Move on Dillon's (again)

[JohnG0609]

On 5/13 Pemberton ordered Loring to perform a reconnaissance to "to find out where the main force" of the enemy was. That's bad enough of an admission, on its own, that Pemberton was not competent. How do you lose a whole **** enemy army in your own back yard?

Loring conducted the reconnaissance and reported that the enemy had moved beyond Edward's Depot, on the Raymond road and by 8pm Loring reported that the enemy was marching on Jackson and that he thinks, "there can be no doubt of this."

On 5/14 Johnston reported enemy in Clinton, 4 divisions, and Adams reported that the enemy had at 0300 made a demonstration upon Bolton.

On 5/15 Loring reported that his scouts had reported in and that on 05/13 and 05/14 had observed the enemy had moved to Raymond and that Smith's division, who they had been watching at Baldwin's Ferry, had moved back in the direction of Raymond via Dillon's. I conclude that Smith would have been well beyond Dillon's when Pemberton ordered the march on Dillon's to begin at 0800, 05.15. Loring went even further and stated he believed that only two regiments would be currently "at or about Dillon's," on the 15th.

In the face of this intelligence, the order to move to Dillon's was at least 24 hours late on the 15th and certainly that late by the morning of the 16th.

I can see no military reason to have issued this order. The intel speaks for itself. It defies even common logic, much less military logic. In "Compelled..." Pemberton unintentionally admitted that the order to move on Dillon's was based in uncertainty by saying he "had hoped to encounter..." the enemy (pp 114)

Why would Pemberton persist in this delusion and make this order when the intelligence is so clear?

 

[JohnG0609]

On 5/13 Pemberton ordered Loring to perform a reconnaissance to "to find out where the main force" of the enemy was. That's bad enough of an admission, on its own, that Pemberton was not competent. How do you lose a whole **** enemy army in your own back yard?

Loring conducted the reconnaissance and reported that the enemy had moved beyond Edward's Depot, on the Raymond road and by 8pm Loring reported that the enemy was marching on Jackson and that he thinks, "there can be no doubt of this."

On 5/14 Johnston reported enemy in Clinton, 4 divisions, and Adams reported that the enemy had at 0300 made a demonstration upon Bolton.

On 5/15 Loring reported that his scouts had reported in and that on 05/13 and 05/14 had observed the enemy had moved to Raymond and that Smith's division, who they had been watching at Baldwin's Ferry, had moved back in the direction of Raymond via Dillon's. I conclude that Smith would have been well beyond Dillon's when Pemberton ordered the march on Dillon's to begin at 0800, 05.15. Loring went even further and stated he believed that only two regiments would be currently "at or about Dillon's," on the 15th.

In the face of this intelligence, the order to move to Dillon's was at least 24 hours late on the 15th and certainly that late by the morning of the 16th.

I can see no military reason to have issued this order. The intel speaks for itself. It defies even common logic, much less military logic. In "Compelled..." Pemberton unintentionally admitted that the order to move on Dillon's was based in uncertainty by saying he "had hoped to encounter..." the enemy (pp 114)

Why would Pemberton persist in this delusion and make this order when the intelligence is so clear?

View attachment 559178

attachment keeps getting stripped so I place it here

Ok. Guess I'm not. Attachment keeps stripping off

 

[RedRover]

The above notes that on the 13th, Pemberton intended to fall on Grant's line of communications should they be moving upon Jackson...

Johnston arrived that evening at Jackson and found some of Grant's forces were indeed between him at Jackson and Pemberton at Edwards Depot. Johnston desired Pemberton to move toward Clinton, if practicable, to press upon the rear of that column of Grant's army as it moved on Jackson, and that he might move to support the battle. Pemberton received this on the morning of the 14th.

Pemberton, did not think it practicable to abide by attacking, and held his council of war; HE STUCK TO THE IDEA/PLAN OF CUTTING GRANT'S LINE OF COMMUNICATION, as if to halt the movement rather than chasing it. Pemberton ultimately decided that to do so, he must move to Dillon's, through which Grant's forces had already passed, and take that position to force Grant to turn back and attack him to clear it.

Pemberton appears to have taken to heart some of the ideas of the times. As Baron Jomini had observed in his "Art of War" strategy demanded cutting an enemy's line of communications BEFORE attacking his rear...

Where Pemberton apparently erred, initially, was that he was unaware that Grant had no particular "line of communications" to cut. Figured it out too late. And Grant fell upon HIS REAR when moving back upon Edwards'...

Historian John Fiske put this rather simply:

It was generally pronounced that Grant presumed the Confederates might divide their strength to move upon his "line of communications" so he labored to render any such movement to his advantage by divesting of one.

Pemberton's claim seems to have been that disastrous as these movements proved, they would have been worse had he not abided what he considered correct military principles... even where misapplied.

Gen. Johnston observed that by the afternoon of the 14th, he had dispatched more direct notices to Pemberton of the importance of their closing the distance between their two forces.
Among them was a notice that barring a union of their forces, he was laboring to prevent Grant from deriving supplies from the eastward of Jackson... to perhaps force him to rely upon a line of communications from the Mississippi River that Pemberton might cut...

But that these did not reach Pemberton until after the Battle at Champion's Hill... and while Pemberton was retreating, away from Johnston.

"Narrative of Military Operations," 178.

 

[JohnG0609]

The above notes that on the 13th, Pemberton intended to fall on Grant's line of communications should they be moving upon Jackson...

That's a great response, well thought out, and I appreciate it. But it doesn't refute my assertion that in the face of the intelligence, then anywhere from 24-48 hours old, a move to Dillon's was militarily unwise, impropietous by even ACW doctrinal standards, and derelict in the extreme. That there is no military reason for the move, thus the reason for the move must lay elsewhere. I assert it was due to extreme dysfunction among the Confederate commanders.

I am very interested in how you would interpret the intelligence received by Pemberton et al.

 

[RedRover]

That's a great response, well thought out, and I appreciate it. But it doesn't refute my assertion that in the face of the intelligence, then anywhere from 24-48 hours old, a move to Dillon's was militarily unwise, impropietous by even ACW doctrinal standards, and derelict in the extreme. That there is no military reason for the move, thus the reason for the move must lay elsewhere. I assert it was due to extreme dysfunction among the Confederate commanders.

I am very interested in how you would interpret the intelligence received by Pemberton et al.

I think per the doctrines of the era (as exemplified by Jomini, etc.), Pemberton's intent was, as he described, to fall upon Grant's line of communications, BEFORE attacking his rear. So as to cause Grant to halt his movements toward Jackson, etc., and turn back upon him.

Loring reported that the federals were indeed pressing upon Jackson, that THEY HAD passed through Dillon's, and so Pemberton figured that occupying that point in strength would cut their line of communications.

Maybe it would have worked if Grant had a line of communications. Which he didn't particularly, having followed much of the example of Gen. Scott in Mexico (Where Grant was a young quartermaster and commissary).

So even had Pemberton reached Dillon's in strength, or moved to any point to merely cut Grant's communications with the Mississippi, he just placed himself out of the game chasing a shadow, as Grant wasn't concerned about that particularly.

Johnston's ideas, of May 14, being apparently that it was first necessary to FORCE Grant to ESTABLISH a line of communications; that if Pemberton came nearer him, and advanced upon the rear of Grant's forces, in an attack, while Johnston blocked Grant's ability to derive supplies from the countryside east of Jackson, and sent reinforcement to Pemberton, then Grant would have had to concentrate his forces... and in the face of the more or less united Confederate forces could not forage... and would have had to establish and keep open a line of communication to the Mississippi for face starvation. ONLY THEN would a movement upon a line of communications, such as Pemberton hoped to achieve from the 13th on, bear fruit...

Johnston was also a veteran of Scott's campaign in Mexico....

 

[JohnG0609]

Pemberton's intent was

We know the intent. I wish to know your thoughts on that intent based on the intelligence documents from my first post. If you make a timeline of the intelligence products: by the morning of the 15th (when the movement was ordered) the intelligence upon which the intent was made was at least 24 hours old, and certainly by the morning of the 16th (when the movement was to continue) it was now 48 hours old. How do you interpret this? Would you think the movement still propriotous based on outdated, obsolete intelligence?

 

[RedRover]

We know the intent. I wish to know your thoughts on that intent based on the intelligence documents from my first post. If you make a timeline of the intelligence products: by the morning of the 15th (when the movement was ordered) the intelligence upon which the intent was made was at least 24 hours old, and certainly by the morning of the 16th (when the movement was to continue) it was now 48 hours old. How do you interpret this? Would you think the movement still propriotous based on outdated, obsolete intelligence?

The information seems somewhat accurate enough. Shows Grant was by-passing Pemberton's principal positions about Edwards and moving eastward toward Jackson. His idea to stop him was not to attack his flank or rear, or get ahead of him in front of Jackson, but to "cut" a line of communications in his rear (one that didn't exist).

Pemberton says he was seeking Grant's "line of communications" and not his army. He wanted to know where Grant's forces were going, in order to choose the point at which to lay his force across a line of communications, well in Grant's rear in a practically undefended point. I think that he had no concern about Grant's increasing distance from Dillon's, and presumed The further away Dillon's was from the rear of Grant's force the better. The greater that distance the more time for Pemberton to reach and dig in at Dillon's on what he thought was Grant's line of communications... where he presumed Grant would be forced to back track to attack him or retreat for the Mississippi...


Meanwhile Johnston wanted Pemberton to move to attack the rear of Grant's forces as they closed on Jackson, etc. To use actual FORCE to force Grant's movements or concentration if possible, rather than relying upon merely "strategic" ideas.

The planning and attempted execution of the movement by Pemberton were wastes of time. Had Pemberton himself not arrested them before placing his army at Dillon's, I think he would have been subject to even more criticism than has been attached to him.
Pemberton gambled and invested precious time and resources to that false movement, which even he admits was rather "disastrous." His only significant excuse (as you quote from his manuscript) being that at least he did not follow Johnston's instructions. Not much of an explanation really.


In fairness to Pemberton, had he more aggressively moved eastward toward Jackson to get ahead of or block Grant's movement there (even before Johnston's arrival), instead of attempting to operate in his rear (on his presumed line of communications)... Grant might have just advanced upon Edwards, between him and Vicksburg, etc.

That said, had Pemberton employed his intelligence to advance toward Grant's rear for a general Battle nearer Jackson, in conjunction with Johnston's forces, that battle, and Vicksburg, might have been lost anyway. I would just observe that in that case perhaps less odium would have accrued to Pemberton; recalling Hood fought desperate losing battles around Atlanta, but lost the city, without a tremendous public outcry against him requiring his shelving.

 

[tony_gunter]

On 5/13 Pemberton ordered Loring to perform a reconnaissance to "to find out where the main force" of the enemy was. That's bad enough of an admission, on its own, that Pemberton was not competent. How do you lose a whole **** enemy army in your own back yard?

Loring conducted the reconnaissance and reported that the enemy had moved beyond Edward's Depot, on the Raymond road and by 8pm Loring reported that the enemy was marching on Jackson and that he thinks, "there can be no doubt of this."

On 5/14 Johnston reported enemy in Clinton, 4 divisions, and Adams reported that the enemy had at 0300 made a demonstration upon Bolton.

On 5/15 Loring reported that his scouts had reported in and that on 05/13 and 05/14 had observed the enemy had moved to Raymond and that Smith's division, who they had been watching at Baldwin's Ferry, had moved back in the direction of Raymond via Dillon's. I conclude that Smith would have been well beyond Dillon's when Pemberton ordered the march on Dillon's to begin at 0800, 05.15. Loring went even further and stated he believed that only two regiments would be currently "at or about Dillon's," on the 15th.

In the face of this intelligence, the order to move to Dillon's was at least 24 hours late on the 15th and certainly that late by the morning of the 16th.

I can see no military reason to have issued this order. The intel speaks for itself. It defies even common logic, much less military logic. In "Compelled..." Pemberton unintentionally admitted that the order to move on Dillon's was based in uncertainty by saying he "had hoped to encounter..." the enemy (pp 114)

Why would Pemberton persist in this delusion and make this order when the intelligence is so clear?

View attachment 559178

I think his Compelled story is fudging the truth, because it roughly complies with Johnston's suggestion that he break the enemy's line of communication.

I think in reality he was fixated on making Grant turn back by attacking the rear of his army wherever it may be. If Johnston was resisting the occupation of Jackson, potentially Pemberton could relieve him by engaging the other end of his army.

Which makes Johnston's decision to abandon Jackson without notifying Pemberton of the decision a critical mistake.

 

[JohnG0609]

I think in reality he was fixated on making Grant turn back by attacking the rear of his army wherever it may be.

That's fair. And explains what he intended on doing. I'm asking why in the face of the intelligence, now 24-72 hours obsolete, did he give the order to move for the purposes he stated, attack the enemy he admitted to saying he hoped would be there. It makes no military sense, violates numerous principles of war, and defies common logic. I could see a move on the morning of 15th. By the afternoon when they finally traversed Raymond Road and most certainly by the morning of the 16th it was derelict in the extreme to start a march without any Priority Intelligence Reports (PIRs).

 

[tony_gunter]

That's fair. And explains what he intended on doing. I'm asking why in the face of the intelligence, now 24-72 hours obsolete, did he give the order to move for the purposes he stated, attack the enemy he admitted to saying he hoped would be there. It makes no military sense, violates numerous principles of war, and defies common logic. I could see a move on the morning of 15th. By the afternoon when they finally traversed Raymond Road and most certainly by the morning of the 16th it was derelict in the extreme to start a march without any Priority Intelligence Reports (PIRs).

Maybe you could call the movement east a reconnaissance in force

 

[JohnG0609]

reconnaissance in force

lol. I've got a few things I'd call it and reconnaissance ain't one of them. Although at the end I'd have to say "pardon my French!"