy with a bit of knowledge, enthusiasm for the ACW, and some opinions. And far from a professional planner or strategist or even a practitioner in a meaningful way of the profession of arms (I'm medical). But my education and experience does allow me to frame things differently than an academic or historian.
Over on the Vicksburg forum we've been having a discussion under the heading "Raymond" and "Raymond and Walker's brigade" which led me to create a post today that I think really gets to the essence of what I'm attempting to do, make military doctrine simple and relatable to the academic, historian, or lay person.
So I'm beta testing my post with a larger audience here and I ask for any and all feedback, good, bad, or indifferent of what I've written. I'd be most interested in knowing if it's easily understood and that you don't have to be a War College graduate to grasp modern doctrine concepts. TIA!
__________________________________________________________________________________________
My post on Siege of copied and pasted here:
Your comment started me looking at the artillery available for operations around 05.11-05.13 time frame.
Hoskin's battery, Brookhaven Light artillery, was attached to Gregg's brigade and is present on the April 30 return at PH. It went with the brigade on its move to Jackson. Pemberton, responds to a 05.08 dispatch from Gregg at Brookhaven, "Yes, bring batteries...", obviously implying more than one battery (Hoskins and Bledsoe). But Gregg fought the Battle of Raymond with just one battery (Bledsoe). So where was Hoskins?
I speculate that the purpose of Gregg's dispatch that Pemberton responded to was possibly for some sort of official sanction to allow Hoskin's battery some time at home, considering they were from Brookhaven. Transportation thru-put after Grierson was still slow and I speculate that Gregg may have allowed Hoskins to ship last and granted Hoskins' men a short, unofficial leave to see their families. I speculate that Gregg may have allowed them to proceed by road to Jackson. So now Hoskins' battery would be running 24-36 hours behind the rest of the brigade.
After Gregg had begun his movement to Raymond, J. Adams, on 05.11 stated that there was, "no field battery," present then in Jackson. But by the afternoon of 05.12 two batteries are now accounted for, Hoskins' and Martin's (Walker's battery). Adams sent forward with Walker one battery while, "one battery to arrive in morning." By 05.13 that battery arrived and Adams was, "sending forward one battery- all that is here." Adams confirmed in a second 05.13.63 dispatch that he had, "sent forward from here this morning one battery and a battalion."
Now which of the two batteries, Hoskins' or Matin's, arrived first and went forward first to Gregg's support isn't specified. I speculate that Hoskins' arrived first to Jackson based solely on the seemingly surprise battery that suddenly appeared solo for Adams to order forward with Walker. Martin's battery arriving the next morning (05.13) by railroad with an additional infantry contingent.
Why does any of this matter?
Pemberton had ordered a mission and that mission is expressed doctrinally as Commander's Intent. Commander's Intent is a clear and concise statement of the purpose, desired end state, and key tasks of an operation. For the mission Pemberton had designed his Commander's Intent would be expressed as a statement something similar to:
"Position troops at Raymond of sufficient capability to defend the approaches to Jackson and Southern Railroad and if ordered, attack in rear or flank enemy forces attacking friendly forces at Edwards Depot and Big Black River Bridge."
Then it becomes fair to ask, "How well did the leaders of TF Gregg do in executing this mission?"
In two words, not well.
Obviously, it isn't fair to judge them based on doctrine that didn't exist in 1863, but it is fair to use modern doctrine to explain how things went wrong.
The mnemonic METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time, and Civil Considerations) is a good tool for analyzing the Raymond operation. Focusing just on the Troops, establishing what friendly forces were available to execute this mission. In other words, the Combatant Commander (Pemberton) presents forces to the Task Force Commander (Gregg) to execute the assigned mission.
That would have looked something like this:
Gregg's brigade 2700
Walker's element 1000
Adams' Cavalry 300
Thompson's MI 200(?)
Bledsoe's Battery 3 guns
Hoskins' Battery 4 guns
Adams' howitzers 2 guns
Total: 4200 men and 9 guns
But as we know, Gregg was only able to get his brigade and one 3 gun battery into action. So this is where all these seemingly minor deviations from orders begin to come into play.
If W Adams orders had not been confused by competing command authorities
If Walker had obeyed his orders to move immediately
If Gregg had not allowed Hoskins to move independently (I speculate)
If Gregg had properly provisioned his troops for sustained operations
Then maybe the Battle of Raymond would have turned out differently, at the very least delaying Grant another day, allowing the Confederate reinforcements one more day to get into place at Jackson, thus making the Battle of Jackson a bit more of a contest for Grant.
Using James Reasons "Swiss Cheese Model" of error causation in complex systems, it's easy to see how the holes in the cheese all lined up to create Confederate defeat at Raymond.
This is far from a complete analysis of the operation concluding with the Battle of Raymond. But is a fair representation I think of how things could have been different.
Interested to know what you guys think, feel free to be critical of my analysis or correct any mistakes I may have made.
Bringing the