Raymond and Walker's brigade

[JohnG0609]

On 05.11 Pemberton telegraphed BG Adams in Jackson. Presume for the sake of argument this telegraph was received at 1700L:

Essentially the same orders given to Gregg. Adams replied forthwith:

Pemberton then immediately telegraphs Walker, presumably by 1900L:

Walker had peremptory orders to move "immediately", as opposed to Gregg's order 24 hours earlier to move "promptly."

But..... On 5.12, Gregg sent a courier to Pettus at about the time he began his withdrawal from the field at approximately 1700L. Gregg reports Walker only "within 4 miles," of him.

Any ideas why it took Walker, a West Pointer no less, and Thompson approximately 24 hours to not even get to Raymond? When Gregg covered the same route plus 4 miles in 12 hours just the day before.

 

[tony_gunter]

On 05.11 Pemberton telegraphed BG Adams in Jackson. Presume for the sake of argument this telegraph was received at 1700L:

View attachment 558009

Essentially the same orders given to Gregg. Adams replied forthwith:

View attachment 558010

Pemberton then immediately telegraphs Walker, presumably by 1900L:

View attachment 558011

Walker had peremptory orders to move "immediately", as opposed to Gregg's order 24 hours earlier to move "promptly."

But..... On 5.12, Gregg sent a courier to Pettus at about the time he began his withdrawal from the field at approximately 1700L. Gregg reports Walker only "within 4 miles," of him.



View attachment 558012


Any ideas why it took Walker, a West Pointer no less, and Thompson approximately 24 hours to not even get to Raymond? When Gregg covered the same route plus 4 miles in 12 hours just the day before.

Plus 2 miles. Gregg fought 2 miles outside Raymond, so that seems to put Walker at Snake Creek. Although, Gregg did start 2 miles northeast of Jackson in present day Belhaven so I guess it's plus four miles total.

So Walker traveled 15 miles. Maybe it's because they're garrison troops with plenty of straggling? Also, sounds like the battery they carried with them had not yet arrived, they may have waited for the battery?

Also, Gregg arriving at 5 pm sounds a little early. They marched almost 20 miles total, and when they arrived soldiers "dropped to sleep where they stood." Sunset was at 6:44 pm, so maybe 6-7?

 

[tony_gunter]

On 05.11 Pemberton telegraphed BG Adams in Jackson. Presume for the sake of argument this telegraph was received at 1700L:

View attachment 558009

Essentially the same orders given to Gregg. Adams replied forthwith:

View attachment 558010

Pemberton then immediately telegraphs Walker, presumably by 1900L:

View attachment 558011

Walker had peremptory orders to move "immediately", as opposed to Gregg's order 24 hours earlier to move "promptly."

But..... On 5.12, Gregg sent a courier to Pettus at about the time he began his withdrawal from the field at approximately 1700L. Gregg reports Walker only "within 4 miles," of him.



View attachment 558012


Any ideas why it took Walker, a West Pointer no less, and Thompson approximately 24 hours to not even get to Raymond? When Gregg covered the same route plus 4 miles in 12 hours just the day before.

Oh, look at that. It's because they cooked two days' rations before they moved.

This text claimed they only made it to Mississippi Springs, but started marching before noon from the same camp that Gregg vacated previously. So … 15 miles in 6(?) hours? That's pretty impressive marching.

 

[JohnG0609]

Maybe it's because they're garrison troops with plenty of straggling?

They were indeed and terrible marchers. The story of the reinforcements from Beauregard is an awesome one! They had not even been brigaded together until the movement order. They went AWOL by the hundreds, two men were decapitated while standing up going through a low overpass. And I was fully prepared to lay it off on their poor readiness until your incredible find in your follow on post. And oh, Walker was "eccentric" to say the least

Gregg arriving at 5 pm sounds a little early.

Per Gregg's report:

 

[JohnG0609]

Oh, look at that.

And look at it I did..... I'm astonished! What a great find. It is going to be a pleasure to take this child's report and "run the numbers" so to speak. But at first glance: Walker was in Jackson on 05.10 but apparently unknown to Pemberton which means Walker could have marched with Gregg and his 1,000 men could have been, should have been on the line of Fourteen Mile Creek. Is that how you see it?

 

[tony_gunter]

And look at it I did..... I'm astonished! What a great find. It is going to be a pleasure to take this child's report and "run the numbers" so to speak. But at first glance: Walker was in Jackson on 05.10 but apparently unknown to Pemberton which means Walker could have marched with Gregg and his 1,000 men could have been, should have been on the line of Fourteen Mile Creek. Is that how you see it?

Yeah, I was shocked by that. Might need corroboration for that one?

But at some point their battery arrived, so maybe they were awaiting that and John Adams thought that was reasonable?

 

[JohnG0609]

Might need corroboration for that one?

Yes that's what I'm going for. Make sure the young man's story timeline matches up to what we do know already and then look to corroborate it.

 

[JohnG0609]

I worked up what I think is a reasonable timeline taken from the young man's statements.

05.11 1900-2300 Order issued.
05.12 0300 Long roll sounded
1100 Move commenced
17 mile distance
~1800 Halt/drop knapsacks - 8 miles
~2200 Arrive Miss Springs - 4 miles
5 miles short of destination

Lacking any other corroboration, it does seem at least his account is perfectly reasonable.

Can only speculate as to why Walker deviated from his order to move immediately. Or how his unit made it Jackson without Pemberton's apparent knowledge. As it seems Pemberton thought Gist had arrived and not Walker. Strange.

IIRC Gregg's retreat only moved about 1.5 miles beyond Raymond on the Jackson road on the night of 05.12. So he would not have joined Walker at Miss Springs until 05.13.

Sound about right?

 

[alan polk]

Which route do you think they took? Modern- day Raymond-Jackson Road? Or did they go via Clinton and then cut across on modern-day Springridge Road?

 

[JohnG0609]

Which route do you think they took?

Well I had supposed the more direct Raymond-Jackson road, but I can't rule out the Clinton route. Do you have any Info that specifies the route?

I'm more astonished that it seems Walker deviated from his order to move immediately. Had he done so there is every reason to believe he would have been along side Gregg at Fourteen Mile Creek. The word Derelict comes to mind.

 

[alan polk]

I do not have any specific knowledge but have always assumed he took the Raymond-Jackson Road because of the location of Mississippi Springs.

However, it appears Gregg left Jackson on the direct Clinton road instead of the Jackson-Raymond Road, and I've always assumed by that that Greg's task force then travelled the Clinton-Raymond Road into Raymond. But I have no clear basis for that except I do know Gregg (or at least a portion) passed through Clinton on their way to Raymond.

If all this is so, then I wonder why Walker used a different route. Was it designed as a way to arrive in Raymond on Gregg's flank or something?—or did he receive word of Gregg's possible retreat toward MS Springs and then deviated from Clinton to reach MS. Springs?

I have never looked deeply into Walker's move so am not sure, but is interesting and might need to be factored in as concerns your timeline.

Also, I find it interesting that in the article the boy mentions dropping knapsacks in a building while on the march but before moving to Ms. Springs. Very odd. If Walker came direct on Jackson-Raymond Road, that kind of sounds like the Forest Hill area. But that's me just spitballing….

 

[JohnG0609]

But at some point their battery arrived

IIRC Hoskin's Brookhaven Light Artillery was unattached and I think in Jackson. They appear on Gregg's April return while at Port Hudson but seemingly fall off (at least to my knowledge) until they reappear in the fight at Battle of Jackson. Why they hadn't been ordered to Raymond seems a bit strange.

 

[JohnG0609]

I do know Gregg (or at least a portion) passed through Clinton on their way to Raymond.

I wasn't aware of this. Do you know what units were on this route?

I thought Forest Hill as well.

 

[alan polk]

I wasn't aware of this. Do you know what units were on this route?

I thought Forest Hill as well.

I got that information from a 1908 newspaper article where the author recalls that Col. Farrquarson's 41st Tennessee stopped briefly at Greenwood Plantation in Clinton (this site is marked today on the Natchez Trace). According to the recollection, the 41st Tennessee was on its way to "join" Gregg in Raymond. That is why I said at least a "portion." I've just assumed that, if the article is correct, that Gregg's men might've used the same route.

 

[JohnG0609]

I got that information from a 1908 newspaper article where the author recalls that Col. Farrquarson's 41st Tennessee stopped briefly at Greenwood Plantation in Clinton (this site is marked today on the Natchez Trace). According to the recollection, the 41st Tennessee was on its way to "join" Gregg in Raymond. That is why I said at least a "portion." I've just assumed that, if the article is correct, that Gregg's men might've used the same route.

Do you recall the entire regiment or maybe just a foraging party?

 

[alan polk]

Do you recall the entire regiment or maybe just a foraging party?

Actually, I don't recall the article being specific about the "regiment" or not.. I'll try to see if I can find it. I can just say that it mentioned Farrquarson and his soldiers. If I recall correctly, it also mentioned that Farrquarson's wife was accompanying him. But the thrust of the account was about how Mrs. Mead's (the owner of Greenwood) fifteen-year old son had heard Farrquarson's soldiers talking about fighting the Yankees very soon and so the boy, unbeknownst to his mother, grabbed his hunting musket and ran away with the soldiers —claiming to have subsequently taken part in the Battle of Raymond.

 

[JohnG0609]

Actually, I don't recall the article being specific about the "regiment" or not.. I'll try to see if I can find it. I can just say that it mentioned Farrquarson and his soldiers. If I recall correctly, it also mentioned that Farrquarson's wife was accompanying him. But the thrust of the account was about how Mrs. Mead's (the owner of Greenwood) fifteen-year old son had heard Farrquarson's soldiers talking about fighting the Yankees very soon and so the boy, unbeknownst to his mother, grabbed his hunting musket and ran away with the soldiers —claiming to have subsequently taken part in the Battle of Raymond.

Yeah I'd love to read that!

 

[alan polk]

Yeah I'd love to read that!

 

[JohnG0609]

But at some point their battery arrived

Your comment started me looking at the artillery available for operations around 05.11-05.13 time frame.

Hoskin's battery, Brookhaven Light artillery, was attached to Gregg's brigade and is present on the April 30 return at PH. It went with the brigade on its move to Jackson. Pemberton, responds to a 05.08 dispatch from Gregg at Brookhaven, "Yes, bring batteries...", obviously implying more than one battery (Hoskins and Bledsoe). But Gregg fought the Battle of Raymond with just one battery (Bledsoe). So where was Hoskins?

I speculate that the purpose of Gregg's dispatch that Pemberton responded to was possibly for some sort of official sanction to allow Hoskin's battery some time at home, considering they were from Brookhaven. Transportation thru-put after Grierson was still slow and I speculate that Gregg may have allowed Hoskins to ship last and granted Hoskins' men a short, unofficial leave to see their families. I speculate that Gregg may have allowed them to proceed by road to Jackson. So now Hoskins' battery would be running 24-36 hours behind the rest of the brigade.

After Gregg had begun his movement to Raymond, J. Adams, on 05.11 stated that there was, "no field battery," present then in Jackson. But by the afternoon of 05.12 two batteries are now accounted for, Hoskins' and Martin's (Walker's battery). Adams sent forward with Walker one battery while, "one battery to arrive in morning." By 05.13 that battery arrived and Adams was, "sending forward one battery- all that is here." Adams confirmed in a second 05.13.63 dispatch that he had, "sent forward from here this morning one battery and a battalion."

Now which of the two batteries, Hoskins' or Matin's, arrived first and went forward first to Gregg's support isn't specified. I speculate that Hoskins' arrived first to Jackson based solely on the seemingly surprise battery that suddenly appeared solo for Adams to order forward with Walker. Martin's battery arriving the next morning (05.13) by railroad with an additional infantry contingent.

Why does any of this matter?

Pemberton had ordered a mission and that mission is expressed doctrinally as Commander's Intent. Commander's Intent is a clear and concise statement of the purpose, desired end state, and key tasks of an operation. For the mission Pemberton had designed his Commander's Intent would be expressed as a statement something similar to:

"Position troops at Raymond of sufficient capability to defend the approaches to Jackson and Southern Railroad and if ordered, attack in rear or flank enemy forces attacking friendly forces at Edwards Depot and Big Black River Bridge."

Then it becomes fair to ask, "How well did the leaders of TF Gregg do in executing this mission?"

In two words, not well.

Obviously, it isn't fair to judge them based on doctrine that didn't exist in 1863, but it is fair to use modern doctrine to explain how things went wrong.

The mnemonic METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time, and Civil Considerations) is a good tool for analyzing the Raymond operation. Focusing just on the Troops, establishing what friendly forces were available to execute this mission. In other words, the Combatant Commander (Pemberton) presents forces to the Task Force Commander (Gregg) to execute the assigned mission.

That would have looked something like this:
Gregg's brigade 2700
Walker's element 1000
Adams' Cavalry 300
Thompson's MI 200(?)

Bledsoe's Battery 3 guns
Hoskins' Battery 4 guns
Adams' howitzers 2 guns
Total: 4200 men and 9 guns

But as we know, Gregg was only able to get his brigade and one 3 gun battery into action. So this is where all these seemingly minor deviations from orders begin to come into play.

If W Adams orders had not been confused by competing command authorities
If Walker had obeyed his orders to move immediately
If Gregg had not allowed Hoskins to move independently (I speculate)
If Gregg had properly provisioned his troops for sustained operations

Then maybe the Battle of Raymond would have turned out differently, at the very least delaying Grant another day, allowing the Confederate reinforcements one more day to get into place at Jackson, thus making the Battle of Jackson a bit more of a contest for Grant.

Using James Reasons "Swiss Cheese Model" of error causation in complex systems, it's easy to see how the holes in the cheese all lined up to create Confederate defeat at Raymond.

This is far from a complete analysis of the operation concluding with the Battle of Raymond. But is a fair representation I think of how things could have been different.

Interested to know what you guys think, feel free to be critical of my analysis or correct any mistakes I may have made.


*I'm laid up, off my feet after a small ortho procedure so I got nothing better to do than annoy people on CWT with my TED Talks.

John

 

[tony_gunter]

If W Adams orders had not been confused by competing command authorities

I'm not sure this is phrased correctly. Yes, there were competing authorities on May 10th. Pemberton resolved them on May 11th, giving Adams full discretion to watch all of the approaches to Edwards and Raymond.

Adams consolidated 800 men and pushed forward on the Old Port Gibson Road, uncovering Sherman's corps, while leaving a single squadron in Raymond.

I think this if affects all the others: IF Adams had split his cavalry between the Old Port Gibson Road and Utica Road.

He certainly would have uncovered McPherson's men marching up the Utica Road to Raymond and warned Pemberton. Gregg would have deployed for a delaying engagement.